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A B S T R A C T 
With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States Navy 
has seen the fleet shrink from nearly 600 ships in 1988 to 
320 ships in 1999, with a planned reduction to 305 ships by 
2004. While the fleet has been reduced by nearly 50 percent 
over the last decade, the deployment of U.S. naval forces 
has continued at near-Cold War levels. The result is a 
mismatch between the national security requirements that 
naval forces are called on to support, and the forces 
available to meet those requirements. Some have suggested 
that the traditional forward presence mission of the Navy-
Marine Corps team is no longer relevant in the post-Cold War 
environment. Others suggest that "virtual presence" through 
space surveillance and global air power can replace the 
physical presence of naval forces. Still others have 
advocated a return to an isolationist policy, forgoing 
military presence altogether. Although U.S. naval forces 
are no longer required to counter the threat of Soviet 
aggression, possible peer or near-peer competitors, such as 
Russia and China, combined with emerging regional powers, 
require that the United States maintain forces in areas near 
U.S. interests. This thesis will examine the continued 
importance of maintaining a strong naval presence in the 
three principal areas of U.S. interest--the Mediterranean 
Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia--and the inability 
to meet U.S. national security requirements with proposed 
alternatives to forward presence. Also covered will be new 
systems and operational concepts of the Navy-Marine Corps 
team, and their importance to the forward presence mission. 
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Their strength lay in the greatness of their navy, and by 
that and that alone they gained their empire. 
--Alcibiades 
Without a respectable Navy--alas America! 
--John Paul Jones 
Navies are not all for war. 
--Matthew Fontaine Maury 
Navies do not dispense with fortifications or armies, but 
when wisely handled they may save a country the strain 
which comes when these have to be called into play. 
--Alfred Thayer Mahan 
The whole principle of naval fighting is to be free to 
go anywhere with every damned thing the Navy owns. 
--Admiral Sir John Fisher 
Thank God for the U.S. Navy! 
--Major General "Gee" Gerow, Commander, U.S. V Corps, 
message to General Bradley, 
evening of 06 June 1944 
Any man who may be asked what he did to make his life 
worthwhile can answer with a good deal of pride and 
satisfaction: I served in the United States Navy. 
--John F. Kennedy 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Navy has long been the principal 
guardian of American security beyond the nation's borders. 
While the United States Army and Air Force play vital roles 
in America's defense, the Navy has been protecting American 
interests abroad since the earliest days of the Republic, 
and is uniquely capable of fulfilling this vital role today. 
From sending a squadron to the Mediterranean in 1801 to 
deter the Barbary states from preying on U.S. commerce, to 
escorting the tools of war across the Atlantic in World War 
Two, to escorting Kuwaiti tankers in 1987, the Navy has 
always been a global force, capable of projecting American 
power into any area of the world accessible by sea. 
For most of the post-World War Two era, the Navy was 
focused, as were all branches of the U.S. military, on the 
threat posed by the Soviet Union. From 1947 until 1991, the 
Soviet Union drove virtually every aspect of U.S. defense 
planning. The Red Banner Fleet formed the overriding 
concern of the Navy, which would be tasked primarily with 
keeping the sea lanes to Europe open in the event of a 
Warsaw Pact-NATO war. With the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, the United States has (happily) found itself without 
1 
a plausible challenger. However, the importance of the 
Navy's traditional forward presence mission has not declined 
in the post-Cold War environment. If anything, the 
importance of naval forward presence has grown. 
U.S. interests are global in scope. Interests range 
from vital, including such interests as access to energy and 
the associated freedom of the seas, to very important, such 
as protecting U.S. allies from significant external 
aggression, to just important, including preventing or 
terminating conflicts that do not threaten the United States 
directly. 1 Almost all of America's interests have one 
common feature, however: they are not to be found, nor can 
they be protected, within the borders of the United States. 
It follows naturally that threats to U.S. interests also are 
global, as threats occur in proximity to interests. 
Instead of a readily identifiable threat, such as was 
posed by the Soviet Union, the nation and the Navy in the 
post-Cold War world face uncertainty as to the origin of 
threats to U.S. interests. Accordingly, the United States 
has adopted a security strategy focused on specific regions 
in which U.S. interests are to be found. The National 
Military Strategy (NMS) focuses on regional security, most 
1The interests of the United States differ from author 
to author or from committee to committee. The examples 
listed here come from Robert Ellsworth et al., eds., 
America's National Interests, a report by the Commission on 
America's National Interests, July 1996. 
2 
notably in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. The 
strategy--Shape, Respond, Prepare Now--attempts to shape 
events in order to maintain regional security, while 
responding to crises when they occur. 2 It is in meeting 
these two aims of the NMS--shaping and responding--that 
forward-deployed U.S. naval forces, consisting of the Navy 
and Marine Corps, are uniquely capable. 
In order to protect global national interests, the 
military forces of the United States must be global as well. 
That is, they must be capable of deploying to and operating 
from any location on Earth where American interests are 
threatened. It is in these criteria--global mobility, along 
with global sustainability--that forward-deployed naval 
forces render the greatest utility to defense planners. 
Despite arguments to the contrary, the importance of the 
forward presence mission of U.S. naval forces has not 
diminished since the breakup of the Soviet Union--nor will 
it. As long as U.S. interests are located overseas, the 
forward presence mission of the Navy-Marine Corps team will 
remain an inherent feature of U.S. defense planning.3 
2National Military strategy of the United states of 
America 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1997) . 
3colin Gray, The Navy In the Post-Cold War World 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1994), 163. "Relative decline or not, it is the case that 
the U.S. role as the essential leader for the undertaking of 
international peace and security duties is as plain as it 
3 
The forward presence of U.S. naval forces serves to 
protect global U.S. interests in both the near-term and the 
long-term. In the near-term, the presence of U.S. naval 
forces serves to deter aggression, promote lawful behavior 
on the seas, and provide a signal of U.S. preparedness to 
protect interests. Many nations around the world view U.S. 
naval forces as a valuable and appreciated instrument of 
regional security, embodying the concept of "benevolent 
hegemony." In the long-term, the presence of U.S. naval 
forces serves to strengthen ties with allies, at both the 
military and diplomatic levels. Annual exercises such as 
COBRA GOLD (U.S.-Thailand) and RIMPAC (U.S.-Japan, South 
Korea), as well as port visits by U.S. ships, serve both to 
maintain military interoperability and to strengthen the 
political ties between the United States and allies around 
the world. 
Why is naval forward presence superior to that of land-
based forces, whether Army or Air Force? The attractiveness 
of naval forward presence derives from the salient features 
of naval forces in general, and of forward-deployed naval 
forces in particular. Naval forces are less obtrusive to 
other nations that may desire U.S. presence, but have 
ever was .... The detail of naval power, deployment, and 
action varies dramatically from era to era; but the 
structure of the strategic demand for effectiveness at and 
from the sea does not alter from decade to decade, or even 
from century to century." 
4 
political or religious reasons for avoiding large numbers of 
U.S. servicemen on their territory. The physical occupation 
of Kuwait by Iraq was required to overcome Muslim-Christian 
friction in Saudi Arabia's security thinking, for example. 4 
Also, because naval forces operate in international 
waters, they are free to come and go without the host nation 
permission needed for land-based forces. With the ability 
to sustain themselves at sea for extended periods, naval 
forces can be moved to a crisis area and maintained there, 
free from basing or transit constraints, allowing U.S. 
policy-makers time to attempt peaceful resolution. Naval 
forces are inherently quick to respond to crises, due to 
proximity to problem areas and the speed with which normal 
peacetime operations can transition to combat operations. 
Because naval forces have a lower profile among the 
populations of regional actors, the political impact of 
their arrival or departure may be less than that of ground-
based forces. American troops or aircraft often are magnets 
for local attention. The Khobar Towers bombing is a tragic 
example of the animosity sometimes caused by the presence of 
U.S. troops on another nation's territory. By virtue of 
their location offshore, naval forces can avoid many of the 
political problems of land forces, and can adjust their 
4The Future of U.S. Sea Power. U.S. Army War College 
Report of the Fourth Annual Conference on Strategy, May 
1993: 27. 
5 
level of visibility as dictated by the situation. Naval 
forces can take position close to the twelve-mile limit of 
international waters, or remain over the horizon, "out of 
sight but not out of mind." For this same reason, their 
departure may be less traumatic to local nations than the 
departure of land-based forces. 
Additionally, two emerging features of the 
international environment dictate the need for forces that 
can be on-scene anywhere, and respond quickly to protect 
U.S. interests. The first feature is the increasing 
incidence of emergency evacuations of U.S. or allied 
civilians from areas of impending or occurring violence. 
Known as Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), this 
mission demands the attributes possessed by the Marine 
Corps: ability to deploy in close proximity to crisis areas, 
mobility overland from the sea, forcible entry capability, 
and organic firepower support if needed. 
The second emerging feature is the growing emphasis on 
ballistic missiles in world militaries, particularly the 
militaries of potential adversaries. Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea, the three nations mentioned in the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) as potential sources of regional conflict, 
have advanced ballistic missile capability. 5 If used to 
5william Clinton, A National Security strategy of 
Enqaqement and Enlarqement 1995-1996 (Washington, D.C.: 
Brassey's, 1995); The Proliferation Primer. Report by the 
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and 
6 
attack regional port or airfield facilities, especially with 
chemical or biological weapons, ballistic missiles could 
prevent U.S. forces from deploying into a region in the 
event of a major, short-warning crisis, such as the 1990 
invasion of Kuwait. 
By providing theater missile defense (TMD) capability, 
forward-deployed naval forces would be positioned to defend 
regional facilities, U.S. and allied forces, and regional 
populations at the outset of a crisis, rather than having to 
be flown into the region. This TMD capability would be 
independent of host nation access, since it would be based 
at sea. The two naval TMD programs currently underway, 
Upper Tier and Lower Tier, are designed around the Aegis 
radar system on existing Ticonderoga-class cruisers and 
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. These Aegis ships are 
constantly deployed around the world, as part of carrier 
battle groups (CVBG), amphibious ready groups (ARG), or 
surface action groups (SAG). As such, they would allow 
constant TMD coverage of critical regional facilities, with 
the ability to increase the number of Aegis ships quickly in 
times of crisis. 
Finally, the inherent mobility of naval forces, which 
are able to come and go as they please in international 
Federal Services, January 1998. 
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waters, means that the deployment and re-deployment of naval 
forces requires nothing more than the orders of the National 
Command Authority (NCA). No agreements are needed with host 
nations prior to the deployment of naval forces, nor are 
political or military negotiations required for their 
removal. 
When naval forces arrive on station, their organic 
logistics and ability to replenish at sea provide long 
endurance. This mobility and sustainability allowed 
Amphibious Squadron 4 (PhibRon Four) to maintain station off 
the coast of Liberia from 2 June 1990 to 6 August 1990, at 
which time the embarked 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
conducted an emergency evacuation of over sixteen hundred 
American, Spanish, Swiss, and German civilians from the U.S. 
Embassy in Monrovia.6 
For all of the reasons provided here, naval forward 
presence is the preferred method of using military 
capability to protect American global interests. The 
qualities of mobility, flexibility, sustainability, 
independence from host permission to come and go, ability to 
increase or decrease visibility as required, ability to 
transition from peacetime operations to combat operations on 
short notice, and ability to respond rapidly to crises make 
6Lt. Colonel T.W. Parker, "Operation Sharp Edge," 
Proceedinqs (May 1991): 102. 
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forward-deployed naval forces one of the most important 
features of U.S. defense planning. 
As important as the naval forward presence mission is, 
it is important to be clear about what it is not intended 
for. Naval forward presence is neither capable of 
protecting every U.S. interest, nor resolving every crisis. 
Preventing genocide in the former Yugoslavia, for example, 
or preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction within a region are interests that naval forces 
have little ability to influence. Also, naval presence 
forces are not meant to fight regional wars by themselves, 
as they lack the sustained land power of the Army or the 
sustained high sortie rates of Air Force land-based 
aircraft. 7 
Instead, forward presence forces serve a function 
similar to the policeman walking a beat. Keeping a watchful 
eye on conditions in a region, maintaining law and order on 
the seas, deterring aggression through physical presence, 
re-assuring regional allies of U.S. interest in their 
7Land-based forces, whether Army or Air Force, are 
required in Korea and Europe as much for political reasons 
as military reasons. In Korea, the Eighth Army provides an 
unambiguous signal of U.S. commitment to an important ally, 
while U.S. Army forces in Europe serve to maintain the 
United States' leadership position in NATO. See Bradford 
Dismukes, National security strateqy and Forward Presence: 
Implications for Acquisition and Use of Forces (Alexandria, 
VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), 4. 
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safety, responding quickly when U.S. or allied civilians are 
in danger, maintaining the capability to head off many 
crises before they erupt into war--these are the primary 
functions of forward-deployed naval forces. 8 
A second, and equally important, function of naval 
forward presence is to enable the introduction of land and 
air power into a region if deterrence fails, and the United 
States must employ military force. The Navy has the ability 
to conduct strikes ashore, but cannot seize or hold 
territory. The Marines can seize discrete pieces of 
territory, but lack the heavy equipment necessary to engage 
in sustained heavy fighting. Thus the Army must be 
transported into the region if significant ground combat is 
anticipated. Likewise, Navy carrier air wings are limited 
in their ability to generate sortie rates, resulting in 
fewer missions per plane over time than land-based aircraft. 
For a sustained air campaign, the Air Force is the service 
of choice, and must be transported into the region. 
8Jan Breemer describes these short-of-major-war 
activities as "The U.S. Navy and Marines' specialty." See 
"Naval Strategy Is Dead," Proceedings (February 1994): 49; 
Bradford Dismukes provides a similar commentary:" Presence--
deploying and operating forces forward to influence, short 
of war, what foreign governments think and do--plays a 
crucial role in a national security strategy of 'engagement 
and enlargement'." See Bradford Dismukes "The U.S. Military 
Strategy Abroad," Strategic Review (Spring 1995): 49. 
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This comprises the second function of forward presence: 
"holding the door open" for the deployment of land-based 
combat power from the continental United States (CONUS) to a 
region of crisis. Although soldiers can be flown in from 
CONUS, their heavy equipment and supplies must be delivered 
by ship. 9 Before this can happen, the sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs) must be rendered safe for the passage 
of sea lift ships. Air Force aircraft can fly in to 
regional airfields, but must have air cover until they have 
built up sufficient assets and logistics to protect 
themselves. Finally, in the future it will be necessary to 
protect regional facilities from ballistic missile attack, 
requiring TMD capability at the outset of a crisis. Naval 
forward presence satisfies the conditions needed for the 
deployment of CONUS-based land and air power, and can do so 
without the need for foreign permission or access. 
If naval forces are to continue to meet the national 
security requirements of the forward presence mission, the 
force structure of the Navy and Marine Corps will require 
careful assessment and adjustment. While the size of the 
Navy's fleet has nearly been halved since 1988, the tempo of 
normal peacetime operations has hardly decreased at all, 
9During the build-up for Desert Storm, for example, 
approximately 95 percent of all equipment and supplies were 
delivered to the Gulf region by sea. See Greg Weaver and 
David Glaes, Inviting Disaster: How Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Undermine u.s. strategy for Projecting Military 
Power (McLean, VA: AMCODA Press, 1997. 
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while crisis interventions have increased over the last 
decade. The result is easy to predict: a heavy strain on 
Navy and Marine Corps personnel and equipment, as 
operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) 
continue to produce wear and tear on servicemen and their 
equipment. Correcting this imbalance between mission 
requirements and force structure represents one of the 
greatest challenges facing the sea services. 
Additionally, the Navy and Marine Corps are at a 
transition period in terms of modernizing their equipment. 
The Marine Corps in particular suffers from rapidly 
approaching obsolescence of many of its systems, such as the 
CH-46E helicopters used for vertical insertion of MEU forces 
and the AAV7 amphibious landing vehicle. The Navy has begun 
work on the next-generation surface combatant, as well as a 
new class of amphibious ship, the LPD-17. As mentioned 
previously, two TMD programs are underway, with a projected 
deployment of the more crucial Upper-Tier system slated for 
2006. Lower-Tier, which is a point defense system, will 
begin a User Operational Evaluation System in 1999. 10 
Finally, the Navy is in the beginning stages of 
developing Network-Centric Warfare (NCW), an information-
based warfighting concept similar to the Army's Task Force 
10vision. Presence. Power: A Proqram Guide to the u.s. 
Navy 1998 Edition (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 
1998), 74. 
12 
xxr. 11 When combined with the current austere defense 
budget, continuing uncertainty about the international 
setting, and the need to replace aging systems, both the 
Navy and Marine Corps clearly face challenges in maintaining 
an appropriate force structure. 
It should not be surprising that alternatives to 
forward presence have been proposed as strategies for U.S. 
national security. For reasons of financial constraint, 
inter-service rivalry, differing philosophies of 
international relations, and other reasons, many different 
proposals have been advanced in the past. Three 
alternatives will be addressed in this thesis. The first is 
a withdrawal of most U.S. forces to CONUS, with the ability 
to deploy those forces overseas in a crisis. The second 
alternative is the use of long-range air power, embodied in 
the B-2 bomber, combined with space-based surveillance to 
monitor threats. The third alternative is a return to a 
1940-style isolationist policy, in which American forces 
would be responsible for little more than the physical 
integrity of the United States.12 
llMark Hanna, "Task Force XXI: The Army's Digital 
Experiment," Strategic Forum 119 (July 1997): 1-4; Vice 
Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Gartska. "Network-Centric 
Warfare: Its Origin and Future," Proceedinqs (January 1998): 
28. 
12william Odom, "Transforming the Military," Foreign 
Affairs (July/August 1997): 55; James Canan, "Airpower From 
Home Base," Air Force Magazine (June 1994): 20; Patrick 
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Each of the alternatives has champions that advocate 
reducing or eliminating naval forward presence as a means of 
protecting American interests. Especially among Air Force 
proponents, the alternative of global air power combined 
with space surveillance has great currency. However, it is 
the position of this thesis that none of the alternatives 
satisfy the requirements of protecting global interests, 
while simultaneously shaping the security environment in the 
manner that naval forward presence does. 
This thesis will examine the continued relevance of the 
Navy-Marine Corps team's forward presence mission in the 
post-Cold War world. Chapter II will examine and classify 
the interests of the United States as the twenty-first 
century approaches. It is not the purpose of Chapter II to 
debate and develop a comprehensive list of U.S. interests, 
but rather to provide a broad description of U.S. interests, 
from which will be drawn the specific interests supported by 
naval forward presence. Special emphasis will be given to 
the three "hubs" of major significance to the United States: 
the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf/North Arabian Sea, and 
Northeast Asia.13 
Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," .T.h.e. 
National Interest (Spring 1990): 77. 
13Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward 
Presence: Implications for Acquisition and Use of Forces, 
26. "The presence of U.S. forces forward in East Asia, 
Europe, and the Gulf--and not elsewhere--is a reflection of 
14 
After presenting the national interests supported by 
naval forward presence, this chapter will examine existing 
and possible future threats to the security of those 
interests. Again, the primary focus will be on the 
Mediterranean, the Gulf, and Northeast Asia. 
Chapter III will examine the nature of the forward 
presence mission. Specific force postures and/or 
operational plans are not intended. Rather, the advantages 
provided by constant naval presence in areas of interest 
will be described. The enabling function of naval power, 
which makes possible all military strategies outside CONUS, 
will be examined, as will the visual signal provided to 
friends and foes alike of U.S. interest in the region. The 
concept of conventional deterrence, and the age-old practice 
of naval ("gunboat") diplomacy will be covered, with 
emphasis on the flexibility and scalability of naval forces. 
Crisis response is one of the most important tasks of 
forward-deployed forces, and accordingly will receive in-
depth treatment. Finally, the ability to re-assure allies 
the primacy of these regions in the national strategy 
today." Jerome Kahan and Jeffrey Sands, Alternative Naval 
Deployment concepts: Demand for Deployed Naval Forces 1992-
~ (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1991), 1-2. 
"In the mid-1990s, despite the fact that the Soviet threat 
has largely receded, the traditional crucial deployment 
areas or "hubs" where U.S. interests will lie remain 
essentially where they have been for decades--the 
Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf/North Arabian Sea, and the 
Northern Pacific." 
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of our intention to support them, the opportunities provided 
for training with allies, and the familiarization of U.S. 
forces with the theater will conclude Chapter III. 
Chapter IV will examine the various issues of force 
structure and systems, from which capabilities derive. 
Included will be the new littoral focus in Navy-Marine Corps 
thinking, concepts for new surface combatants, the possible 
future (or lack of a future) of aircraft carriers, the new 
LHD-1 and LPD-17 amphibious ships, emerging mine 
countermeasures ships and capabilities (MCM), and emerging 
naval surface fire support (NSFS) programs, which are 
increasingly important in the new littoral focus. Theater 
missile defenses are perhaps the most important conventional 
system in the Navy's immediate future. Lower Tier, a 
relatively short-range endo-atmospheric point defense 
system, and Upper Tier, a long-range exo-atmospheric system, 
will be addressed. Completing Chapter IV will be coverage 
of Network-Centric Warfare. 
Chapter V will examine in turn the alternatives to 
naval forward presence. A CONUS-based military, with 
deployments only in times of crisis, is the first such 
alternative. Global air power combined with space 
surveillance--Billy Mitchell rides again--is the second 
alternative, and will receive somewhat more emphasis due to 
the wealth of literature extolling its virtues. The option 
16 
of withdrawing from the events of the world, and adopting a 
policy of isolationism, will conclude Chapter V. 
Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the information 
presented in the body of the thesis, with observations on 
the Navy-Marine Corps team and the forward presence mission 
in the twenty-first century. 
17 
CHAPTER II 
AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THREATS 
This chapter will address U.S. national interests, and 
threats to those interests. After examining the broad range 
of U.S. interests, the individual interests that can be 
protected with naval forward presence will be described, 
including interests specific to the Mediterranean, the 
Persian Gulf/North Arabian Sea, and Northeast Asia. 
Finally, existing and projected threats to American 
interests will be presented. 
U.S. National Interests 
U.S. defense policy derives from national interests, 
and the need to protect U.S. interests. After interests are 
identified and ranked, the kinds of protection required can 
be determined. Finally, from a determination that military 
capabilities are required to protect an interest, the 
specific military capabilities and missions needed can be 
established. The forward presence mission is no different 
in this regard than any other mission of the armed forces. 
The national security requirement for forward presence 
arises from the need to maintain military force in proximity 
to far-flung U.S. interests. 
18 
The process of identifying and ranking U.S. interests 
is subject to different perspectives on the U.S. role in the 
world, differing theories of international relations, 
personal preference, political preference, and a variety of 
other factors. In reading several different works on U.S. 
national interests, the nature and order of interests likely 
will differ from one work to the next, as different authors 
place different value on interests. Accordingly, the 
national interests set forth in the following pages 
represent a combination of several different works, as well 
as this author's judgment.14 
When considering national interests, it is natural that 
interests should occupy differing positions of importance. 
In this thesis, U.S. interests will be categorized as Vital, 
Very Important, and Just Important. Vital interests 
represent interests that are fundamental to the safety and 
prosperity of the nation, and for which the United States 
should be willing to go to war if threatened. Very 
Important interests are not fundamental to the safety and 
prosperity of the nation, but do have a significant impact 
1 4The specific sources used to produce the national 
interests set forth in this thesis are: Ellsworth et al., 
America's National Interests; Kim Holmes and Thomas Moore, 
eds., Restoring American Leadership: A u.s. Foreign and 
Defense Policy Blueprint (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage 
Foundation, 1996); William S. Cohen, Report of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 1997). 
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on American safety and prosperity. While military force may 
not be the preferred method of dealing with threats to Very 
Important interests, nonetheless the nation may decide that 
these interests are worth fighting for. Finally, Just 
Important interests are interests that have a noticeable 
impact on American safety or prosperity, but often are not 
worth resorting to military force to protect. The result of 
threats to Just Important interests may be inconvenient for 
American prosperity, or may impinge on American moral 
sensibilities, but likely will not affect U.S. safety or 
prosperity in any lasting way. The decision on how to 
resolve threats to Just Important interests will depend on 
the specific circumstances of the situation, but often will 
not involve the use of military force. 
The Vital Interests of the United States include: 
• Maintaining the physical safety of American territory. 
• Protecting the lives and safety of U.S. citizens. 
• Maintaining freedom of the seas. 
• Preventing the emergence of a hostile peer or near-peer 
competitor in Europe or Asia. 
• Maintaining access to resources. 
• Preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in the 
Persian Gulf or in Asia. 
• Preserving the safety and security of strategically 
important allies. 
20 
These Vital interests are presented only in a general 
order of priority, except for the first two interests, which 
must take priority over all others. Freedom of the seas 
likewise must come third, but the remaining Vital interests 
are sufficiently interrelated that ordering them is not 
necessary. 
The Very Important Interests of the United States 
include: 
• Deterring regional conflict in the Persian Gulf. 
• Deterring regional conflict in Northeast Asia. 
• Deterring regional conflict in Europe. 
• Maintaining the U.S.-Japan security relationship. 
• Maintaining the U.S.-South Korea security relationship. 
• Maintaining U.S. access to and use of space. 15 
• Promoting international adherence to law and order. 
15rt is worth noting, although beyond the scope of this 
thesis, that access to space may soon be elevated to a Vital 
interest. Indeed, among military planners of all services, 
the level of dependence on space assets for surveillance, 
communications, early warning, and positional information is 
so high that many likely would place access to space in the 
list of Vital interests today, let alone in the future. See 
George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power. 
Technoloqy. and American Dominance in the 21st Century (New 
York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1996); Gray, The Navy in the 
Post-Cold War World; Daniel Goure and Christopher Szara, 
eds., Air and Space Power in the New Millennium (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997); 
Cohen, Report of the ouadrennial Defense Review, section 3; 
Commander Randy Bowdish and Commander Bruce Woodyard, "Space 
Is An Ocean," unpublished U.S. Navy briefing produced by 
OPNAV N513, Strategy and Concepts Branch, 1998. 
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• Preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical {NBC) weapons. 
• Stopping or reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the 
United States. 
The Very Important interests also are presented without 
regard to relative order, as no one interest can easily be 
judged more important than another. However, deterring 
regional conflict strongly suggests itself as an interest 
primus inter pares. 
Finally, the Just Important Interests of the United 
States include: 
• Promoting democracy abroad, especially among U.S. allies. 
• Preventing or stopping conflict in regions of lesser 
importance. 
• Undertaking humanitarian relief operations. 
• Promoting and following sound environmental policies. 
Just Important interests are more likely than Vital or 
Very Important interests to be removed from considerations 
of employing military force. Sound environmental policy, 
for example, is very unlikely as a cause of U.S. military 
involvement. 16 Nonetheless, the interests listed are valid 
security concerns, albeit only Just Important. 
16But not to be ruled out completely. For example, 
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As mentioned in Chapter I, naval forward presence 
forces are not intended to protect every U.S. national 
interest. For example, maintaining the physical safety of 
American territory is the mission of all of the armed 
forces, and cannot be apportioned to naval forces alone. 
While naval forward presence supports maintaining the 
physical safety of the United States, this interest is too 
broad to be assigned to a single military mission. 
Similarly, stopping or reducing the flow of illegal drugs 
into the United States, while primarily a naval mission, is 
not a naval forward presence mission. 
Which of the national interests advanced in this 
chapter are protected by naval forward presence? While 
other interests may gain some form of protection or indirect 
benefit from naval forward presence, the interests that 
naval forward presence is tailored for are: freedom of the 
seas, maintaining access to resources, preserving the safety 
wholesale destruction of the Amazon rain forests with the 
approval of the local governments is a possible future cause 
to resort to military force. Another might be actions that 
degrade or destroy U.S. fishing grounds, a possibility 
demonstrated in 1998 by the 900-mile pursuit and forced 
boarding of a Chinese fishing boat, caught using illegal 
drift nets by the U.S. Coast Guard. Another possibility is 
actions that lead directly to unacceptable air pollution or 
acid rain affecting the United States. The recent forest 
fires in Indonesia and Florida are suggestive of the impact 
such air pollution can have on a society, necessitating the 
inclusion of environmental safety as a security interest of 
the United States. See James Thach III, "Prepared for Any 
Eventuality at Sea," Sea Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 
23. 
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and security of strategically important allies, and 
deterring regional conflict, especially in the Persian Gulf, 
the Mediterranean, and in Northeast Asia. 
Freedom of the seas 
From the earliest days of the United States, use of the 
sea has been crucial to American prosperity and security. 
It is not by chance or whim that the Constitution of the 
United States directs the Congress to "provide and maintain 
a Navy."17 The United States has always been a maritime 
trading nation. Even before the colonies declared their 
independence from Great Britain, sea-borne commerce formed 
the foundation of American life, and the Royal Navy served 
to protect trade upon the Atlantic ocean. 
The unalterable facts of geography compel the United 
States to look to the sea for trade with any nations other 
than Canada and Mexico. This was true in 1799, and it 
remains true in 1999. The ability to transport goods across 
the sea, in safety from capture or damage from hostile 
parties, has been the principal mission of the Navy since 
its birth: 
The interests of this nation demand free and 
unfettered use of the seas and its [.s..i.c.] resources 
subject to the rule of law. The ultimate purpose of 
the Navy is to gain, protect, or permit that use, and 
17constitution of the United states of America, Article 
I, Section 8. 
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the roles and missions go about achieving that 
purpose. 18 
Free and unfettered use of the seas remains as 
important today as at any time in the past. The great 
majority of American trade comes from imports or exports 
between the United States and overseas countries. Of the 
top fifteen destination countries for U.S. exports, thirteen 
lie across the Atlantic or Pacific oceans. Together these 
thirteen countries account for 266 billion dollars' worth of 
goods, representing 45.5 percent of all U.S. exports. The 
same is true of imports to the United States, which amount 
to 387 billion dollars' worth of goods and 52.1 percent of 
all imports.19 
Although trans-oceanic aircraft have made possible air 
delivery of goods, the cost of air transport makes this 
delivery method suitable only for high-value, time-sensitive 
products. 95 percent of all U.S. foreign trade in terms of 
tonnage travels by sea, representing 51 percent of foreign 
trade by value. 20 Until and unless the laws of gravity and 
aerodynamics undergo dramatic change, U.S. commerce will 
continue to be overwhelmingly maritime in nature. Ensuring 
18Harlan Ullman, In Harm's Way: American Seapower and 
the 21st Century (Silver Springs, MD: Bartley Press, 1991), 
135. 
19Holmes and Moore, Restoring American Leadership, 112-
113. See Appendix A, Tables 1 and 2 for a complete list of 
the top 15 importers and receivers of exports. 
20 rbid., 20. 
25 
freedom of the seas through forward presence thus is of 
tremendous importance to U.S. markets. 
In addition to U.S. commerce, the Navy has undertaken 
the protection of essentially all sea-borne trade since 
1945. Both through presence on and near the trade routes, 
and through a system of maritime and military alliances, 
U.S. naval protection of commercial shipping has helped to 
develop a global trade network. Linked globally to other 
nations by trade, with the gray hulls of American ships 
protecting their goods, both Western and Asian nations have 
developed closer and more peaceful ties through commercial 
interaction. North America, Western Europe, and East Asia 
today account for 75 percent of the world's gross product, 
and 80 percent of all international trade moves by sea, a 
situation made possible by the U.S. Navy's focus on freedom 
of the seas. 21 
The Earth's geography provides several locations that 
serve to constrict movement by sea. Some are natural 
features, while others are man-made. Freedom of passage 
through these chokepoints is of critical importance for 
merchant and military shipping. The five major chokepoints 
for maritime movement are the Strait of Gibraltar, the 
Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Panama Canal, 
21Lt. Col. Thomas c. Linn, "Naval Forces in the Post-
Cold War Era," Strategic Review (Fall 1992), 19. 
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and the Suez Canal.22 Of these, three--Hormuz, Malacca, and 
the Suez Canal--have strategic importance for the United 
States coupled with proximate and plausible threats of 
closure or interference. 
The Strait of Hormuz holds perhaps the greatest 
strategic significance to the United States of any body of 
water, large or small. Through this long, narrow channel 
passes 43 percent of the world's oil supply.23 The Strait 
is bordered on the north by Iran for all of its 
approximately one hundred-mile length, and shrinks to just 
thirty-three miles at its narrowest point. Iran also has 
possession of several islands in the Strait proper.2 4 
Abu Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, and Sirri 
Island provide Iran ideal interdiction positions among the 
shipping lanes, and all have been fortified with bunkers, 
anti-aircraft batteries, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and 
launching facilities for anti-ship missiles. The main 
22while these obviously are not all of the world's 
chokepoints, the five listed in this thesis represent 
chokepoints at or near the middle of major trade routes, 
involving time and cost penalties upon closure. The English 
Channel is perhaps the busiest confined seaway in the world, 
but is at the end of the major trans-Atlantic routes, 
allowing quicker and easier diversion to alternate European 
or English ports if the Channel were closed. 
23 The Strait of Hormuz: Global Shipping and Trade 
Implications in the Event of Closure. Report by the Office 
of Naval Intelligence, 1997, 11. 
24see Appendix A, Figure 1. 
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shipping channel through the Strait passes sufficiently 
close to these islands that even 155mm artillery would have 
enough range to be effective, and such "unconventional" 
weapons have indeed been deployed to Abu Musa.2 5 Not 
surprisingly, the Strait of Hormuz has been the scene of 
recent conflict between U.S. Navy ships enforcing freedom of 
the seas, and Iranian forces attempting to restrict 
passage. 26 
The Strait of Malacca is the second-busiest seaway in 
the world, trailing only the English Channel in annual 
transits. In 1993 over one-half of the world's merchant 
capacity, consisting of one-third of the world's merchant 
ships, passed through this very confined passage. 27 Malacca 
sits in the middle of the shipping route from the Middle 
East to East Asia, and sees particularly heavy shipment of 
25 For a detailed depiction of the fortifications and 
emplacements on Abu Musa, including a schematic diagram and 
aerial photographs, see Harold Hough, "Iranian Intentions: 
The Strait of Hormuz or Beyond?" Jane's Intelligence Review 
(October 1995): 454. 
26see Dexter Smith, "GCC Regional Security," marketing 
supplement in Defense News, 3-9 March 1997, 6; Anthony 
Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, 
vol. 2,The Iran-Iraq War (San Francisco: Westview Press, 
1990), 281; Admiral (Ret.) Wesley McDonald, "The Convoy 
Mission," Proceedings Naval Review (May 1988), 36; Ronald 
O'Rourke, "The Tanker War," Proceedings Naval Review (May 
1988), 30. 
27 John Noer, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in 
Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996. 
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crude oil to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 28 
The importance of the sea lines of communication passing 
through the Strait of Malacca and surrounding waters was 
demonstrated in 1995 by then-Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, who warned China and the Philippines that 
interruption of merchant shipping arising from a quarrel 
over the Spratley Islands would not be tolerated. 29 
The Suez Canal is a man-made chokepoint, connecting the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, thus providing an 
important shortcut between the Middle East and Europe. 
Although no longer a major trade route for Persian Gulf oil, 
the Suez Canal does carry a high proportion of time-
sensitive bulk cargoes destined for Europe. 30 
The Suez Canal retains strategic importance to the 
United States for the movement of Atlantic Fleet naval 
forces from their East Coast ports to the Persian Gulf, a 
trip shortened by about three thousand nautical miles (or 
28see Appendix A, Figure 2. 
29Noer, Chokepoints, 1. 
3
°For example, chemicals and machinery parts commonly 
transit the Suez Canal, due primarily to new "just-in-time" 
business logistics. Also, the emergence of very large crude 
carriers (VLCC) has seen much of Middle East oil shipments 
diverted around the Cape of Good Hope due to draft 
restrictions in the Canal. See The Suez Canal/ SUMED 
Complex; Global Shipping and Trade Implications in the Event 
of Closure. Report by the Office of Naval Intelligence, 
1997, ix, 7-8. 
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about six days' steaming time at twenty knots) compared to 
the route around Africa.31 In 1974 the United States agreed 
to support both the financial and manpower costs of clearing 
the Suez Canal of mines, removing ten sunken blockships, and 
removing unexploded ordnance left from the 1973 Yorn Kippur 
War. The operation lasted from April through December 1974, 
with a small U.S. contingent remaining in the area until the 
formal re-opening on 5 June 1975.32 
Maintaining freedom of the seas through these 
chokepoints, which are important for both commercial and 
military movement, is a difficult task given the location of 
potentially hostile forces directly astride the waterways. 
Nonetheless, the ships of the U.S. Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Fleets can be found preserving the right of free passage 
every day of the year. 
Access to Resources 
As a major industrialized nation, the United States has 
massive resource requirements. Most of America's 
industrialized trading partners have similar if smaller 
31 John Collins, Military Geoqraphy for Professionals 
and the Public (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1998), 240. 
Also, naval forces already deployed in the Mediterranean 
would see their normal 11-day transit time to the Persian 
Gulf increased to 26 days if forced to sail around Africa. 
The Suez canal I SUMED complex, 4. 
32captain J. Huntly Boyd, "Nimrod Spar: Clearing the 
Suez Canal," Proceedinqs (February 1976): 18. 
30 
requirements. Also, the emerging economies of East and 
South Asia have rapidly growing resource demands. Since the 
U.S. economy is affected by the economic status of our 
global trading partners, ensuring access to resources is 
important not just for the United States, but for much of 
the world. 
Among the resources needed for major industrial 
economies, oil is the primary requirement. Other resources, 
such as iron, chromium, and coal, are important to 
maintaining industrial nations' production, but oil holds 
unique status as a strategic resource.33 The Quadrennial 
Defense Review acknowledges the lasting importance of 
petroleum to the United States: "Access to oil will remain a 
U.S. national interest for the foreseeable future."34 
American interest in maintaining access to oil is well-
established. The United States is the world's leading 
consumer and importer of oil, rendering America vulnerable 
to interruptions in oil supply. In the past, American 
economic recessions have followed closely behind increases 
in oil prices, most notably in 1974, 1980, 1981-82, and 
1990-91. 35 Immediately following Iraq's 1990 invasion of 
33strait of Hormuz, ii: "Oil stands alone among the 
primary commodities in its ability to cause disruptive and 
costly economic consequences." 
34cohen, Quadrennial Defense Review, Section 2, page 1. 
35Holmes and Moore, Restorinq American Leadership, 22. 
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Kuwait, the cost of oil jumped from nineteen dollars per 
barrel to forty-two dollars per barrel, eventually costing 
the United States nearly 200 billion dollars in lost 
productivity over the next year. Worldwide economic losses 
over the same year are estimated at over one trillion 
dollars. 36 
The Persian Gulf is the principal location of 
recoverable oil, with more than two-thirds of known oil 
reserves and 43 percent of world oil production concentrated 
in the Gulf area. 37 Additionally, over 90 percent of the 
world's spare production capacity resides in the Gulf, as 
most non-Gulf oil producers operate at or near 100 percent 
capacity today. With projected increases in oil demand 
among Asian nations, and with other oil-producing regions 
unable to increase production to satisfy demand, Persian 
Gulf oil is predicted to provide 64 percent of world oil 
supply by 2010, representing 81 percent of the growth in oil 
consumption over the next decade.3 8 
The 1973 Arab oil embargo drove oil from $2.50 per barrel to 
over $10 per barrel, while the 1979 Iranian revolution 
resulted in a jump from $13 per barrel to $34 per barrel. 
36Maj. Gen. Edward Hanlon Jr., "Naval Expeditionary 
Warfare: Opening the Door," Surface Warfare (July/August 
1997), 7. 
37strait of Hormuz, 11, 61. 
38 rbid., 65, 27. 
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One-half of Persian Gulf production goes toward Asian 
oil demands, representing 83 percent of all Asian oil 
imports, while one-quarter of Persian Gulf oil goes toward 
European oil demands, representing 42 percent of all 
European oil imports.39 With such high dependence on 
Persian Gulf oil among world economic powers, closure or 
restriction of the Strait of Hormuz would be economically 
devastating: 
Any prolonged oil supply disruption caused by the 
closure of the Strait of Hormuz will have global 
economic consequences and cause severe disruption to 
the growing economies of East Asia as oil in the 
distribution system is exhausted. Except for Japan, 
they maintain no strategic security stockpile to 
guard against supply disruptions.4D 
Clearly the Gulf will continue to hold strategic 
importance to the United States in the future. While 
Caspian Sea oil appears to offer a possible new major supply 
of petroleum, the proven reserves of easily-extracted, high-
quality oil in the Persian Gulf will keep it foremost in 
importance, as indicated in Strateqic Assessment 1997: "The 
Persian Gulf will retain its preeminent status as the major 
source of excess oil capacity. 11 41 President Jimmy Carter 
39 rbid., iii. 
40 rbid., 24. 
41Hans Bennendjik and Patrick Clawson, eds., Strateqic 
Assessment 1997 (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1997), 88. 
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made clear the United States' interest in the Gulf in his 
State of the Union speech on 23 January 1980: 
Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of 
the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an 
assault on the vital interests of the United States 
of America and such an assault will be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force. 42 
Emphasizing the continued importance of access to the 
Gulf's resources in U.S. strategic planning was the 1 July 
1995 recommissioning of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, stationed at 
Bahrain.43 
In addition to oil, the U.S. defense industry is 
dependent on chromium, cobalt, and manganese, metals that 
are used in the production of high-quality alloys needed for 
military jet aircraft components. Although the United 
States is the leading consumer of these metals, none are 
produced by American mines. Instead, imports from South 
Africa, Zaire, and Zambia supply most U.S. demand for these 
metals. 44 Transported to the United States by ship, these 
strategic resources are available to the U.S. defense 
industry by virtue of freedom of the seas. 
42cited in First Lt. Philip Wasielewski, "Sea Power and 
Counterinsurgency," Proceedings (December 1986): 63. 
43vice Admiral John Scott Redd, "Fifth Fleet, 
Arriving," Proceedings (July 1997): 48. 
44Holmes and Moore, Restoring American Leadership, 22. 
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Safety of u.s. Allies 
One of the central concepts of U.S. security policy is 
to promote and protect the safety of U.S. allies, whether 
treaty allies such as the NATO nations, or informal allies 
such as Israel and Taiwan. In the past such protection has 
included the active defense of South Korea in 1950, 
assistance to Israel in 1973, escorting Kuwaiti tankers and 
policing the Strait of Hormuz in 1987, restoration of 
Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1991, and support for Taiwan in 1996. 
Absent a clear military threat to the United States itself, 
threats to allies are a major focus of U.S. thinking: 
The foremost regional danger to U.S. security is the 
continuing threat that hostile states with 
significant military power pose to allies and friends 
in key regions. Between now and 2015, it is 
reasonable to assume that more than one such aspiring 
regional power will have the motivation and the means 
to challenge U.S. interests militarily.45 
Key allies requiring U.S. military support today 
include Japan, South Korea, Israel, and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) members.46 Not surprisingly, the United 
States maintains military forces in or near each of these 
nations. 
45william Cohen, Secretary of Defense Annual Report to 
the President and the Conqress 1998 (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 1998), 2. 
46Binnendjik and Clawson, Strateqic Assessment 1997, 
57-68, 83-96, 97-106, 107-116. 
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The U.S.-Japan security alliance is judged by U.S. 
military leaders as, "the linchpin of our security strategy 
in Asia." 47 The disappearance of the Soviet threat to Japan 
has been replaced by China's emergence as a potential Asian 
power, making the continued defense commitment to Japan 
necessary. 48 Japan also is a top trading partner of the 
United states, trailing only Canada in annual import and 
export value.49 
In South Korea, the threat of North Korean aggression 
has kept American forces present since 1950. North Korea's 
large Army, well-developed ballistic missile capability, and 
NBC weapons make the North Korean-South Korean border one of 
the most likely sites of future armed conflict. In addition 
to the United States' long-standing political commitment to 
South Korea's safety, the South's growing economic strength 
and movement toward the principles of democratic government 
make defending South Korea a lasting U.S. interest. 50 
47 The United States Security Strateqy for the East 
Asia-Pacific Region 1998. Report by the Department of 
Defense, last updated 25 November 1998. Downloaded from 
Defenselink at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/easr98/. 
48Peter Rodman, America Adrift (Washington, D.C.: Nixon 
Center for Peace and Freedom, 1996), 30. 
49Holmes and Moore, Restoring American Leadership, 111-
112; Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997, 66. 
50 Ibid., 104. 
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In the Persian Gulf, the members of the GCC all require 
U.S. assistance, as their populations are too small to 
support large standing armies. 51 Even with the advanced 
modern arms purchased by the GCC states from Western nations 
over the last two decades, the threat posed by Iran and Iraq 
mandates that U.S. military forces be present to protect 
these allies. 
Israel occupies a unique position among U.S. allies. 
Although Israel provides little of the market value common 
to most other U.S. allies, and has shown itself more than 
capable of self-defense in the past, nonetheless Israeli 
security has remained a focus of U.S. foreign policy for 
decades. The United States' historical willingness to 
defend democratic states from aggression, combined with a 
powerful Jewish-American lobby, have kept Israel a close 
ally for over thirty years. 52 President Richard Nixon did 
not shy away from a possible U.S.-Soviet confrontation 
during the 1973 Yorn Kippur War, when elements of the Sixth 
Fleet were ordered to take positions from which they could 
51see Appendix A, Table 3 for a breakdown of the 
different Persian Gulf force levels. 
52see Charles Dittmer, "The United States and the State 
of Israel: A Critical Examination of U.S.-Israeli Relations 
Since 1981," master's thesis, Southwest Missouri State 
University, 1995. 
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block Soviet sea lift to Egypt, underscoring the importance 
placed on Israeli safety in U.S. foreign policy. 53 
In both South Korea and the GCC states of Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, the immediate threat posed by large, armor-heavy 
forces on these nations' borders requires the permanent 
presence of U.S. land forces, both to send the strongest 
possible signal of U.S. commitment and to back up that 
commitment with capability.54 These nations provide 
excellent examples of the need for land-based forces in some 
cases, underscoring the point that naval forces cannot meet 
every U.S. security concern. In South Korea and Kuwait, 
clearly only heavy land forces will do to protect U.S. 
interests. In each instance the tension caused by a large 
U.S. presence on the ground is outweighed by military 
necessity. However, the land forces in Korea and the Gulf 
are intended to confront a single threat in a specific 
location, and cannot easily or rapidly be re-deployed to 
react to other crises. 
53captain Kevin Jordan, "Naval Diplomacy in the Persian 
Gulf," Proceedings (November 1981): 29. 
54Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997, 
84, 88, 100. "The GCC states on their own are no match for 
either of their two powerful neighbors [Iran and Iraq]. Only 
a sustained U.S. military presence in the Gulf can redress 
the inherent military asymmetry ... Iraq still possesses a 
land force that is larger than and qualitatively superior to 
all the GCC states combined and Iran ... The large, heavily-
armed, and forward-deployed military forces of North Korea 
continue to pose a serious threat to South Korea and to U.S. 
forces stationed there." 
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The presence of U.S. naval forces also serves to 
express U.S. commitment to the safety of key allies. The 
fact that naval forces are routinely deployed to key areas, 
and therefore either present or close at hand if a crisis 
emerges, highlights one of the key roles of forward-deployed 
U.S. military forces: backing up U.S. diplomacy with 
capability. 55 When compared to land-based forces, naval 
forward presence offers the additional advantage of mobility 
and flexibility in supporting allies, as naval forces can 
move rapidly in response to crises. Naval forces, 
particularly carrier aircraft, would be especially vital in 
any military support to Israel due to access questions for 
land-based aircraft.56 
Deterrinq Reqional conflict 
Possibly the most important reason for maintaining the 
forward presence mission in the absence of the Soviet threat 
is the need to maintain stability in regions where U.S. 
55Dismukes, National Security Strateqy and Forward 
Presence, 39. "Words about forces are important, but they 
are a poor substitute for the forces themselves." 
56Former CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt: "In three of the 
four crises during my watch--Jordan, September 1970; India-
Pakistan, December 1971; Yorn Kippur War, October 1973--the 
U.S. Air Force was totally incapable of playing a role due 
to lack of access to airfields, and only carrier aviation 
could be brought to bear." See On Watch (New York: 
Quadrangle, 1976), 70. 
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interests are located. 57 Uncertainty about the origin of 
threats to U.S. interests is one of the defining features of 
the post-Cold War environment.58 In order to deter regional 
actors from aggressive moves that could threaten U.S. 
interests, U.S. military forces must be present and 
vigilant. 
Maintaining stability in key areas is important for 
several reasons. International trade can only continue when 
stability exists within a region, allowing the safe 
transport of goods. Conflict in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or 
the Mediterranean would impact on global trade, and would 
ripple through the U.S. economy even if U.S. forces were not 
involved. 
Asia currently is experiencing dramatic economic 
growth. Asia holds 40 percent of the world's purchasing 
power today, and it is predicted that Asia will contain four 
of the five largest economies in the world by 2020.59 As 
57 Jacquelyn Davis, Aircraft Carriers and the Role of 
Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century (Washington, D.C.: 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1991), 20. 
58Redd, "Fifth Fleet, Arriving,",51: "There always 
seems to be at least one additional crisis either in 
progress or simmering. These 'hot buttons' vary in intensity 
and location." 
59Daniel Goure and Dewey Mauldin, Naval Forward 
Presence: Present status, Future Prospects (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1997), 
6. 
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described previously, the Persian Gulf will remain a crucial 
location for the production and distribution of oil. 
Maintaining adherence to law and order, and avoiding 
conflict in these regions through deterrence, clearly is in 
the United States' best interest. 60 President Bush first 
recognized trade as a U.S. national security objective in 
1990, and regional stability is the key to economic 
intercourse. 61 
When it comes to maintaining stability in the key 
regions of the world, U.S. capability is indispensable. 
Many nations can upset the status quo in key regions; only 
the United States can maintain it. The primary reason for 
the United States' preeminent role in maintaining regional 
peace and security is the perception among other nations 
that the United States is a "fair broker", one that can be 
trusted to intervene fairly and evenly in confrontations. 62 
60Hans Binnendjik makes the obvious but important point 
that deterring wars is preferable to fighting them: "Three 
times between 1914 and 1950, neutrality or disengagement led 
America to major conflict. It is better to deter two major 
regional conflicts than to fight them." See "The Case for 
Forward Deployment," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995), 7. 
61National security strateqy of the United states 1990, 
cited in Bradford Dismukes and Commander Bradd Hayes, "The 
Med Remains Vital," Proceedings (October 1991): 46. 
62Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: Status. 
Prospects, 48. 
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A 1993 survey of U.S. embassy personnel in 
Mediterranean countries confirmed this position. Each 
embassy's team indicated that their host nation viewed U.S. 
presence as a desirable feature in the Mediterranean, one 
that served to deter conflict. 63 The same holds true in the 
Pacific. Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore, 
echoes the Mediterranean opinion: 
We have to accept the reality that there is no 
combination of forces in ASEAN that could stand up to 
a military confrontation with China. Unless there is 
an outside force, such as America, there can be no 
balance in the region.64 
As long as U.S. interests reside in regions far from 
U.S. territory, preventing conflict in those regions will 
remain a U.S. interest. 
Specific Interests in the Mediterranean Sea 
The Mediterranean Sea is one of the three major 
strategic hubs that this thesis addresses. 65 The U.S. Sixth 
Fleet has responsibility for the Mediterranean, and has been 
present in these waters since 1946. 
63Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward 
Presence, 37. 
64Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: Status, 
Prospects, 49. 
65The Caribbean often is cited as another strategic 
hub, but its proximity to CONUS, lack of significant 
military threats, and accessibility to land-based air power 
make naval forward presence less important than in the 
Mediterranean, the Gulf, and East Asia. 
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Freedom of the Seas 
The Mediterranean contains several important SLOCs, 
both for the United States and for the Western European NATO 
states. At the western end of the Mediterranean, the Strait 
of Gibraltar provides one of the two entrances or exits from 
the Mediterranean. Further east, the Strait of Sicily and 
the Malta Channel produce a chokepoint near the center of 
the Mediterranean. The Gulf of Sidra, which lies to the 
north of Libya, provides maneuvering room both for merchant 
shipping and military traffic. Libya's attempt to claim the 
Gulf of Sidra as territorial waters led to a series of 
military confrontations in 1981 and again in 1986 between 
units of the U.S. Navy and Libyan air and surface units. 66 
At the eastern end of the Mediterranean lies the Suez Canal 
and its associated SUMED pipeline complex, providing the 
only alternative to Gibraltar for passage into or out of the 
Mediterranean. 
Merchant shipping through the Mediterranean connects 
the United States and Europe to the Middle East and Asia. 
66An often-overlooked motivation for the 1986 
Operations in the Vicinity of Libya (OVL-I, -II, and -III), 
which challenged Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra as 
territorial waters, was the need for operational space in 
which to conduct naval exercises, without the interference 
and hazards involved in the main shipping channels. Both the 
U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy commonly used the Gulf of 
Sidra for such exercises. See Colonel W. Hayes Parks, 
"Crossing the Line," Proceedinqs (November 1986): 42. 
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For the United States, the economies of Italy, Greece, 
Turkey, and Israel represent growing markets. While still 
small in comparison to U.S.-Asia trade, the volume of trade 
with Turkey and Greece has grown at an annual rate of 9 
percent over the last decade, while trade with Israel has 
grown at an annual rate of 12 percent.67 
In addition to merchant traffic, the Mediterranean-Suez 
SLOC provides a crucial route for moving military equipment 
from Europe to the Persian Gulf in times of crisis. During 
the 1990-91 Desert Shield/Storm operations, 90 percent of 
U.S. air lift and sea lift traveled through or over the 
Mediterranean, including all of the supplies and equipment 
transported to the Gulf from Europe. 68 As described 
earlier, the transit from U.S. East Coast bases to the 
Persian Gulf via the Mediterranean is shortened by about six 
days compared to the route around Africa. 
Within the Mediterranean, several nations have military 
forces capable of interfering with the passage of maritime 
traffic. 69 Most notable among the regional forces is 
67Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: Status, 
Prospects, 52. 
68Dismukes and Hayes, "The Med Remains Vital," 47. 
69The forces of the various NATO nations clearly have 
the capability to interfere with Mediterranean traffic. 
However, as the likelihood of any of these nations 
interfering with merchant traffic is remote absent a 
regional war, their respective forces will not be addressed 
in this thesis. Israel's close alliance with the United 
44 
Algeria's possession of two Kilo-class submarines, purchased 
from the Soviet Union prior to 1991.70 Capable of deploying 
mines while submerged, and armed with 533mm torpedoes, the 
Algerian Kilos could allow interdiction in the Strait of 
Gibraltar or in the Strait of Sicily. Libya and Egypt also 
possess ex-Soviet Foxtrot and Romeo-class submarines, 
although most if not all are believed to be non-operational 
due to maintenance problems. Syria possesses three Romeo-
class boats, whose operational status is unknown. 71 
In addition to submarines, every nation on the North 
African coast from Morocco to Syria possesses patrol craft 
armed with anti-ship missiles. Some are fairly modern, such 
as Tunisia's French-built La Combattante III-class boats, 
while others are older ex-Soviet Osa or Nanuchka-class 
boats. However, all are armed with effective anti-ship 
missiles, including Exocets (Morocco), Otomats (Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco), and SS-N-2 Styx (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and 
Syria), making these small craft extremely dangerous to both 
merchant and naval ships.72 
States likewise exempts Israeli forces from threat 
assessments in the Mediterranean. 
70Terence Taylor, The Military Balance 1997/98 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), 122; 
Francis Tusa, "The Maghreb Cauldron," Armed Forces Journal 
International (October 1994): 55. 
71 Taylor, The Military Balance 1997/98, 124, 133, 141. 
72Ibid., 121-141. 
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Access to Resources 
The Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline provide a vital 
energy lifeline for industrialized European nations, who 
depend on Persian Gulf oil for nearly half of their energy 
needs. In 1994, for example, over forty million metric tons 
of oil passed through the Suez Canal, while over eighty 
million metric tons were pumped through the SUMED 
pipeline. 73 Without the ability to move Persian Gulf oil 
through the Canal or pipeline, oil shipments would have to 
pass around Africa, adding time and additional cost to 
European oil imports.74 
Within the Mediterranean, shipments of oil are no less 
important. For example, Algeria provides over 70 percent of 
Spain's oil requirements. Also, it is expected that the 
majority of Caspian Sea oil destined for Europe in the 
future will be pumped through Turkish pipelines, and then 
shipped throughout the Mediterranean.75 Maintaining the 
73The Suez Canal/ SUMED Complex, 16. The SUMED 
pipeline travels from Ain Sukhna on the Gulf of Suez to Sidi 
Kerir on the Mediterranean, just west of Alexandria, a 
distance of 320 kilometers. 
74 see Appendix A, Table 4 for a comparison of the time 
difference between Suez and the Cape of Good Hope. 
75Leah McAnally, "NATO's Post-Cold War Internal 
Adaptations" (master's thesis, Southwest Missouri State 
University, 1997), 97. 
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flow of energy to America's major trading partners is of 
great importance to the U.S. economy, and the Mediterranean 
is the route for the majority of Europe's oil needs. 
Safety of u.s. Allies 
The principal U.S. ally requiring protection in the 
Mediterranean is Israel. Surrounded by Arab neighbors, 
Israel has had to fight for its existence on several 
occasions. Egypt and Syria, Israel's traditional security 
concerns, last mounted a conventional military assault on 
Israel in 1973, but terrorist activity has continued to 
plague Israel. 
The Camp David peace agreement has kept relations 
between Israel and Egypt peaceful if not friendly since 
1976, but tensions still exist. 76 Continued trouble arising 
from the Palestinian problem could lead to renewed 
hostilities, including war, between Israel and Egypt. 
Syria, on the other hand, has been unmistakably hostile 
towards Israel since 1948, and continues so today. Syria's 
animosity towards Israel exists independent of the Middle 
East "Peace Process", and likely will continue as long as 
President Assad is alive. Syrian claims to the Golan 
Heights, claims to the water rights in and around the Golan, 
and Assad's desire for Syrian hegemony in the eastern 
76Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Amonq The Nations: Israel 
and the World (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 254. 
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Mediterranean will maintain Syria as a mortal threat to 
Israel in the future. Syria has continued to purchase new 
military equipment from former Soviet states, including 
modern tanks, aircraft, and artillery systems, thus 
increasing the size and quality of the Syrian armed 
forces. 77 
Egypt, notwithstanding possible aggression towards 
Israel, is an important U.S. friend in the Mediterranean, 
although falling short of the criteria of being an ally on 
the order of Israel or Japan. Both as a primary means of 
maintaining peace between Arab nations and Israel, and as 
the guardian of the Suez Canal, Egypt likely will remain on 
good terms the United States. Egypt could see its security 
threatened by terrorism or para-military activity from 
Libya, Sudan, or Ethiopia. In the recent past, Iran has 
attempted to establish a military presence, including a 
submarine base, in Sudan. The presence of submarines, anti-
ship missiles, or minelaying capability astride the Red Sea 
would be a direct threat to Egypt, and could be beyond 
Egypt's ability to respond to militarily.78 
77 Gregory Rublee, "Prosecuting the Syrian Threat to 
Israel: Motive, Means, and Opportunity" (master's thesis, 
Southwest Missouri State University, 1995), 200-214. 
78Yossef Bodansky, "The Grand Strategy of Iran," Global 
Affairs (Fall 1995): 27. 
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Turkey and Greece are both NATO members, and their 
continued membership in NATO is judged very important in the 
current international security environment. 79 Turkey in 
particular may encounter external difficulties with Russia, 
Iran, and even China, as the Caspian Sea oil fields are 
developed. 80 
Deterring Regional conflict 
Responding to crises in the Mediterranean has been a 
frequent occurrence for U.S. forces over the last twenty-
five years. In fact, the Mediterranean has been the focus 
of more crises requiring naval forces than any other region 
since 1970.81 Continued animosity between Israel and Syria, 
Iranian efforts to establish a military presence in Sudan, a 
coup by fundamentalist Muslim militants in Algeria--any of 
these, and a host of other catalysts, could provide the 
79Turkey is described as, "the linchpin of NATO's 
southern strategy by virtue of its geographic position near 
the new southern states that border Russia." See Binnendjik, 
Strategic Assessment 1997, 36. 
80Ahmed Rashid, "A New 'Great Game'-for Fuel," E.ar. 
Eastern Economic Review, cited in World Press Review (June 
1997): 32; Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still An Enemy?" 
Foreign Affairs (September/October 1997): 74. Umit Enginsoy, 
"Russian Moves in Armenia Heighten Regional Tensions," 
Defense News, 01 February 1999, 4. 
81 Kahan and Sands, Alternative Naval Deployment 
Concepts, 3-4. See Appendix A, Table 5 and Table 6 for a 
depiction of the frequency and nature of U.S. military 
operations in the Mediterranean from 1970-1989. 
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spark for a regional conflict. 82 Such a conflict would have 
the potential to disrupt the economic stability of the 
Mediterranean, and thus the economies of Europe and the 
United States. 
The most serious regional conflict, although perhaps 
not the most likely, would involve another Arab attempt to 
attack and destroy Israel. Such a conflict could spill over 
into the Persian Gulf, where other Islamic states might 
provide aid to Syria or Egypt. Thus one U.S. interest, 
protection of Israel, could be directly at odds with another 
U.S. interest, maintaining the flow of oil from the Persian 
Gulf. 
An Arab-Israeli war also could see the employment of 
NBC weapons, delivered by ballistic missiles. Both Egypt 
and Syria possess SCUD and other ballistic missiles capable 
of striking any part of Israel.83 Iran has several long-
range ballistic missiles under development, some in advanced 
stages, that could be targeted on Israe1. 84 Israel in turn 
82Tusa, "The Maghreb Cauldron," 55. 
83Taylor, The Military Balance 1997/98, 124, 141. 
84Barbara Opall, "Israelis Say Russia Aids Iran's Quest 
For Missiles," Defense News, 10-16 February 1997, 1; Steve 
Rodan, "Iran Missile Program Is Nearly Complete," Jerusalem 
.Eo.at., 4 October 1997, 1, "Iran's Missiles Able to Hit Israel 
in 18 Months," Jerusalem Post, 11 October 1997, 1, "Secret 
Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missiles in Year," 
Defense News, 6-12 October 1997, 4. 
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might be motivated to respond to a successful chemical or 
biological attack with a nuclear weapon, using its own 
Jericho missiles or F-15 aircraft. Such nuclear retaliation 
could transform a small regional conflict into a much larger 
conflict, involving Muslim countries throughout North Africa 
and the Middle East. 
Turkey and Greece, while both important NATO members, 
have a long history of acrimonious relations. Most recently 
a dispute over Russian S-300 SAMs, purchased by Greek 
Cypriots, led Greece and Turkey into confrontation, with 
Russia threatening to join in to protect its customer after 
Turkey threatened to block the missile shipment. 85 Greek-
Turkish issues go back for centuries, making conflict 
between them a constant possibility.86 
The NATO nations understandably view conflict in the 
Mediterranean as a threat to their national interests: 
Because of the unstable environment and vital 
resources in these areas, many NATO nations (France, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey) see 
threats emanating from this region as dangerous to 
their vital interests.87 
85John Roos, "Ersatz Allies: Misstep By Greece Or 
Turkey Could Trigger War Over Cyprus," Armed Forces Journal 
International (May 1997): 44. 
8 6James Pasley, "Cold Turkey No More: Security 
Perspectives for the Republic of Turkey in the Post-Cold War 
Era," (master's thesis, Southwest Missouri State University, 
1994), 121-141 provides a good treatment of the myriad 
issues of contention between Greece and Turkey. 
87McAnally, "NATO's Post-Cold War Internal 
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Deterring conflict in the Mediterranean, or ending 
regional conflict quickly if deterrence fails, remains one 
of the primary reasons for the continued presence of Sixth 
Fleet ships. 
Specific Interests in the Persian Gulf 
The Persian Gulf is an area of great strategic 
importance to the United States, and to most of the 
industrialized world. Oil is the overriding factor in all 
U.S. interests in the Gulf. Freedom of the seas (to get the 
oil out), the protection of allies (allies only because of 
their possession of oil), and preventing regional conflict 
(which could interrupt oil shipments) all relate back to 
oil, and the need to keep Persian Gulf oil flowing to the 
economies of the world. 
Freedom of the Seas 
Freedom of the seas means one thing in the Gulf: 
providing safe passage through the Gulf and the Strait of 
Hormuz for tankers loaded with oil. While over fourteen 
million barrels of oil and natural gas pass through the 
Strait every day, no other commodity of any importance 
originates in the Gulf. The supertanker, or very large 
crude carrier (VLCC), was designed for the transport of 
Persian Gulf oil, and over 90 percent of the world's VLCCs 
Adaptations," 98. 
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pass through the Strait at least once each year. Of the 
twenty-eight ships entering the Gulf daily, half are 
tankers. 88 
The Strait is the point most vulnerable to 
interdiction, a vulnerability made even greater due to 
Iran's position astride the full length of the Strait. 
Iran's ongoing military buildup is focused on the Strait, 
and includes mines, Kilo-class submarines, anti-ship 
missiles, fast patrol craft, and small gunboats capable of 
attacking merchant ships and tankers. Iran's mining 
operations in the Strait from 1986 to 1988 resulted in the 
sinking of several ships, and the near-sinking of USS Samuel 
B. Roberts (FFG-58) . 8 9 In addition to the Strait and the 
Gulf tanker routes, the oil terminals and associated 
facilities must be protected and kept open for the loading 
of oi1. 90 
In the future, Caspian Sea oil may be distributed to 
world oil users via the Gulf. Iran is the logical location 
for a pipeline connecting the Caspian to the ocean, which 
88The Strait of Hormuz, i, 5, 9. 
89smith, "GCC Regional Security," 6; Binnendjik and 
Clawson, Strateqic Assessment 1997, 92. 
90uri Ra'anan, Robert Pfaltzgraff, and Geoffrey Kemp, 
eds., Projection of Power: Perspectives. Perceptions. and 
Problems (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1982), 96. 
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could elevate the need to maintain freedom of the seas in 
the Gulf and the Strait to even higher importance. 91 
Access to Resources 
Oil is the only resource of any importance in the Gulf, 
but its importance is paramount in the strategic outlook of 
the United States, as described by Colin Gray: 
No subject for statecraft and private commercial 
concern could be more geoeconomical than is access 
to, and the price of, oil, and no geoeconomical 
subject is more obviously dominated by the threat and 
use of force.92 
The importance of Persian Gulf oil was recognized as 
far back as 1933, when the Standard Oil Company launched its 
first Saudi oil venture. President Franklin Roosevelt 
established a rapport with the Saudi kings of the day, and 
American oil workers have been present in the area ever 
since.93 
As described previously, world oil demand is expected 
to grow enormously in the future, with Asian economies in 
particular increasing their demand for energy. Without the 
presence of U.S. forces, a regional hegemon, most likely 
91Michael Dunn, "Mideast Turnaround," Armed Forces 
Journal International (November 1997): 22. 
92Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World, 170. 
93Amos Jordan, William Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence Korb, 
American National Security: Policy and Process (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 385-390. 
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Iran or Iraq, could establish control of all Gulf oil. 
Control by a single entity would be extremely serious due to 
Saudi Arabia's unique spare production capacity. No other 
world oil producer could increase production to make up for 
lost Persian Gulf oil, allowing monopolistic manipulation of 
the world oil market.94 
Even without a monopoly over Gulf oil, the disruption 
of the oil flow from the Gulf would have serious, possibly 
even crippling, results for world economies. A serious 
disruption of Gulf oil flow could drive the cost of oil 
beyond fifty dollars per barrel, entailing catastrophic 
results for many economies.95 While the U.S. economy likely 
could survive a prolonged interruption of Gulf oil, the 
economies of Japan and Western Europe would suffer complete 
collapse, the effect of which would surely be felt in the 
96 U.S. economy. 
94Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press, and Harvey Sapolsky, "Come 
Home America," in Michael Brown, Owen Cote, Sean Lynn-Jones, 
and Steven Miller, eds., America's Strategic Choices 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997), 220-222. 
95Joseph Hoar, "Continuous Forward Presence of Naval 
Forces Vital to Maintaining Middle East Stability," .s..aa 
Power (January 1995): 44. 
96Jordan et al., American National Security, 391. "In 
all likelihood, a prolonged interruption in their [Japan and 
Europe] imports would literally bring about their economic 
collapse."; The Strait of Hormuz, 18. "The economic 
repercussions of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz will 
ripple through the global economy." 
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Safety of u.s. Allies 
The safety of U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf poses one 
of the biggest challenges faced by U.S. defense planners. 
Even in South Korea, where the North's large forces are only 
twenty-five miles from Seoul, the difficulties of defending 
against aggression are less than in the Gulf. Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, small in population and with no natural 
defensive positions, are the allies most at risk in the 
Gulf. Their preeminent status as oil producers makes their 
survival crucial to the sustained flow of oil to the world, 
requiring U.S. military presence on a daily basis. 
Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia border on Iraq, where 
Saddam Hussein remains in power. If Saddam regains full 
control of Iraq in the future, he might decide to attack his 
southern neighbors, both to control their oil reserves and 
to exact revenge for the Gulf War and its resulting 
sanctions against Iraq.97 Saudi Arabia has additional 
importance as the leader of the Arab world. Failure to 
protect Saudi Arabia, or to restore Saudi sovereignty after 
an invasion, would harm U.S. standing throughout the Arab 
world. 98 
97Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997, 
88. 
98Rodman, America Adrift, 38. 
56 
While Iraq is viewed as an inunediate threat to Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia, Iran is viewed by most observers, 
including the full membership of the GCC, as the most 
significant long-term threat.99 Continued Iranian 
insistence that Bahrain is the "14th Province of Iran", 
threats to the United Arab Emirates, including the seizure 
and militarization of several islands in the Strait, and a 
historical sentiment of Iran's place in the region make Iran 
a serious and lasting threat to U.S. allies in the Gulf.lOO 
Deterrinq Reqional conflict 
As shown from 1980-88, and again in 1990-91, the Gulf 
is a region full of potential for major conflict. The Gulf 
is only slightly less likely than the Korean Peninsula as a 
possible site of future conflict, as indicated by Vice 
Admiral Redd: 
Even as we debate the number and size of 
contingencies facing our military, we know that as 
far as we can see into the future, the Gulf will be 
on our screen. Indeed, the potential for the use of 
99smith, "GCC Regional Security," 4; Redd, "Fifth 
Fleet, Arriving," 50; Hoar, "Continuous Forward Presence," 
45. 
lOOPhilip Collins, "Iran: An Emerging Military Threat 
to U.S. National Interests in the Middle East," (master's 
thesis, Southwest Missouri State University, 1994), 134; 
Ahmed Hashim, The Crisis of the Iranian state (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 43; Rodman, America Adrift, 
43; Binnendjik and Clawson, Strateqic Assessment 1997, 91. 
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U.S. military power arguably is higher in the Gulf 
than anywhere else on earth.101 
A future conflict could arise from any of the 
"persistent instabilities" in the Gulf.102 The lasting 
hatred between Iran and Iraq could lead to a repeat of their 
eight-year war. Iran's threats to various GCC members, 
especially the UAE, could flare into open conflict. The 
disputes between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, or between Qatar 
and Bahrain, also could lead to armed conflict.103 
The most likely and dangerous possibility would arise 
from Iran or a resurgent Iraq attacking one or several of 
the smaller GCC states. The involvement of the large 
Iranian or Iraqi armed forces would require the commitment 
of U.S. forces, whereas a conflict between the smaller GCC 
militaries would tend to contain itself. Both Iran and Iraq 
have large numbers of modern weapons, and neither nation has 
shown any reduction in its desire for hegemony over the 
Gulf.104 Most significantly, both Iran and Iraq have 
aggressively pursued a full range of NBC capabilities, along 
with ballistic missile capability. Iran is believed to be 
101Redd, "Fifth Fleet, Arriving," 49. 
102Jordan et al., America's National security, 417. 
103Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997, 
84-85. 
104Holmes and Moore, Restoring American Leadership, 80; 
Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward Presence, 
25. 
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within a few years, possibly one or two years, of having 
nuclear weapons, while Iraq undoubtedly will resume its 
hidden nuclear program when UNSCOM is removed. 105 
Preventing a regional conflict that could interfere 
with world oil flow is important enough to justify the 
continued presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf. Especially 
if the belligerents have NBC capability, avoiding conflict 
in the Gulf through conventional deterrence must remain a 
high priority for the United States. 
Specific Interests in Northeast Asia 
Northeast Asia is a region of great importance to the 
United States, ranking at least as high as Europe, if not 
higher. Two of the longest-standing U.S. defense 
commitments are in Korea and Japan, while the emerging 
economies of the "Asian Tigers"--South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore--represent a growing percentage of 
U.S. foreign trade. 
Freedom of the seas 
In the North Pacific Ocean, the flow of economic goods 
is the primary basis of freedom of the seas. Asian economic 
might is becoming ever more important to the U.S. economy, 
lOSA CIA report cited in Smith, "GCC Regional 
Security," estimates that Iran could have nuclear weapons 
production capability, far more serious a threat than mere 
possession of a handful of weapons, by the year 2000. For a 
thorough examination of Iran and Iraq's ongoing efforts in 
the area of NBC/M, see The Proliferation Primer. 
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and is projected to grow enormously in the future. In 1995, 
seven of the top fifteen U.S. trade partners were located in 
East Asia: Japan (number two), China (number five), South 
Korea (number seven), Taiwan (number eight), Singapore 
(number nine), Malaysia (number eleven), and Hong Kong 
(number thirteen) .106 Together, these seven nations 
combined for an aggregate of 427 billion dollars in trade, 
or 33 percent of all U.S. foreign trade. Protecting the 
SLOCs over which this trade travels is a lasting interest of 
the United States. 
Disputes among Asian nations over the Spratley Islands 
are often cited as a possible threat to the SLOCs and 
merchant traffic. China and the Philippines already have 
clashed over possession of Mischief Reef, and further 
struggles for possession could interrupt the flow of 
shipping, especially the shipment of Persian Gulf oil on its 
way to Japan and South Korea.107 
The South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca also 
represent an important military SLOC, as the alternate 
routes via the Sunda Strait, the Ombai-Wetar Straits, or the 
Torres Strait are all limited in maximum draft, preventing 
aircraft carriers and some large auxiliary ships from 
10 6Holmes and Moore, Restoring American Leadership, 
114. 
107Rodman, America Adrift, 28. 
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passing through.108 The Strait of Malacca itself is 
uncomfortably narrow in places, but has an average depth of 
seventy-two feet.109 It also is the shortest route between 
East Asia and the Middle East or Europe. 
Access to Resources 
There are no significant amounts of raw resources 
transiting the East Asian SLOCs to the United States. The 
flow of oil to the Asian economies is vital to their 
continued prosperity and economic strength, but it is mostly 
finished consumer products that pass over the Pacific 
destined for the United States. Oil from the Persian Gulf, 
as well as from Brunei on the island of Borneo, makes the 
South China Sea the most important SLOC in terms of 
resources destined for important U.S. trading partners, but 
not for U.S. resource needs. 
Safety of u.s. Allies 
The safety of regional allies is a major consideration 
in East Asia, where several small nations with robust 
economies reside in close proximity to militarily 
threatening neighbors. Most also are truly democratic or 
108Noer, Chokepoints, 3. See Appendix A, Figure 3. 
10 9The author passed through the Strait of Malacca 
onboard the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) in 1991, and can 
testify to the confined nature of this waterway. Due to the 
heavy traffic and number of large vessels passing through 
Malacca, precise seamanship is required during the transit. 
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moving towards democracy, and are threatened by non-
democratic enemies, adding to the imperative of preserving 
their security. 
Japan is the indispensable U.S. ally in Northeast Asia, 
for economic as well as military reasons. In addition to 
being the United States' number two trading partner, Japan 
is the base for the U.S. military presence in East Asia, 
both for land and sea forces, and therefore the foundation 
of U.S. efforts to protect national interests in East 
Asia. 110 Maintaining close ties with Japan, and assisting 
in Japan's security calculus, also is seen as important in 
order to keep Japan from expanding its armed forces, which 
could easily produce anxiety and an arms race among Asian 
states fearful of a large, well-armed Japan.111 
110Jason Ingebrigtsen, "The U.S.-Japan Security 
Alliance: Current Status, Future Prospects," (master's 
thesis, Southwest Missouri State University, 1996), 153; 
Daniel Chiu, The Politics of overseas Bases and Access 
Facilities: Prospects for the Future (Alexandria, VA: Center 
for Naval Analyses, 1993), Appendix A, page A-4; Kahan and 
Sands, Alternative Naval Deployment Concepts, 3-15; 
lllJosef Joffe, "Bismarck or Britain?" in Brown et al., 
America's strategic Choices, 116. Ullman, In Harm's Way, 
133: "Although the presence of U.S. military forces in the 
Pacific has provoked some controversy and criticism, this 
presence has unmistakenly [.sic.] and unambiguously 
contributed to regional peace and stability. The U.S. 
assumption of the larger military burden has allowed 
regional states to forgo acquiring additional military 
capability that could have proved threatening to the 
region." 
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South Korea is, without question, the U.S. ally most at 
risk in East Asia, and indeed anywhere in the world. While 
U.S. ground forces remain present in Europe to bolster NATO 
against an uncertain threat, and remain in Kuwait to hedge 
against possible Iraqi aggression, the threat faced by South 
Korea is easily identified and close at hand. North Korea's 
large standing army, its hard-line communist regime, its 
unrelenting animosity towards Seoul, and its continued 
pursuit of nuclear weapons make the Korean Peninsula the 
single most likely and most dangerous location for an attack 
on a U.S. ally. 11 2 In addition to the constant state of 
tension along the de-militarized zone (DMZ), the current 
dire economic situation in North Korea makes the outbreak of 
a second Korean War possible at any time.113 
Taiwan presents another difficult security 
consideration for the United States. Taiwan is a democratic 
state, is the United States' number eight trading partner 
worldwide, and is threatened by a non-democratic China 
across the Formosa Strait. Defending Taiwan thus is clearly 
112Ernest Lefever, America's Imperial Burden; Is the 
Past Prologue? (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 126; 
Holmes and Moore, Restorinq American Leadership, 54; Jordan 
et al., American National Security, 368; Chiu, The Politics 
of Overseas Bases, Appendix A, page A-2 
113Binnendjik and Clawson, Strateqic Assessment 1997, 
97. 
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a U.S. interest.114 However, Taiwan's proximity to China, 
and its distance from U.S. bases in Japan or the 
Philippines, would make Taiwan difficult to defend in the 
face of a determined Chinese attack. 
A fourth U.S. ally in East Asia, often overshadowed by 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, is the Republic of 
Singapore. Located at the southeast end of the Strait of 
Malacca, Singapore is the Pacific equivalent of Gibraltar. 
One of the "Four Dragons" of the Pacific, Singapore is a top 
U.S. trading partner despite a population of less than three 
million citizens.115 When the Philippines demanded the 
removal of U.S. forces and installations in the early 1990s, 
Singapore moved quickly to replace Subic Bay as a primary 
maintenance and refueling station for the U.S. Navy, 
including a pier capable of receiving aircraft carriers. 116 
Frequent joint training and good military-to-military 
11 4Ted Carpenter, "Managing a Great Power Relationship: 
The United States, China and East Asian Security," .The. 
Journal of Strateqic studies (March 1998): 8; Jordan et al., 
American National security, 373-374; Kahan and Sands, 
Alternative Naval Deployment concepts, 3-15; 
115rn 1995, trade with Singapore exceeded trade with 
France, and equaled 60 percent of trade with the United 
Kingdom. Holmes and Moore, Restorinq American Leadership, 
114. 
116The United states security strateqy for East Asia, 
7. 
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contacts have kept Singapore a solid U.S. ally in the 
region. 
Deterring Regional conflict 
The North Korea-South Korea standoff will continue to 
be the number one threat of regional conflict in East Asia, 
barring the unlikely event of a peaceful reunification.11 7 
The Korean theater is especially troublesome due to the 
possibility of a conflict erupting with little or no notice. 
An event as small as an accident at the DMZ could escalate 
into war, due to the North's "propensity for brinkmanship", 
the lack of any military-to-military communications links, 
and the close proximity of large troop formations that are 
always on a war footing.118 
A war in Korea could easily involve chemical or 
biological weapons use by North Korea, as well as the use of 
any existing nuclear weapons. Japan would be threatened by 
North Korean ballistic missiles, and in the not-too-distant 
11 7Thomas Ricks, "Nightmare Prospect of Nuclear Rogue 
State Makes North Korea the Hot Spot That Worries U.S. 
Most," Wall street Journal, 3 February 1999, A24. 
11 8Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997, 
101-102. The United states Security strategy for East Asia, 
13, provides the following commentary: "Along the DMZ, just 
24 miles from Seoul, the North Korean Peoples' Army has 
nearly 600,000 troops, more than 2,400 tanks, and over 6,000 
artillery pieces. It is an area where hostilities could 
erupt with little or no warning." 
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future so could Hawaii, Alaska, and even the West Coast of 
the United States. 
As threatening as North Korea is to South Korean and 
American forces on the ground, as well as to nearby nations, 
most Asian countries view China as the more serious long-
term threat. China's current economic and military growth, 
its insistence that Taiwan is a "renegade province", its 
aggressive claims to the Spratley Islands, its clumsy 
attempts to intimidate Taiwan with a military show of force 
in 1996--all are disquieting to the much smaller nations of 
East Asia that must live in the shadow of China's 1.3 
billion population.119 
All of the East Asian nations, except North Korea, see 
U.S. presence in the region as a stabilizing influence. 
Given the small size of most East Asian states, and "the 
major power animosities not far beneath the surface," 
stability likely will continue to depend on U.S. military 
presence in East Asia.120 
11 9carpenter, "Managing a Great Power Relationship," 
10; Lefever, America's Imperial Burden, 126; Goure and 
Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: status, Prospects, 49; 
Holmes and Moore, Restorinq American Leadership, 64. 
120Ra'anan et al., Projection of Power, 103; Rodman, 
America Adrift, 26; Dismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence 
Abroad," 52. 
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Threats to U.S. Interests 
Just as U.S. interests are global in nature, so are the 
threats to U.S. interests global. The most pressing threats 
to U.S. interests will come from peer or near-peer major 
power competitors, such as the former Soviet Union, and from 
regional states that can challenge the United States within 
their respective regions. 
Peer or Near-Peer Competitors 
Only two nations can realistically be considered as 
potential peer competitors to the United States: China and 
Russia. Arguments are sometimes made that India may become 
a major power, or that the European Union could transform 
itself into a political and military power, instead of just 
an economic power. However, only China and Russia have the 
combination of population size, resources, technology, 
military forces, and motivation to challenge the United 
States. Not surprisingly, both China and Russia are 
mentioned in the first pages of the National Security 
Strategy, as well as being mentioned in other defense 
documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review and 
Secretary of Defense Report to Congress. 121 
121rn fact, Chinaand Russia are the only "great 
powers" mentioned by name in the NS.S.. 
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Neither China nor Russia can be described as a peer 
competitor today, and it is by no means clear that they will 
be in the future, but only China and Russia are credible 
threats to become peer competitors. Even so, it is unlikely 
that either nation could build itself into a true peer 
competitor, able to compete globally with the United States, 
in less than twenty-five years, if not longer. 
China is often pointed to for its rapidly-growing 
economy and third-largest GDP in the world. However, 
China's growth must be measured from its low starting base, 
which can distort the significance of economic figures. For 
example, even with the number three GDP worldwide and growth 
rates approaching 10 percent annually, China's per capita 
GDP is a meager four hundred dollars. Given China's 
population size, it is estimated that China could require as 
long as 150 years to match the United States in economic 
might. 122 Russia remains in the throes of severe economic 
problems, with no relief in sight, and so is even less 
likely than China to match the United States in world 
standing any time soon. These problems notwithstanding, 
both China and Russia are advanced as twenty-first century 
major power threats by many sources.123 
122Hon Lee, "China in the 21st Century: America's 
Greatest Strategic Challenge," in Mary Sommerville, ed., 
Essays on Strategy XIII (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996), 
83. 
12 3chinese and Russian nuclear weapons clearly make 
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A more likely possibility for China and Russia would be 
their development into near-peer threats in a regional 
context, able to employ defensive "keep-out" strategies 
against the United States near their own territory, but 
unable to project power far from home. Russian exertions in 
the Caspian Sea region, or Chinese efforts to dominate the 
East and South China Seas, are examples of possible regional 
peer strategies for China and Russia.124 
China is viewed as the more serious threat to American 
interests in the foreseeable future. In as little as ten 
years, given its current military expenditures, China could 
take up the role of a regional peer. 125 China continues to 
purchase advanced jet aircraft, nuclear powered and 
conventional submarines, air-to-air refueling planes, SAMs, 
these nations threats to the United States, but not in the 
context of a global competitor able to exert influence in 
opposition to U.S. interests through power projection. It 
may be that China and Russia are identified as potential 
peer threats simply because no other nation can credibly be 
substituted for them. However, describing China as an 
impending "juggernaut" in world affairs, or as "an emerging 
great power" seems to be exaggerating the strength of 
available evidence. See America's National Interests, 29, 
and Restorinq American Leadership, 55. 
12 4A recent U.S. Navy war game, "U.S. Navy RMA 
Revolution in Military Affairs Wargame," 21-23 April 1998, 
postulated a 'Red' (Chinese) strategy built around sea 
denial capability in the China Sea, allowing China to invade 
a unified Korea and consolidate its gains before sufficient 
U.S. power could be brought to bear to stop the invasion. 
125Binnendjik and Clawson, Strateqic Assessment 1997, 
55. 
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and other high-tech hardware from Russia. 126 Although today 
China is incapable even of projecting military power across 
the Formosa Strait, a mere one hundred miles wide, in 
sufficient strength to contemplate invading Taiwan, in 
twenty-five years' time China could conceivably replace 
Japan as the dominant regional military power.12 7 
Russia's future is unclear, and could as easily lead to 
fragmentation and civil war as to reemergence as a great 
power. What is clear, however, is that Russia would be 
challenged even to pose a regional threat to the United 
States today, and for at least a decade to come. Russia's 
ground forces are in a pitiable state, its air forces are no 
better despite their first-rate aircraft, and its naval 
forces face "irreversible" reductions in shipbuilding 
capacity combined with the loss of thirteen to fifteen ships 
monthly for lack of funds.128 
Russia's possible reemergence as a peer or near-peer 
competitor centers on its political situation. The current 
conditions in Russia have been likened to those in Weimar 
126Lee, "China in the 21st Century," 86. 
12 7china's inability to cross the Formosa Strait 
results from lack of amphibious lift capability and Taiwan's 
highly capable air defenses. See Binnendjik and Clawson, 
strategic Assessment 1997, 52; Lee, "China in the 21st 
Century," 91. 
12 8Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997, 
19. 
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Germany in the 1920s, with a corresponding possibility of an 
ultra-nationalist leader gaining power and rebuilding the 
former Soviet empire.129 Another possibility would be the 
re-establishment of the Soviet Union or a facsimile. The 
fact that Russia continues to pump money into its submarine 
programs, giving it some capacity to deploy military power 
beyond its borders, and has continued to pursue an assertive 
foreign policy, suggest that Russian leaders still envision 
a great power Russia.130 
Regional "Bad Actors" 
Less-than-great powers with hostile intent can also 
pose serious threats to U.S. interests. When these "bad 
actors" reside in areas close to U.S. interests, they are 
inherently capable of influencing and affecting those 
interests, even without large or modern military forces. 
The Gulf War provided the clearest possible example of how a 
small, hostile state (admittedly, in Iraq's case, one with 
large military forces) can imperil U.S. interests. 
Commonly cited bad actors include Iran, Syria, North 
Korea, Iraq, and occasionally India.131 These nations 
12 9Lefever, America's Imperial Burden, 129. 
130captain John Morgan, "Preparing for Tomorrow's 
Troubles," Proceedings (December 1996): 49; Michael 
Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment," in Brown et 
al., America's strategic Choices, 139. 
131Morgan, "Preparing for Tomorrow's Troubles," 49. 
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possess credible military forces and hostile, or at least 
uncertain, intentions. Smaller irritants, such as Haiti or 
Somalia, lack the military means to affect important U.S. 
interests, and so cannot be considered in the same context. 
An important factor in the assessment of threats from 
regional bad actors is their need only to conduct operations 
in, or close to, their own territory. These smaller nations 
do not need the kinds of global power projection 
capabilities possessed by the United States, as their forces 
likely will not be operating far from home. Especially if 
able to take advantage of geographical "high ground", such 
as a maritime chokepoint, the smaller and less capable 
forces of regional bad actors could enjoy significant 
advantages over larger and more capable U.S. forces. Iran's 
position astride the Strait of Hormuz, and India's proximity 
to the Strait of Malacca, are examples of geographic 
equalizers that smaller states could use to their 
advantage. 132 
Libya once might have been included in the list of bad 
actors, but has largely given up the kinds of flagrant bad 
behavior that resulted in the 1986 naval and air attacks by 
U.S. forces. 
132rndia's insistence on pursuing a nuclear-powered 
submarine force, at great financial cost and despite 
repeated setbacks, can be explained through the benefit such 
submarines would provide in a conflict. SSNs have the 
endurance and magazine capacity to interdict the Strait of 
Malacca, allowing India to prevent the approach of naval 
forces from the east. SSNs also could be employed in the Bay 
of Bengal to keep opposing naval forces at a distance from 
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Rather than engaging the United States in conventional 
fighting, the most logical and economical option for a 
smaller state to employ would be the use of a geographic 
chokepoint and a defensive keep-out strategy.133 By 
attempting to restrict the ability of U.S. forces to 
approach a crisis area by sea, the smaller state could 
establish a difficult cost-vs.-interest question for U.S. 
planners. If the chokepoint provided sufficient leverage, 
such a keep-out strategy could prevent the necessary U.S. 
build-up of forces and materials for prosecuting a regional 
war. 
An emerging component of such a keep-out strategy is 
the use of ballistic missiles, both for deterrence and long-
range attacks. Chapter Six of the Secretary of Defense 
Annual Report to Conqress, "Missile Defenses," acknowledges 
the impact of ballistic missiles in a regional conflict, 
stating that: 
India's coast. The impact of a handful of Argentine diesel 
submarines on British operations in the Falklands War 
indicates the value of submarines in a defensive posture. 
See Andrew Koch, "Nuclear-powered submarines: India's 
strategic trump card," Jane's Intelligence Review (June 
1998): 29; Jacquelyn Davis et al., The Submarine and u.s, 
National Security strategy Into the 21st Century (Cambridge, 
Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1997), 58; 
Captain Charles Wilbur, "Remember the San Luis!" Proceedings 
(March 1996): 86. 
133Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: Status, 
Prospects, 34. 
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The threat of missile use in regional conflicts has 
grown substantially, and the potential combination of 
NBC weapons with theater missiles poses serious 
complications to the management of regional crises 
and the successful ~rosecution of U.S. strategy for 
major theater wars. 34 
Given the current very low level of ballistic missile 
defenses available to U.S. forces and U.S. allies, the even 
lower level of defenses against chemical and biological 
agents among civilian populations worldwide, and the 
widespread possession of ballistic missiles in the 
inventories of various bad actors, it should be expected 
that future regional conflicts will involve the use, or 
threatened use, of ballistic missiles. 
Any regional bad actor able to combine a geographical 
advantage with ballistic missiles (and NBC weapons, if 
available) into a viable keep-out strategy clearly has the 
potential to impinge on U.S. interests. The regional state 
most capable of employing this strategy today is Iran, where 
a vital U.S. interest--oil--coincides with a severe maritime 
chokepoint. Appendix B provides a case study of Iran's 
capabilities, and how Iran might employ a keep-out strategy 
in the Persian Gulf. 
Summary 
The United States is a maritime state, dependent on the 
seas for the life blood of the nation. Connected to the 
markets of Europe and Asia by the sea lanes crossing the 
134cohen, Secretary of Defense Annual Report 1998, 64. 
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world's oceans, seaborne trade forms the backbone of the 
largest and strongest economy in the world. 
If trade is to flow to and from the United States on 
the seas, protection for U.S. trade must likewise be capable 
of going to sea, and of offering protection without 
dependence on the facilities or good will of others. This 
has long been recognized as the primary function of the 
navies of maritime states. Although not the first to make 
the observation, Alfred Thayer Mahan's words, "The necessity 
of a navy springs from the existence of peaceful shipping," 
are as true today as when spoken by Mahan a century ago, and 
when spoken by others a century before him. As long as U.S. 
trade moves over the sea in merchant ships, warships must 
watch over them. The tools of naval power may change, from 
sail power to nuclear power, from vessels traveling on the 
sea to vessels traveling under or above the sea, but the 
need for naval power remains constant for the United States. 
The sea has always been the most economical means of 
transporting people and goods, allowing a large volume to be 
conveyed over long distances at the lowest cost. Even with 
the emergence of large jet aircraft, capable of crossing the 
Atlantic or Pacific in a matter of hours, ships remain the 
most cost-effective method for the transport of resources, 
and the only viable method of transporting bulk resources. 
This economy of effort is extremely important in regard to 
raw resources, and especially the preeminent resource of the 
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twentieth century: oil. Without the ability to deliver oil 
safely to users around the world, the economies of most U.S. 
trading partners would collapse, probably dragging the U.S. 
economy down with them. More than perhaps any other 
commodity, oil must be transported in large quantities, and 
only ships can carry the millions of tons of oil used every 
year around the world. 
The end of the Cold War was heralded as the beginning 
of a "New World Order." Without the threat of the Soviet 
Union, the world was expected to be a safer place for all 
concerned, and especially for the United States. To some 
extent this vision has come true. The prospect of global 
thermonuclear war has receded, as has the threat of a major 
invasion of Western Europe by Soviet armies. On the other 
hand, new threats have sprung up to take the place of the 
Soviet Union. 
While the United States homeland may be safer than at 
any time since 1945, U.S. allies around the world live in an 
increasingly dangerous environment. Nations led by brutal 
dictatorships, in possession of the most modern arms and the 
products of malicious science--NBC weapons--can be found in 
many regions of the world. Old great powers, recently 
fallen on hard times, may resurrect themselves in the 
future. Often too small to field more than token armies, 
and often residing near unfriendly neighbors with the intent 
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to do them harm, allies look to the United States for 
protection. 
One constant has remained after the demise of the 
Soviet Union. The United States is still a global nation, 
linked by trade and treaty to other nations in every area of 
the planet. Just as U.S. interests are found in widely-
scattered locations around the world, so are threats to U.S. 
interests found abroad. As long as U.S. interests reside in 
places far from U.S. shores, protection must be provided for 
those interests. The next chapter will'examine how naval 
forward presence, consisting of Navy and Marine Corps assets 
deployed around the world, acts to safeguard American 
interests. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE MISSION 
In assessing the importance of naval forward presence, 
it is helpful to step back and ask the question: Why does 
the United States need to employ a military strategy of 
forward presence? Not just U.S. naval forces, but U.S. land 
and air forces as well are in position all over the world, 
carrying out a multitude of diverse military tasks. Why 
cannot these forces meet their security obligations from 
CONUS? Why are U.S. servicemen required to go into harm's 
way around the world? Most importantly, why is naval 
forward presence so important in U.S. national security? 
This chapter will examine the need for the forward 
presence of U.S. military forces. After defining the need 
for forward presence, the unique capabilities of naval 
forward presence will be advanced. Naval forces have 
significant advantages over land-based forces in maintaining 
U.S. presence abroad, advantages that derive from the 
characteristics of naval forces. The characteristics and 
capabilities of naval forward presence will comprise the 
bulk of this chapter. 
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Why Forward Presence? 
First and foremost, the presence of U.S. military power 
is required around the world to protect U.S. interests. 
U.S. interests are global in scope, and U.S. military power 
must be prepared and positioned to defend those 
interests. 135 U.S. forces stationed in CONUS are limited to 
deterrence for the protection of interests, making them 
strictly reactive. If deterrence fails, CONUS-based forces 
can only react to an adversary's actions, and could be too 
late in arriving to prevent the adversary from reaching his 
objectives. By remaining in CONUS, instead of being on the 
scene in proximity to U.S. interests, U.S. forces thus would 
cede the initiative to adversaries. 
U.S. forces present in a region send a strong message 
to all other states in the area. Whether land-based or sea-
based, U.S. forces provide a signal of U.S. interest in the 
region, and in maintaining peaceful, stable conditions. 
Land-based forces, particularly ground combat forces, send 
the most specific message of where U.S. interest lies. U.S. 
forces in the Gulf signal our interest in the region; U.S. 
Army forces in Kuwait signal our very specific interest in 
the safety and security of Kuwait. 
135James Hessman, "Forward-Thinking and Forward-
Deployed," Sea Power (November 1997): 20. 
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The example of U.S. Army forces in Kuwait demonstrates 
another important reason for forward presence. Regional 
allies need to have confidence that the United States is 
interested in their safety, and is capable of protecting 
them. Without this reassurance, smaller states may not be 
willing to take actions for their own safety, or allow U.S. 
actions for the common safety of both, that entail risk of 
reprisal. For example, Saudi Arabia might not allow U.S. 
forces to operate from Saudi bases against Iraq if the Saudi 
leadership doubted the willingness or ability of U.S. forces 
to defend Saudi Arabia. This apprehension is lessened by 
the proximity of U.S. forces. If the nearest U.S. forces 
are located in CONUS, and the only assurance the United 
States can give is to restore an ally's sovereignty after 
they have been attacked, allies understandably may feel 
nervous about any actions that provoke larger neighbors, 
even if the provocation occurs through actions intended for 
self-defense. 
Through presence in a region, U.S. forces also hope to 
deter aggression and prevent regional conflicts. The 
presence of U.S. forces applies U.S. deterrence to all 
states in the region, and encourages observance of law and 
order. U.S. forces may undertake specific missions or 
postures intended to deter individual nations as well, as 
when U.S. aircraft enforce the no-fly zones in northern and 
southern Iraq, but the presence of U.S. forces acts to 
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promote lawful behavior from all the states in a region. In 
order to influence events and to deter credibly, U.S. forces 
must be visible to other states. This deterrent effect 
cannot be replicated from CONUS, as articulated by Colin 
Gray: 
For a great power, let alone a would-be coalition 
leader, to function as a player rather than as an 
observer of regional security politics, it has to 
maintain a local military pres~nce that is more than 
lightly symbolic in scale .... Great power must be 
seen to be believed.136 
In order to be convincing in the deterrent role, U.S. 
forces must have combat capability.137 It is the primary 
task of U.S. forces to deter conflict, but the often-
necessary fallback is the ability to fight. 138 Without 
visible combat power, U.S. forces will only fit Gray's 
"lightly symbolic" description. Lightly symbolic forces may 
serve to deter, but if deterrence fails they will be unable 
to defend. 139 The British experience in the Falklands, in 
136colin Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast: Warmer/Still 
Cloudy," Proceedings Naval Review (May 1990): 42. 
13 7Admiral William Owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted 
World," Proceedings (December 1994): 31. 
138Rear Admiral Philip Dur, "Presence: Forward, Ready, 
Engaged," Proceedings (June 1994): 42. 
139colin Gray points out that, "deterrence is useful 
and should be attempted," but also that, "As a general rule, 
conventional deterrence is destined to fail because hopes of 
swift victory at bearable cost spring eternal in the breasts 
of adventurous policy makers and bold strategists." 
Accepting Gray's position as true, symbolic deterrent forces 
should be seen as having very limited utility in most 
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which the on-scene garrison was symbolic rather than 
functional, indicates the all-or-nothing nature of 
attempting to deter with symbolic presence, and the much 
higher cost of having to fight a regional conflict that 
might have been deterred.140 
If deterrence does fail, the presence of U.S. forces 
often will allow a crisis to be headed off and dealt with 
before it blooms into a full-blown conflict. U.S. forces 
help to shape events before crises erupt, but they can also 
shape the way the crisis unfolds. By virtue of their 
proximity, U.S. forces are likely to be more informed about 
the actions taken by other players in a crisis, and should 
be able to take preemptive action in a much more timely 
fashion than CONUS-based forces.141 
Finally, if deterrence fails and U.S. forces must 
fight, U.S. strategy calls for allies to fight alongside 
U.S. forces. Maintaining interoperability between U.S. and 
allied forces will be a necessity if they are to fight 
situations. See "Deterrence and Regional Conflict: Hopes, 
Fallacies, and Fixes," Comparative Strateqy (January-March 
1998): 53, 56. 
140commander Alan Zimm, "Deterrence: Then & Now," 
Proceedinqs (August 1996): 52. 
141Admiral Jay Johnson and General Charles Krulak, 
"Forward Presence in a Violent World," Surface Warfare (July 
/August 1997): 4; Dismukes, National Security Strateqy and 
Forward Presence, 49. 
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together, and interoperability requires constant training 
and exercises between U.S. and allied forces.1 42 Without 
the presence of U.S. forces around the world, training 
exercises likely would be limited in scope and frequency. 
The requirements spelled out in the preceding 
paragraphs form the basis of U.S. military strategy for the 
twenty-first century. The guiding document for U.S. 
military planning, Joint Vision 2010, states the importance 
of forward presence clearly: 
The primary task of the Armed Forces will remain to 
deter conflict--but, should deterrence fail, to fight 
and win our nation's wars .... To ensure we can 
accomplish these tasks, power projection, enabled by 
overseas presence, will likely remain the fundamental 
strategic concept of our future force. 1 4 3 
Why Naval Forward Presence? 
If forward presence is the enabler of power projection, 
what attributes make naval forward presence superior to 
presence via land-based forces, whether ground units or air 
units? Both the Army and Air Force have their own unique 
combat capabilities, and each will be vital in a regional 
war. Forward-based Army units possess the heavy forces 
needed for sustained ground combat, while the Air Force has 
the ability to conduct air superiority and strike missions 
1 42owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," 32. 
143Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 1994), 4. 
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• 
time to crises, and organic logistics. In addition, naval 
forces are a primary requirement for introducing Army or Air 
Force units into a theater. 
Only naval forces combine reliable access to most 
regions of the world, forcible entry capability, mine-
countermeasures (MCM) capability, organic logistics for 
combat operations, organic command and control facilities, 
and (in the near future) organic TMD capabilities.145 More 
importantly, naval forces can bring their capabilities to a 
region without the need for host nation permission, since 
they operate in international waters. 1 46 With a declining 
availability of facilities to which the United States has 
reliable access, the ability to operate independent of host 
permission is invaluable, and allows naval forces to bring 
U.S. tactical air power, U.S. land power, U.S. strike power, 
and U.S. command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, sensors, and reconaissance (C 4 ISR) to any area 
on earth that is accessible by sea.14 7 
145Roger Barnett, "Regional Conflict Requires Naval 
Forces," Proceedings (June 1992): 31-32. 
146Morgan, "Preparing for Tomorrow's Troubles," 51. 
147Ectward Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 1. 
Also, it is significant that 70 percent of the world's 
population reside within one hundred miles of the sea, 
allowing U.S. naval forces access to the majority of earth's 
strategically important locations. See Scott Gourley, 
"Expanding the Littoral Battlespace," Sea Power (June 1998): 
45. 
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After naval forces enter a region, their high level of 
sustainability allows them to keep station for weeks or even 
months at a time. With the ability to take on fuel, food, 
ammunition, spare parts, personnel, and electronic data at 
sea, naval forces comprise a "sea base" for the projection 
of power, and can monitor events in a region without the 
entanglements of being stationed in a host nation. As an 
extreme example of sustainability, USS Eisenhower (CVN-69) 
and her battle group spent 247 days out of a 252-day period 
at sea during the 1979-1980 Iran hostage crisis. 148 Even on 
ordinary deployments in the absence of a crisis, at-sea 
periods of five or six weeks are common, and may involve 
several underway replenishment operations. 
Flexibility is one of the most important 
characteristics of naval forces. Because U.S. naval forces 
are the only forces that operate across all three mediums--
on land, on and under the sea, and in the air--they are 
uniquely flexible in responding to crises.14 9 In addition, 
naval forces can respond to events at any level of the 
spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian operations to major 
148Admiral (retired) Carlisle A. H. Trost, "Maritime 
Strategy for the 1990s," Proceedings Naval Review (May 
1990): 97. 
149owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted World," 33. 
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theater war.1 5 0 The ability of naval forces to take 
station, monitor events, gather information, and respond 
when directed at an appropriate level of violence (or non-
violence) to a crisis are the quintessential attributes of 
forward presence forces.151 
When naval forces take station in a region, their level 
of visibility can be increased or decreased as the situation 
warrants. This scalability allows naval forces to announce 
their presence very plainly, for instance when USS N.e.N 
Jersey (BB-62) sailed within sight of the coast of Lebanon, 
or to remain over the horizon, out of sight but not out of 
mind.152 Thus naval forces can be present in crisis areas, 
able to monitor events and intercede if necessary, without 
being as provocative as land-based U.S. forces. With the 
emerging ability to put the Marines ashore from over the 
horizon, maintaining ambiguity about the location of U.S. 
naval forces will be a significant advantage.15 3 
150 
••• From the Sea (Washington, D.C.: Department of the 
Navy, 1992, 6-7. 
151Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,'' 97. 
1S2Barnett, "Regional Conflict Requires Naval Forces," 
33; Captain Robert Johnson, "Carriers Are Forward Presence," 
Proceedinqs (August 1996): 38. 
153General Charles Krulak, "Projecting Combat Power 
Ashore: The Marine Corps in Transition," Armed Forces 
Journal International (March 1994): 27. 
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When naval forces deploy to a region, their position in 
international waters avoids the political issues involved in 
having U.S. troops on foreign soil. This is an important 
requirement in many Islamic countries, notably Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait, as well as in smaller countries that may desire 
military-to-military relations and joint training with U.S. 
forces, but do not want to be smothered by a large U.S. 
presence. 15 4 Singapore, for example, is eager to train with 
U.S. forces and to host U.S. port calls, but wishes to avoid 
a large, permanent presence on its territory. 155 While on 
station, naval forces' separation from land protects them 
from the kinds of religious or political animosity that led 
to the bombing of the Khobar Towers and Beirut Marine 
barracks. Also, their position allows naval forces to 
withdraw from a crisis with far less publicity than land-
based forces, and without signaling a U.S. retreat in the 
eyes of regional friends and adversaries.156 
154 James Lasswell, "Presence--Do We Stay or Do We Go?" 
Joint Force ouarterly (Summer 1995): 85. 
155chiu, The Politics of overseas Bases, Appendix B, B-
26-27; Barbara Opall-Rome, "U.S., Singapore Reach Agreement 
Expanding Defense Ties," Defense News, 16-22 November 1998, 
30. 
156charles Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 1980), 15; Kahan and Sands, Alternative 
Naval Deployment Concepts, 2-4. 
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Naval forces are quick to respond to crises due to 
their regular positioning in likely trouble areas, and their 
ability to shift locations as soon as they receive orders to 
do so. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, USS Independence (CV-62) 
and USS Eisenhower (CVN-69) were positioned in the Indian 
Ocean and the Mediterranean, respectively. Both carriers' 
battle groups immediately set course for the Gulf, while 
nearly a week passed before the first land-based forces 
began deploying to Saudi Arabia. The reason: ~he ground-
based forces had to wait until U.S.-Saudi agreements on the 
size and composition of forces were completed. 157 In 
addition to their ability to re-deploy at a moment's notice, 
naval forces on routine deployment are essentially at full 
combat readiness all the time. In the words of one author, 
"The Navy is always mobilized, and preparedness is a service 
principle. M-Day is every day for ships at sea."158 This 
high level of readiness, which allows peacetime operations 
to shift to combat operations in a matter of hours, adds to 
the quick response time of naval forces. 
When a crisis does escalate into a regional war, naval 
forces will be the key enabler for deploying Army and Air 
157David Perin, Aircraft Carriers: Why Do We Have Them? 
How Many Do We Need? (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval 
Analyses, 1993), 19. 
158George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 278; 
Johnson, "Carriers Are Forward Presence," 39. 
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Force units to the theater. The Army's heavy equipment will 
have to come by sea, requiring that the relevant SLOCs are 
maintained open. Mine countermeasures (MCM), long neglected 
during the Cold War due to emphasis on open-ocean warfare 
against the Soviet Navy, have received renewed focus in 
recent years. 159 Diesel submarines, once a small threat to 
deep-water nuclear powered submarines and carrier battle 
groups, are a significant menace in shallow-water littoral 
environments, and must be kept away from arriving cargo 
ships.1 60 Air-launched anti-ship missiles have shown their 
lethality to merchant ships and warships alike in the past, 
and must also be defended against during a build-up for 
regional war.161 Finally, the need for TMD capability from 
the outset of a crisis is one of the most important 
requirements of a future overseas deployment of U.S. forces, 
and will be met in the near future by the Navy's Aegis-class 
destroyers and cruisers.162 
l59Robert Holzer, "Study: Mines, Quieter Subs Pose 
Looming Naval Threats," Defense News, 8-14 September 1997, 
38. 
1 60commander Joseph Lodmell, "It Only Takes One," 
Proceedinqs (December 1996): 30. 
1 61Mark Hewish, "The Menace Reawakens: Defense Against 
Cruise," Jane's International Defense Review (December 
1996): 28. 
l62Lt. Commander Charles Swicker, "Ballistic Missile 
Defense from the Sea: The Commander's Perspective," Naval 
War Colleqe Review (Spring 1997): 7; Weaver and Glaes, 
Invitinq Disaster. 
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Naval forces possess the combat capabilities, freedom 
of movement, sustainability, flexibility, and quick 
responsiveness needed to defend against uncertain and 
unforeseen threats to U.S. interests. The level of U.S. 
dependence on the seas for safety and prosperity is unlikely 
to diminish in the near future, or even the distant 
future. 163 Thus the need for maritime forces, both Navy and 
Marine Corps, to be deployed around the world in the 
protection of U.S. interests will be an enduring 
requirement: 
Political emphases at home and abroad may wax and 
wane, but it is difficult to imagine any lessening of 
the nation's fundamental requirement for maritime 
security to protect its most basic interests in the 
future. 164 
Naval Diplomacy 
Edward Luttwak, in his 1974 work The Political Uses of 
Sea Power, opens with the observation that: 
The familiar attributes of an oceanic navy--inherent 
mobility, tactical flexibility, and a wide geographic 
reach--render it peculiarly useful as an instrument 
of policy even in the absence of hostilities. 165 
163until and unless scientific advances overcome the 
laws of gravity and allow cheap transportation of goods by 
air or space, the oceans will remain the principal highways 
for U.S. commerce. 
1 64 Joseph Alexander and Merrill Bartlett, Sea Soldiers 
in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare. 1945-1991 (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1995), 172. 
165Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, 1. 
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Luttwak's point is a good one, and underscores the fact 
that, for the majority of their existence, armed forces will 
not be engaged in war, but in peacetime activities. The 
capability to fight wars, and the pursuit in peacetime of 
better warfighting skills, has definite utility in U.S. 
diplomatic relations with others. However, the wide range 
of peacetime activities that naval forces are able to 
undertake, by virtue of their mobility, flexibility, and 
reach, give them preeminent status as a peacetime tool of 
U.S. diplomacy. 
Naval diplomacy may be defined as actions short of war, 
possibly involving the use of limited force, intended to 
influence the thoughts and actions of other states or 
individuals. The older term "gunboat diplomacy" was well 
known in previous eras, especially to such famous mariners 
and sea-minded leaders as Admiral Horatio Nelson and 
President Theodore Roosevelt.166 While the instruments of 
naval diplomacy have changed from Nelson's and Roosevelt's 
day, the principle of employing military force in actions 
166Nelson is well known for the assertion that, "The 
best diplomats are a fleet of English ships of war,", while 
Roosevelt's famous "big stick" was the U.S. Navy's Great 
White Fleet: "If the American nation will speak softly and 
yet build and keep at a pitch of the highest training a 
thoroughly efficient Navy, the Monroe Doctrine will go far." 
See Robert Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval 
Quotations (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1966), 88, 
209. 
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short of war is an age-old aspect of diplomacy. Since most 
if not all such actions must take place far from U.S. 
territory, the sea services' mobility and freedom of 
movement is their principal advantage in supporting American 
diplomacy. 
Naval diplomacy can include such activities and uses as 
deterrence, signaling of U.S. interest, providing assurance 
to allies, intimidation or suasion of adversaries, limited 
combat operations, the enforcement of international 
sanctions, the enforcement and protection of freedom of the 
seas, and humanitarian and non-combatant evacuation 
operations.167 At times naval diplomacy takes on the 
appearance of "business as usual", as when Sixth Fleet ships 
and aircraft sail the Mediterranean on routine deployment. 
At other times, the latent power of U.S. naval forces is 
plainly visible for all to see, as when those same ships 
conduct strikes against Libyan facilities. In both 
instances, however, the intent is the same: to influence the 
thoughts and actions of others, and to do so in a way that 
safeguards U.S. interests. 
An obvious but important point is that military forces 
cannot be employed for diplomatic purposes without risk. 
167An important difference between naval diplomacy and 
gunboat diplomacy is the implicit threat of force in the 
latter, whereas naval diplomacy includes non-combat aspects 
such as evacuations and humanitarian operations. See Sir 
James Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," Proceedinqs 
(August 1986): 38. 
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Even in peacetime, when Sixth Fleet ships sail the 
Mediterranean there is the not inconsiderable risk attendant 
to ships at sea, and to the sailors and marines aboard those 
ships. Accidents during training, the dangerous environment 
of the flight deck, the inherent danger of handling 
explosive ordnance, the possibility of being mistaken as a 
target during a war involving other states--all combine to 
make daily life a dangerous affair for the Navy and Marine 
Corps.168 
When naval forces are used for naval diplomacy in areas 
of tension or crisis, the risk to those forces increases 
substantially. Naval forces are not exempt from danger when 
used for naval diplomacy, their other advantages 
notwithstanding. Particularly in light of the proliferation 
of modern weapons among even third-rate powers, naval forces 
employed in naval diplomacy may be at serious risk, as the 
Stark incident demonstrated.169 However, the value provided 
by having military force on the scene in potential trouble 
spots warrants the continued presence of naval forces. 
168During the author's brief service in the U.S. Navy, 
each of the examples listed resulted in the loss of life of 
sailors and marines: mid-air collisions between jet 
aircraft; aviation boatswain's mates blown off the flight 
deck; the USS .I..mia turret explosion; and the USS Stark 
attack. 
1 69william Smith, "As Sophisticated Weapons 
Proliferate, More Than Ever the Navy Needs to Be Ready," sea 
Power (January 1995): 59-60. 
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Provided that rules of engagement are biased towards 
protecting American naval forces, the risks of naval 
diplomacy are well worth taking.170 
When using naval diplomacy, two forms of naval power 
have shown themselves to be very well-suited to a wide 
variety of situations. The aircraft carrier has attained 
premier status as the "big stick" of U.S. naval diplomacy, 
carrying nearly as much diplomatic impact as it does 
military capability. Able to conduct a wide range of 
military missions, and with logistical and medical 
facilities for the largest of humanitarian operations, the 
aircraft carrier is the embodiment of naval diplomacy. 171 
The second highly-suited form of naval diplomacy is 
the Navy-Marine Corps amphibious ready group (ARG). In 
fact, for operations conducted during periods when the armed 
forces as a whole are structured and postured for peace, the 
170one of the most telling facts to come out of the 
investigation of the Stark incident was the hazy ROE under 
which U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf were required to 
operate. While U.S. captains were authorized to warn and, if 
necessary, to fire on approaching aircraft, one of the two 
"overriding concerns" of U.S. leaders was to avoid 
"political incidents," such as shooting down a "friendly" 
Iraqi aircraft. See Michael Vlahos, "The Stark report," 
Proceedings Naval Review (May 1988): 65. 
171Johnson, "Carriers Are Forward Presence," 38; Sir 
James Cable, "Showing the Flag," Proceedinqs (April 1984): 
60. 
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Marines' constant readiness for war makes them 
indispensable: 
The need for Marines as a ready force is paramount 
when the Nation is largely demobilized; it may 
actually recede after full mobilization. The 
Nations's ground shock trooQs must be most ready when 
the Nation is least ready.172 
In a study of 215 incidents from 1946 to 1975 in which 
U.S. forces responded, short of war, to crises around the 
world, the Marine Corps was found to be a principal 
participant in the majority of cases. The reasons for the 
frequent use of the Marines in crises are not hard to 
understand: 
The sort of limited politically oriented operation 
which makes up most of the incidents may well 
constitute the essence--that is, the central self-
perception or purpose--of the corps .... Moreover, 
the Marines are equipped, trained, and organized for 
quick reaction, limited operations, and flexible 
utilization. Most important, Marine Corps units have 
been maintained afloat in the Mediterranean, the 
Western Pacific, and often in the Caribbean, 
throughout the postwar period.173 
Events since 1975, including operations in Grenada, 
Somalia, Liberia, Bosnia, and Haiti, have demonstrated the 
lasting importance of having Navy-Marine ARGs at sea in 
potential trouble spots. The ability to deliver ground 
combat forces from the sea, with supporting air power and 
172 From the report of the 82nd Congress, cited in 
General Charles Krulak, "An Enduring Instrument: The Force 
in Readiness in National Defense," Strategic Review (Spring 
1997): 10. 
173Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 45. 
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naval fire support, is a threat no adversary can ignore when 
U.S. naval forces are present. 
Deterrence 
Perhaps the most important function of naval diplomacy 
is conventional deterrence. Deterrence can be applied to 
specific target states, or to uncertain entities that might 
wish to do harm to U.S. forces or interests. Naval forces, 
due to their global mobility, combat power, and long inland 
reach, are powerful agents of deterrence. The Department of 
Defense defines deterrence as: 
the prevention from action by the fear of the 
consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought 
about by the existence of a creditable threat of 
unacceptable counteraction.174 
In order for deterrence to work, the deterring state 
must present both the capability and credibility to produce 
"unacceptable counteraction" for the state to be 
deterred.175 Although both are required, capability is the 
174 From Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, cited in Zimm, 
"Deterrence: Then & Now," 50. 
1 75while the model of deterrence is well established, 
it is very difficult to know when deterrence has worked. 
Usually all that can be known with certainty about 
deterrence is when it has failed; the absence of deterrence 
failure, however, does not necessarily mean that deterrence 
has been successful. This caveat aside, the components of 
deterrence are capability and credibility. See Blechman and 
Kaplan, Force Without War, 518; Jordan et al., American 
National security, 36. 
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prime requirement. If the deterring state does not have (or 
appear to have) the capability to carry out its threatened 
action, it will have little if any credibility. Only after 
capability is present can credibility exist. In the words 
of Colin Gray, "Defense deters, if anything can."176 
Recent events surrounding the appropriately-named 
Mischief Reef have underscored the need for capability first 
and foremost. Chinese military construction on Mischief 
Reef, in flagrant violation of an agreement reached with the 
Philippines and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), has found Manila without the military means to 
deter China, even though the reef is over one thousand miles 
from China and a mere two hundred miles from the 
Philippines. As stated by the Philippines' Defense 
Secretary, Orlando Mercado: 
Many people now have begun to realize that we have 
allowed ourselves to become so weak militarily that 
we cannot back ug our diplomatic moves with a 
credible force.177 
Credibility in turn arises from the will to act, and 
the belief in the minds of others that the threatened action 
might actually be carried out. In this regard, the level of 
interest involved for the deterring state is of great 
17 6Gray, "Deterrence and Regional Conflict," 58. 
177steve Watkins, "Military Weakness Hampers 
Philippines in China Dispute," Defense News, 16-22 November 
1998, 3; See also Ralph Cossa, "Mischief Reef Flashpoint," 
Defense News, 11 January 1999, 13. 
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importance. A state with a vital interest at stake should 
be judged more likely to carry out its deterrent threat than 
a state with a marginal interest. It is as much for this 
reason as for defensive capability that U.S. ground troops 
are forward-based in Kuwait and South Korea. Any attack on 
these countries almost certainly will cause U.S. casualties, 
thereby threatening the vital U.S. interest of safety and 
security of American citizens, and de facto involving the 
United States in the conflict. The placement of U.S. 
servicemen in harm's way signals the level of U.S. interest 
in the defense of these allies. The knowledge of U.S. 
involvement, with the full range of U.S. capabilities that 
involvement would entail, strengthens the credibility of 
deterrence in Kuwait and South Korea.178 
Also important for deterrence is the perception of the 
deterring state's willingness to resort to military force. 
If the state has often taken action in the past, it will be 
seen as more credible than a state that has only rarely 
taken action. Operations such as the MayaQuez rescue, the 
Iran rescue attempt, and the Operations in the Vicinity of 
Libya (OVL-I, -II, and -III) serve to create a reputation 
for action, even if sometimes unsuccessful. 179 Conversely, 
17 8Michael O'Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S. 
Troops Home?" ForeiQn Policy (Winter 1998-99): 83. 
179Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime, 11; Parks, 
"Crossing the Line," 40-42. 
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the abrupt departure from Somalia, and repeated toleration 
of Saddam Hussein's violations of U.N. resolutions, serve to 
create a reputation for inaction. The prevailing impression 
of will in the mind of the target state will be crucial to 
the success or failure of deterrent efforts. The periodic 
display of will is itself an important action, as rogue 
states and various bad actors tend to "push the envelope" of 
acceptable behavior.180 
Important in the context of will to use force is the 
seemingly lower political penalty for using military force 
from the sea, as opposed to using land-based forces. The 
March 1986 attacks by Sixth Fleet carrier aircraft on Libyan 
patrol boats aroused little indignation among U.S. allies, 
or even from Arab governments in the Mediterranean. One 
month later, when the United States requested basing support 
for air strikes with land-based aircraft, only Britain 
obliged the request. Because U.S. allies can be distantly 
supportive of U.S. action taken from the sea, as opposed to 
actions originating from their territory, force from the sea 
may be less constrained than force from land. 181 Thus it 
follows that the threat of military force from the sea will 
often be more credible than force from land. 
lBOzimm, "Deterrence: Then & Now," 52. 
lBlcable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," 40. 
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Perhaps the most important factor in the mind of the 
state to be deterred is the visibility of the deterrent 
capability. While some schools of thought, especially the 
long-range air power school, believe that forces can exert 
presence and deterrence from a distance, it seems more 
likely that visible forces, forces manifestly able to 
observe and intervene in a crisis, and to "produce 
unacceptable counteraction," will have the strongest 
deterrent effect on an adversary. This point is of great 
importance, as it is the adversary's perception that 
ultimately determines the success or failure of deterrence, 
not U.S. perception. Thus visibility is of paramount 
importance to conventional deterrence. 182 U.S. naval 
forces, whether carriers, ARGs, or surface combatants, 
combine the military capability and visibility necessary to 
produce a strong deterrent effect. Emerging precision 
guided weapons (PGMs), designed for use from the sea, should 
make U.S. naval forces a deterrent even to large-scale 
ground operations in the near future, while naval TMD 
182Thankfully, even some Air Force officers have called 
into question the deterrent capability of forces in CONUS. 
See "Presence Is in the Beholder's Eye," letter to the 
editor, Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1995): 112, written by 
Colonel Ronald Dietz, USAF. See also Lasswell, "Presence-Do 
We Stay or Go," 84. 
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capability should provide deterrence against the leverage of 
ballistic missiles.183 
Although it is difficult to judge the success of 
deterrence, several examples of deterrence success and 
failure highlight the need to combine capability with 
credibility. In the Yorn Kippur War of 1973, the Sixth Fleet 
was able to deter the Soviet Union from conducting a sea 
lift to Egypt. While the United States had a vital interest 
in Israel's survival, and thus could credibly threaten to 
take action, the Soviets had at best a secondary interest at 
stake, and deemed it not worthwhile to risk a conflict with 
the United States. 184 In the 1987-88 convoy operations in 
the Persian Gulf, Iranian attempts to mine the Strait and 
conduct commando attacks on passing ships largely ceased 
after U.S. forces demonstrated the capability to intercept 
Iranian forces, even at night.185 In contrast to these 
successes, naval operations in the Bay of Bengal in 1971 had 
little or no effect on India, since the credibility of the 
United States taking military action on the Indian 
183Glenn Goodman, "Nowhere To Hide," Armed Forces 
Journal International (October 1997): 64; Willard Fallon, 
"Combating the Ballistic Missile Threat," Proceedinqs (July 
1994): 31. 
184Jordan, "Naval Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf," 29. 
185Ronald O'Rourke, "The Tanker War," Proceedinqs Naval 
Review (May 1988): 32. 
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subcontinent was marginal.18 6 Saddam Hussein also was not 
deterred from invading Kuwait because of his perception of 
U.S. interest, which he believed to be indifferent to 
Kuwait's sovereignty. 
These examples point out the critical relationship 
between national interests, from which policy is derived, 
and the ability to deter. If a crisis does not involve 
sufficient interest for U.S. intervention in the mind of the 
aggressor, deterrence likely will fail. Likewise, if the 
threatened action is not credible to the situation, because 
the action is not proportionate to the interest, deterrence 
likely will fail. The relationship between the level of 
interest, the threatened action, and the credibility of 
naval deterrence is summed up by Sir James Cable: "Gunboat 
diplomacy is a screwdriver intended to turn a particular 
kind of screw. It is not a hammer that will bang home any 
old nail. 111 87 
The wide range of options that U.S. naval forces 
provide the National Command Authority in crisis response, 
often referred to as a "rheostat" of options, allows U.S. 
policy-makers to threaten a credible, proportionate action, 
and set limits on the options available to the deterred 
state. This is especially true due to the very high 
186Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 518. 
18 7cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future," 39. 
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readiness of U.S. naval forces, which can shift to combat 
operations on very short warning. Luttwak refers to this 
feature of naval deterrence as, "a shadow that impinges on 
the freedom of action of adversaries, because the 
capabilities can be activated at any time."188 
The ability to combine a certain vagueness of intent 
with uncertainty of location makes naval forces ideal for 
this role, which Luttwak calls "latent suasion." 189 The 
ability to operate in international waters, to take station 
close up or at a distance, the range of capabilities 
provided, the ability to remain for months at a time, and 
the responsiveness of forces on the scene, have made U.S. 
naval forces the "preeminent military force in discrete 
political operations" in the post-World War Two era.l90 A 
former Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command 
(CinCCENTCOM), Army General Binford Peay, sums up the 
deterrent utility of naval forces: 
Because of their limited footprint, strategic 
agility, calculated ambiguity of intent, and major 
strategic and operational deterrent capability, naval 
forces are invaluable. Our ability to rapidly move 
these forces in 1993 and again in 1994 from the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Gulf to positions 
off the coast of Somalia and Kuwait demonstrates 
extraordinary utility and versatility .... The 
188Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, 11. 
1B 9 rbid. 
190Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War, 529. 
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carrier battle group, in particular, has been an 
unmistakable sign of U.S. commitment and resolve in 
the Central Region.191 
Siqnalinq u.s. Interest/Supportinq u.s. Allies 
One of the principal methods for the United States to 
signal its interest in a region or country is by dispatching 
military forces. Given the global mobility of naval forces, 
and their freedom to come and go in international waters, 
warships clearly make good "diplomats", as Nelson observed. 
Add to this mobility the visibility of naval forces and it 
is not surprising that the Navy has been the service of 
choice for sending a signal of U.S. interest for the last 
fifty years. 192 Army and Air Force units can be employed in 
this role as well, but encounter political, logistical, and 
risk concerns from which naval forces largely are exempt. 
Again, it is not intended to marginalize the need for land 
forces in places like Kuwait or Korea. However, for 
providing a flexible, mobile, and responive means of 
signalling U.S. interest, naval forces remain superior to 
land forces. 
The first post-World War Two use of naval forces for 
signaling occurred in 1946, when USS Missouri (BB-63) was 
191Quoted in Johnson, "Carriers Are Forward Presence," 
37. 
192Roger Barnett, "U.S. Strategy, Freedom of the Seas, 
Sovereignty and Crisis Management," Strateqic Review (Winter 
1992): 32. 
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sent to Turkey by President Truman.1 93 Ostensibly sent to 
return the body of the late Turkish ambassador in style, in 
reality the Missouri's mission was to signal U.S. support 
for the Turks, who were being pressured by Stalin to re-
negotiate the Montreaux Convention. The Missouri's presence 
in this instance largely was symbolic, as no single warship, 
not even the "Mighty Mo", could have any decisive impact on 
the military balance in the eastern Mediterranean.194 
Nonetheless, the appearance of a U.S. capital ship in a 
Turkish port gave Turkey a boost in confidence in dealings 
with the Soviets, and laid the groundwork for a lasting 
U.S.-Turkish alliance. 
The deployment of naval forces to a region can signal 
U.S. interest without targeting a certain state, as a 
deterrent deployment might aim to do. Over the last fifty 
years, the deployment of U.S. naval forces has become part 
of the landscape in strategically important areas, and has 
served to emphasize U.S. interest in the Mediterranean, the 
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.195 Even 
greater emphasis is placed on a region when U.S. naval 
forces are homeported or headquartered there.196 The 
193Baer, 100 Years of sea Power, 282. 
194Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, 32. 
195Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime, 15. 
196Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward 
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Seventh Fleet homeports a CVBG and an ARG in Japan, while 
the Sixth Fleet is headquartered in Italy. After the Gulf 
War, the Fifth Fleet was re-established and headquartered in 
Bahrain, replacing the five-ship Mid East Force with a 
thirty-ship fleet as a signal of U.S. interest in the 
Gulf. 197 
In each of the three strategic hubs, the presence of 
U.S. naval forces serves to promote stability, a requirement 
for continuity of trade. For example, the Seventh Fleet in 
the Pacific does not have to be postured to deter any one 
Asian nation, but can convey to all observers the fact that 
the United States is interested in the stability of this 
region. In fact, many observers judge U.S. naval presence 
in the Pacific to be the principal stabilizing force in an 
important region: 
Perhaps most critical for U.S. interests in this 
region will be a sustained and visible naval presence 
that will reassure friends and allies about the 
United States' commitment to the region's political 
stability, which is necessary for economic 
prosperity.198 
Presence, 2. 
197In 1982, nearly a decade before the Gulf War, the 
authors of Projection of Power advocated stationing a U.S. 
fleet in the Persian Gulf, and even advocated homeporting an 
aircraft carrier in the region. See Ra'anan et al., 
Projection of Power, 98-99. Also, Redd, "Fifth Fleet, 
Arriving," 48. 
198Don DeYoung, "Sea Power Is Grand Strategy," 
Proceedinqs (November 1994): 76. 
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In addition to general, day-to-day signaling via 
presence, naval forces can send specific messages to 
specific states through a variety of means. The means can 
be subtle or highly visible, and can show support or 
intimidate as needed, often at the same time. One of the 
most common means of showing support for an ally is through 
a port visit by U.S. ships. Easily arranged and beneficial 
both to U.S. sailors and the local economy, a visit to Haifa 
or Singapore serves to re-affirm the close ties between the 
United States and allies. Ordinarily low-key, a port visit 
can also be a pointed reminder to potential enemies of U.S. 
capability in a region. In November 1992, for example, USS 
Topeka (SSN-754) held a very visible port visit in Bahrain. 
Conducted at the time the first of three Kilo-class 
submarines was in transit to Iran from Russia, the visit 
served both to remind Iran of the presence of a premier 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platform in the Gulf, and to 
re-assure the GCC states of U.S. interest in their 
safety. 199 
Another means of sending a signal of U.S. interest in 
events is a significant change in established operating 
pattern or tempo. An increased number of patrol flights 
199Although not known for their visibility--the service 
motto being "the Silent Service"--in this instance a visit 
by a submarine to a U.S. ally proved highly useful in 
displaying U.S. interest in the Gulf. See Jan Breemer, 
"Where Are The Submarines?" Proceedings (January 1993): 38. 
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from a CVBG, or the placement of a naval force in greater 
proximity to a certain location, can signal a departure from 
normal operating procedure due to heightened interest. An 
example of such a signal occurred in 1973, at the outset of 
the Yorn Kippur War. The USS Independence (CV-62) put to sea 
immediately on 6 October in the eastern Mediterranean, 
signaling increased U.S. interest and watchfulness. At the 
same time, USS Kennedy (CV-67) remained in port in Scotland, 
signaling U.S. restraint during a crisis. When the Soviets 
began to show signs of an impending air lift and sea lift to 
Egypt, three U.S. carriers concentrated near Crete, a major 
departure from normal operating patterns and a strong signal 
of U.S. preparedness to act.200 
In the late 1970s, an increase in the tempo and 
frequency of U.S.-Thailand exercises served to re-assure 
Thailand of U.S. support in the face of Vietnamese 
provocation. The annual COBRA GOLD exercises continue to 
demonstrate U.S. support for Thailand. Also in late 1970s, 
during the civil war in Yemen, the United States sent the 
USS Constellation (CV-64) CVBG to the Gulf of Aden, as well 
as sending Air Force E-3 aircraft to Saudi airfields, to 
show support for Saudi Arabia.201 
200Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime, 24-26; John 
Douglass, "Often the Only Option," Proceedings (February 
1998): 34. 
201Adarn Siegel, To Deter. Compel. and Reassure in 
International Crises: The Role of u.s. Naval Forces 
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The deployment of the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) and USS 
Independence (CV-62) CVBGs near the Taiwan Strait in March 
1996, in response to Chinese intimidation of Taiwan, also 
marked a major departure from normal operating procedure, as 
well as a massive concentration of U.S. firepower.2° 2 The 
concentration of two CVBGs sends a message simply by virtue 
of the latent combat power represented by these forces.2o 3 
The level of capability carried by a CVBG or ARG is one of 
the reasons these two forms of naval power are so useful in 
signaling U.S. interest, and is why U.S. regional commanders 
want these assets to be present even when conditions in 
their region seem calm: 
The presence of U.S. Navy ships has come to represent 
an expression of U.S. interest backed by readily 
deployable forces. This presence reassures allies 
and is one reason that Unified Commanders still 
demand carriers and amphibious forces even in the 
absence of an identifiable threat.204 
Under the National Security Strategy, which emphasizes 
engagement, the ability to re-assure allies and signal 
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1995), 22. At 
least in part because of the timely deployment of U.S. 
forces to support Saudi Arabia in 1979, the Saudi government 
granted full base access to U.S. forces in 1990. 
202Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: status, 
Prospects, 55-57. 
203Dismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 52; 
Linn, "Naval Forces In The Post-Cold War Era," 20. 
20 4Linn, "Naval Forces in the Post-Cold War Era," 20. 
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interest will be an important function of U.S. military 
forces.205 Given the mobility, sustainability, visibility, 
and responsiveness of naval forces, it seems likely that the 
Navy-Marine Corps team will continue to be the instrument of 
choice for signaling U.S. interest in the future. 
Limited Use of Force 
The strongest possible use of naval diplomacy is the 
use of military force in limited operations that do not 
qualify as war, either in response to or in anticipation of 
actions taken by another state or entity. 2 06 The ability to 
apply force in a controlled manner, in incremental levels as 
the situation warrants, makes this aspect of naval diplomacy 
useful for situations in which the United States cannot 
tolerate the status quo, is not willing or able to retreat, 
but does not wish to engage in a regional war. 207 Limited 
20 5william Johnsen, The Future Roles of U.S. Military 
Power and Their Implications (Carlisle, PA: Army War 
College, 1997), viii, 11. 
2 06The emerging stature of non-state terrorist 
organizations world-wide means that naval diplomacy can be 
applied to groups of individuals, without necessarily being 
directed at the state those individuals reside in. The 
recent cruise missile strikes against targets in Sudan and 
Afghanistan, and the 1985 intercept of an airliner carrying 
the Achille Lauro hijackers by Navy F-14 aircraft, are 
examples of naval diplomacy in which U.S. force is applied 
to individuals, not governments. See Jeffrey Simon, U........S..... 
Countermeasures Aqainst International Terrorism (Fort 
Belvoir, Virginia: Defense Technical Information Center, 
1990), 25-28. 
20 7Breemer, "Naval Strategy is Dead," 53. 
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strikes may be seen as a corollary to deterrence, in which 
the United States provides a demonstration of capability and 
will to an adversary, while still allowing the adversary to 
reverse course and cease its misbehavior. 
Because ground forces are more difficult to move into a 
region, and because ground forces can have little direct 
effect on an adversary without entering his territory, the 
utility of Army forces for limited military action is 
problematic.208 Unless Army forces are located in an 
adjacent state, they will likely be unable to bring force to 
bear, and will require permission from the host state. If 
Army forces are employed in limited action, the risk of 
sustaining U.S. casualties will be proportionate to the 
number of ground troops employed, and will be higher than 
for air or naval forces in any case.209 
Given the arguments against ground troops in most 
cases, the instruments of choice for the limited use of 
208rt is important to note the distinction between the 
limited use of military force, which entails attacking some 
target set of value to an adversary, and political-military 
operations such as the intervention in Somalia, which may 
not involve physical attacks on any targets, except in self-
defense. 
209The Mayaquez rescue operation, conducted by Marine 
ground troops, often is criticized for having resulted in 
forty-one U.S. casualties in the rescue of forty 
crewmembers. See Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime, 11. 
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force have been aircraft-delivered weapons. 21 0 In recent 
years, cruise missiles and other PGMs also have been used, 
obviating the need for the aircraft and pilot in many cases. 
The attractiveness of aircraft or PGMs stems from their 
ability to conduct discrete, controlled attacks from great 
distance, to limit collateral damage, and to minimize the 
number of U.S. servicemen put at risk. Because the United 
States is well above most regional powers in the balance of 
air power vs. air defenses, the air strike has been a 
favored method for employing limited force. 
Naval forces provide the ability to deliver U.S. strike 
aircraft to any region of the world that can be approached 
from the sea, with the all-important virtue of independence 
from host nation permission. The CVBG has no peer in this 
regard, as its air wing can deliver a wide range of weapons 
to targets hundreds of miles inland. In addition, the 
continued development of such autonomous weapons as the 
Tomahawk cruise missile, the stand-off land attack missile 
(SLAM and SLAM-ER), the joint stand-off weapon (JSOW), and 
the land-attack Standard missile (LASM), allow even smaller 
surface combatants and submarines to deliver potent strike 
weapons from the sea.211 
21°commander Robert Stumpf, "Air War With Libya," 
Proceedings (August 1986): 42; Hessman, "Forward-Thinking 
and Forward Deployed," 20-21. 
2llcaptain Richard Wright, "Shaping the Battlefield: 
The 21st-Century Navy," Surface Warfare (March/April 1998): 
113 
The employment of cruise missiles, especially 
Tomahawks, is extremely appropriate in many cases due to the 
nature of typical targets for limited use of force. High-
value assets of an adversary, such as military airfields, 
air defense systems, or command and control facilities, tend 
to be large, static targets. Thus cruise missiles, which 
can find such targets with increasing accuracy, can allow 
the use of force with no risk of U.S. casualties.212 
Emerging technology being introduced into the Tomahawk 
program should allow Tomahawks to be used against mobile 
targets in the future, as well as providing for immediate 
battle damage assessment.213 While Tomahawks or similar 
cruise missiles may not be appropriate for every target, for 
example terrorist training facilities in Afghanistan, they 
are very appropriate for attacking large, fixed targets with 
no risk of U.S. casualties. 
What other means does the United States have for 
employing limited military force? Unless ground troops are 
to be sent into a foreign country to conduct attacks, 
aircraft and missiles are the only options. The Air Force 
has tremendous striking power in its tactical aircraft, as 
33-35. 
212Rear Admiral Walter Locke and Kenneth Werell, "Speak 
Softly and ... " Proceedinqs (October 1994): 32. 
213vision. Presence. Power, 71. 
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well as in its inventory of cruise missiles and stand-off 
weapons. Air force bombers, particularly the B-2, are able 
to conduct strike missions from far greater distance than 
carrier aircraft, even from CONUS if necessary. However, 
all Air Force aircraft except heavy bombers require the 
permission of a host nation for launching strikes, 
permission that may not be forthcoming. 21 4 
The ability of U.S. naval forces to conduct strikes 
from international waters, free of host nation permission, 
is an advantage that cannot be overstated. Naval forces are 
the ideal instrument for the employment of military force 
short of war, and enjoy access to virtually all potential 
trouble areas by sea. Naval strike aircraft, such as the 
FA-18E/F, can deliver ordnance up to six hundred miles 
inland, while Tomahawks can attack targets up to fifteen 
hundred miles from their launch points, making few areas on 
earth immune to U.S. naval strike capability.215 Given the 
littoral location of almost all plausible sites for the use 
of limited military force, the ability to employ modern-day 
214 Davis, Aircraft carriers and the Role of Naval 
Power, 34. 
215James Hessman, "Overwhelming Air Power-From the 
Sea," Sea Power (June 1997): 27; Daniel Murphy, "Achieving 
21st Century Naval Mastery," Surface Warfare (March/April 
1998): 8. 
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"gunboat diplomacy" makes forward-deployed naval forces 
indispensable. 
Enforcement of Economic sanctions 
The ongoing enforcement of economic sanctions against 
Iraq is yet another form of naval diplomacy. Imposed after 
the Gulf War, the sanctions are intended to motivate Iraqi 
compliance with UNSCOM inspections of Iraqi facilities. For 
maritime sanctions enforcement, only on-scene naval forces 
will do. The need to stop, board, search, and detain 
smugglers cannot be met with land or air forces, nor can it 
be met from CONUs.216 
Since the establishment of Maritime Intercept 
Operations (MIO), conducted by the Multinational Intercept 
Force (MIF), over eleven thousand suspected smugglers have 
been stopped in the Persian Gulf.21 7 Supported by Task 
Force 50 of the Fifth Fleet, the MIF since 1991 has 
conducted the largest maritime intercept operation in 
history.218 
From 1991-1995, over 80 percent of attempts to smuggle 
oil through the Persian Gulf were foiled by the MIF. After 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 986 was signed, however, 
216nismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 52. 
21711 Sentinels of International Will," All Hands (July 
1998): 7. 
218Redd, "Fifth Fleet, Arriving," 49. 
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allowing Iraqi oil sales for food and medical supplies, the 
interception of oil smugglers has dropped off. A principal 
reason for the reduction in successful intercepts has been, 
and continues to be, Iranian assistance to Iraqi 
smugglers.219 
By allowing Iraqi ships to sail inside the twelve-mile 
limit of Iran's territorial waters, Iran effectively 
prevents the MIF from conducting intercepts. Vice Admiral 
Thomas Fargo, a former commander of Fifth Fleet, described 
the Iranian actions as, "a rather sophisticated effort," and 
indicated that substantial portions of illegal Iraqi oil 
proceeds were being diverted to Iranian authorities in 
return for their assistance. 220 Some Iraqi ships reportedly 
have been allowed to fly the Iranian flag after entering 
Iranian waters, further complicating the problem of 
intercepting them.221 
Despite Iranian efforts to help Iraq circumvent the 
U.N. sanctions, ships of the Fifth Fleet and the MIF remain 
on station in the Gulf, with U.S. ships of Task Force 50 
219Lt. Commander William Bray, "Five Fleets: Around the 
World with the Nimitz," Proceedings (January 1999): 80. 
220"u.s. Admiral Says Iraq, Aided by Iran, Is Smuggling 
Oil in Gulf," New York Times, 12 February 1997, A7. 
221 Tom Chamberlain, "Naval Forces and the Persian 
Gulf," Surface warfare (March/April 1997): 4. 
117 
conducting the majority of intercepts. 222 A minimum of two 
U.S. ships are constantly on duty conducting maritime 
intercepts, including boarding, searching, and, when 
violators are caught, escorting ships to Gulf ports for 
further investigation.223 
Enforcing and Protecting Freedom of the Seas 
One of the long-standing principles of international 
law is the right of free passage on the seas. Especially 
for a maritime nation, such as the United States, freedom of 
the seas is a vital national interest. As currently 
defined, the limit of a coastal state's territorial waters 
is twelve miles, beyond which any nation has the right to 
navigate and overfly the world's seas and oceans. Within 
twelve miles, ships are allowed "innocent passage," but 
overflights are not permitted. Excessive claims to offshore 
waters as territorial waters, based on abuse of 
international definitions of territorial bodies of water, 
consistently have been resisted by the United States, at 
times through the use of naval forces to challenge excessive 
claims.224 
222
"NAVCENT: Forward Presence," Surface Warfare (March 
/April 1997): 14. 
22 3chamberlain, "Naval Forces and the Persian Gulf," 2. 
224Parks, "Crossing the Line," 41-42. 
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In the modern era, President Ronald Reagan was one of 
the strongest proponents for aggressive defense of freedom 
of the seas. After the Carter administration's half-hearted 
attempts to protect freedom of the seas, the Reagan 
administration produced formal guidelines for freedom of 
navigation (FON) operations. The first such FON operation 
occurred on 18 August 1981, when USS Forrestal (CV-59) and 
USS Nimitz (CVN-68) sailed into the Gulf of Sidra, claimed 
by Libya as a territorial sea. Libya's claim was legally 
unjustifiable, and could have set a precedent for the many 
similar claims around the world. After F-14s from the 
carriers were fired on by Libyan Su-22 fighters, the Libyan 
planes were shot down in self-defense. No further incidents 
occurred, and the carriers left the Gulf a few days 
later.225 
After renewed Libyan claims to the Gulf of Sidra, 
including Colonel Gadhafi's assertion that the line of 
thirty-two degrees, thirty minutes North Latitude 
constituted the "Line of Death", President Reagan authorized 
the 1986 OVL operations. OVL-III, conducted from 23-29 
March 1986, involved the Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers USS 
Coral Sea (CV-43), uss Saratoqa (CV-60), and uss America 
(CV-66), along with their escorts. On 24 March these ships 
steamed into the Gulf of Sidra in a direct challenge to 
225rbid., 43-44. 
119 
Gadhafi's claims. When Libyan SAMs were fired at U.S. 
aircraft, the carriers responded with strikes against Libyan 
facilities and ships. As in 1981, Libyan provocation ceased 
after the first U.S. retaliation.226 
One year later, in 1987, President Reagan again 
authorized a FON operation, this time in the Persian Gulf. 
The Iran-Iraq War had spread to include attacks on each 
adversary's shipping. The attacks, which included 
minelaying and aircraft-delivered anti-ship missiles, 
threatened to interrupt the steady flow of oil to world 
economies, as attacks by Iran often targeted Iraq's two 
principal supporters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.2 27 Just two 
months after the Stark incident, Reagan authorized the re-
flagging of Kuwaiti tankers with the U.S. flag, and the 
formation of convoys escorted by U.S. warships.2 28 Although 
Iranian attacks continued for some time after the convoys 
were established, by the end of 1987 twenty-three convoys 
had been escorted through the Gulf, and Iranian efforts to 
conduct commando attacks with small boats largely had ceased 
after Marine Corps helicopter gunships repeatedly 
226stumpf, "Air War With Libya," 46-47. 
22 7see Appendix A, Table 7, for a chronology of events 
in the Gulf in 1987. 
228captain Frank Seitz, U.S. Merchant Marine, "S.S. 
Bridgeton: The First Convoy," Proceedings Naval Review (May 
1988): 52. 
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intercepted the Iranian forces.229 The FON operations, 
although costly and dangerous, were justified by the 
imperative in U.S. national security and foreign policy of 
maintaining freedom of the seas. 
Another threat to freedom of the seas, less well-known 
and seemingly anachronistic, is modern-day piracy. 
Occurring primarily in and among the islands of the East 
Indies and the South China Sea, roughly eighty acts of 
piracy are recorded each year, half of them involving 
violence. Not surprisingly, the ASEAN defense forces 
allocate significant effort and resources to combating the 
problem of piracy.230 U.S. naval forces, through training 
and joint exercises, assist ASEAN nations in their ongoing 
efforts to fight piracy. 
Enforcing and protecting freedom of the seas is one of 
the Navy's principal responsibilities, and is conducted 
essentially every day by underway ships. The focus on the 
Mediterranean, the Gulf, and Northeast Asia indicates the 
importance of the SLOCs in these regions, but all of the 
world's international waters receive the benevolent 
attention of the U.S. Navy. 
229o'Rourke, "The Tanker War," 30, 34. 
230Russ Swinnerton, "Piracy Remains A Concern For 
Southeast Asian Nations," Defense News, 25-31 August 1997, 
8. 
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The preceding sections, covering deterrence, signaling 
and re-assuring, limited use of force, sanctions 
enforcement, and enforcement and protection of freedom of 
the seas, comprise the broad concept of naval diplomacy. 
Each is a useful tool for U.S. relations with other nations, 
provided that the risks and limitations of each is 
understood. It is the unique features of naval forces, and 
primarily their ability to come and go at will in 
international waters, that make possible the wide array of 
actions encompassed by naval diplomacy. 
Maintaining Interoperability with Allies 
Although U.S. forces are the best-equipped and most 
capable in the world, it is both sensible and advantageous 
to involve U.S. allies whenever possible, both in peacetime 
and in times of crisis or conflict. While the United States 
must maintain the capability to act alone, it is especially 
important that U.S. allies be able to participate in a 
meaningful way in regional crises or conflicts. Without the 
willingness and ability of allies to participate in crises 
taking place in their regions, it is doubtful that the U.S. 
public would support military action to protect them. 231 
The various documents that guide U.S. defense planning 
reflect the desire for allied and coalition assistance in 
231nismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 51. 
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U.S. national security whenever possible. The National 
Security Strategy states that: 
No matter how powerful we are as a nation, we cannot 
always secure these basic goals unilaterally ... the 
threats and challenges we face frequently demand 
cooperative, multinational solutions.232 
The National Military Strategy provides similar 
commentary: 
Because we will often act in concert with like-minded 
nations, as we implement JV 2010, we must also retain 
interoperability with our allies and potential 
coalition partners.233 
The overarching document for the armed forces, Joint 
Vision 2010, states: 
We must find the most effective methods for 
integrating and improving interoperability with 
allied and coalition partners. Although our Armed 
Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we 
expect to work in concert with allied and coalition 
forces in nearly all of our future operations.234 
Finally, the principal concept of operations for the 
Navy-Marine Corps team, Forward ••• From the Sea, states: 
In peacetime U.S. naval forces build 
"interoperability" ... so that in the future we can 
easily participate fully as part of a formal 
multinational response or as part of "ad hoc" 
coalitions forged to react to short-notice crisis 
situations. 235 
232clinton, National Security strategy, 12. 
233National Military strateqy, 17. 
234Joint Vision 2010, 9. 
235 Forward ••• From the Sea (Washington, D.C.: Department 
of the Navy, 1994), 3. 
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If U.S. allies are to possess interoperability with 
U.S. forces, there is no substitute for regular training 
exercises between U.S. and allied forces. 23 6 It was not 
through coincidence or accident that U.S. and NATO forces 
were fully interoperable in the Gulf War, but through 
constant training in Europe during the Cold War. 
Conversely, U.S. and Syrian forces were almost totally non-
interoperable, and remain so today.23 7 
Forward-deployed forces obviously are the best-suited 
to the role of training with allies, since forward-deployed 
forces operate in regions of U.S. interest where allies are 
located. U.S. naval forces, as described earlier, continue 
to focus on maintaining forward presence in the 
Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia. 
Accordingly, U.S. naval forces constantly train with the 
armed forces of allies in these regions. 
236Lt. Commander Craig Faller, interview by author, 20 
January 1999, via e-mail. "The allies look to the U.S. for 
leadership in this area. And while we can talk about it or 
discuss issues or even wargame together--the only way to 
truly test concepts, doctrine and equipment is by doing it." 
Lt. Commander Faller served as Executive Officer on USS .iIQ.hn. 
Hancock (DD-981) before reporting to N513 at the Pentagon. 
See also Dismukes, National security Strategy and 
Forward Presence, 47. "Interoperability is achieved 
exclusively through interoperations. Practically speaking, 
only forces forward can generate it." 
237Ibid., 46; Owens, "Naval Voyage to an Uncharted 
World," 31. 
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In the Mediterranean, ships and aircraft of the Sixth 
Fleet conduct frequent exercises with NATO forces.238 In 
the Persian Gulf, U.S. allies participate daily in ongoing 
operations, such as the MIO efforts.239 U.S. Fifth Fleet 
and GCC naval forces also conduct a variety of exercises, 
including operations ashore involving Marine ground 
units.240 In recent years, such exercises have included MCM 
efforts with Omani ships in the Strait of Hormuz, providing 
valuable training for a vital wartime need. In addition to 
such formal exercises, U.S. naval forces make regular use of 
the facilities owned by the UAE, especially the deep-water 
port of Jebel Ali and dry-dock facilities at Dubai. 241 In 
the Pacific, U.S. Seventh Fleet units conduct regular 
training with naval forces from Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines.242 
In all, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps conduct around 
300 exercises annually, of which nearly half involve allied 
238McAnally, "NATO's Post-Cold War Internal 
Adaptations," 160. 
239Redd, "Fifth Fleet, Arriving," 49. 
240captain Scott Lopez and Sgt. Marc Ayalin, "ARG 
Employment: America's Maritime Assault Weapon," Surface 
Warfare (March/April 1997): 17. 
2411t. Commander Jeffrey Macris, "Knowing Thy Gulf 
Partners," Proceedings (March 1998): 39. 
242Tbe United states security strategy for the East 
Asia-Pacific Region 1998, 8. 
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forces. The exercise goals typically include training in 
basic combat skills, developing common doctrine and 
operational procedures, and ensuring that command, control, 
and communications procedures and equipment are fully 
interoperable.243 Given the high likelihood that future 
regional conflicts will be coalition efforts, the ability of 
forward-deployed U.S. forces to conduct regular training 
with allies helps to build and maintain the necessary 
military-to-military contacts, ensuring that U.S. and allied 
forces are familiar with each other's operational and 
doctrinal practices.244 
Familiarizing U.S. Forces with Regional Conditions 
Each of the regions to which U.S. forces routinely 
deploy have unique features and patterns, which may not be 
apparent to forces stationed in CONUS. Familiarity with a 
region requires presence in the region, and is one of the 
stronger arguments against a CONUS-based national security 
strategy. For example, the Persian Gulf is a very busy and 
congested place, with hundreds of VLCCs, naval vessels, 
smaller cargo vessels, and small boats constantly present. 
The large number of offshore oil rigs have provided starting 
243Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s,'' 98; 
Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward Presence, 
47; Johnsen, The Future Roles of u.s. Military Power, 26. 
244Dietz, "Presence Is in the Beholder's Eye," 112; 
Dur, "Presence: Forward, Ready, Engaged," 41-42. 
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points for attacks on shipping in the past.245 Vice Admiral 
Redd's description of the Gulf makes clear the need for U.S. 
forces to be familiar with regions where they may be 
required to fight: 
The threat is proximate, real, and varied, from low-
tech Boghammers and mines to tactical air and air-, 
sea-, and ground-launched antiship cruise missiles .. 
. . It is an incredibly busy theater .... Military 
forces must understand the region and all its 
dimensions. That comes only through beini there and 
operating in the demanding environment.2 6 
Constant presence in a region, whether on land or at 
sea, allows U.S. forces to become familiar with the features 
and conditions of the region, and to incorporate these 
features into operational and contingency plans.2 47 
For example, during the OVL-I and -II operations, USS 
Coral Sea and USS Saratoqa had built up familiarity with 
Libyan flight patterns, radar patterns, ship movements, and 
communications capabilities, as well as having honed their 
own tactical and communications practices. When USS America 
arrived to take part in OVL-III, her crews and pilots had to 
acquaint themselves quickly with local conditions. 248 If 
U.S. forces were required to respond to a crisis from CONUS, 
245smith, "GCC Regional Security," 6. 
246Redd, "Fifth Fleet, Arriving," 49, 51. 
24 70 1 Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops 
Home?" 83. 
248stumpf, "Air War With Libya," 46. 
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it is doubtful that they would have available the 
intelligence on the theater needed to allow operations to be 
as safe and efficient as possible. Through lack of 
familiarity, the incidence of mistakes, losses, and 
collateral damage should be expected to be higher than for 
forces already familiar with the area. 249 The routine 
deployment of naval forces to important regions, and the 
ability of naval forces to gather intelligence on the region 
through a variety of means, allows U.S. commanders to remain 
current on conditions in the region from day to day. 
Crisis Response 
With the demise of the Soviet Union and the 
corresponding reduction in the likelihood of a global 
general war, one of the primary duties of the Armed Forces 
of the United States has become crisis response. Since the 
end of World War Two, U.S. forces have responded to an 
average of five crises annually.2 5 0 Crisis response may 
entail anything from non-combatant evacuation operations 
(NEO) to major theater war (MTW), but the ability to respond 
quickly to short- or no-warning crises clearly is one of the 
principal requirements placed on America's military forces 
in the post-Cold War world. Small-scale contingencies, 
249Dismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 53. 
250Perin, Aircraft carriers, 4. 
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falling somewhere along the continuum of crises below MTW, 
are expected to form the majority of future events requiring 
the intervention of U.S. military forces: 
Based on recent experience and intelligence 
projections, the demand for smaller-scale contingency 
operations is expected to remain high over the next 
15 to 20 years .... these operations will still 
likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. 
forces through 2015.251 
Forward-deployed forces are inherently more capable of 
responding to crises than forces in CONUS, since forward-
deployed forces will be nearer to crisis locations. Naval 
forces in particular are well-suited for crisis response, at 
any point along the spectrum of crisis, due to their 
mobility and independence of movement.2 52 Especially if the 
warning of an impending event is ambiguous, in which case 
political difficulties may exist in the deployment of U.S. 
ground or land-based air forces into a region, naval forces 
can move into the region and take up position without 
depending on host nation permission. 
Appendix A, Table Eight presents a description of 
crises that naval forces have responded to between January 
1991 and October 1998. The following sections will proceed 
from the low end of the crisis spectrum towards the high 
251cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
Section 3, page 8. 
252Kahan and sands, Alternative Naval Deployment 
concepts, 2-6. 
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end, which is major theater war. One of the most prominent 
forms of crisis response in the post-Cold War period has 
been the NEO, usually conducted by Navy-Marine Corps ARGs 
and their embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU). 
Non-Combatant Evacuation operations <NEOl 
The NEO is the specialty of the Marine Corps, as it 
usually requires the ability to put forces ashore, with 
organic and supporting firepower and air support, secure an 
area, identify and load civilians, and transport the 
civilians back to the Marines' ships. Often the location to 
be secured is well inland, requiring the "vertical'' assault 
capability of the Marines' CH-46E and CH-53E helicopters. 
While a few special cases may be conducted by other naval 
forces, the ARG with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(Special Operations Capable), known as MEU(SOC), is tailor-
made for the NEO mission. 
An ARG consists of three amphibious ships, usually one 
big-deck amphibious ship (LHA or LHD) capable of operating 
helicopters and AV-8B Harrier jets, and two other amphibious 
ships. The embarked MEU(SOC) consists of approximately 
twenty-one hundred Marines, four AH-lT Super Cobra 
helicopters, six Harriers, a SEAL detachment, and various 
combat support and logistics units. The ARG's Marines are 
not considered special forces, but are tasked with being 
mission-capable for twenty-one special missions, including 
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clandestine recon/surveillance, tactical recovery of 
aircraft and personnel, and specialized demolition, among 
others.253 Additionally, each MEU(SOC) is required to be 
capable of launching any of the twenty-one special missions 
within six hours of receiving orders from the regional 
Cinc.254 
For many of its missions, the MEU(SOC) will employ a 
special formation, known as the Maritime Special Purpose 
Force (MSPF), a unit built around the MEU(SOC) 's 
reconnaissance teams. All members are qualified swimmers, 
qualified close combat (pistol) shooters, trained in assault 
climbing, and possess other small-team skills.255 
Frequently paired with the ARG's embarked SEAL detachment, 
the MSPF can also operate independently. Past missions 
conducted by MSPFs include the destruction of Iranian oil 
platforms and the rescue of Air Force pilot Scott 
O'Grady.256 
253Arthur Brill, "Anatomy of a MEU(SOC)," Sea Power 
(December 1997): 42. See Appendix A, Table 9 for a full 
listing of MEU(SOC) special missions. 
254Lopez and Ayalin, "ARG Employment," 16; Brill, 
"Anatomy of a MEU(SOC)," 45. 
255Glenn Goodman, "Special Ops Afloat," Armed Forces 
Journal International (April 1995): 18. 
256rbid., 18; Scott O'Grady, "The Rescue From My Point 
Of View," Armed Forces Journal International (December 
1995): 18. 
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Navy-Marine ARGs have conducted several large NEOs in 
the 1990s, and have shown their flexibility in each. In 
August of 1990, the 22nd MEU(SOC) deployed to the west coast 
of Africa in anticipation of evacuating American citizens 
from a growing civil war in Liberia. Ordered from southern 
France to Liberia on 25 May 1990, the ARG arrived on 3 June 
and stayed nearby until early August. On 4 August, as 
fighting in and around Monrovia increasingly threatened the 
U.S. Embassy, the U.S. ambassador contacted the National 
Command Authority and requested assistance. The 22nd 
MEU(SOC) was directed to enter Monrovia and establish three 
landing zones, including one at the U.S. Embassy, from which 
U.S. civilians could be evacuated. 
On 5 August, the ARG steamed to a position five miles 
offshore and began flying Marine units ashore. AV-8Bs 
aboard USS Saipan (LHA-2) stood at five-minute standby in 
case air support was needed. Included among the forces 
deployed at the Embassy were six Light Armored Vehicles and 
the Marines' organic heavy weapons. From 6 August through 
21 August, Marine helicopters and Landing Craft Air-Cushion 
(LCAC) ferried U.S. and other nations' civilians to the 
ARG's ships. A total of more than sixteen hundred U.S. and 
foreign civilians were evacuated safely, including 754 on 18 
August alone. 2 57 
257Parker, "Operation Sharp Edge," 103-106. 
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In January of 1991, a seventy-man Marine MSPF and SEAL 
force in two CH-53E helicopters flew 460 miles at night from 
their ships to the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, where 
they prepared for the arrival of the ARG's twenty CH-46E 
helicopters the next morning. A total of 263 civilians, 
including ambassadors of eleven nations and other civilians 
from thirty nations, were flown safely back to the ARG.258 
On some occasions, non-ARG ships may be in place to 
conduct NEO operations. Such a case occurred in 1991 in the 
Philippines, when the eruption of Mount Pinatubo combined 
with Typhoon Yunya to create horrific conditions at the U.S. 
naval facility at Subic Bay. Sixteen thousand U.S. Air 
Force personnel and their dependents already had driven to 
Subic Bay from Clark Field, and ships of the Seventh Fleet 
were diverted from all over the Pacific to Luzon to begin 
one of the largest peacetime evacuations in history. 
Beginning on 16 June 1991, the ships USS Arkansas 
(CGN-41), USS Rodney M. Davis (FF-60), and USS Curts (FFG-
38) loaded nine hundred civilians for the sixteen-hour trip 
to Cebu, located farther south in the Philippines. On 17 
June, over seventeen hundred U.S. Air Force servicemen and 
dependents were loaded aboard USS Lonq Beach (CGN-9), USS 
Lake Champlain (CG-57), USS Merrill (DD-976), USS~ (FFG-
2 5 8Geoffrey Till, "Maritime Strategy and the 21st 
Century," Journal of strateqic Studies (March 1994): 193; 
Goodman, "Special Ops Afloat," 18. 
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51), and USNS Passumpsic (T-A0-107). USS Peleliu (LHA-5), 
an amphibious assault ship with very large medical 
facilities, took all of the serious medical cases and most 
of the pregnancies, four of which were delivered while 
aboard ship. Finally, the aircraft carriers USS Midway (CV-
41) and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) were able to carry 
several thousand guests apiece.2 59 In a ten-day period 
involving several trips per ship, over nineteen thousand 
U.S. servicemen, dependents, and civilians were evacuated 
safely to Cebu, with no injuries other than minor 
accidents.2 60 
The Marines conducted two NEOs in 1997, one in Albania 
and one in Sierra Leone. In March, over eight hundred U.S. 
and foreign civilians were evacuated by helicopter from 
Albania. During the mission, ground fire was directed at 
several Marine helicopters. The escorting AH-lT Super Cobra 
gunships were able to silence the ground fire quickly, and 
all helicopters returned to the ARG without damage, but the 
incident demonstrates the enormous advantage of being able 
259The author was stationed onboard Abraham Lincoln at 
the time, and took part in the evacuation. In addition to 
servicemen and dependents, on two of the Lincoln's three 
trips from Subic to Cebu, hanger bays 2 and 3 were utilized 
as animal shelters for over 500 dogs of all sizes. One baby 
was born onboard the Lincoln, and was named Abraham Lincoln 
Prestera in memory of the event. 
260Lt. Commander Kevin Mukri, "Fiery Vigil: Out From 
the Ash," Proceedinqs Naval Review (May 1992): 117-119. 
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to bring along air support and heavy firepower without 
depending on other-service assets that may be too distant to 
arrive on short notice. In June 1997, over twenty-five 
hundred civilians were evacuated from Freetown, including 
thirteen hundred on 3 June alone, after a military coup 
overthrew the government of Sierra Leone.261 
One reason for the high readiness of Navy-Marine ARGs 
to conduct NEOs and other special operations is the constant 
practice dedicated to such operations, and the maintenance 
of standard operational plans that require only minor 
modification to fit a specific scenario. As stated 
previously, each ARG is required to be able to launch any 
one of its special missions on six hours' notice. Each 
MEU(SOC) maintains what one Marine officer describes as a 
"playbook" for each of the twenty-one special operations. 
Contained in the playbook are such variables as different 
levels of opposition, different geographical environments, 
operations that may involve multiple sites or cross the 
borders of multiple countries, and tactical communication 
procedures.262 
Because of naval forces' ability to take station off 
the coast in crisis regions, maintain themselves there for 
261Richard Burgess, "Navy/Marine Corps Team Sees NEO 
Missions Expand," Sea Power (August 1997): 21. 
262Lopez and Ayalin, "ARG Employment," 16. 
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weeks or months, and conduct operations with organic air and 
firepower support, the Navy-Marine ARG is the perfect 
instrument for the NEO mission. The introduction of the MV-
22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, due to enter the fleet in 
2001, will nearly double the range of Marine vertical 
operations, allowing NEOs to be performed even further 
inland than today's CH-46E helicopters. 263 The safety and 
security of U.S. citizens is the one overriding vital 
interest of the United States, and the ability of U.S. naval 
forces to extract U.S. citizens from areas of existing or 
impending danger, on short notice and without logistical 
support or political permission from others, is a crucial 
capability. 
Political/Military special Operations 
In addition to normal military and warfighting 
missions, naval forces are well-suited to special operations 
that require the use, or implied threat of use, of military 
force. Because naval forces can be positioned anywhere in 
international waters, and because naval aircraft and Marine 
helicopters provide mobility over wide areas, naval forces 
are extremely flexible, and have performed several special 
operations in recent years. 
263Loren Thompson, "Marine Corps Tilts Into the 
Future," Sea Power (November 1997): 44; Krulak, "Projecting 
Combat Power Ashore," 27. 
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The rescue of Air Force pilot Captain Scott O'Grady is 
one example of the special missions naval forces can 
conduct. Known as Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and 
Personnel (TRAP), it is one of the special missions for 
which each deploying MEU(SOC) is required to be mission-
capable. The 24th MEU(SOC), stationed in the Adriatic Sea 
in June 1995, shared responsibility with the Joint Special 
Operations Task Force in Aviano, Italy, for the recovery of 
any downed aviators. 
When Captain O'Grady's F-16 was shot down, the 24th 
MEU(SOC) had the unusual luxury of nearly a week for 
planning and preparation, rather than the six-hour 
requirement. Intelligence was gathered on local SAM threats 
and other ground-based threats, and several different 
scenarios for the mission were developed. When Captain 
O'Grady was able to contact a NATO aircraft, six days after 
being shot down, the 24th MEU(SOC) was at one-hour readiness 
to launch the TRAP mission.264 
Launching from USS Kearsarqe (LHD-3), the ARG's big-
deck Wasp-class amphibious ship, the TRAP mission consisted 
of two CH-53E helicopters, two AH-lT Super Cobra gunships, 
and AV-8B Harrier jets. FA-18D Hornet aircraft from the 
Sixth Fleet provided additional jamming support and ground 
2 64Brigadier General Martin Berndt and Major Michael 
Jordan, "The Rescue of Basher 52," Proceedings (November 
1995): 42. 
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support capability. The flight inland, which covered more 
than 100 miles, was conducted at low level and high speed, 
and encountered some ground fire along the way. 
Nonetheless, Captain O'Grady was located, picked up, and 
returned safely to the Kearsarqe, ending a six-day stay in 
hostile territory in Bosnia.265 
Incredibly, the Marines have received severe criticism 
from some authors for the conduct of the O'Grady TRAP 
mission, principally due to the difference between Marine 
units' non-SOF status and the SOF status of Air Force or 
Army search-and-rescue forces. Comparisons of the MH-53E 
Super Stallion helicopters used by the MEU(SOC) to the Air 
Force's MH-60G Pave Hawk, comparison of Marine kevlar body 
armor and Ranger body armor, lack of full night-vision 
capability, and insufficient medical training among Marine 
company-sized units, are just some of the arguments raised 
in criticizing the Marines.2 66 Lt. Colonel Christopher 
Gunther, who commanded the mission, responds to these 
criticisms by stating what should be obvious, that any 
mission can be improved by waiting for superior forces and 
equipment to become available, but at the expense of the 
265Lt. Colonel Christopher Gunther, "Fortune Favors the 
Bold," Armed Forces Journal International (December 1995): 
23. 
2 66Michael Sparks, "One Missile Away From Disaster," 
Armed Forces Journal International (December 1995): 18-19. 
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prompt action that may be required in order to have any 
chance of succeeding: "In times of need, the enemy of 'good' 
is 'better'. Others may have a better canteen cup ore-tool, 
but if they aren't available, you go with what you've 
got."267 
Another example of a special operation was the 1985 
intercept of an airliner carrying the Achille Lauro 
hijackers, conducted by F-14s from the USS Saratoga. Given 
the nature of this mission, in which a civilian aircraft was 
forced to land in Sicily by U.S. warplanes, it is doubtful 
that the use of land-based aircraft would have been approved 
by a U.S. ally, a point underscored by Italy's refusal to 
turn the terrorists over to the United States.2 68 The 
ability to launch the mission from the Saratoga, which had 
been positioned by the National Command Authority in the 
eastern Mediterranean in anticipation of the operation, 
again highlights the advantageous nature of naval forces, 
which are free to come and go in international waters. The 
United States will not always have access to the facilities 
of other nations, making the ability to operate in 
international waters a very valuable attribute. 
267Gunther, "Fortune Favors the Bold," 23. 
268 simon, u.s. Countermeasures Against International 
Terrorism, 25-28. 
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Respondinq to a Short- or No-Warning Invasion 
In the event of a short-warning crisis involving a 
ground invasion of a U.S. ally, such as Iraq's 1990 invasion 
of Kuwait, slowing or halting the invasion is viewed as a 
critical phase in the U.S. response.269 The ability to stop 
or slow significantly an armored advance is the main focus 
of the halt phase in U.S. strategy, and has been co-opted by 
the Air Force as the justification for several long-range, 
hi-technology systems, such as the B-2 bomber.2 70 The focus 
on stopping a large armored force as it streams across a 
neighbor's borders, however, is a dangerously narrow view of 
what is required to establish the conditions needed for the 
successful prosecution of a major regional war. 
Of equal importance will be the need to defend regional 
ports and airfields, friendly force concentrations, and 
regional population centers from attack via ballistic 
missiles, even in the absence of ballistic missile attacks. 
The threat of using NBC weapons, delivered by ballistic 
269william Cohen, Secretar~ of Defense Annual Report to 
the President and the Conqress 1997 (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 1997), 5; Cohen, Report of the 
ouadrennial Defense Review, Section 3, page 9. 
27oJames Kitfield, "To Halt an Enemy," Air Force 
Magazine (January 1998): 62; General Charles Horner, "What 
We Should Have Learned in Desert Storm--But Didn't," AiJ:. 
Force Maqazine (December 1996): 54; Glenn Goodman, "Virtual 
Overseas Presence," Armed Forces Journal International(April 
1995) : 12. 
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missiles, likely would serve as a strong deterrent to 
cooperation with the United States among regional nations, 
and could limit or prevent the use of regional facilities. 
The blackmail threat to regional population centers, and to 
population centers of U.S. allies both within and outside 
the theater, can best be met with theater missile defenses 
that are present in the region on a full-time basis, not by 
flying strikes from CONUS to destroy ballistic missile 
launch sites. The results of the 1991 "Scud Hunt" in Iraq 
indicate the difficulty of finding individual ballistic 
missile launchers in the territory of an enemy, even an 
enemy unable to defend its own airspace.2 71 An adversary 
that could have remaining ballistic missiles and NBC 
warheads thus would retain the ability to blackmail U.S. 
allies, reduce U.S. access to regional facilities, and lower 
the likelihood of U.S. intervention.2 72 The ability to 
defend, and to convince regional allies that the United 
States can defend them against ballistic missiles as well, 
will be crucial. 
271see Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor,~ 
Generals' War (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1995), 
Chapter 11, "The Great Scud Hunt," for an excellent 
depiction of the problems encountered in finding and killing 
Iraqi SCUDS. 
272colin Gray, "The Second Nuclear Age: Insecurity, 
Proliferation, and the Control of Arms," in Brassey's 
Mershon American Defense Annual 1995-96 ed. Williamson 
Murray (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995), 151-152. 
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Accordingly, the halt phase of an invasion must 
encompass more than just destroying armor on the move. 
Theater missile defense, available from the outset even 
without warning, and anti-air warfare capability must be 
combined with the ability to slow or stop an armored 
advance, if the conditions for successful termination of the 
conflict are to be produced. 
Emerging systems expected to enter the fleet in the 
near future should allow naval forces to play a role in each 
of these aspects of a regional conflict. The most important 
of these systems are the Navy TMD systems, Lower Tier and 
Upper Tier.2 73 Also important will be emerging anti-armor 
weapons capable of being delivered by carrier aircraft or by 
Tomahawk missiles, which should allow surface combatants as 
well as aircraft carriers to play a part in the halt 
phase. 274 Organic MCM capability is being pursued for all 
surface combatants and submarines, and should lower the 
current level of dependence on dedicated MCM ships.2 7 5 
273David Foxwell and Joris Janssen Lok, "Naval TBM 
defense matures," Jane's International Defense Review 
(January 1998): 28-30. 
274captain Denis Army, "Tactical Tomahawk," Surface 
Warfare (September/October 1997): 22. 
2 7 5The systems mentioned here--TMD, anti-armor weapons, 
and MCM systems--will be covered in greater depth in Chapter 
IV, and so will not be expanded on in Chapter III. 
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It is not intended here to portray naval forces as 
being capable of fighting and winning a regional war on 
their own. The Army and Air Force will have to participate 
in any crisis that qualifies as a major regional war, and it 
is hoped that allies will participate as well. However, by 
being present at the outset of such a crisis, naval forces 
should be able to shape events in such a way that successful 
termination of the conflict becomes more probable. The 
regular presence of Aegis cruisers and destroyers in the 
Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Pacific, should 
provide TMD capability on a full-time basis, and allow 
reinforcement of TMD coverage in times of crisis. The 
presence of Tomahawk-armed surface combatants should provide 
anti-armor capability on a full-time basis, sufficient to 
blunt if not to stop completely an armored advance. When 
combined with the ability of an ARG to insert forces of its 
embarked MEU(SOC), in order to seize facilities for follow-
on forces, naval forces clearly represent an important 
element of slowing and halting an invasion, and providing 
the conditions needed for the successful prosecution of a 
regional war. 
Enabling the Deployment of Follow-On Forces 
In addition to their usefulness in crisis response, 
naval forces will be vital in the deployment of Army or Air 
Force units to a theater if a regional war must be fought. 
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This was true in 1917, in 1942, in 1990, and will remain 
true in the future. Unless the United States is called on 
to wage war against Canada or Mexico, the war by definition 
will be overseas, requiring the ability to send U.S. combat 
power overseas.2 76 Colin Gray elaborates: 
It does not much matter that the exact locus and 
occasion for U.S. military interventions in the 
future cannot be predicted with certitude, because it 
is known that such interventioris will be distantly 
overseas. Material large in volume or that is heavy 
has to move by sea from North America to Europe, 
Asia, or Africa.277 
If U.S. military power is to be moved across the sea, 
U.S. naval forces will be the key enabler. Even for Air 
Force units that can transport themselves over part or all 
of the distance between CONUS and the theater in question, 
naval forces will be required during the transit time of 
those forces, and for protecting the facilities that those 
units will require in the theater. The same is true for the 
deployment of Army units, whose heavy equipment must come by 
sea. The SLOCs that the transport ships will use, the ports 
those ships will require for off-loading, the continued 
delivery of supplies for Army forces--all will depend on 
naval forces for their protection. 
276Forward ... from the sea, 6. 
277Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War world, 193. 
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The frequent analogy used to describe the sea services' 
crucial role in the transition from crisis to war is 
"holding the door open" for Air Force and Army entry into 
the theater. It is an important role, and one that may have 
been de-emphasized after 1991, due to the relative ease with 
which the Army and Air Force were able to deploy to Saudi 
Arabia. This is not to say that the Desert Shield 
logistical effort was anything but enormous. Rather, it is 
a reflection of the excellent, modern air and sea bases that 
awaited U.S. forces arriving in Saudi Arabia, and the all-
important fact that Saddam could do little to impede the 
arrival of U.S. forces, and did not make the efforts he was 
capable of. Instead, the United States was given a six-
month period of unobstructed build-up in Saudi Arabia, 
without any interference from Iraqi forces.278 In a future 
conflict, U.S. naval forces will be required to hold the 
door open in two distinct but equally important regards. 
First, the sea and air lines of communication must be 
278For an excellent treatment of the logistical effort 
involved in Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, see Lt. General 
William Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and 
Logistics from the Gulf War (Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1992). Pagonis likens the logistical effort of the 
Gulf War to, "Transporting the entire population of Alaska, 
along with their personal belongings, to the other side of 
the world, on short notice," and to, "feeding all the 
residents of Wyoming and Vermont three meals a day for forty 
days." 
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cleared and kept open. Secondly, the facilities at the end 
of the communication lines must be protected against attack. 
Clearing the sea lines of communication will be most 
difficult in the approaches to the region, particularly if a 
maritime chokepoint is involved. In fact, given the current 
preponderance of the U.S. Navy in open-ocean capability, it 
is not unrealistic to state that clearing the sea lines will 
center on the terminal portion of the transit from U.S. 
ports to regional ports, rather than the Cold War model of 
naval forces having to fight their way across the Atlantic 
Ocean to reach Europe. 27 9 Mines, submarines, and anti-ship 
cruise missiles are expected to be employed in a sea denial 
strategy by regional opponents, with the goal being to stop 
or merely delay the transport of U.S. forces into the 
theater.2 80 Accordingly, naval forces will have to provide 
MCM capability, ASW capability, theater air and anti-cruise 
missile defense, and strike capability in order to deal with 
the expected threats. More importantly, these capabilities 
will need to be present at the outset of a crisis, meaning 
that all surface ships and battle groups must possess at 
least some degree of organic MCM and air defense 
2 7 9oavid Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 
Joint Force ouarterly (Summer 1995): 73. 
280Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: Status. 
Prospects, 10. 
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capability.281 Also, because crisis operations are often 
"come-as-you-are" events, without the time for deploying 
distant assets into a theater, the MCM and air defense 
assets of allies will be important additions to U.S. assets, 
re-emphasizing the need for U.S.-allied training.282 
At the end of the transit from CONUS or other theaters, 
arriving Army forces and Air Force aircraft still require 
modern facilities for disembarking or landing. Since port 
and airfield facilities are large, static aim-points, 
ballistic missiles provide an excellent means for an 
aggressor to attack these high-value targets. Especially 
for nations such as Iraq or North Korea, whose air forces 
are very unlikely to be effective in the face of modern air 
defense systems, ballistic missiles provide the means to 
conduct the deep-strike attacks that their aircraft cannot 
conduct. 
Although Iraq did not employ its SCUD and Al Hussein 
missiles prior to the initiation of hostilities, after 15 
January 1991 Iraq fired ballistic missiles at a variety of 
281David Foxwell, "Mine-conscious surface ships back on 
the agenda," Jane's International Defense Review (May 1997): 
26; Alan Maiorano, Nevin Carr, and Trevor Bender, "A Primer 
On Naval Theater Air Defense," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 
1996): 26-28; Captain Gary Holmstrom, "Joint Theater Air and 
Missile Defense: A Primer for the Surface Warrior," surface 
Warfare (March/April 1998): 30-31. 
282Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: Status. 
Prospects, 12. 
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military and population targets. While the effect of Iraq's 
missiles was felt largely in the political sphere, where 
Israel had to be dissuaded from retaliation, Iraq literally 
came within yards of a potentially devastating hit on 
coalition ships and supplies at Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia. On 
16 February an Iraqi missile fell into the harbor an 
estimated one hundred yards from a pier at which five ships, 
including USS Tarawa (LHA-1), were moored. On the pier 
itself were Army fuel trucks, 155mm artillery shells, and 
assorted other military equipment.2 83 The Tarawa, 
positioned directly adjacent to the 155mm storage area, 
would have been at tremendous risk of her own magazines and 
aviation fuel being ignited if the SCUD had hit the pier, 
probably leading to the destruction of the ship. 
Iraq's use of ballistic missiles, which led to the 
single largest loss of life for the coalition at Dharan on 
25 February, when a storage and barracks facility was hit, 
is even more sobering when it is considered that Iraq rarely 
engaged in multiple-missile salvos, instead firing 
individual SCUDs at regional targets. 284 If a regional 
adversary was able to fire large numbers of missiles at a 
port or airfield, perhaps twenty or twenty-five at a time, 
283John Gresham, "Navy Area Ballistic Missile Defense: 
Coming On Fast," Procedinqs (January 1999): 58-59. 
284 Ibid. 
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it is reasonable to expect that several missiles would land 
on or near something valuable. And of course, if the 
missiles carried chemical or biological warheads rather than 
high explosive, the missiles would need to hit only within a 
kilometer or so of their aim point to be effective. Thus 
the ability to defend against ballistic missiles is a 
critical requirement for a future regional conflict. 
Finally, the Gulf War model, in which arriving U.S. 
forces found massive, modern facilities waiting for them, 
should not be viewed as representative of all possible 
future regional conflicts. Depending on the location of the 
conflict and the adversary's ability to target existing 
facilities, the Marines may be called on to seize facilities 
ashore, or to land and establish suitable locations for the 
unloading of forces and supplies "over the beach".2 95 It 
may also be necessary for the Marines to land in order to 
clear the shore areas of a chokepoint, for example by 
seizing Queshm Island, Abu Musa, and the Tunb Islands in the 
Strait of Hormuz. 
Wherever a regional conflict is situated, deploying 
Army and Air Force units to the theater will require that 
naval forces are present to keep open the lines of 
communication, and to protect facilities until Army and Air 
Force strength has been built up sufficiently that they can 
285DeYoung, "Sea Power Is Grand Strategy," 77. 
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protect themselves. Since forward-deployed naval forces are 
maintained in the most likely areas of crisis on a full-time 
basis, there is reason to be confident about the continued 
ability of the United States to fight a regional war. If 
all U.S. forces were withdrawn to CONUS, however, the 
deployment of U.S. forces to a distant theater would become 
very problematic. The forward presence mission thus can be 
seen to retain its importance in U.S. security strategy, 
even in the absence of the Soviet Union or a similar global, 
peer-level threat. 
Summary 
The presence of U.S. military force in proximity to 
U.S. interests is a requirement unlikely to diminish in the 
future. As long as U.S. interests reside far from CONUS, 
threats to U.S. interests must be guarded against. 
Particularly in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and 
East Asia, military forces are needed to protect U.S. 
interests against existing threats, and to hedge against 
unforeseen threats. For the purposes of deterring 
aggressors and protecting U.S. interests, forces that are 
forward-based or forward-deployed have clear advantages over 
CONUS-based forces. Where the threat is clearly identified, 
as on the Korean Peninsula, land forces may be appropriate 
for guarding U.S. interests. However, for many reasons 
forward-deployed naval forces often are more desirable than 
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forward-based ground forces. Primarily for providing 
flexible, responsive, and combat-capable forward presence, 
naval forces are the preferred method of positioning U.S. 
military power near U.S. interests. 
Naval forces provide reliable access to any area of the 
world accessible by sea, which encompasses an ever-growing 
portion of the earth's landmass. The forced entry 
capability of naval forces, embodied principally by Navy-
Marine ARGs, allows the insertion of land power from the 
sea, both for discrete combat operations and to allow the 
follow-on of Army or Air Force units. Naval forces possess 
superb sustainability when at sea, both through their 
onboard stores and through the ability to replenish while 
underway. Naval forces are less obtrusive when positioned 
in international waters than U.S. forces on the territory of 
another state, an important consideration for political and 
religious reasons in the Persian Gulf. With the ability to 
operate in the air, on land, and on and under the sea, naval 
forces are uniquely flexible in responding to crises, and 
can respond at any point along the spectrum of crisis, from 
non-violent intervention to sustained combat operations. 
Also, naval forces can adjust their level of visibility, by 
alternately stationing themselves in plain sight or 
remaining over the horizon, and so can monitor an area of 
tension without being seen as provoking further tension. 
Finally, and most importantly, naval forces do not require 
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the permission of any entity except the National Command 
Authority to conduct a full range of operations, as their 
position in international waters makes them an extension of 
sovereign U.S. territory. 
By virtue of the above qualities, the Navy-Marine Corps 
team can be employed in the practice of naval diplomacy, 
which describes military actions short of war, intended to 
influence what other states think and do. Since U.S. 
interests are located around the world, and naval forces are 
inherently mobile, naval diplomacy provides a tremendously 
flexible and responsive tool to U.S. policy-makers. 
Included under the concept of naval diplomacy are such 
military-political activities as deterrence, signaling U.S. 
interest in a region, providing re-assurance to U.S. allies, 
intimidating a potential adversary through visible combat 
power, limited combat operations, enforcement of 
international sanctions, enforcement and protection of 
freedom of the seas, and non-combat operations. 
The two principal instruments of naval diplomacy in the 
current international setting are the aircraft carrier 
battle group (CVBG) and the amphibious ready group (ARG). 
The CVBG in particular holds preeminent status as a symbol 
of American sea power, and sends a proportionate message 
when used for naval diplomacy. The ARG, although not 
capable of as wide a range of combat operations as the CVBG, 
nonetheless is a very flexible and valuable instrument of 
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naval diplomacy. Due to the very high readiness maintained 
by deployed naval forces, both CVBGs and ARGs can transition 
from peacetime operations to crisis response or combat 
operations nearly instantly. 
For purposes of deterrence, naval forces combine the 
requisite capability and credibility to be effective. 
Because naval forces do not need basing support or political 
permission to conduct combat operations, their threatened 
use is more credible than that of land-based forces. Also, 
naval forces' growing capability to conduct limited strikes 
with un-manned systems means that, in appropriate cases, 
such strikes can be launched with no risk of U.S. 
casualties, a factor that adds to the credibility of 
threatened action. When force must be used, force 
originating from the sea may be more acceptable to U.S. 
allies in terms of political support, as it does not 
implicate allies through the use of their facilities. Naval 
forces' visibility, which can be increased or lowered as the 
situation dictates, provides great flexibility in the 
escalation of deterrent efforts, and perhaps is the most 
important factor operating on the minds of adversaries. A 
wing of B-2 bombers may be capable of carrying out 
threatened action, but if it is not visible to an adversary 
it may not deter. Since the adversary's perception 
ultimately is what determines the success or failure of 
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deterrence, visibility counts for a great deal, and naval 
forces offer unique scalability in this regard. 
When used to signal U.S. interest or support, naval 
forces can be employed in a variety of ways. Sending naval 
forces to an area on routine deployment is itself a signal 
of U.S. interest, and is the reason that the Mediterranean, 
the Persian Gulf, and East Asia maintain full CVBG coverage. 
The positioning of naval forces near specific locations 
during periods of crisis, for example near Taiwan during the 
1996 PRC "missile diplomacy" operations, sends a message of 
heightened U.S. interest. Another means of signaling 
interest is through a port visit by U.S. warships, which 
serves both to announce U.S. friendship with the host nation 
and to support the upkeep of the naval forces. Even a port 
visit can carry a clear message to regional observers, as 
when USS Sam Hanston (SSBN 609) visited the Turkish port of 
Izmir in 1963, advertising the U.S. nuclear umbrella 
provided to Turkey.286 
When signaling U.S. interest falls short, and the use 
of limited force must be employed to convince an adversary 
to change its behavior, naval forces' ability to apply force 
incrementally from a secure sea base makes them ideal 
instruments of U.S. policy. The instruments of choice for 
limited use of force have been aircraft and cruise missiles, 
286Breemer, "Where Are the Submarines?" 41. 
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since these systems can destroy targets while minimizing 
risk to U.S. forces, and naval forces can deliver both 
aircraft and cruise missiles to locations where force must 
be used. 
Another instrument of naval diplomacy is the 
enforcement of international economic sanctions. Since the 
great majority of world commerce moves by sea, naval forces 
can provide the means to apply economic leverage against 
states that have exceeded international norms for acceptable 
behavior. Only ships can stop, board, search, and impound 
other ships, requiring naval forces to be present in the 
vicinity of sanctioned states. 
Often overlooked, perhaps due to its fundamental place 
in U.S. policy, is the important need to enforce freedom of 
the seas, and to challenge unacceptable claims to 
international waters by coastal states. The ships of the 
U.S. Navy fulfill this vital mission every day, in all the 
world's seas. 
In addition to their use in naval diplomacy, naval 
forces support several other important requirements in U.S. 
defense policy. Since naval forces regularly operate in 
regions of U.S. interest, they are able to conduct frequent 
training operations with U.S. allies, an important means of 
maintaining interoperability in case of war. Equally 
important in keeping U.S. forces prepared for regional war 
is the need to maintain familiarity with different regions 
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of the world. Different regions have their own unique 
characteristics, and constant operations in those regions 
build familiarity in case of war. 
Crisis response has replaced global general war as the 
primary concern of the U.S. military, as the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union removed the only plausible threat of a 
global war. Crisis response may involve combat or non-
combat operations, and may be large or small in scale, but 
requires the ability to respond on short notice. Both 
through physical proximity and through high everyday 
readiness, forward-deployed naval forces are well-suited to 
crisis response. Naval forces should soon be equipped to 
take part in the halt phase of sudden cross-border attacks, 
as existing and projected anti-armor weapons begin to enter 
the fleet. For the transition from crisis to a regional 
war, naval forces will provide vital service by maintaining 
the sea and air lines of communication open, and providing 
TMD capability for the defense of regional facilities, 
population centers, and force concentrations. If regional 
facilities are not available or accessible, the Marines' 
forced entry capability may be needed to secure facilities 
and safe logistical marshaling areas. 
While the primary threat to U.S. interests has changed 
with the demise of the Soviet Union, the need to maintain 
military force near U.S. interests abroad has not 
diminished. As long as U.S. interests reside far from 
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CONUS, which would seem to include the future as far as can 
be seen or predicted, U.S. military power must also be 
deployed far from CONUS. By virtue of mobility, 
flexibility, sustainability, scalability, and independence 
from host nation permission, forward-deployed naval forces 
represent the best means of protecting U.S. interests 
abroad. Chapter IV will examine the component capabilities 
and systems of naval forward presence, both at present and 
in the near future. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SYSTEMS AND CAPABILITIES 
In meeting the requirements of providing forward 
presence, U.S. naval forces will need certain capabilities 
in the future. Those capabilities in turn depend on 
specific systems, some of which exist at present and some of 
which are under development. Some systems, for- example the 
aircraft carrier, have been suggested to be obsolete in the 
post-Cold War setting. Others, such as TMD, have been 
identified as important but have yet to be fielded. 
Chapter IV will examine the capabilities and systems 
required for the naval forward presence mission in the 
twenty-first century, and will examine the Navy's twenty-
first century warfighting concept, known as Network-Centric 
Warfare(NCW). 
The Shift to a Littoral Focus 
In 1992, shortly after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, the U.S. Navy announced a shift in emphasis from 
open-ocean operations to operations in the littorals, 
defined as areas within 650 miles of the coast. The Navy 
document .•• From The Sea stated that: 
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the free nations 
of the world claim preeminent control of the seas and 
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ensure freedom of commercial passage .... This 
strategic direction, derived from the National 
Security Strategy, represents a fundamental shift 
away from open-ocean warfighting on the sea toward 
joint operations conducted from the sea.287 
The emphasis on littoral regions stems from the absence 
of a global peer competitor, able to challenge U.S. 
interests on the high seas, and a new focus on deterring 
regional crises. Since nearly 75 percent of the world's 
population live within the littoral r~gion, and since U.S. 
interests abroad exist primarily in the littorals, it is 
logical for the focus of the sea services to be directed at 
coastal areas. 
The littoral area typically is a very busy place, with 
heavy traffic on the seas and in the air. The ships and 
planes of friendly forces, enemy forces, and neutral states 
all occupy a compressed space, with identification and the 
monitoring of movement posing a serious difficulty.2 88 Due 
to the need for U.S. naval forces to approach the shore in 
order to influence events on land, the littoral offers 
adversaries the opportunity to layer their defenses. Mines, 
anti-ship cruise missiles, and submarines in particular are 
expected to form layered, supporting defenses for coastal 
states that desire to keep U.S. forces from approaching.2 89 
287
,,,Frorn The Sea, 3. 
288 rbid., 6. 
289stephen Keller, "To Influence Events Ashore," .s..e.a. 
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The focus on the littorals also offers opportunities to the 
United States in its efforts to protect national interests. 
Naval forces can project power inland for many hundreds of 
miles, allowing U.S. sea power to influence events ashore as 
never before. 
The Marine Corps also has developed a littoral concept 
of operations, still focused, as Marine operations always 
have been, on events on land, but now conducted and enabled 
by position and mobility at sea. Known as Operational 
Maneuver From the Sea, the concept envisions using the sea 
as a secure base for maneuver, at the operational level, to 
allow Marine forces to strike directly at enemy "centers of 
gravity" rather than assaulting through enemy defenses. 290 
With the current level of sophisticated weapons contained in 
the arsenals of many regional states, the movement of Marine 
forces from sea to land will have to be conducted from 
greater distance offshore than in the past. In order both 
to protect ARGs and Marine landing forces from shore-based 
weapons, and to maintain uncertainty about the destination 
of Marine landings, future amphibious operations are likely 
to be conducted from over the horizon.291 
290"0perational Maneuver From The Sea: A Concept For 
The Projection Of Naval Power Ashore," Surface Warfare (July 
/August 1996): 9. 
291Krulak, "Projecting Combat Power Ashore," 27-28. 
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In order to be successful, Operational Maneuver From 
the Sea will require tactical and operational mobility, 
dedicated fire support, aviation support, and mine 
countermeasures support (MCM). In addition, all naval 
vessels will require better self-protection capabilities if 
they are to operate close to shore.2 92 Finally, both Navy 
and Marine units require improvements in nuclear, 
biological, and chemical (NBC) detection and protection. 2 93 
The overall Navy-Marine Corps focus on operations 
closer to the shore than in the past dictates that existing 
systems be examined for their continued relevance, and that 
new systems be approached from the standpoint of their 
suitability to the littoral environment. Accordingly, there 
are two major areas of emphasis in examining the twenty-
first century Navy-Marine Corps team's systems and 
equipment. The first is the ability to project military 
power ashore, whether in the form of an ARG's ground combat 
units, naval surface fire support (NSFS), or a CVBG's air 
strikes. The second is the ability to defend the force 
against littoral threats, and includes anti-submarine 
2 92Robert Holzer, "Funding Shortage Will Delay U.S. 
Ship Defense System," Defense News, 14-20 April 1997, 22. 
293Mark Ormsby, "The Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Threat to Naval Forces," surface Warfare (November/December 
1996): 5-8; Stanley Enatsky, "Protecting the Fleet: Tackling 
the Chemical/Biological Threat," Surface Warfare (November 
/December 1996): 29-31; Major Victor Riley III, "We Need to 
Learn ABCs of NBC," Proceedings (August 1993): 38-39. 
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warfare (ASW), MCM, TMD, and NBC protection. These two 
broad areas of concern will comprise the bulk of this 
chapter. 
ARG Component Systems 
Under the concept of Operational Maneuver From the Sea 
(OMFTS), the characteristics of mobility and survivability 
will be crucial. Navy-Marine ARGs will have to place the 
Marines ashore from over the horizon, while defending 
themselves against a variety of threats. The systems that 
are envisioned for the twenty-first century ARG include 
several different amphibious ships, two types of landing 
vehicles, and a replacement aircraft for existing CH-46 
helicopters. Systems that are in service today, or about to 
enter service, are the LHA-1 class, LHD-1 class, and LSD-
41/49 class amphibious ships, and the Landing Craft Air 
Cushion (LCAC). Systems under development are the LPD-17 
class amphibious ship, the Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV), and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. 
The amphibious ships will form the ARG of the future, while 
the LCAC, AAAV, and MV-22 will form the Marine Corps' 
"triad" for delivering units from the sea to shore. 294 
2 94vincent Grimes, Richard Scott, and Mike Wells, 
"Amphibious Advancement," Jane's Navy International 
(September 1997): 24-26. 
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The five LHA-1 Tarawa-class amphibious ships date from 
the mid-1970s, with the oldest being twenty-two years old. 
With a thirty-five year initial service life, and a Service 
Life Extension Program (SLEP) refit expected to extend the 
ships to nearly fifty years, the LHA-1 class should be in 
service well into the twenty-first century.295 
The LHA-1 is some two hundred feet longer than the LPH-
1 class ships it was designed to replace, as well as having 
nearly twice the displacement of the LPH-ls. The LHA-1 
ships can operate a mixture of up to forty-two CH-46E, CH-
53E, UH-1, and AH-1 helicopters, and six AV-BB Harrier jets. 
Over seventeen hundred Marines can be embarked, along with 
their AAV7Al vehicles, but only a single LCAC can be 
acco:rnmodated.296 The LHA-ls are used as the big-deck ship 
in an ARG, and can modify their mix of aircraft depending on 
the mission. 
The newer and larger LHD-1 Wasp-class ships are the 
largest amphibious ships ever built, with a displacement of 
over forty thousand tons at full combat load.2 97 In 
comparison, the World War Two Essex-class carrier~ (CV-
18) displaced thirty-three thousand tons when fully 
295Bryan Bender, "USN study will decide future of 
amphibious fleet," Jane's Defense Weekly, 17 June 1998, 8. 
296sea Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 116-117. 
297 rbid. 
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loaded.298 Based on a modified LHA-1 hull, the LHD-ls can 
carry twenty-one hundred Marines, three LCACs, forty-five 
helicopters, AV-8Bs, five MlAl main battle tanks, twenty-
five Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), eight M 198 artillery 
pieces, sixty-eight heavy trucks, and ten logistical 
vehicles. In addition, the six hundred-bed hospital 
facilities aboard the LHD-ls are second in size only to 
those found on dedicated hospital ships.299 
The original Marine Corps request for ten LHD-ls was 
halved by the Navy for budgetary reasons, but was later 
increased to seven through the direct intervention of 
Congress. At a cost of over one billion dollars each, the 
LHD-ls are among the most expensive surface ships in the 
fleet, trailing only the full-size aircraft carriers as a 
capital investment.300 The fifth and sixth of the LHD-ls, 
USS Bataan (LHD-5) and USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), have 
joined the fleet in the last fifteen months, while the final 
298 Jane's Fiqhtinq Ships of World War II (New York: 
Military Press, 1989), 267. 
299commander Christopher Wode, "The Forward Warriors: 
The United States Must Revitalize Its Amphibious Fleet," 
Armed Forces Jonrnal International (March 1994): 26; Grimes 
et al., "Amphibious Advancement," 27. 
300scott Truver, "Tomorrow's Fleet, Part II," 
Proceedinqs (August 1996): 58. 
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ship of the class, USS Iwo Jirna (LHD-7) is expected to be 
commissioned in 2001.301 
Due to the significantly higher capabilities of the 
LHD-ls compared to the LHA-ls, proposals have been made to 
spend the roughly one billion dollars budgeted for the LHA 
SLEP refits on additional LHD-ls. Citing the LHD-l's 
superior hangar and deck space, larger well deck, ability to 
operate larger numbers of MV-22s, and improved self-defense 
capability, both the Senate Armed Services Committee and 
Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak have openly 
supported purchasing more LHD-ls.302 The two hundred 
million dollars of additional cost involved in building new 
LHD-ls, instead of refitting the LHA-ls, would be more than 
offset by the improved capability of the Wasp-class ships, 
as well as providing a new ship with a fifty-year life span, 
rather than simply extending the life of an existing LHA for 
another fifteen years. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Jay Johnson has indicated agreement in principle, adding 
that the thirteen years until the LHA-ls begin their SLEP 
refits should allow ample time for studying the trade-offs 
301Richard Burgess, "Fifth Wasp-Class LHD Joins the 
Active Fleet," Sea Power (November 1997): 39; Richard 
Burgess, "USS Bonhomme Richard Joins the Active Fleet," .s.e.a 
Power (September 1998): 24; Vision. Presence, Power, 61. 
302Bender, "USN study," 8. 
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of the proposal.303 Whatever decision is reached, the Navy-
Marine ARG requirement is for twelve big-deck ships for the 
future fleet, with current plans calling for a balance of 
five LHA-ls and seven LHD-ls.304 
The newest amphibious ship is the LPD-17 San Antonio-
class, the first of which is due to be commissioned in 2002. 
The LPD-17s will carry 720 Marines, two LCACs, and up to 
four CH-46E or CH-53E helicopters. Storage space aboard 
ship will be over twenty-five thousand cubic feet for 
vehicles, and over thirty-six thousand cubic feet for other 
stores. 305 Intended to replace ships of the LST-1179 class, 
LSD-36 class, LKA-113 class, and LPD-4 class, the LPD-17 
reflects the influence of the OMFTS philosophy. Unlike its 
predecessors, the LPD-17 will not be able to beach itself in 
order to offload equipment and supplies, will not be able to 
turn 360 degrees within its own length in shallow water, 
cannot pump bulk fuel ashore, and will have only a ten-ton 
over-the-side lifting capacity, compared to thirty tons on 
previous classes of amphibious ships.306 
3o3Ibid. 
304 James Hessman, "For the Corps and for the Nation," 
Sea Power (November 1997): 13, 17; Krulak, "Projecting 
Combat Power Ashore," 28. 
305vision. Presence. Power, 62. 
306Major Thomas Lloyd, "The Whole LPD-17 Story," 
Proceedings (November 1996): 73. 
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Since OMFTS p~sits the delivery of the Marines from 
over the horizon, the shallow-water capabilities mentioned 
above should not be required. Also, due to the perceived 
need to reduce vulnerability to littoral threats as much as 
possible, the LPD-17's crane size was reduced to lower the 
ship's radar signature, sacrificing lifting capability for a 
smaller radar return.307 Thus the OMFTS vision of 
amphibious operations can be seen in the design features of 
the newest amphibious ship. 
In addition to attempts to lower radar visibility, the 
LPD-17 class will have unprecedented self-defense 
capability. The Integrated Combat Direction System (ICDS), 
a combination of existing combat direction and self-defense 
systems, will be installed in the LPD-17s, as will a forward 
VLS cell with sixty-four Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles guided 
by a pair of Mk 91 fire control units. A pair of Rolling 
Airframe Missile launchers and a pair of Mk 15 Phalanx Close 
In Weapons System (CIWS) mounts also will be installed.30S 
In addition to the ARG ships, the Marine Corps is in 
dire need of the new amphibious assault vehicle. The AAAV 
is a critical modernization requirement for the Marine 
Corps, as many existing AAV7Al vehicles already have served 
for over thirty years. The AAAV is expected to begin 
3 07 Ibid. 
308Grimes, et al., "Amphibious Advancement," 25. 
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production in 2005, and to begin service with the fleet in 
2007. The last of the 'AAV7Als will not be replaced until 
2011, at which time they will be nearing fifty years of 
service.309 
Capable of speeds of twenty-five knots in the water, 
and forty-five miles per hour on land, the AA.AV will be a 
great improvement over the 'AAV7Al, which is limited to eight 
or nine knots in the water.3lO Additionally, the AA.AV will 
be able to carry its eighteen Marines ashore from over the 
horizon, as its range in the water is seventy-five miles. 
Equally valuable will be the use of Global Positioning 
System (GPS) data to allow precise navigation from ship to 
shore, at night or in poor weather, easing command and 
control problems associated with the transition from sea to 
land. Precise navigation also may be required in order to 
pass through clear lanes in enemy minefields.311 
The AA.AV is being designed with a number of features 
that should improve its survivability. It is intended to be 
seaworthy in up to nine-foot seas, to be able to roll up to 
sixty degrees to either side, and to pitch up or down to a 
309Jim Courter and Merrick Carey, "An Alligator for The 
21st Century," Sea Power (November 1997): 53. 
310rbid., 51; Krulak, "Projecting Combat Power Ashore," 
28. 
311Robert Holzer, "U.S. Marine Corps Readies for AA.AV 
Prototype Phase," Defense News, 17-23 August 1998, 18. 
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vertical position as it passes over waves without 
foundering. Modular composite armor, able to be installed 
or removed as dictated by the situation, will improve 
survivability to battle damage. The proven Bushmaster 30mm 
cannon of the Army's Bradley fighting vehicle has been 
paired with a forward-looking infra-red sighting system and 
computer fire control.312 Finally, the AAAV will be one of 
just two American land combat vehicles (the Bradley being 
the other) with full NBC protection, allowing its occupants 
to travel through areas of chemical or biological 
contamination without donning special protective gear. 313 
Like the LPD-17, the AAAV is a manifestation of the 
requirements of OMFTS. It possesses the speed in water and 
range to be launched from over the horizon, and should be 
much more survivable than its predecessor. Although the 
AAAV will not enter service for another eight years, it 
already is being factored into Marine Corps doctrinal 
development and amphibious tactics.314 
312courter and Carey, "An Alligator for the 21st 
Century," 53. 
313Holzer, "US Marine Corps Readies," 18. It should be 
noted that troops in the AAAV would still need to don 
protective gear before leaving the vehicle, or to have the 
vehicle thoroughly de-contaminated. However, the ability to 
pass through contaminated areas is an important improvement 
over the AAV7Al. 
314Roman Schweizer, "Waterworld: The Marine Corps Is 
Rethinking Operations Ashore and May Just Stay At Sea," 
Armed Forces Journal International (September 1998): 60. 
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A second important leg of the Marines' amphibious triad 
is the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, intended as a 
replacement for existing CH-46E and CH-53E helicopters. In 
order to meet the OMFTS requirement of delivering combat 
power directly to an enemy's center of gravity, which may be 
miles or hundreds of miles inland, the ability to employ 
vertical assault is crucial. The Vietnam-era CH-46E and CH-
53E helicopters have been performing this role for many 
years, and each is nearing the end of its useful service 
life. The CH-46E in particular is showing signs of age, as 
seen from its accident record between 1985 and 1995, when 
one CH-46E was lost nearly every three months due to 
airframe failure or accident.315 Not surprisingly, Marine 
Commandant General Krulak has stated that his number one 
modernization priority is the development of the MV-22.316 
The MV-22 is a hybrid aircraft, able to take off and 
land vertically like a helicopter, but also able to fly as a 
fixed-wing airplane. The MV-22's oversized propellers are 
mounted at the end of its wing, and the entire engine 
assembly can be rotated forward after takeoff, allowing the 
Osprey to transition from vertical lift to forward flight. 
While its two to three-fold increase in payload over the CH-
31 5Loren Thompson, "Marine Corps Tilts Into the 
Future," Sea Power (November 1997): 43. 
316Hessman, "For the Corps and for the Nation," 13. 
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46E is significant, its most important feature is its five-
fold increase in speed. After taking off and shifting to 
forward flight, the Osprey has a top speed of 275 knots and 
a range of two hundred miles.31 7 The Osprey can carry 
twenty-four fully-loaded Marines, can refuel in flight, and 
has a ferry range of twenty-one hundred miles with a single 
aerial refueling.318 
The Osprey currently is undergoing sea trials aboard 
USS Saipan (LHA-2), which will include vertical and rolling 
takeoffs, landing at various ship speeds, landing in high 
winds, lifting netted cargo from a sling hook, and night 
operations.319 The Marine Corps plans to purchase 360 
Ospreys, with the first being delivered in 1999. The first 
operational squadron is expected to be formed in 2001, with 
the last Ch-46Es being replaced in 2014.320 
The MV-22 might have entered service as early as 1991, 
since it began development in 1985. However, technical 
problems and strong resistance from different quarters in 
the Department of Defense nearly killed the MV-22 
317Richard Burgess, "Naval Aviation Program Update," 
Sea Power (June 1998): 10. 
31 8Thompson, "Marine Corps Tilts Into the Future," 46; 
Vision. Presence, Power, 57. 
31911v-22 Tiltrotor Aircraft Undergoes Sea Trials," 
Defense News, 8 February 1999, 15. 
320Thompson, "Marine Corps Tilts Into Future," 43. 
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development program. Only the continued insistence of 
Congress that the MV-22 be developed and fielded kept the 
project alive.321 It is unpleasant to consider where the 
Marine Corps might be today, with no replacement for the 
aging CH-46, had the MV-22 been allowed to die. 
The third leg of the amphibious triad is the Landing 
Craft Air Cushion (LCAC). Capable of carrying sixty tons 
(seventy-five tons in a maximum overload configuration), and 
able to travel over water at forty knots, the LCAC provides 
a critical ability to deliver heavy vehicles from ship to 
shore quickly, including the MlAl tanks recently acquired by 
the Marines.322 The first LCAC was delivered to the Navy in 
1984, with a total of ninety-one LCACs ordered through 
1997. 323 
Typical loads for an LCAC are: one main battle tank; 
four LAVs; three AAV7Al amphibious vehicles; or two M 198 
155mm towed howitzers. 32 4 With a deck area of eighty-one by 
321 Ibid., 45. One of the strongest opponents of the MV-
22 was Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who felt it was too 
expensive. Ironically, it was the arrival of Bill Clinton, 
one of the worst Presidents of this century in regard to 
national security and defense issues, that helped rescue the 
MV-22. Clinton had endorsed the MV-22 during his 1992 
campaign, and he continued to support it after the election. 
322vision. Presence. Power, 61. 
323Norman Polmar, Naval Institute Guide to the Ships 
and Aircraft of the u.s. Fleet (Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 1993), 183; Vision. Presence. Power, 61. 
324 Polmar, Naval Institute Guide, 184. 
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twenty-seven feet, the LCAC could also carry well over one 
hundred troops, time-sensitive bulk cargo such as ammunition 
or fuel, and any of the assorted items of equipment that a 
MEU(SOC) might desire to take ashore. The LCAC has a 
projected service life of thirty years, including a SLEP 
program at fifteen years.32S Able to drive itself into and 
out of the well decks of LHA, LHD, LSD, and LPD amphibious 
ships, and able to travel 200 miles with a full sixty-ton 
payload, the LCAC is a very versatile and valuable vehicle. 
The ARG's ships, which in the future will consist of 
an LHA or LHD big-deck ship matched with an LSD and LPD, 
should be able to position the LCACs, AAAVs, and MV-22s in 
proximity to an enemy's coast, enabling the Navy-Marine 
Corps team to project power ashore virtually anywhere in the 
world. When combining the LCAC, the AAAV, and MV-22 in the 
future, the Marine Corps amphibious triad should be able to 
deliver combat power quickly, both onto and beyond the 
beach, enabling OMFTS's vision of rapidly moving Marine 
forces striking directly at adversary centers of gravity. 
Naval surface Fire support 
Among the different areas of naval warfare, possibly no 
area is undergoing a more dramatic change than naval surface 
fire support (NSFS). In addition to a new concept for 
325vision, Presence, Power, 61. 
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organizing and directing NSFS, known as Ring Of Fire (ROF), 
several weapons programs are underway that will utilize a 
combination of GPS data and on-board sensors to provide 
highly accurate fire support to Marine forces ashore. The 
application of GPS guidance to ordinary iron bombs already 
has produced the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which 
should allow virtually any tactical aircraft to make 
precision attacks previously limited to F-18D or A-6E 
aircraft equipped with laser designators. This section will 
cover two systems designed specifically for launch or firing 
from surface combatants, rather than from aircraft. These 
two systems are the 5-inch gun/Extended Range Guided 
Munition and the Tactical Tomahawk. 
The 5-inch rifled gun has been the standard naval gun 
since the early twentieth century, and continues to serve on 
every destroyer and cruiser in the fleet. The current model 
is the Sin/54 caliber Mk 45, which was designed and fielded 
in the mid 1960s primarily as an anti-air weapon. Although 
the anti-air warfare (AAW) mission has shifted to missiles, 
the 5-inch gun has been retained for its secondary roles of 
fire support and anti-surface warfare. The thirteen-mile 
range of the gun was not seen as a major disadvantage during 
the 1960s and 70s, since many older 8-inch gun cruisers, as 
well as the Iowa-class battleships, remained on active duty 
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with the fleet.326 With the retirement of the Iowa-class 
ships, apparently for good, the only naval gun remaining is 
the Mk 45. With the Navy's shift to littoral operations, 
the range of the Mk 45 has become a serious limitation in 
providing NSFS. 
The Marine Corps is the primary driver of gunfire 
requirements. With the new Operational Maneuver From the 
Sea strategy, the Marines now require gunfire support to a 
much greater depth than in the past. Starting with the 
twenty-five-mile offshore position typical of amphibious 
operations, the Marines require fires to a depth of sixteen 
miles inland to prepare the beach landing area, as well as 
an additional twenty-two miles to suppress enemy artillery 
and tactical missiles. Thus the Marine requirement of 
providing support fires from a distance of sixty-three miles 
has become the criteria for NSFs.327 
Firing a 5-inch round to a range of sixty-three miles 
is made possible through modifications to the Mk 45 gun, 
increasing the size of the round's propellant charge, and 
providing a new type of 5-inch shell with rocket assistance. 
Fortunately, the Mk 45 gun is not limited by chamber 
pressure, but only by the strength of the recoil mechanism, 
326oennis Hagan, "Naval Gunfire Support: Versatile 
Weapons Systems for Warfighting Needs," Surface Warfare 
(September/October 1997), 30-31. 
3 2 7 rbid., 32. 
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so that adding forty inches to the barrel length and 
strengthening the recoil/counter-recoil components will 
allow the larger propellant charge. The rocket propellant 
is designed to burn for several seconds after launch, 
increasing the shell's apogee and giving the shell 
additional velocity.328 
The most important component of the new gunfire support 
system, however, is the new projectile. Even at a range of 
only thirteen miles, with observer support, the Mk 45 has a 
circular error probable (CEP) of 333 meters. Maintaining 
and improving on this level of accuracy at sixty-three miles 
would be virtually impossible without some type of guidance. 
The new Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) utilizes a 
combination of GPS data and an inertial navigation system 
(INS) to maintain the accuracy needed for close gunfire 
support. In order to accommodate the GPS/INS guidance 
package, as well as a submunitions payload, the ERGM has a 
length of sixty-one inches, compared to around forty inches 
for standard 5-inch shells. 
The ERGM utilizes GPS data in two ways. Prior to 
firing, the location of the target is fed into the shell's 
guidance system. Since GPS data is three dimensional, 
differences in altitude between the ship and the target are 
328captain John w. Townes III, "Naval Surface Fire 
Support: On Target," Surface Warfare (January/February 
1997), 24-26; Hagan, "Naval Gunfire Support,'' 32-33. 
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accounted for. Next, immediately after firing the ERGM's 
GPS receiver locks on to four GPS satellites, allowing for 
precise self-location. The ability to lock on to GPS 
satellites in the early seconds of flight is crucial, as 
enemy jamming of the GPS signal is expected as the shell 
nears the target area. In addition, the INS system cannot 
easily be calibrated prior to firing. Instead, the GPS 
receiver updates the INS after firing, allowing the INS to 
be initialized in flight. The GPS/INS system controls a set 
of small fins to allow the ERGM to correct its course, and 
for terminal guidance. The INS provides terminal guidance 
if the GPS receiver is jammed, maintaining the degree of 
precision needed to provide an acceptable CEP when friendly 
forces are near the target area.329 
The new system has been designated as the 5-inch/62 
caliber ERGM. The system is planned for installation on 
most of the Aegis cruisers (CG-52 through 73), as well as 
most of the DDG-51 class destroyers yet to be built. A 
total of forty-nine ships, with seventy-one 5-inch/62 ERGM 
guns, are expected to be deployed by 2008. The ERGM will 
initially be provided with seventy-two XM-80 multi-purpose 
submunitions, an Army munition developed for the 155mm 
howitzer. A unitary warhead for hard-target penetration 
329Kenneth Lyons, "Extended Range Guided Munition," 
Surface Warfare (May/June 1996): 8-9. 
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also should be available in the future. 33 0 With the ERGM 
shell being larger and heavier than the standard 5-inch 
shell, the twenty rounds per minute standard of NSFS will 
have to be reduced to ten rounds per minute. However, it is 
expected that the ERGM's improved accuracy will make up for 
the lower rate of fire.331 
When employed in the context of ROF, a description of 
which will follow, the ERGM system should make the NSFS 
process more effective, accurate, and timely. With ROF, any 
ship within range can respond to a call for fire. The 
ability to mass naval fires, and to coordinate those fires 
to allow shifting from target to target rapidly, should 
provide greater flexibility and effect to Marine forces 
ashore.332 Fire mission planners should be capable of 
receiving and responding to requests for fire very quickly, 
as the firing platform will not need to lay the gun in the 
traditional manner. The target's GPS coordinates are the 
only offboard requirement. After the target's location has 
been provided to the ERGM, the shell can be fired along an 
azimuth to the target and guide itself to impact. Since the 
330Murphy, "Achieving 21st Century Naval Mastery," 
Surface Warfare (March/April 1998), 12; Lyons, "Extended 
Range Guided Munition," 9,11. 
331scott Truver, "A call for fire: Launching the NSFS 
projectile," Jane's Navy International (September 1997): 18. 
332william Gravell, "The Offensive Punch of Network-
Centric Warfare," Surface Warfare (March/April 1998): 16. 
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ERGM will be able to change its trajectory in flight, it may 
be possible simply to raise the gun to the elevation that 
provides the greatest range, and allow the ERGM to fly 
itself to the target. In any event, the ERGM will provide a 
greatly improved capacity for offshore fire support, an 
improvement made possible by the ERGM's ability to utilize 
GPS data. 
A second improvement to NSFS being made possible by 
integration of GPS data is the Tactical Tomahawk. An 
evolutionary development of the BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise 
missile, the Tactical Tomahawk will provide greater 
flexibility in targeting and effectiveness: 
System improvements include inflight retargeting; 
battlefield loiter capability; a missile-mounted 
camera that gives a snapshot of the battlefield for 
BDI [Battle Damage Indication], Battle Damage 
Assessment (BDA), and target identification; on-board 
GPS mission planning; and an architecture to allow 
for future advances and alternative payloads.3 33 
As with the ERGM, it is the ability to utilize GPS data 
that makes the Tactical Tomahawk possible. Unlike the ERGM, 
however, the Tactical Tomahawk is a powered aircraft, 
meaning that it can remain airborne under its own power for 
over two hours. The Tomahawk also has a much greater 
payload than the ERGM, allowing sensor, communications, and 
weapons payloads to be carried simultaneously. The Tactical 
333vision. Presence. Power, 71. 
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Tomahawk will be provided with a two-way satellite link, 
which will allow the missile to report its status to strike 
planners. The planners likewise will be able to communicate 
with the missile, allowing re-targeting in mid-flight. This 
capability is perhaps the greatest improvement over existing 
Block II and Block III Tomahawks, which cannot be re-
targeted after launch. 334 In addition to re-targeting 
capability, the Tactical Tomahawk should support multiple-
engagement attacks through the use of submunitions, 
particularly the Brilliant Antitank (BAT) submunition. 335 
The advantages of the Tactical Tomahawk's new 
capabilities are obvious. With loiter capability, a 
Tactical Tomahawk could be positioned over enemy territory 
and wait for a target of opportunity. With the networked 
sensor capability envisioned for the twenty-first century 
Navy, a target could be attacked by such a loitering 
Tomahawk almost as soon as the target is detected. The 
Tomahawk's 1,500-mile range allows the kind of deep strike 
attacks formerly conducted by A-6E aircraft, which are now 
retired. 336 The ability to use GPS makes possible the re-
334captain John W. Townes, "Surface Strike: The 
Powerful Punch of Deterrence," Surface Warfare (January/ 
February 1997), 19. 
335Army, "Tactical Tomahawk," 22-23. 
336Murphy, "Achieving 21st Century Naval Mastery," 11. 
180 
targeting and loiter capability of Tactical Tomahawk, by 
allowing new target coordinates to be downlinked while the 
missile is in flight. Using only INS and terrain contour 
matching guidance, Block II and III Tomahawks require 
several hours for programming before launch, and cannot be 
retargeted after launch. Although still awaiting contractor 
and Naval Strike Warfare Division approval for production, 
the Tactical Tomahawk should begin low-rate initial 
production in 2002.337 
The new ROF concept for coordinating and directing NSFS 
typifies the networked systems entering service with the 
armed forces. ROF currently exists only at the level of 
Fleet Battle Experiments, which are conducted by underway 
forces around the world to test operational concepts. Fleet 
Battle Experiment Bravo (FBE-B), conducted in August-
September 1997 by USS Coronado (AGF-11), USS Peleliu (LHA-
5), and USS Russell (DDG-59), tested the ROF concept of a 
local area network for providing NSFS. In addition to the 
ships listed above, ground elements of the 13th Marine 
Expeditionary Unit also participated in the experiment. The 
six elements of ROF are: 
• Continuous automatic inventory of the force's weapons. 
• The ability to quickly and easily apportion ordnance to 
warfare commanders. 
337vision, Presence, Power, 71. 
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• The ability to automatically pair ordnance to targets. 
• The sharing of common information by all providers and 
users. 
• Automated integrated deconfliction tools. 
• The ability for each ship's fire control system to be 
the master or decision-maker station.338 
ROF is a local area network (LAN) that connects ships, 
forces ashore~ artillery fire planners, and close air 
support. ROF is designed to manage all kinds of support 
fire, from short range gunfire to Tomahawk land attack 
missiles. ROF allows different platforms to "plug in" to 
the LAN at any time, as ships arrive or depart the area. 
Upon plugging in, the magazine loadout of the platform is 
automatically provided to the task force commander via the 
LAN. 339 The platform's weapons can then be assigned to 
calls for fire by the master station in the LAN. Each 
ship's captain can manually select limits on the amount of 
his magazine that can be expended, so that the ship 
maintains a minimum level of ordnance for self-defense. 
The weapons on the LAN are continuously inventoried, so 
that weaponeering can be automated to the greatest extent 
practical. For example, the ROF software might require 
338navid Blake, Joe Penny, and Allen Hjelmfelt, Fleet 
Battle Experiment Bravo-Ring of Fire Analysis Report {U} 
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1998), 1-2. 
33 9rbid., 7. 
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human intervention only if there is uncertainty as to the 
best match of weapon to target. The ROF system in its 
current form requires human approval for any fire mission, a 
safety feature that may not be practical to automate.340 
Any fire control station on the LAN can serve as the master 
station, and will be able to launch ordnance from another 
ship's magazines remotely when functioning as the master 
station. Thus, there should be no degradation of the system 
as individual ships come and go, or suffer battle damage. 3 41 
The subsequent Fleet Battle Experiment Charlie (FBE-C), 
conducted 1-11 May 1998 by the USS Eisenhower (CVN-69) 
battle group, utilized lessons learned from FBE-B to further 
test the ROF concept. Among the conclusions of FBE-C was 
the statement that, "The ROF engagement grid concept is 
ready for expanded experimentation to include Sensor Grid 
and sensor fusion inputs."342 Such testing will be 
conducted through additional Fleet Battle Experiments in the 
future. Already the ROF concept is providing a significant 
improvement in NSFS, in that ROF allows a large number of 
fire requests to be processed simultaneously, rather than 
340 rbid., 10-11. 
341 rbid., 8-10. 
342 Fleet Battle Experiment Charlie (FBE-C} Quick Look 
Report, unpublished report by the U.S. Navy Maritime Battle 
Center, 12 May 1998, 6. 
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having to be processed individually. 343 With continued 
development, the ROF concept should support OMFTS with 
responsive, accurate, long-range fires in any weather, day 
or night. 
Aircraft carriers: Their Future Prospects 
The aircraft carrier is the capital ship of the U.S. 
Navy, a position held since June of 1942, when the Pacific 
fleet carriers Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet turned back 
the Japanese fleet at Midway. From the end of World War Two 
until the present day, the CVBG has been the Navy's "big 
stick", both as an instrument of naval diplomacy and as a 
warfighting platform. Able to operate a wide variety of 
aircraft and helicopters, and with excellent facilities for 
command, control, and communications, the aircraft carrier 
remains one of the "basic building blocks" of naval forward 
presence.34 4 
The value of the carrier is its ability to bring U.S. 
tactical air power to any region of the world accessible by 
sea, and to allow that air power to be exercised without 
dependence on foreign facilities or permission. The 
carrier's air wing (CVW) is capable of a wide range of 
military missions, including strike, anti-air, anti-
343Kip Wright, "Ring of Fire: A Quantum Leap in 
Warfighting," Surface Warfare (November/December 1997), 13. 
344 Forward ... From the Sea, 4. 
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submarine, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, airborne 
early warning, and search and rescue. The nine existing 
nuclear powered carriers (CVN) also have excellent endurance 
and sustainability, as they enjoy effectively unlimited 
steaming capability and can carry very large quantities of 
aviation fuel and ordnance.345 
Despite the powerful and versatile nature of carriers, 
their design philosophy and basic relevance in the current 
international setting have become hotly-debated topics. For 
reasons of cost, perceived duplication of function between 
carrier-based and land-based aircraft, and extremely 
valuable status (which could make them too valuable to risk 
losing), critics of large-deck CVNs call for a shift to 
smaller, less capable but less costly conventional carriers, 
or for the abandonment altogether of the aircraft carrier. 
The issue of cost cannot be denied in regard to CVNs. 
The USS Enterprise (CVN-65) was the most expensive warship 
ever built when launched in 1960, costing 444 million 
dollars. The most recent Nimitz-class carrier, USS Harry s. 
Truman (CVN-75), was purchased for over six billion dollars, 
and will deploy with an air wing valued at several billion 
dollars as well.346 In addition to the six billion-dollar 
price of CVN-75, -76, and -77, these ships will entail a 
345sea Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 97-98. 
346Polmar, Naval Institute Guide, 84, 89. 
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further twelve billion dollars each in lifetime operating 
costs. 3 47 Particularly in light of the current defense 
budget, there are valid questions about whether it makes 
financial sense to continue purchasing multi-billion dollar 
ships. 3 48 The General Accounting Office (GAO) has been very 
critical of the cost-effectiveness of CVNs compared to 
conventional (oil-burning) carriers (CVs), claiming among 
other things that the life-cycle costs of a CVN will exceed 
that of a CV by over eight billion dollars.349 
A corollary to the cost criticism is the fact that, 
with only twelve carriers available, each is too valuable to 
risk losing, a concern that easily could preclude certain 
wartime employments of a CVBG: "Our entire grand strategy 
rests on only twelve battle groups. What can we risk them 
347David Perin, Fundamental Issues for a New Aircraft 
carrier: some Thoughts About cost and Affordability 
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1996), 1. 
348Rear Admiral Daniel Murphy, at the time the Director 
of Surface Warfare programs, stated in an October, 1997 
press conference that, "We cannot afford to continue to 
build 4-5 billion-dollar aircraft carriers." See Otto 
Kreisher, "Admiral warns 300-ship goal is periled," .s.a.n 
Diego Union-Tribune, 16 October 1997, from DoD Early Bird, 
17 October 1997, 16. 
349Bradley Peniston, "Navy Disputes GAO Nuclear Carrier 
Critique," Defense News, 7-13 September 1998, 26. For the 
complete GAO report, see United States General Accounting 
Office, Navy Aircraft Carriers: cost-Effectiveness of 
conventionally and Nuclear-Powered carriers, GAO/NSIAD-98-1, 
August 1998. 
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on?"350 This criticism has great merit, especially in a 
world of abundant, cheap anti-ship cruise missiles. 
Increasingly as time advances, and as smaller and smaller 
states possess themselves of anti-ship missiles, the Navy 
will have to weigh the benefits of sea-based aviation 
against the likelihood of losing a significant portion of 
overall capability in a single ship. It is not clear what 
the answer to this cost-vs.-risk equation will be, but it 
must be addressed nonetheless. 
Another common criticism is the claim that aircraft 
carriers have outlived their intended purpose, which was to 
be an instrument of open-ocean fighting against a peer-level 
navy, such as the Imperial Japanese Navy or the Red Banner 
Fleet. As such, current carriers are much larger, more 
expensive, and more complex to build and operate, than are 
called for by the setting in which they will be used.351 
Smaller carriers, in the range of forty thousand to fifty 
thousand tons and operating around forty multi-mission 
aircraft, are advocated as a more appropriate and cost-
effective means of taking air power to sea. 352 
3soFriedman, The Future of War, 201. 
35lcaptain Charles Girvin, "Twilight of the 
Supercarriers," Proceedings (July 1993): 42-43. 
352 Ibid., 44. 
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Then-CNO Admiral Elmo Zumwalt advocated even smaller 
and less-capable "Sea Control Ships" in the early 1970s, 
envisioned at seventeen thousand tons and carrying only 
helicopters and a small number of Harriers, as a "low mix" 
to alleviate the high cost of building only nuclear powered 
carriers. 353 While smaller carriers clearly would be less 
expensive than large-deck nuclear powered carriers, it is 
not clear that they would be more cost-effective, or even as 
cost-effective. Again, this difficult question will have to 
be addressed by the Navy in the near future, as the first 
post-Nimitz-class carrier is due to be delivered in 2013.3 54 
A third common criticism is that land-based aircraft, 
and even small remotely-piloted vehicles (RPV), can fulfill 
the strike and electronic warfare missions conducted by CVW 
aircraft, while other surface combatants can satisfy the air 
control, electronic warfare, and anti-submarine missions. 355 
Land-based aircraft are indeed more versatile than carrier-
based aircraft, and can sustain more sorties per plane over 
353 zumwalt, On watch, 75-76. 
354scott Truver, "Sunrise or Sunset?: U.S. carrier 
power launches itself into the future," Jane's International 
Defense Review (February 1997): 26. 
355Lieutenant Richard Arthur, "The Last Days of 
Carrier-Based Aviation?" Proceedings (January 1999): 75; 
Bill Sweetman, "Pilotless fighters: has their time come?" 
Jane's International Defense Review (June 1997): 58. 
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time, making land-based air power more effective than 
carrier-based air power if bases are available. 
Unfortunately for land-based air power advocates, 
history has shown that, in situations short of war, local 
allies may be unwilling to grant basing rights for U.S. 
planes.3 56 Also, while RPVs clearly have a place in 
conducting certain high-risk missions, and are well-suited 
for battlefield surveillance, there is little basis for 
asserting that they can replace manned strike aircraft at 
the present and foreseeable level of RPV technology. It 
seems likely that RPVs will supplant manned aircraft 
someday; however, that day would appear to remain far in the 
future. 
In countering the aforementioned GAO report on the 
cost-effectiveness of CVNs, the Navy has argued that nuclear 
propulsion allows a CVN to be steamed at top speeds for much 
longer periods than a CV, due to a more robust propulsion 
plant design. This allows CVNs to avoid areas of bad 
weather, to sprint at top speed over long distances in 
response to crises, and to launch aircraft at lower cost. A 
Nimitz-class CVN can also carry 100 percent more aviation 
35 6A recent refusal to grant basing access for less-
than-war use of land-based air power came in 1995, when 
Italy refused to allow U.S. F-117 planes to operate out of 
Aviano Air Base during the bombing campaign in Bosnia. See 
Johnson, "Carriers Are Forward Presence," 38. 
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fuel than a JFK-class CV, the last CV class built for the 
U.S. Navy. 357 
While proposals for smaller CVs are attractive 
financially, there is little evidence to support the 
assertion that small CVs can provide the same capability as 
a single large-deck CVN. In a study of possible future 
naval forces and deployments, it was concluded that: 
Credible "work-arounds" in the form of substitute 
forces [for CVNs] or varying patterns of operation 
could not easily be found to respond to demands . 
. . . no naval force group could substitute for the 
independent air power and capital ship clout of 
large-deck carriers to provide comparable credibility 
and reasonable risk.358 
Despite all the criticisms launched against large-deck 
carriers, some admittedly with merit, the fact remains that 
a carrier's ability to deliver U.S. air power to any 
littoral area, with 100 percent certainty of access, is a 
unique and valuable feature. 359 CVBGs have responded to 
nearly eighty crises since 1970, many of which were beyond 
the reach of land-based aircraft, leading to the justified 
357Tom Philpott, "The Year Of Declining Readiness,"~ 
Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 5; Peniston, "Navy 
Disputes GAO Nuclear Carrier Critique," 26. 
358 Jerome Kahan et al., Alternative Naval Force 
Deployment Concepts study: Summary Report (Alexandria, VA: 
Center for Naval Analyses, 1991), vi, 28. 
359Peter Perla et al., Future sea-Based Aviation: 
Roles, Missions, and Threats (Alexandria, VA: Center for 
Naval Analyses, 1992), 56; Davis, Aircraft carriers and the 
Role of Naval Power, 39. 
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claim that, "No other DoD asset can match the carrier's 
record or provide that type of powerful and compelling 
presence."360 As long as manned combat aircraft remain an 
important component of U.S. strategy, it seems likely that 
the large-deck aircraft carrier will remain also. 
FA-18E/F Super Hornet 
The newest aircraft in the Navy's inventory is the 
FA-18E/F Super Hornet, intended as a replacement for the A-
6, the F-14, and the FA-18A/B/C/D. The FA-18E/F may also 
replace the EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft in the 
future. 361 Stemming from the need to replace the aircraft 
mentioned above in a period of declining budgets, the Super 
Hornet program is based on a series of modifications to 
existing FA-18C/D aircraft. By adding four feet to the 
length and to the wingspan of the FA-18C/D, the Super Hornet 
will carry 33 percent more internal fuel than its 
predecessor, and will have 40 percent more range with a 
standard strike load of four one thousand-pound bornbs. 3 62 
The FA-18E/F also will enjoy 90 percent commonality of parts 
with the FA-18C/D, an important logistics concern during the 
360Admiral Henry Mauz, Jr., "The Value of Being There," 
Proceedings (August 1994): 27. 
361Hessman, "Overwhelming Air Power," 26. 
362 rbid., 27. 
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ten-year period in which FA-18C/Ds will be phased out of 
service.363 
Initial Navy procurement plans included one thousand 
FA-18E/Fs, but the number has been cut to a low of 548 and a 
high of 785 by the Quadrennial Defense Review. 364 Although 
press reports of the FA-18E/F's development process have 
centered on a "wing drop" problem, the problem has been 
corrected and approval for low-rate initial production has 
been given. The development program is ahead of schedule 
and below budget365 
Although the FA-18E/F is below its original budget 
predictions, the unit cost of production model Super Hornets 
will be around forty-four million dollars. 366 The cost of 
the FA-18E/F has drawn criticism as being too high for what 
is essentially a stop-gap measure until the Joint Strike 
363Loren Thompson, "The New Centerpiece of Naval 
Aviation," Sea Power (June 1998): 18. 
364cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
Section 7, page 11. The possible range of F-18E/F 
procurement stems from uncertainty about the Joint Strike 
Fighter's initial availability and cost, and the possibility 
of replacing the EA-6B with a Super Hornet variant. See also 
Hessman, "Overwhelming Air Power," 25. 
365Thompson, "The New Centerpiece of Naval Aviation," 
18. 
36 6John Tirpak, "The Super Hornet," Air Force Maqazine 
(March 1998): 39. 
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Fighter enters service sometime late in the next decade. 
One naval officer observes that: 
The Navy cannot afford carrier-deck aircraft that 
cost more than $50 million a copy .... Instead of 
paying all that money for a single aircraft, perhaps 
we should use it for two or three aircraft, planes 
that can support Marines on the ground, take out 
critical near-shore facilities and defense sites, 
protect ships at sea, and fall out of the sky--as 
they sometimes do--without breaking the bank. 367 
The cost of new carrier aircraft is a vital 
consideration for the future of naval aviation as a whole, 
since it is aircraft, not carriers, that are the primary 
cost drivers of sea-based air power. 368 The unit cost and 
expected service life of new aircraft are the principal 
determinants of lifetime cost for a CV and its CVW. The 
implications of purchasing forty-four million-dollar 
aircraft thus are clear: unless a significant increase in 
aircraft service life is obtained, it is doubtful that 
367commander Kevin Peppe, "Constant Bearing, Decreasing 
Range," Proceedinqs (December 1996): 42. 
368 John Hall, Lonq-Term Affordability of Sea-Based 
TACAIR; Some Preliminary Examples (Alexandria, VA: Center 
for Naval Analyses, 1997), 7. Of seven inputs to lifetime 
CVN/CVW costs, the greatest changes derived from increased 
aircraft service life from twenty to twenty-five years (a 14 
percent reduction in lifetime cost) and from a 10 million-
dollar increase in aircraft unit cost (a 15 percent increase 
in lifetime cost). Shifting to a more "austere" CVN/CVX 
resulted in a 5 percent decrease, while a reduction to a 
carrier capable of handling only fifty-five aircraft 
resulted in a 4 percent decrease. See Appendix A, Table 10 
for a graphic representation of various cost factors 
associated with lifetime CVN/CVW costs. 
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current CVW size can be maintained. Thus future CVWs may 
deploy with fewer aircraft, perhaps as few as half the 
current seventy-five, if unit costs are not reduced. 
A future CVW is expected to deploy with FA-18E/Fs as 
its only combat jet aircraft, a practice that should lead to 
significant savings in parts and maintenance costs. 
However, it is not clear that the benefits of "necking down" 
to a single aircraft will balance the forty-four million-
dollar (or more) cost of each aircraft. As mentioned 
earlier, the FA-18E/F is intended to cover the ten to 
twelve-year period before the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 
enters service. However, the ability of the JSF to replace 
the FA-18E/F on a one-for-one basis is anything but clear. 
Even the Quadrennial Defense Review hedges with the caveat 
that: 
The Navy will transition to the JSF as soon as costs 
and effectiveness for the JSF are well understood and 
the aircraft is demonstrated to be superior to the 
FA-18E/F .... Uncertainties in prospective JSF 
production cost warrant careful Departmental 
oversight.369 
If the JSF program should encounter the kinds of 
developmental problems that plagued the A-12 program, or the 
Air Force F-111 program, the Navy could be left with a fifty 
million-dollar (or more), thirty-year-old aircraft as its 
369cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
Section 7, page 11. 
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only twenty-first century combat jet. Recent articles about 
the JSF highlight the concern that the JSF may not be ready 
on time, or even be produced at all.3 70 While the risks of 
this acquisition strategy are apparent, the Navy has stated 
that the FA-18E/F, now in production and expected to enter 
squadron service in 2001, is, "the right airplane at the 
right time."3 71 
DD-21/Arsenal Ship/Ohio-class SSGN Conversion 
Three different proposals exist for providing new 
warships, designed for littoral operations, in the twenty-
first century. One, the DD-21, is an evolutionary step in 
surface combatant design. The other two proposals, the 
arsenal ship and the Ohio-class SSGN conversion, would 
represent a new concept in warship design, namely the 
concentration of a very large amount of precision strike 
firepower in a single platform. None is beyond the drafting 
board stage today, and only the DD-21 seems certain to be 
built, but each could provide a valuable capability to the 
Navy in the future. 
The DD-21 surface combatant is often described as a 
land-attack destroyer, since its primary mission would be 
37 0william Matthews, "Two New Fighters Flourish; Future 
of JSF Uncertain," Defense News, 22 February 1999, 14. 
371sea Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 162. 
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strike warfare.372 After a Cost and Operational Evaluation 
Analysis study in 1996, the specifications for DD-21 were 
laid out as: 
• 128 VLS cells with Tomahawk or other missiles. 
• Two 155mm Vertical Gun for Advanced Ships (VGAS). 
• One 5-inch/62 caliber ERGM gun. 
• A new ASW suite with advanced sonar. 
• Two SH-60R multi-purpose helicopters. 
• A "Smart Ship" system to allow manning by 95 
sailors.373 
The VGAS system is a pair of vertically-mounted, 
155mm/52 caliber guns with a round similar to the ERGM. 
Designed to fit within the space allocated for a Mk 41 VLS 
cell, each gun will be fully automatic and have a 750-round 
magazine. Further development of ERGM technology is 
expected to produce a family of VGAS rounds. The guns' 
vertical orientation below decks will serve to remove the 
radar signature of a traditional gun turret. 374 In addition 
372Leslie West, "Competing To Build the 21st-Century 
Destroyer," Sea Power (April 1998): 93. 
373captain Richard Wright, "Future Force," Surface 
Warfare (September/October 1997): 10. 
37 4captain Dennis Moral, "Naval Surface Fire: Enabling 
Maneuver Warfare," Surface Warfare (July/August 1997): 27; 
Captain Richard Wright, "Shaping the Battlefield: The 21st-
Century Navy," Surface Warfare (March/April 1998): 34; 
Vision. Presence. Power, 79. 
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to these offensive capabilities designed to provide support 
ashore, several DD-21 defensive requirements have been 
described for operations in the littorals. These include 
"full-spectrum signature reduction," improved survivability 
to mines, anti-ship missiles, and torpedoes, and a new 
command, control, and communications system.375 
Through a competitive shipyard development process, the 
expected use of innovative design and construction features, 
and a firm limit of ninety-five crewmembers, the Navy hopes 
to keep the average cost of the DD-21 below 750 million 
dollars. 37 6 Thirty-two DD-21 ships are planned, with the 
first to be started in 2004 and commissioned in 2008. 
The arsenal ship, unlike the DD-21, is envisioned as a 
pure land-attack vessel, with no multi-mission capability. 
In fact, the arsenal ship is little more than a 
transportation platform for five hundred VLS cells, armed 
with Tomahawk or other cruise missiles. With so many 
missiles, an arsenal ship would provide a theater Cine with 
a large amount of precision firepower in the early stages of 
a conflict, when other precision strike assets might not be 
available. 377 Targeting ashore could be provided by 
375west, "Competing To Build the 21st-Century 
Destroyer," 95. 
376Glenn Goodman, "Redesigning the Navy," Armed Forces 
JournaJ International (March 1998): 28. 
377captain Richard Wright, "Potent and Punishing: Ships 
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satellite surveillance, special operations forces, or by 
RPVs deployed from the arsenal ship.378 
In the present joint warfighting setting, the arsenal 
ship's magazine likely would be apportioned between the 
different Joint Force component commanders, available to 
each for the completion of different mission areas. The 
Joint Force Air Component Commander might use the arsenal 
ship in counter-air attacks on enemy air bases, while the 
Joint Force Land Component Commander might wish to strike 
enemy artillery, armored forces, or supply areas.379 
However the arsenal ship's missiles were divided, the 
presence of five hundred Tomahawk or other precision weapons 
on a constant basis would provide a very valuable deterrent 
and warfighting tool to the regional Cine. 
Initial studies of the arsenal ship concept postulated 
a 500 million-dollar cost for designing and building each 
vessel, with an additional 250-350 million dollars for the 
missiles. The Navy expressed interest in as many as six 
arsenal ships, and budgeted forty-five million dollars in 
January 1997 for research and development. However, by 
October 1997 the arsenal ship concept had been officially 
of the Line for the 21st Century," Surface Warfare (January 
/February 1997): 22. 
37 8Robert Holzer, "Exercise Highlights Arsenal Ship 
Firepower," Defense News, 14-20 April 1997, 8. 
379wright, "Potent and Punishing," 22. 
198 
rejected by Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, who cited 
ever-tighter defense budgets and competing procurement 
projects.380 Although interest in the arsenal ship 
continues to exist, it would appear that there is 
insufficient money in the defense budget to allow 
development of the concept. 
The Ohio-class SSGN conversion is a proposal to convert 
the first four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBN) into guided missile submarines (SSGN), able to carry 
Tomahawk or other precision missiles. The SSBNs QhiQ. (SSBN 
726), Michigan (SSBN 727), Florida (SSBN 728), and Georgia 
(SSBN 729) are slated for de-commissioning in order to meet 
START II nuclear force levels.38l By re-configuring their 
Trident missile tubes to carry smaller precision guided 
missiles, as many as 150 such missiles could be deployed on 
each Ohio-class SSGN. Each could also deploy a SEAL 
detachment, by installing a lock-out chamber in one of the 
Trident tubes.382 
The Ohio-class boats would require around 400 million 
dollars each for conversion, which would include the cost of 
380Greg Schneider, "Navy scuttles Arsenal Ship 
program," Baltimore Sun, 25 October 1997, in DoD Early Bird, 
27 October 1997, 19. 
381 Jim Courter, "The Boomer Reborn," Proceedings 
(November 1997): 52. 
382 Ibid., 53. 
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a nuclear refueling for their reactors. After conversion, 
each would provide a very survivable, covert means of 
deploying precision strike capability into a crisis region. 
Each Ohio SSGN could carry nearly as many Tomahawks as a 
typical surface action group, as well as deploying SEAL 
teams from as far as 120 miles off an adversary's coast, 
using the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) .383 In 
addition to retaining full ASW and anti-surface capability 
through their existing torpedo systems, each SSGN should 
retain excellent electronic intelligence-gathering 
capabilities. If an encapsulated RPV can be developed for 
underwater launch, the Trident SSGN would provide an 
excellent platform for gathering intelligence many miles 
inland. 
Since the Ohio-class SSBNs already are paid for and 
have many years of remaining service life (Qhi.Q., the oldest, 
was launched in 1979), it makes good financial sense to keep 
them in the fleet in some capacity.384 Even if not 
converted to SSGN configuration, two of the Ohios should be 
kept in service to replace USS Kamehameha(SSN-642) and USS 
James K. Polk (SSN-645), former SSBNs converted into SEAL 
delivery submarines and due to be decommissioned soon. 38 5 
383Jim Courter and Loren Thompson, "Arsenal Under the 
Sea," Sea Power (June 1997): 44. 
3 84 Polmar, Nava] Institute Guide, 56. 
385Lt. Colonel Reynolds Peele, "Combat Power Projection 
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The future of the four Ohio-class SSBNs, which are due to 
begin decorcunissioning in 2002, is not decided, but it would 
represent a tremendous waste of potential capability simply 
to strike them from the active list. 
Mine Countermeasures (MCM} 
In addition to the offensive power-projection systems 
described in the preceding sections, several defensive 
systems and programs are being developed or improved for use 
in the twenty-first century. With the Navy's littoral focus 
and the Marines' OMFTS concept, naval forward presence 
forces will be required to operate in close proximity to the 
coastline of adversaries, necessitating improved defensive 
capabilities. One area that demands improved capability is 
mine countermeasures (MCM). 
Mines are among the oldest of naval weapons, and remain 
highly effective today even in their most rudimentary form. 
Because contact mines involve little technology beyond a 
contact detonator, they are both easy and inexpensive to 
produce. 386 For as little as one thousand dollars each, 
virtually any nation can produce effective contact mines, 
allowing very large numbers to be produced and deployed. 387 
Forward ... From (Under) The Sea," Marine Corps Gazette (June 
1995): 12; Courter, "The Boomer Reborn," 52. 
38 6captain Brian Longworth, "Solutions to the shallow-
water challenge," Jane's Navy International (June 1996): 15. 
387H. Dwight Lyons et al., The Mine Threat: Show 
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Thus it should be assumed that any coastal state will be 
equipped with significant numbers of contact mines. 
Contact mines are highly lethal against even the 
largest of merchants and warships. Partly due to their 
large warhead size, and partly due to their direct proximity 
to the ship's hull upon detonation, such mines have proven 
capable of "mission kills" against U.S. warships on several 
occasions, as well as against tankers and other merchants. 
The Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian contact mine on 18 
April 1988 and very nearly was broken in half, with over 
fifty million dollars' worth of repairs and nearly two years 
required before she was able to return to service.3 88 When 
USS Tripoli (LPH-10) detonated an Iraqi contact mine on 18 
February 1991, the explosion caused extensive flooding in 
the forward part of the ship, ripped open several JP-5 fuel 
tanks, and left a sixteen foot by twenty-six-foot hole in 
the Tripoli's hull below the waterline. 3 89 Merchant Marine 
Captain Paul Seitz, who was captain of the SS Bridgeton when 
she struck an Iranian contact mine on 24 July 1987, stated 
Stoppers or Speed Bnmps? (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval 
Analyses, 1993), 4. 
38 8chamberlain, "Naval Forces and the Persian Gulf," 5. 
A mission kill indicates that the target has survived the 
attack, but is not able to perform its mission without 
repairs. Thus while the target has not been "killed" for 
good, it is out of consideration for some length of time. 
389Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, 344. 
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that the force of the explosion nearly knocked his bridge 
crew off their feet, an impressive statement given the 
401,000-ton displacement of the Bridgeton. Naval repair 
personnel later determined that the Bridqeton had struck a 
Russian model M-08 contact mine, the design of which dates 
to 1908.3 90 
In addition to contact mines, several existing and 
projected types of mines are expected to be encountered in 
the future. Among these advanced mines are both moored and 
bottom influence mines, which are triggered by the magnetic, 
acoustic, or seismic signature of a passing ship, and moored 
and bottom rising mines, whose warhead rises to just beneath 
the ship's keel before exploding, thus maximizing the 
resulting damage. The Chinese EM-52 rising mine, which uses 
a rocket to propel its warhead towards the surface, is one 
such example. Other advanced rising mines are expected to 
employ a small guided torpedo, which should be even more 
effective.391 
Even when a mine does not explode directly under the 
target ship, the shock of a nearby explosion can cause 
significant damage. USS Princeton (CG-59) detonated an 
Iraqi bottom influence mine just hours after Tripoli was 
390"SS Bridgeton: The First Convoy," 52. 
391Jeanne Avery, "The Naval Mine Threat to U.S. Surface 
Forces," Surface Warfare (May/June 1998): 7. 
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damaged, which knocked out all electrical power and 
propulsion for over two hours. With its rudders jammed by 
the explosion, Princeton had to be towed to Bahrain for 
repairs.392 
Additional advances expected to be seen in the future 
include the use of buried bottom mines, mines made from 
high-strength plastic to avoid magnetic mine sweeping, mine 
warheads of up to one ton, and the use of multiple trigger 
sensors to resist sweeping measures.39 3 Already bottom 
influence mines are available that are made of fiberglass, 
and that employ geometric shapes in order to resemble rocks 
when detected by minehunting sonar.394 
The mine problem is made more serious by the fact that 
specialized mine-laying ships are not required to deploy 
mines. Any ship or small craft can deploy mines, often with 
minimal or no modifications to the vessel involved. Given 
the ability of any nation to produce large numbers of 
contact mines, the ready availability of many advanced mines 
in world arms markets, and the ease with which mines can be 
deployed, perhaps the most serious feature of mine warfare 
392Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, 345; 
Chamberlain, "Naval Forces and the Persian Gulf," 5. 
393Robert Holzer, "Dangerous Waters," Defense News, 4-
10 May 1998, 14. 
394Avery, "The Naval Mine Threat," 7. 
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is the sheer number of mines that a future adversary could 
deploy.395 
The Navy's littoral focus, and the Marines' OMFTS 
concept, will require that U.S. naval forces approach the 
coastline of an adversary, up to and across the shoreline in 
the case of a Marine landing. With the kinds of existing 
and projected mines available to virtually any nation, MCM 
capability is re-emerging from a long period of little 
emphasis to a position of priority in the Navy. A recent 
study entitled "Technology for the United States Navy and 
Marine Corps 2000-2035" noted that: 
The other potential undersea expeditionary warfare 
'show-stopper' for naval forces is mine warfare. All 
opponents trying to protect a shore against 
amphibious landings or trying to deny free passage of 
warships and logistic ships will use mines. 3 96 
A similar commentary comes from Rear Admiral Mike 
Mullen, a former commander of the USS George Washington 
(CVN-73) CVBG: 
Without MCM capability, we simply can't put the 
Marines ashore, nor can we safely operate any ships 
in the mine-danger areas. Because of that, full 
integration of mine warfare into the warfare campaign 
plan and the force commander's scheme in terms of 
395"Maneuver Warfare and Mine Countermeasures," Surface 
Warfare (May/June 1998): 29. 
396cited in Robert Holzer, "Study: Mines, Quieter Subs 
Pose Looming Naval Threats," Defense News, 8-14 September 
1997, 38. 
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sequence is vital. Without mine warfare, the campaign 
stops. 397 
U.S. naval forward presence forces will rely on three 
methods for providing MCM capability. The first and oldest 
method is through dedicated MCM forces, which employ 
purpose-built MCM ships and equipment. Dedicated open-water 
MCM will come from the fourteen MCM-1 Avenger-class ships 
acquired from 1985 to 1992. 398 These ships have wooden 
hulls, to defeat magnetic mine triggers, and are in the 
process of having new digital electronic minehunting gear 
installed. Two are homeported in Japan, and two are 
homeported in the Persian Gulf.39 9 The lead ship of the 
class, USS Avenger (MCM-1), operated in the Persian Gulf 
during the Gulf War. 
A second type of purpose-built MCM craft are the MHC-51 
Osprey-class boats, designed primarily for defending ports 
and harbors from enemy divers or offensive mining. Designed 
for work in shallow water, and with limited sea-keeping 
ability and only fifteen days' endurance, these small craft 
are not well-suited to open-water MCM work. 400 Instead, 
397cited in Rear Admiral Dennis Conley, "Mine Warfare: 
Enabling Power Projection in the Littorals," Surface Warfare 
(May/June 1998): 24. 
398Polmar, Naval Institute Guide, 211. 
399sea Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 150. 
400vision. Presence. Power, 63. 
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they likely would be tasked with keeping U.S. ports or 
beachhead areas free from mines. 
The third type of MCM ship is USS Inchon (MCS-12), a 
converted LPH-1 amphibious ship. With large hangar and 
workshop facilities, Inchon serves as a floating support and 
supply base for regional MCM forces. She also carriers a 
squadron of MH-53E Sea Dragon minehunting helicopters. 401 
Although a fairly old ship (launched in 1969), Inchon has 
shown herself to be well-suited to the floating base 
application. Her ability to operate a large number of 
helicopters also is a valuable MCM asset. 
A unique dedicated MCM capability comes from the Navy's 
Marine Mammal System (MMS) platoons. Able to be air lifted 
anywhere in the world quickly, these platoons comprise a 
team of shallow-water divers, a marine mammal unit of 
dolphins, animal handlers, and small boat coxswains, and an 
unmanned minehunting unit. The Mk 4 MMS employs four 
dolphins to detect and locate deep-moored mines, whether 
rising, influence, or contact types. The Mk 6 MMS employs 
six dolphins working in conjunction with explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) and SEAL personnel to protect friendly 
harbors from enemy intrusion. The Mk 7 MMS uses eight 
dolphins for the detection, location, and neutralization of 
bottom mines. The Mk 7 MMS currently represents the only 
401 sea Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 151. 
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capability in the U.S. Navy for dealing with buried 
mines.402 The MMS platoons were integrated into the new 
Very Shallow Water MCM (VSWMCM) detachment in 1998. 
Intended specifically to search and clear prospective Marine 
landing locations, the VSWMCM detachments consist of the MMS 
platoons, EOD and SEAL teams, and Marine Corps Force 
Reconnaissance divers.403 
Perhaps the most important improvement in MCM is the 
development of organic systems and capabilities, which 
should provide every ship and submarine with its own self-
contained MCM capability. Because there may not always be 
time for the dedicated MCM ships to deploy to a theater in 
times of crisis, it is important that every ship be able to 
provide its own MCM, if only to allow itself to maneuver 
freely within a given area.404 Two means of organic MCM are 
airborne, through the helicopter found on almost every 
surface combatant in the fleet, and through remotely guided 
"swimming" systems. 
402 commander Dan Renwick, "Conquering the VSW 
Environment: Man and Dolphins on the Front Lines," Surface 
Warfare (May/June 1998): 39-41. 
403vision. Presence. Power, 105. 
404"Mine Explosion: Defensive Efforts Lag Behind Enemy 
Technology Gains," Defense News, 4-10 May 1998, 15. Cited in 
this article is U.S. Navy data that claims a one- to two-
week delay for deploying MH-53E helicopters, and up to one 
month for MCM ships stationed in CONUS. See also Captain 
Buzz Broughton, "Mine Countermeasures: Zapping the Speed 
Bumps," Surface Warfare (July/August 1997): 16. 
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Most ships carry at least one helicopter capable of 
locating and clearing mines. The Inchon's MH-53E 
helicopters are the best-suited for airborne MCM due to 
their large size, heavy lift capability, and long endurance, 
but the Inchon is the only ship of her class and cannot be 
in two places at once. Thus it is important that the 
smaller SH-60 helicopters found on most surface combatants 
be capable of at least modest MCM. Several emerging systems 
should improve the airborne MCM capability of these smaller 
helicopters. 
The new CH-60S Knigthhawk version of the MH-60 multi-
purpose helicopter eventually will employ two different 
minehunting and neutralization systems. The first combines 
the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS), a blue-
green laser system also known as Magic Lantern, with the 
Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System (RAMICS), a 20mm gun 
with specially-designed ammunition. These two systems are 
optimized for shallow-moored (fifty feet or less) or 
surface-moored mines. 405 Magic Lantern was demonstrated 
successfully in 1995, and three contingency systems are 
operated by the HSL-94 ASW squadron pending final 
development of the system.406 
4osMajor General Edward Hanlon Jr., "Shaping the 
Battlespace: Organic Mine Countermeasures," S11rface Warfare 
(May/June 1998): 13. 
406vision, Presence, Power, 103. 
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The second airborne system will combine the towed 
AN/AQS-20 minehunting sonar and the Airborne Mine 
Neutralization System (AMNS). The AMNS is a remotely-
guided, self-destructing shaped-charge weapon, intended to 
be deployed from the helicopter operating the AN/AQS-20. 
The AN/AQS-20 and AMNS are intended for mines located in 
deeper water, and complement the ALMDS and RAMICS systems 
that operate against shallow mines.407 
To complete the needed organic MCM capability, three 
swimming systems are under development. The first is the 
Remote Minehunting System (RMS), a diesel-powered semi-
submersible craft operated from surface ships. 408 The RMS 
was first demonstrated in an operational setting by USS 
Cushing (DD-985) in the Persian Gulf in 1997, and is 
expected to enter service in 2000. 409 Described as ''an 
organic, high-endurance reconnaissance unit," the RMS is not 
capable of neutralizing mines. Rather, it will provide 
intelligence to its parent ship about the safety of 
surrounding waters. 410 However, as the Tripoli and 
407otto Kreisher, "Unencumbered Maneuverability On Day 
One," Sea Power (February 1999): 58-59.; Hanlon, ''Shaping 
the Battlespace," 14. 
408Hanlon, "Shaping the Battlespace," 13. 
409vision, Presence, Power, 104. 
41 0David Foxwell, "Mine-conscious surface ships back on 
the agenda," Jane's International Defense Review (May 1997): 
33. 
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Princeton examples show, simply knowing where the mines are 
is of great importance, and the RMS should provide such 
knowledge, in both deep and shallow water, at distances of 
several miles.411 
The two other remote minehunting systems are intended 
for U.S. submarines, but hold obvious potential for 
adaptation by surface forces. The first is the Near-term 
Mine Reconnaissance System (NMRS), a torpedo tube-launched, 
"tethered" system that is controlled through a fiber-optic 
cable from the submarine.412 The NMRS will carry the same 
AQS-14 minehunting sonar used by current helicopter MCM 
units. After traveling for up to five hours at four to six 
knots, the NMRS vehicle is recovered through the submarine's 
torpedo tubes, allowing the entire process of launch, 
mission execution, and recovery to be performed while 
submerged. Although relatively slow and short-ranged, the 
NMRS system will provide an important covert MCM capability 
for U.S. submarines. The NMRS, which relies heavily on 
proven commercial systems and components, is viewed as an 
interim system, pending development of the more-capable 
Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) .413 
411Broughton, "Mine Countermeasures," 19. 
412Hanlon, "Shaping the Battlespace," 14. 
41 3navid Foxwell, "Naval ROVs: alternatives sought for 
mine neutralization," Jane's International Defense Review 
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The LMRS essentially will be a "mini-submarine", with 
its own self-contained power source and navigation system. 
It is projected to provide forty to forty-eight hour 
endurance and 120-mile range from the launching submarine. 
Although the LMRS will be more complex and expensive than 
the NMRS, due to the need to develop a suitable power 
source, the LMRS should be a much safer option for the 
deploying submarine (or ship) .414 Slated to enter service 
in 2003, the LMRS should allow long-range, covert minefield 
reconnaissance, a vital requirement for OMFTs.415 
The MCM systems and capabilities described here will be 
vital for a Navy that espouses littoral operations as its 
main focus for the twenty-first century. For a state 
attempting to defend against naval forces, mines are an 
obvious means of countering U.S. sea power. Mines should be 
expected to be used in any regional chokepoints, as defenses 
around likely landing areas, and in important SLOCs.416 
Even the threat of mines can impose caution and delay on 
U.S. operations. Clever adversaries can compound this 
problem by advertising (or falsifying) their minelaying 
(May 1997): 61; Vision, Presence. Power, 104. 
414rbid. 
415vision. Presence. Power, 104-105. 
41 611Maneuver Warfare and Mine Countermeasures," 28. 
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efforts, and by employing dummy mines to augment existing 
minefields. 
Because existing deep-water MCM systems and practices 
do not work well in shallow or surf-zone waters, the 
development of new MCM capabilities has added urgency. 417 
The U.S. Navy has neglected MCM for many years, as open-
ocean operations against the Soviet Union were expected to 
be the principal activity of the Navy in wartime. The Navy 
has found itself forced to "play catch-up" in this vital 
warfighting area, with the result that many developmental 
efforts have come to naught. Despite observations from 
within and from outside the Navy that MCM remains under-
funded, a recent GAO report cites the expenditure of over a 
billion dollars on MCM systems, with little to show for 
it.418 MCM capability must be improved at every level, 
throughout the fleet, if a littoral strategy is to be 
pursued in the twenty-first century. 
Anti-Submarine Warfare <ASW} 
During the Cold War the U.S. Navy was the recognized 
leader in ASW, a not surprising fact given the large Soviet 
submarine force that the Navy trained to counter. 
Structured for an open-ocean effort against Soviet 
417 Daniel Crute, "Surf Zone Technology," Surface 
Warfare (May/June 1998): 36. 
418"Mine Explosion," 15. 
213 
submarines, the Navy's ASW capability primarily was centered 
on deep-water operations against large, relatively noisy 
nuclear powered submarines. With the demise of the Soviet 
Union, and the shift to littoral operations, the twenty-
first century Navy is confronted with a new ASW challenge: 
prosecuting and killing small, quiet diesel-electric 
submarines in shallow waters, where many of the systems and 
tactics of open-ocean ASW are not effective.419 
Since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, the Navy 
has seen a significant decrease in size, readiness, and 
capability. ASW has been a particular area of deteriorating 
capability, as resources and training for ASW have dwindled 
in the post-Cold War period. The lack of a world-wide, 
open-ocean submarine threat and competition for funds from 
higher-priority programs, such as TMD, have seen a serious 
degradation of the Navy's ASW skills.420 Another reason for 
the decline in ASW capability is the restructuring or 
dismantling of much of the Cold War ASW force structure. 
For example, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft have been reduced 
by half since 1989, with the remaining P-3s largely employed 
in surface surveillance and reconnaissance. 421 U.S. SSNs, 
419Longworth, "Solutions to the shallow-water 
challenge," 15. 
420Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy Chief Emphasizes Need To 
Renew ASW Focus," Defense News, 7-13 September 1998, 4. 
421
"ASW Atrophy: Training Sinks Dangerously Low," 
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such as the SSN-688 Los Angeles-class, represent the premier 
ASW platform, yet their numbers are expected to fall to 
fifty, half of the Cold War goal of one hundred, by 2004.42 2 
The combination of decreasing ASW force size and structure, 
decreasing funds, and lack of emphasis due to the absence of 
the Soviet submarine threat have served to leave the Navy in 
poor ASW health. 
In the littoral setting, ASW will be a critical 
capability. The keep-out strategy expected to be employed 
by regional opponents is built upon the traditional weapons 
of sea denial, the mine and the submarine. The study cited 
in the previous section on MCM offers a similar position on 
submarines: 
Of special concern to the naval forces are advanced, 
quiet submarines .... This would present a major 
threat to our ability to initiate and sustain 
expeditionary military operations along the littoral 
regions, especially in view of evolving concepts for 
such warfare that call for extensive fire support and 
logistic support from the sea.423 
The submarine threat, like the mine threat, must be 
taken seriously all the time, even when submarines have not 
been identified. In fact, it is precisely when the location 
of enemy submarines is unknown that the greatest effort must 
Defense News, 4-10 May 1998, 14. 
422sea Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 102. 
42 3Holzer, "Study: Mines, Quieter Subs," 38. 
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be expended in ASW operations. The British experience in 
the Falklands campaign is illustrative of the level of 
respect commanded by even a few old, less-capable 
submarines. 
In the Falklands campaign, Argentina possessed four 
diesel-electric submarines, only two of which were 
seaworthy. Of these two, one was an ex-u.s. Guppy-class 
World War Two submarine, while the other was a modern German 
Type-209. The British Royal Navy was perhaps the only ASW 
peer of the U.S. Navy, operating many of the same advanced 
SSNs and ASW helicopter systems. Yet the mere presence of a 
single Argentine submarine in the South Atlantic forced the 
British commander to divert significant surface assets to 
ASW work, and prevented the British amphibious group from 
taking optimal positions for the re-capture of South 
Georgia. Several hundred ASW weapons were dropped or fired 
on possible submarine contacts, without damaging the 
Argentine submarine San Luis, which was able to conduct at 
least three torpedo attacks on British ships. 424 
Even the two Argentine submarines that did not go to 
sea were able to influence British operations. One, also a 
Guppy-class boat, was towed from port to port to give the 
impression that it was operable, thus increasing British 
424Lodmell, "It Only Takes One," 30; Commander Kevin 
Peppe, "Submarines in the Littorals," Proceedings (July 
1993): 47. 
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apprehension to the submarine threat. The concerns of a 
naval commander faced with enemy submarines is stated by a 
U.S. Navy submarine officer: 
No greater threat exists to successful operations in 
the littorals than that posed by a professionally 
operated diesel submarine .... Even poorly operated 
diesel submarines are a menace .... Even the oldest 
of diesel submarines ... retains that most 
fundamental of submarine qualities: stealth.425 
Just as uncertainty about mines serves nearly as well 
as the actual presence of mines, so can uncertainty about 
the presence of submarines serve an adversary's purposes. 
Until and unless positive information exists that an enemy 
submarine has been sunk, any naval operations in the area 
must be assumed to be at risk of submarine attack, and may 
be restricted in range of action as a result. 
The focus on littoral ASW is especially relevant due to 
the possession of diesel submarines by many potential 
regional adversaries. Diesel submarines are found in the 
navies of Iran, North Korea, China, India, Pakistan, and, of 
course, Russia. 426 Roughly 110 diesel submarines exist in 
the inventories of twenty-one nations around the world, many 
of them relatively modern German, French, or Russian 
425 Ibid. 
426oavid Foxwell, "Sub proliferation sends navies 
diving for cover," Jane's International Defense Review 
(August 1997): 31. 
217 
models.42 7 In addition to previously exported Kilo-class 
boats, the new Russian Amur-class diesel submarine has been 
offered for export even before the first Amur has been 
launched.428 Clearly there is no shortage of available 
submarine capability for small states seeking to strengthen 
their defenses. 
For the Navy's littoral strategy, ASW will be crucial. 
If ships are to approach an enemy's coast, as they must for 
amphibious landings, enemy submarines must be defended 
against. Although aircraft carriers have attracted the most 
attention as being too valuable to risk losing, the 
decreasing size of the U.S. fleet means that every ship 
represents a larger percentage of overall capability, and 
increasingly may be too valuable to risk. The concentration 
of ever-greater capability into individual vessels, such as 
the large AOE fast support ships or the Maritime Pre-
positioning Squadron (MPS) ships, means that a single 
torpedo attack by even the oldest of diesel submarines can 
have disastrous effects for U.S. regional warfighting 
efforts. An ARG's ships, including the large LHA and LHD 
ships with their hundreds of U.S. Marines onboard, must 
approach an enemy's coast to fulfill their power projection 
427commander Kaj Toft Madsen, Royal Danish Navy, 
"Fighting the B_east," Proceedings (August 1996): 28. 
428Foxwell, "Sub proliferation," 33. 
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mission, and so will be at the greatest risk of submarine 
attack. 
In short, no littoral operations can afford to ignore 
the threat of an enemy submarine, however old, that is 
capable of putting to sea.429 Accordingly, the U.S. Navy 
must improve on its current level of shallow-water ASW. 
Indicative of the need for improvement are recent training 
exercises with South Africa, in which thirty-year-old 
French-built diesel submarines were able to avoid detection 
by U.S. ships.430 Existing and future diesel submarines may 
be armed with homing torpedoes that can be launched from 
five miles or more, making the submarine threat even 
greater. 431 The shallow-water ASW mission thus must be 
elevated in priority among naval planners. 
One possible step in improving U.S. ASW training and 
capability against diesel submarines would be for the Navy 
to purchase its own diesel submarines. As stated 
previously, many advanced German, French, and even Russian 
diesel submarines are available on the world arms market. 
Acquiring diesel submarines of its own would allow the Navy 
first-hand experience in the diesel submarine's operational 
tactics and limitations from the submarine commander's 
429Lodmell, "It Only Takes One," 31. 
43011ASW Atrophy," 16. 
431Madsen, "Fighting the Beast," 30. 
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perspective.432 This real-life Red Team capability would be 
an invaluable source of information on diesel submarine 
operations. Such diesel submarines could be based overseas, 
as the SSBNs once were, in order to provide both realistic 
in-theater training as well as combat capability in wartime. 
Simply training against the diesel submarines of allies is 
unlikely to provide the depth of understanding that 
ownership of such submarines would allow. While no plans 
for the purchase of diesel submarines have been announced by 
the Navy, this option certainly merits consideration. 
Other improvements in ASW capability must come from 
increased emphasis on ASW, which must be translated into 
increased funding for training and new systems. The recent 
paper from CNO Admiral Jay Johnson, "1998 ASW Focus 
Statement," is a step in the right direction, but additional 
efforts still must be made. 433 Newer systems for TMD, 
aviation, and other warfighting areas are important, and 
have received much attention (and funding) in recent years. 
The submarine threat, on the other hand, has largely been 
ignored since the Soviet threat disappeared. It should not 
take the loss of a major warship or logistics ship to a 
diesel submarine attack to re-awaken the Navy to the need 
for ASW in the littorals. However, as the British Falklands 
432"ASW Atrophy," 16. 
433Holzer, "U.S. Navy Chief Emphasizes" 4. 
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experience and recent Navy exercises demonstrate, it may be 
that such a loss will have to occur to drive home the 
importance of ASW. 
Theater Missile Defense 
Probably no single warfare area is of greater 
importance in the current international setting than theater 
missile defense (TMD). One of the common threads in defense 
literature concerning possible opponent strategies is the 
use of ballistic missiles to attack U.S. forces, facilities, 
or allied population centers. In the absence of a credible 
TMD system, the mere possession of ballistic missiles likely 
will result in significant political pressure from regional 
allies, particularly if the adversary is believed to possess 
nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons. Regional 
allies may be reluctant to render assistance to U.S. forces, 
such as base access or overflight rights, if their 
population centers are within range of ballistic 
missiles. 434 
In addition to these political effects, an opponent 
with the ability and willingness to use ballistic missiles 
to deliver NBC weapons could gain two important military 
434some authors use the term "horizontal deterrent" to 
describe political pressure from U.S. allies threatened with 
ballistic missile attack. See John Peters, The U.S. 
Military: Ready for the New World Order? (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993), 106-107. 
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advantages in a conflict with the United States. First, the 
use of persistent chemical weapons on regional port and 
airfield facilities could render these facilities useless to 
American forces. Without access to regional ports and 
airfields, the kind of build-up seen in the Persian Gulf in 
1990 would be virtually impossible. 435 Second, an opponent 
in possession of one or more nuclear weapons could use a 
ballistic missile to conduct a nuclear attack on American 
space assets. The current and future U.S. level of 
dependence on space support are potentially severe 
vulnerabilities. If an opponent were able to destroy or 
degrade American space assets, U.S. forces could lose much 
of their high-tech advantage. 
For these reasons, as well as the threat of attack on 
U.S. military forces, the development of TMD systems is a 
high priority within the U.S. armed forces: 
Because the ability to fight and win major regional 
conflicts (MRC) relies on rapid reinforcement from 
home bases, the United States is investing heavily in 
435see Weaver and Glaes, Inviting Disaster; (1).T.he. 
Impact of Nuclear. Biological. and Chemical Proliferation on 
Naval Operations and Capabilities, (2)The Impact of the 
Proliferation of Nuclear. Biological. and Chemical Weapons 
on the United States Air Force, and (3)The Impact of 
Nuclear. Biological. and Chemical Proliferation on u.s. 
Armed Forces. 1-3 are reports by the Center for 
Counterproliferation Research, Washington, D.C.: NDU, 1996. 
Each of these sources describe the absolute necessity of 
large facilities in the theater, and the extreme 
vulnerability of such static facilities to persistent 
chemical attack. 
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assets such as C-17s and Roll-on Roll-off ships. The 
airfields and ports through which our forces must 
arrive are essential to the reinforcement strategy. 
The Surface Navy must be capable of protecting these 
debarkation points and able to force its way ashore 
under the threat or actual conduct of TBM strikes. 436 
The Navy systems intended to provide TMD capability 
are Navy Area Defense (also known as Lower Tier), and Navy 
Theater-Wide (also known as Upper Tier). Both systems are 
built around the Aegis radar system and the SM-2 missile. 
The Aegis system also has been proposed as the foundation of 
a national missile defense (NMD) system, although such a 
system would be prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty. 
The first component of naval TMD is the Navy Area 
system, or Lower Tier. Navy Area utilizes the SPY-1 radar 
of the Aegis ships, and a modification of the SM-2 missile. 
Specifically, the SM-2 Block IVA missile adds a dual semi-
active radar/imaging infrared seeker for terminal guidance, 
as well as an improved blast-fragmentation warhead with 
radar proximity fusing. The use of a proximity fuse reduces 
the "all-or-nothing" nature of hit-to-kill systems, as even 
a near miss should produce a mission kill. 437 Navy Area is 
436captain Phil Balisle, "Theater Ballistic Missile 
Defense: Blunting the Attack," surface Warfare (January/ 
February 1997), 37. The current need for TBMD echoes the 
need for carrier-based aircraft in the 1930s-40s, to provide 
local air superiority so that Marine and Army forces could 
be landed in safety from aerial attack. 
43 7swicker, "Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea," 
8-9. 
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intended for short-ranged ballistic missiles, but retains 
the ability of the SM-2 Block IV to intercept cruise 
missiles and aircraft.438 
The SPY-1 radar's ability to track ballistic missiles 
has been proven by test range operations, as well as real-
world operations. The SM-2 Block IVA likewise has been 
tested successfully at White Sands missile range, where a 
Lance ballistic missile target was destroyed on 24 January 
1997. 43 9 The first multi-ship test took place in July 1995, 
when USS Lake Erie (CG-70) and USS Port Royal (CG-73) 
conducted a tracking experiment at the Pacific Missile Range 
facility in Hawaii.440 A recent test, conducted on 18 
November 1998 at the Pacific Missile Range, involved the 
launch of an SM-2 as a simulated ballistic missile, which 
again was tracked by Lake Erie and Port Royal. The cruisers 
conducted a complete track and intercept of the SM-2, with 
only the launch of the SM-2 Block IVA interceptor being 
simulated. USS Russell (DDG-59), an Aegis destroyer 
operating the newer SPY-lD system, repeated the test two 
438David Hughes, l'Navy Readies Fleet For Anti-Scud 
Warfare," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 February 
1997, 62. 
439vision. Presence. Power, 74. 
4 40David Foxwell and Joris Janssen Lok, "Naval TBM 
defense matures," Jane's International Defense Review 
(January 1998): 28. 
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days later using an Aries target missile. In both tests, 
tracking information was shared in real time with Army TMD 
facilities in Alabama, in order to demonstrate the joint 
warfighting requirement of networking sensors in joint force 
application.441 In March 1996 the cruiser USS Bunker Hill 
(CG-52) tracked all four Chinese M-9 missiles launched 
across the Taiwan Strait, while the Aegis destroyer USS 
Mitscher (DDG-57) has tracked Syrian missile tests from a 
position in the eastern Mediterranean. 44 2 
The ability to utilize Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC) data sharing should make Navy Area much 
more effective, as data on a target missile's trajectory 
could be provided by Aegis-equipped ships located between 
the launch point and the target.443 Initial tests of the 
CEC system confirm that CEC can be employed in a TMD role, 
allowing earlier engagement by the firing ship. Given the 
likely "shoot-look-shoot" method of the Navy Area system, 
the ability to fire the first shot as early as possible has 
obvious advantages. Availability of a CEC-equipped EP-3 or 
441"Navy Launches New Missile Defense Tests," Defense 
:N.e.e.k, 30 November 1998, cited in BMDO External Affairs 
Diqest, 30 November 1998. 
442Foxwell and Lok, "Naval TBM defense matures," 29. 
443cEC is an emerging system for sharing radar tracks 
on airborne targets in real time. A full description of CEC 
will follow later in this chapter. 
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E-2C aircraft would maximize the benefit gained through CEC, 
but even without an aircraft link the ability to share data 
through CEC provides an important advantage in TMD. 444 
As valuable as Navy Area will be, it has two 
significant disadvantages compared to a longer-range system 
like Navy Theater-Wide. First, because of the short range 
of Navy Area (described as "tens of miles"), it ties a 
multi-mission Aegis warship to a relatively fixed position, 
a position that may be hundreds of miles from the likely 
site of battle within the theater. An Aegis cruiser 
positioned to defend Bahrain, for example, would not be 
available to provide anti-air, anti-cruise missile, or anti-
surface capability elsewhere in the Gulf. Secondly, the 
engagement envelope for Navy Area shrinks as the defended 
site gets farther inland, making it less effective in 
defending sites that are not located on or near the 
coast.4 45 For these reasons, a longer-range TMD capability 
is required. 
The second component of naval TMD is Navy Theater-Wide, 
or Upper Tier. Like Navy Area, Navy Theater-Wide is crafted 
around the SPY-1 radar and the SM-2 missile. Unlike Navy 
Area, Theater-Wide is intended as an exo-atmospheric system, 
444cooperative Engagement Capability: A Revolution in 
Air Defense, U.S. Navy booklet, no publisher or date, 16. 
445swicker, "Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea," 
9. 
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destroying incoming ballistic missiles outside the 
atmosphere. In order to conduct intercepts outside the 
atmosphere, Navy Theater-Wide will utilize a modified SM-2 
missile and the Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile 
(LEAP) kill vehicle. Modification to the SM-2 will include 
a third stage, comprised of the Advanced Solid Axial Stage 
rocket motor, and replacement of the blast-fragmentation 
warhead with the LEAP. The new missile likely will be 
designated SM-3.446 
An important advantage of Navy Theater-Wide over Navy 
Area is the ability to conduct intercepts during the ascent, 
mid-course, and descent phase of a ballistic missile's 
flight. Such capability will allow multiple shots in many 
cases, as well as dispersing chemical or biological warheads 
harmlessly outside the atmosphere. When combined with Navy 
Area, a layered defense against ballistic missiles will be 
effected. The Theater-Wide system should share the same 
benefits of CEC data-sharing as Navy Area. Four successful 
test launches of an SM-2 missile configured to carry the 
LEAP projectile have been conducted since 1992. The initial 
446rbid., 10. The LEAP kill vehicle is a hit-to-kill 
system, relying on direct impact with an incoming missile in 
order to destroy it. With a mass of 18kg and a velocity in 
the neighborhood of 4.5 km/sec, the kinetic energy of the 
LEAP kill vehicle is approximately 250 million ft-lbs!! 
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intercept test of the SM-3/LEAP missile is planned for 1999, 
with deployment scheduled for as early as 2006.447 
While both TMD systems should be capable of relying 
only on CEC for offboard cueing, the ability to integrate 
space assets into naval TMD would provide a significant 
advantage. 448 Space-based sensors should provide the 
earliest possible notification of missile launch, due to the 
ability of a satellite to look down at the earth: 
Providing targeting information to the Aegis system 
from these external sensors will supplement the 
information provided by the Aegis system's own SPY-1 
radar and allow interceptors to "launch on remote 
data." This means the interceptor can be launched on 
the basis of information provided by external sensors 
and before the attacking missile is picked up by the 
SPY-1 radar. This would permit attacking missiles to 
be intercepted much earlier in their flight 
trajectories, substantially widening the area that 
can be defended, especially against higher velocity, 
longer-range theater ballistic missiles. 449 
The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a 
constellation of satellites in both geosynchronous orbit 
(SBIRS-High) and low earth orbit (SBIRS-Low), should provide 
447vision, Presence, Power, 74. 
44 8Frank Gaffney, "Defend America-From the Sea," 
Proceedings (October 1998), 73; Swicker, "Theater Missile 
Defense from the Sea," 12. Swicker states that, "In 2005, 
cueing to Aegis will be primarily a function of the U.S. 
Space Command." 
449Defending America: Ending America's Vulnerability to 
Ballistic Missiles (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage 
Foundation, 1996). Cited in Gaffney, "Defend America-From 
the Sea," 73. 
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the space-based cueing needed to extract maximum benefit 
from the Aegis TMD systems. Launch of SBIRS-High satellites 
was scheduled commence in 2002, but has been pushed back by 
the Air Force to 2004. 450 Launch of SBIRS-Low satellites 
will begin in 2004. Even with the delays in the SBIRS-High 
program, both components of SBIRS should be available when 
Navy Theater-Wide enters service.451 
Through the use of CEC data-sharing, any Aegis ship 
capable of tracking a ballistic missile should be able to 
provide cueing to the ship that actually fires at the 
ballistic missile. The ability to utilize offboard cueing 
in this manner will extend the range of the firing ship 
substantially, allowing a larger coverage against ballistic 
missiles and possibly allowing multiple shots in a shoot-
look-shoot engagement. In addition, both TMD systems are 
good examples of the benefit gained through the ability to 
place sensors in space, and to transmit information from 
space in real-time. By combining two different systems to 
form a layered defense, with space and CEC support to 
improve the effectiveness of each component in the TMD 
shield, American TMD capability should provide much-needed 
protection against ballistic missile attack in the future. 
450warren Fe~ster, "Satellite Projects Killed," Defense 
Melis., 15 February 1999, 36. 
451secretary of Defense Annual Report to congress and 
the President 1998, 70. 
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Despite the recognized importance of TMD, the Area and 
Theater-Wide programs have experienced problems imposed from 
outside the Department of the Navy. Lack of enthusiastic 
support from the Clinton administration, and even from 
within the Department of Defense, have served to reduce the 
pace of Navy TMD development.452 A further hindrance to the 
Theater-Wide program is its recent merger with the Army's 
problem-plagued Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
system. The merger was directed by the Pentagon's 
comptroller, William Lynn, for budgetary reasons.453 The 
Navy has strongly criticized the merger, arguing that it 
will force unjustified delays on the development of a long-
range TMD system, as well as entailing extra costs to make 
the eventual system compatible with each service's operating 
requirements. 454 
Navy Area has entered initial manufacturing 
development, with the full software system installed on Lake 
E.r..i..e. and Port Royal. Problems remain to be solved in making 
the Area TMD software, the CEC software, and the existing 
452Eugene Fox and Stanley Orman, "Lack of Cooperation 
Cripples TMD Credibility, Effectiveness," Defense News, 6-12 
October 1997, 21. 
45 3colin Clark and Robert Holzer, "Pentagon To Combine 
Theaterwide, THAAD," Defense News, 18 January 1999, 4. 
454Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy Rips Missile Merger," 
Defense News, 8 February 1999, 4. 
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Aegis software compatible, a daunting task given the size of 
the Aegis software alone.455 However, the Navy has planned 
thirty-five test launches of the SM-2 Block IVA missile in 
the next two years, and hopes to have the Navy Area system 
fully operational by 2003. Theater-wide is hoped to be 
operational by the year 2005, although a 2006-2008 time 
frame is more realistic.4 56 Both systems should provide a 
much-needed defensive capability against ballistic missiles, 
a capability made more effective through its position at 
sea. 
Defenses Against Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) 
The United States possesses unmatched power projection 
capability, both through forward-deployed forces and forces 
that can be transported overseas from CONUS, as demonstrated 
in 1990-91. However, the emergence of NBC capability in the 
hands of smaller states has the potential to invalidate U.S. 
regional warfighting strategy by targeting specific 
weaknesses of that strategy. In particular, chemical and 
biological weapons (CBW) represent an attractive 'equalizer' 
455Bryan Bender, "USN digitisation effort is hit by 
integration flaw," Jane's Defense Weekly, 01 July 1998, 9; 
Captain Dan Meyer and Captain John Geary, "Aegis Computing 
Enters the 21st Century," Proceedings (January 1998): 40. 
The Aegis system currently utilizes over fifteen million 
lines of computer code and twenty-eight dedicated computers. 
456sea Power Almanac Issue (January 1999): 150. 
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for smaller states that envision war with the United 
States.457 
In a regional crisis requiring the deployment of U.S. 
power projection forces, the units deployed in the theater 
will present an adversary with an enticing target for CBW 
attack. A regional power may conclude that it cannot defeat 
American forces using conventional weapons, making CBW 
necessary as an equalizer. Thus the attractiveness of CBW 
attack would derive from purely military considerations, 
setting aside the logistical, political, and blackmail 
benefits of using or threatening to use CW/BW weapons. 
Naval forward pr~sence forces, including Marine units, 
are the front line of U.S. power projection capability. 
These forces are most likely to be on station when a crisis 
erupts, and would be the first deployed into the theater. 
The importance of the Marines' amphibious capability has 
increased since the Gulf War, as a regional opponent is 
unlikely to allow U.S. forces to land unmolested at area 
ports. Marine units may well have to conduct combat 
landings to secure port facilities, or to set up major 
logistical hubs at suitable sites away from existing port 
facilities. Additionally, the facilities of local allies 
457While many smaller states are believed to be 
pursuing nuclear capability, the possession of chemical and 
biological weapons in these nations' arsenals largely is a 
known fact. This section thus will be written from the 
standpoint that CW and BW are the most likely to be employed 
against the United States. 
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may not be made available to U.S. forces due to the threat 
of NBC attack or for political reasons. 
Given the need to put Marine units "over the beach", an 
adversary's first and most viable opportunity to attack U.S. 
forces would come in the littoral area. The necessity for 
Marine units to come into close proximity with enemy forces 
would allow chemical attack via artillery, rockets, mortars, 
mines, and aerial bombs, while the need for supporting naval 
forces to concentrate in the waters near the landing area 
would allow attack by cruise missiles.458 
In regard to attacks on Marine units, the continuing 
shortfall in fielding effective CBW protective gear likely 
would result in heavy casualties following a chemical 
attack. Among the problems faced by Marine units are 
insufficient detection capability, insufficient personal 
protective capability, and inability to safely process and 
treat chemical casualties.4 59 Marine Corps Major Victor 
Riley, writing in Proceedings, offered the following 
shortcomings of Marine NBC readiness: 
Until recently, there has been no standard testing or 
progression of instruction to ensure mastery of NBC 
skills beyond the basic level that is required to 
ensure survival in a contaminated environment. 
45 8ormsby, "The Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat 
to Naval Forces," 5. 
459The Impact of Nnclear, Biological, and Chemical 
Proliferation on Naval operations and capabilities, 15. 
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. The current protective suits (OG-84) used by 
the Marine Corps are bulky and extremely heavy . 
. The Ml7 protective mask, which most Marines 
use, was found to have a failure rate of more than 
37% when the Marine Corps Test facility at Camp 
Lejeune, North Carolina, tested masks that belonged 
to units preparing to deploy to SWA between 7 August 
and 31 December 1990 .... The ability to detect 
chemical agents is critical to a unit .... 
Currently, few detection devices are available. 460 
. 
While some progress has been made in addressing the 
problems identified by Major Riley, significant shortfalls 
still exist. In particular, decontamination training and 
knowledge remains a major problem, in part because of the 
belief that decontamination operations are too hard to do. 
Despite some progress in CBW defensive capabilities, 
significant deficiencies in NBC defenses are likely to exist 
well into the next decade. 
Despite the physical separation of naval units from 
opposing forces, CBW attacks also pose a major threat to the 
U.S. Navy. The 1996 National Defense University report 
I:mpact of the Proliferation of Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical Weapons on Naval operations and capabilities cited 
numerous material weaknesses, as well as conceptual 
weaknesses, in the Navy's NBC readiness: 
• Fleet NBC training readiness has been substantially 
eroded. 
• There is a fundamental division of opinion within 
the military community about NBC risks to U.S. 
military operations. While most take it very 
460Riley, "ABCs of NBC," 38-40. 
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seriously, some tend to discount the NBC threat or 
place it in the "too-hard-to-do" box. 
• CBW attacks may be delivered by penetrating weapons. 
In the case of some persistent chemical and 
biological agents, such attacks could render a ship 
effectively unusable for protracted periods. 
• Tactical and doctrinal development remains a major 
deficiency. 
• The impact of NBC on naval operations may be 
underestimated in war games; the lack of effective, 
integrated simulation and modeling tools impedes 
gaming and tactical doctrine development. 
Among the most telling of the deficiencies noted by the 
report was the mindset of many Navy leaders. Among the 
quotes listed in the report: "NBC will not be the deciding 
factor in future regional wars;" "Bugs and gas are like 
heavy weather--the fleet will just button down and drive 
through;" "If it happens, it happens. We will just continue 
with combat operations." Such statements recall the 
official position that Pearl Harbor was too shallow for 
aerial torpedo attack, thus ruling out any risk to the 
Pacific Fleet. This mindset may be attributed to another of 
the report's observations: "NBC considerations, especially 
in the biological area, remain substantially outside the 
professional expertise of most naval officers." 4 61 
Whether in the context of a Marine landing force or a 
naval battle group, the existing deficiencies in detection 
461 The Impact of Nnclear. Biological. and Chemical 
Proliferation on Naval Operations and Capabilities, 21. 
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and protection require urgent attention. Additionally, CBW 
training must be made more regular and realistic. Finally, 
the level of knowledge concerning CBW issues must be 
improved through military education. As long as the 
deficiencies presented here remain, the vulnerability of 
military forces to CBW attack will be an 'Achilles Heel' for 
an opponent to exploit. 
In addition to the military weaknesses describes above, 
American power projection forces are dependent on access to 
major facilities in order to operate. Port facilities are 
required to deliver the men and material needed to fight a 
ground war, while U.S. tactical aircraft require large, 
modern airfields from which to operate. In regard to a 
major regional war, the 1997 Secretary of Defense Report to 
Congress lists four general phases of U.S. intervention: 
1. Halt the invasion. 
2. Build up U.S. and allied combat power in the region, 
while reducing the enemy's. 
3. Decisively defeat the enemy. 
4. Provide for post-war stability.462 
It should be noted that phases one, two, and three 
depend on unfettered access to in-theater facilities. 
Without access to regional airfields, U.S. tactical air 
power will be unable to repeat the performance of 1990-91, 
when most of the Tactical Air Command deployed to Saudi, 
462william Cohen, Annual Report to the President and 
the Congress 1997, 5. 
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Emirate, and Omani airfields. Without access to regional 
ports, U.S. sea lift will be unable to repeat the 
performance of 1990-91, when 95 percent of the supplies and 
equipment used in Desert Storm were delivered by ship. 463 
Finally, without the full weight of U.S. air power, and with 
diminished capability to deliver and supply ground forces, 
the ability to decisively defeat the enemy becomes 
problematical. Thus the use of CBW weapons to neutralize 
regional facilities provides an adversary the means to 
degrade severely American warfighting capability. 
The neutralization of regional facilities does not 
require an actual CBW attack in every case. In the book 
Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Aqe, Keith Payne describes 
the effect of intimidation produced by possession of CBW 
weapons. 464 Since almost the whole of Saudi Arabia is 
within the range of Iranian missiles, and all of South Korea 
and Japan are within range of North Korean missiles, it is 
not difficult to imagine the facilities in these nations 
being denied to U.S. forces due to fear of CBW attack. In 
the Persian Gulf and Middle East, most U.S. allies are "one 
463weaver and Glaes, Invitinq Disaster, 3. 
464Payne describes the enormous effect SCUD attacks had 
on Israel, and emphasizes that the threat of chemical 
attack, even though it never occurred, weighed heavily on 
Israeli morale. See Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Aqe 
(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 22-30. 
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target" populations in that their capital cities are the 
focal point of their national existence, making them even 
more fearful of CBW attack.465 Particularly in light of the 
United States' minimal ability to defend against ballistic 
missiles, the possibility of regional allies denying U.S. 
access to their bases cannot be discounted. 
In addition to the threat of ballistic missile attack, 
cruise missiles will pose an increasing threat to facilities 
in the future. While Third World cruise missile capability 
largely remains limited to naval use, it should be expected 
that small states will be able to develop rudimentary land-
attack cruise missiles in the future, in part due to the 
ready availability of GPS information, which could be used 
in a guidance system for such a cruise missile. Even using 
the commercial GPS signal, a cruise missile so equipped 
would be accurate to within one hundred meters, much better 
than any Third World ballistic missile: 
This [different nations' planned GPS systems] 
suggests that GPS-INS technology suitable for long-
range cruise missiles will become widely available in 
the Third World in the early 1990s .... In theory, 
selective availability will prevent Third World 
military forces from using GPS to deliver ordnance 
with an accuracy better than about 100 meters. For 
some applications, that may be enough.466 
465Andrew Rathmell, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle 
East: Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Libya," Marine Corps Gazette 
(July 1990): 60. 
466seth Carus, cruise Missile Proliferation in the 
1990s (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 66. 
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Whether or not a Third World nation could develop a 
true land-attack missile, capable of utilizing terrain 
masking or a multi-leg flight path, remains to be seen. 
However, the possibility of a regional power fielding a 
basic land-attack cruise missile, capable of correcting its 
position autonomously, cannot be discounted. 
When such attacks occur, the results are likely to be 
severe for any facility struck with CBW weapons. Chemical 
weapons, which are widely held, inexpensive, and whose 
effects are very rapid, would provide the optimal agent for 
such attacks. Both The Impact of Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical Proliferation on Naval operations and Capabilities 
(1) and its sister report, The Impact of the Proliferation 
of Nuclear, Bioloqical, and Chemical Weapons on the United 
States Air Force, (2) provide very frank assessments of the 
survivability of major facilities: 
(1) Large area defense, decontamination, and 
organizational responsibilities remain a major 
concern ..•. Next to detection, the most commonly 
voiced concern is for the NBC defense of ports and 
other large-area logistics nodes. 
(2) Wargame participants generally believed that 
chemical and biological weapons attacks could shut 
down air operations at forward bases .... The Air 
Force has no effective means to decontaminate 
aircraft that have been contaminated by toxic agents 
or materials without taking the aircraft out of 
service for a long period or damaging key aircraft 
components (italics mine).467 
467 The Impact of Nuclear, Bioloqical, and Chemical 
Proliferation on Naval Operations and Capabilities, 17; The. 
Impact of the Proliferation of Nuclear, Bioloqical, and 
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Until the facilities needed by U.S. power projection 
forces can be given protection from CBW attack, this 
vulnerability in U.S. strategy will continue to pose a grave 
threat to U.S. prospects in any regional conflict. The fact 
that such protection, if and when it becomes available, must 
be provided on a constant basis adds to the problem. A 
regional adversary is unlikely to withhold its CBW weapons 
until defenses against them have been positioned. Rather, 
it should be expected that regional facilities would be 
attacked at the outset of hostilities, before the United 
States could deploy whatever defensive systems it had 
available. Thus the ability to defend against ballistic 
missiles would have to be in place permanently. At present, 
of course, the vulnerability of major logistical facilities 
is a relative constant, since none of the U.S. theater 
missile defense systems, including the two Navy systems, are 
ready for deployment. 
The most readily correctable vulnerability of the power 
projection paradigm is the state of U.S. active CBW 
defenses. As ballistic missiles and cruise missiles 
represent the primary means for an enemy to deliver CBW 
weapons, defenses aimed at defeating these missiles are 
crucial to improving overall U.S. defensive capability. The 
existing Navy TMD systems remain several years from 
Chemical Weapons on the united states Air Force, 4, 7. 
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deployment. Cruise missile defenses are more advanced, 
especially defenses for use at sea, but will have to be 
improved to meet the land-attack cruise missile threat. 
More than any other defensive measures, defenses against 
ballistic and cruise missiles are vital to improving U.S. 
survivability against CBW attacks. 
Without the ability to deliver CBW warheads via 
ballistic or cruise missile, much of an enemy's CBW leverage 
disappears. No regional air force is likely to get past 
American air superiority aircraft to deliver gravity bombs, 
nor is a regional navy likely to be able to approach U.S. 
naval forces and survive. The two Navy TMD programs would 
provide the enormous advantage of mobility, being capable of 
deployment wherever needed without regard to conditions 
ashore. Just as a carrier's aircraft enjoy independence 
from foreign basing rights, so would a naval missile defense 
system be able to operate anywhere in international waters. 
Since U.S. Navy ships are deployed to the Mediterranean, 
Persian Gulf, and Korean theaters on a permanent basis, 
ensuring the presence of the Aegis-equipped ships needed for 
ballistic missile defense would not require a major upheaval 
in deployment patterns. 
Unlike TMD systems, programs designed for cruise 
missile defense have been given little emphasis in recent 
years. Because cruise missiles have been exclusively a 
naval problem for many years, the Marines in particular have 
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been slow to develop defenses against cruise missiles. The 
problems involved in intercepting and destroying a cruise 
missile are not as great as those involved in ballistic 
missile defense, and so cruise missile defenses may be 
expected to be developed more quickly. 
Among the cruise missile defenses intended for use on 
land, the Army's PAC-3 version of the Patriot missile and 
the Tactical High-Energy Laser (THEL) appear to hold the 
most promise.468 The PAC-3, when completed, will serve as a 
dual-purpose system, capable of intercepting ballistic and 
cruise missiles, as well as intercepting aircraft. The 
THEL, while still in the design concept stage, has been 
tested using the Mid Infra-Red Advanced Chemical Laser 
(MIRACL). The tracking and fire control systems intended 
for the THEL system successfully destroyed a 122mm artillery 
rocket in 1996, using the MIRACL laser at a low power 
setting to simulate the smaller THEL laser. 46 9 Provided 
that these Army systems can be made compatible with 
deployment as part of an ARG, their adoption by the Marine 
Corps would seem a logical step. 
In addition to active defenses, measures of passive 
defense must be improved if U.S. naval forces are to be 
468
"Israel and US forces warm to high-energy laser 
weapons," Jane's International Defense Review (February 
1997): 5. 
469Hewish, "The Menace Reawakens," 33. 
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survivable to CBW attacks. It is only prudent to assume 
that an active defense system may allow some ''leaks", making 
it less than 100 percent effective against incoming 
missiles. Also, Marine ground forces in close proximity to 
enemy forces will need protection against chemical or 
biological weapons delivered by mortars or artillery, 
methods that cannot be intercepted. Finally, chemical and 
biological weapons can be used in land or naval mines, 
requiring that U.S. forces be able to protect themselves 
while passing through contaminated areas. Thus personal and 
shipboard protective measures will be vital to protecting 
men and equipment. 
The first requirement of passive defense is the ability 
to detect chemical or biological agents. The Marine Corps 
is ahead of the other services in regard to developing and 
fielding chemical detection equipment, which is not 
surprising given the role of the Marines in a regional 
conflict. Among the programs underway to improve chemical 
detection are several innovative ideas. One concept, which 
has not yet been tested, involves placing a living nerve 
cell on a silicon microchip. The cell fires electronic 
signals on a continual basis as long as it remains living. 
These signals are sent by the chip to the alarm component of 
the system, which will sound if the signal is interrupted. 
A chemical agent would kill the nerve cell, interrupting the 
signal and sounding the alarm. Another system in 
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development utilizes the light-absorbing properties of most 
chemical agents. Able to detect both aerosol clouds and 
surface contamination, the Differential Absorption Lidar 
(DIAL) is expected to be effective at up to ten 
kilometers.4 70 
Biological agent detection rates with ballistic missile 
defense as one of the most pressing needs for American 
forces. Chemical detection enjoys the benefit of relatively 
short warning time due to the rapid effects of most chemical 
agents. Biological agents, however, typically do not 
produce effects for hours or days, and in some cases months. 
Detection of biological agents therefore must rely on other 
methods than the action of the agent itself, as timely 
warning would not be possible otherwise. The Impact of 
Nuclear, Biological. and Chemical Proliferation on Naval 
Operations and Capabilities states that: 
The combination of our inability to detect BW agents 
and the potentially high lethality of BW attacks 
makes the biological threat especially significant to 
naval forces .... Biological and chemical agents 
can be successfully delivered against naval forces 
operating in littoral areas; expeditionary forces are 
even more vulnerable .... Biological attack 
detection remains the single most important technical 
problem (italics mine) .471 
470Hewish, "Surviving CBW," Jane's International 
Defense Review (March 1997): 35. 
471 The Impact of Nnclear. Biological. and Chemical 
Proliferation on Naval operations and capabilities, 2-3. 
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Unlike chemical detectors, which are produced in 
numerous countries and in a variety of forms, biological 
detectors remain rudimentary in design. Despite the high 
level of medical and biological knowledge in the United 
States, and in many U.S. allies' laboratories, the goal of 
producing an effective biological agent detector has not 
been reached.4 72 However, both the U.S. Army and the 
British Army are attempting to develop a stand-off detector 
for identifying biological agents. By utilizing a laser 
scanner to measure the diameter and shape of airborne 
particles, the presence of biological particles 
theoretically could be detected. The detector also would be 
able to produce liquid samples from air passing through the 
unit, allowing more detailed analysis of suspected 
biological agents. Known as the Biological Integrated 
Detection System (BIDS), the unit is intended to be placed 
upwind of threatened areas, to allow sampling of the air 
before airborne agents could reach those areas.4 7 3 Like the 
PAC-3 and THEL, this system could be adopted by the Marines 
for future use. 
Both chemical and biological detectors must be improved 
in order to protect U.S. forces and allies from chemical and 
47 2Brad Roberts, "Bursting the biological bubble: how 
prepared are we for biowar?," Jane's International Defense 
Review (April 1998): 23. 
473Hewish, "Surviving CBW," 36. 
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biological agents. The need for improvement is recognized 
by the different services, and efforts are being made to 
effect improvements. However, at present the detection of 
chemical and biological agents remains a critical weakness. 
The second component of passive defense is protection, 
both personal protection for individuals and protection of 
facilities and ships. While existing personal protective 
suits offer adequate protection against chemical and 
biological agents, the suits are cumbersome and lead to 
rapid fatigue under most conditions, degrading troop 
performance. Especially in hot climates, such as the Middle 
East, wearing protective gear can be physically exhausting, 
even leading to heat stress or heat stroke. 474 Thus the 
greatest concern in regard to personal protective gear 
involves producing a suit that is capable of protecting 
against chemical and biological agents, while being light 
enough for extended use without heat exhaustion. 
A British design, designated the Mk IV suit, has served 
as the model for improved CBW protective suits, as it is 
lightweight, relatively comfortable, and far less bulky than 
existing OG-84 suits used in the U.S. military. In order to 
focus U.S. development efforts, the Joint Service 
Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology program is developing 
a single CBW suit for all U.S. service members. This suit 
474 Ibid., 47. 
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is intended to be light, durable, able to be decontaminated 
and worn again, and have a minimum usable period of 45 
days.475 
Production and deployment of an effective, durable CBW 
suit will be crucial to allowing U.S. troops to operate in a 
CBW environment. Existing suits, while effective, are so 
uncomfortable that troop performance is degraded 
severely.4 7 6 The suit must be light enough to be easily 
man-portable, durable enough to be worn over a period of 
days, able to be decontaminated and re-used, and not 
physically taxing to wear. Development of the JSLIST II, 
the follow-on to the original U.S. all-service CBW suit, is 
aimed at deployment in 2003.477 
When a CBW attack occurs, especially a persistent 
chemical attack, the ability to decontaminate men and 
material in affected areas will be critical. Particularly 
in regard to large facilities such as ports and airfields, 
existing decontamination capability is minimal. While the 
475Riley, "ABCs of NBC," 38; Hewish, "Surviving CBW," 
47. 
476weaver and Glaes provide good depiction of the 
physical effects of wearing existing suits, which include 
decreased hearing and vision, decreased speech 
intelligibility, limited manual dexterity, hyperventilation 
and panic attacks, mood changes, and physical performance 
decrements. See Inviting Disaster, 27. 
477Hewish, "Surviving CBW" 47. 
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need for decontamination capability has been recognized by 
the military services, existing decontamination capability 
continues to fall short of the operational requirements set 
by Department of Defense (DoD) regulation 5000.2-R: 
"Requires all mission-essential systems to be survivable to 
those threat levels anticipated in their operating 
environment."478 
One of the reasons for the lack of emphasis being 
placed on decontamination is the widespread belief that 
decontamination is too hard to do. 479 In regard to the 
decontamination equipment and materials available to Marine 
ground forces, there perhaps is some justification for the 
too-hard-to-do label. Major Riley's article on Marine Corps 
NBC readiness pointed out that each individual Marine's 
M258Al Skin Decontamination Kit consisted only of a small 
packet of towlettes, which are suitable only for blister 
478Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997 (Washington, 
D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1996), Section II, 
pg 16. 
479The sentiment that many aspects of NBC training and 
readiness are "too hard to do" can be found throughout the 
twin reports The Impact of Nuclear. Bioloqical, and Chemical 
Proliferation on Naval Operations and capabilities and .T.h.e. 
Impact of the Proliferation of Nuclear. Bioloqical. and 
Chemical Weapons on the United states Air Force. This 
pessimistic approach to training and readiness must be 
viewed as a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts, in that lack 
of a determined approach has kept the United States from 
developing viable decontamination procedures that are not 
"too hard to do." 
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agents. Furthermore, the packaging material used to wrap 
the towlettes is prone to failure, resulting in the packet 
being rendered useless. 48 0 Regardless of the difficulty 
involved, however, the ability to decontaminate men, 
equipment, and facilities will be vital to keeping U.S. 
forces functional. 
The only surface decontamination agent available to the 
U.S. military has been found to be extremely corrosive to 
many of the vital components of aircraft and other vehicles, 
including plexiglass, rubber, and aluminum. In addition, 
the quantity of the agent needed to decontaminate a large 
facility is measured in hundreds of tons, making it unlikely 
that a port or air base commander would have sufficient 
quantities available.481 
The overall importance placed on decontamination by the 
services and the Department of Defense can be judged from 
the mention given in Proliferation: Threat and Response 
.1.9..9..1.. A single paragraph is provided, which does little 
more than cover the problems of developing non-corrosive, 
environmentally safe decontamination agents.482 It is not 
480Riley, "ABCs of NBC," 39. 
481weaver and Glaes cite a U.S. Joint Staff study on 
decontaminating a major port after an attack with VX nerve 
agent. The report concluded that 863 tons of supertopical 
bleach decontaminant would be required. See Invitinq 
Disaster, 26. 
482Threat and Response 1997, Section II, pg 21. 
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surprising that one of the major findings of the NDU war 
games and their resulting reports is that, "Decontamination 
is not currently a priority investment area. 114 83 
Developing treatment and vaccination options for 
biological attacks likewise has been a slow process, and 
continues to fall short of required capability. Ongoing 
efforts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
seek to develop a "one vaccination fits all" vaccine, which: 
requires only a single oral dose, has no side 
effects, provides rapid immunity, offers complete 
protection, has a long storage life, is cheap to 
produce, and is licensed for worldwide use. However, 
these aims remain many years away from fruition 
(italics mine) . 484 
While vaccines for anthrax have been available since 
the 1950s, many other biological agents have no available 
vaccine. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's 
program for developing biological treatments, known as the 
Unconventional Pathogen Countermeasures Program, has 
budgeted 30 million dollars over the next five years to 
develop a full range of vaccines and medications intended 
for use with biological casualties.485 However, as the 
previous quote indicates, such treatments remain years away, 
483Tbe Impact of Nuclear. Biological. and Chemical 
Proliferation on Naval operations and capabilities, 17. 
484Hewish, "Surviving CBW," 45. 
4B5rbid., 46. 
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providing little protection to U.S. forces in the 
foreseeable future. 
While the United States is making some progress in 
addressing shortfalls in active defenses and protective gear 
for CBW warfare, the state of decontamination and 
vaccination capability remains a major problem. Until these 
related capabilities are given more emphasis within the 
Department of Defense, U.S. facilities will be at risk of 
being neutralized by chemical or biological weapons that get 
past whatever active defenses exist. In addition, moving 
and treating any chemical or biological casualty will risk 
spreading the chemical or biological agent to additional 
personnel, compounding the problems caused by CBW attack. 
The Navy and Marine Corps, as well as their sister services, 
must improve the level of progress being made in providing 
decontamination and vaccination capability if they are to be 
sent into harm's way in a chemical or biological 
environment. 
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) 
As the Navy enters the twenty-first century, emerging 
technologies in the areas of communications, command and 
control, sensor inputs, and information management are being 
combined to change fundamentally the way the Navy will 
operate. In a 2 March 1998 memo to all Navy flag officers, 
CNO Admiral Jay Johnson set out the Navy's long-range 
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planning objectives, which included the overall objective 
to: 
Develop secure c4 systems and doctrine that provides 
the capability to significantly compress the 
operational decision loop through reduction of 
decision-making layers, through increases in direct 
sensor-to-shooter connectivity, and through automated 
processing and evaluation aids for decision-
makers.486 
The objectives listed above lay out, in simple terms, 
the basis of the Navy's twenty-first century warfighting 
concept, known as Network-Centric Warfare (NCW): reduce the 
number of decision layers in order to obtain speed of 
command and rapid tempo of operations, link sensors to 
shooters as tightly as possible so that what can be seen can 
be killed, and provide assistance in evaluating and 
utilizing information so that the commander's intent can be 
put into action without unnecessary delay. The features 
that are seen as enablers of NCW are the Sensor Grid, the 
Shooter Grid, and the Information Backplane.487 
The Sensor Grid will be achieved through the continued 
evolution of existing command, control, communications, and 
intelligence (C3I) systems such as the Advanced Combat 
Direction System (ACDS), which eventually should allow the 
486Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, memo 
to all Navy flag officers, 3 March 1998. 
487vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and John Gartska, 
"Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," 
Proceedinqs (January 1998): 31. 
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fusion of sensor input from virtually any source, including 
joint and allied sensors. The Shooter Grid already exists 
in preliminary form as Cooperative Engagement Capability, 
which should be applicable to surface targets, ballistic 
missile targets, submarine targets, and shore bombardment 
targets. 488 Finally, the Information Backplane is expected 
to grow out of existing networks, such as the Joint 
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and 
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) . 48 9 The 
program intended to bring together the Sensor, Shooter, and 
Information components is Information Technology for the 
21st Century (IT-21). Already in place, IT-21 is co-
directed by OPNAV N6 (Space, Information Warfare, and 
Conunand and Control), the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command, and the Naval Computer and Telecommunications 
Command. 490 
4 88Bryan Bender, "Buying into networked warfare," 
Jane's Defense Weekly, 13 May 1998, 27; Vice Admiral James 
Fitzgerald, Raymond Christian, and Robert Manke, "Network-
Centric Antisubmarine Warfare," Proceedings (September 
1998): 93; Glenn Goodman, "Sea-Based Firepower," Armed 
Forces Journal Internatjonal (November 1997): 34; Alan 
Maiorano, Nevin Carr, and Trevor Bender, "A Primer on Naval 
Theater Air Defense," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1996): 
24. 
489vision, Presence. Power, 96. 
490Rear Admiral Robert Nutwell, "IT-21 Intranet 
Provides Big 'Reachbacks'," Proceedings (January 1998): 36. 
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The concept for NCW was derived from the growth of 
networks in non-military settings such as businesses, and 
the superior performance in many cases of networked 
businesses. In contrast to the rigid hierarchical 
organization of a typical military formation, in a network 
organization all units of the network are linked in terms of 
information. A unit does not depend on the higher levels of 
the organization to supply information, but instead can seek 
information from any location within the bounds of the 
network. When decisions are required, the unit is better 
equipped to decide for itself, rather than having to depend 
on (and wait for) a higher unit to decide. The advantages 
of units making decisions for themselves are obvious: faster 
decision-to-action time, better appreciation of conditions 
due to proximity to the problem, and flexibility in problem 
solving.491 
Possibly the greatest advantage of distributed 
decision-making in a networked structure occurs in periods 
of "information distortion", when information is 
unavailable, incomplete, or uncertain.4 92 Units are able to 
"self-synchronize" with other units, allowing flexibility in 
solving problems. Particularly when operating under 
4 91Kathleen Carley and Zhiang Lin, "A Theoretical Study 
of Organizational Performance Under Information Distortion," 
Management Science (July 1997): 976. 
492rbid. 
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conditions that are similar to previous experience, 
intuition and pattern recognition can allow experienced 
leaders to reach course-of-action decisions quickly, 
maintaining a high operational tempo. The ability to 
maintain a high tempo is particularly applicable to military 
operations, where time often is a critical commodity and 
information uncertainty often exists.493 It is through the 
networking of dispersed platforms and the sharing of 
information that NCW is seen by its proponents as providing 
superior warfighting capability. 
The first component of NCW, the Sensor Grid, will allow 
data from virtually any sensor to be viewed by any member of 
the network. Current sensor platforms, such as J-STARS and 
E-3 Sentry radar aircraft, represent the first step in the 
integration of sensor data. Fleet Battle Experiment Bravo 
validated the ability to utilize such offboard sensor data 
from naval, joint, or allied sensors.49 4 In the future, 
sensor fusion may include input from satellites, RPVs, 
visual or infrared sensors deployed by aircraft or 
artillery, seismic sensors, sound sensors, radar data, and 
493Marine Corps manual MCDP-6, "Command and Control," 
stresses the need to maintain a high operational tempo. 
MCDP6 states that, "speed is an essential element of 
effective command and control." 
494vision. Presence. Power, 22; Blake, Penny, and 
Hjelmfelt, Fleet Battle Experiment Bravo-Rinq of Fire 
Analysis Report <Ill, 66-68. 
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manual input from special operations units. 495 The result 
will be to provide the proverbial "God's eye picture" to 
members of the network: 
The central concept of networking is the ability for 
any participant in the network to directly access any 
other participant for information exchange or 
activity coordination .... The networking goal is 
for every unit to have the ability to access and 
display, at the same time, all or any part of the 
totality of sensor information available from all 
sources. While this alone does not guarantee perfect 
knowledge, it does mean that whatever insights are 
available from all organic, theater and national 
sensors arrayed against the problem can be used to 
aid every unit in the performance of the mission. 49 6 
NCW's Sensor Grid should provide the ability to link 
any sensor connected to the network to any platform in the 
network, regardless of distance. The ability to fuse 
incoming sensor data efficiently will derive from one of the 
properties of a network known as "Metcalf's Law" (not a true 
physical law). Metcalf's Law holds that the computational 
power of a network is proportional to the square of the 
number of nodes in the network. With the ability to link an 
495Nick Cook, "US technology will lead the way to 
improved reconnaissance systems," Jane's Defense Weekly, 13 
May 1998, 29; "Teledyne Ryan's Global Hawk Begins Taxi 
Tests," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 November 1997, 
38; Dennis Hagan, "Naval Gunfire Support," Surface Warfare 
(September/October 1997): 35; Fred Belen, "Tactical 
Information Technology ... From the Sea," Proceedinqs 
(September 1998): 122. 
496captain William Gravell, "The Offensive Punch of 
Network-Centric Warfare," Surface Warfare (March/April 
1998): 15. 
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enormous number of nodes, NCW's Sensor Grid should be able 
to assimilate and distribute information from organic 
sensors, such as radar, non-organic sensors, such as land-
based aircraft, and national, other service, or allied 
sensors, such as satellites.49? 
NCW's Shooter Grid, also known as the Engagement Grid, 
will allow a networked force to make optimum use of 
available weapons by pairing weapons to targets quickly and 
(potentially) automatically. The Shooter Grid should allow 
any weapons that are within range of a given target to be 
fired at that target, regardless of the firing platform's 
ability to track the target independently. When coupled 
with the Sensor Grid's situational awareness, the Shooter 
Grid is seen as allowing widely dispersed naval forces to 
mass fires on a target, to engage targets more quickly and 
efficiently, and to utilize built-in deconfliction tools to 
avoid having rules-of-engagement software prohibit 
attacks. 498 In addition to the Ring of Fire system 
described previously, Cooperative Engagement Capability is 
an early example of the kind of networked Shooter Grid 
envisioned for NCW. 
497Leslie West, "Exploiting the Information Revolution: 
Network-Centric Warfare Realizes Its Promise," Sea Power 
(March 1998): 38. 
498Gravell, "The Offensive Punch of Network-Centric 
Warfare," 16. 
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Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) represents the 
first implementation of an emerging focus in naval 
warfighting: the ability to link sensors to shooters in real 
time. CEC allows individual platforms to share information 
on airborne threats, and to engage airborne threats using 
remote sensor data. The 1997 Navy Posture statement 
provides the following explanation of CEC: 
With CEC, it appears to each shooter's combat system 
as if every netted sensor is that unit's own sensor. 
Engagement using remotely provided track data is 
possible for the first time. In addition, the ability 
to develop composite tracks means that every 
participating unit has an identical, real-time 
picture of the battlespace, as well as identical 
identification information.499 
CEC utilizes a dedicated onboard computer system of 
cooperative engagement processors, together with a data-
distribution system, to provide a composite radar track of 
airborne targets. CEC is an outgrowth of two similar 
systems, the Battle Group Anti Air Warfare Commander 
(BGAAWC) and Force AAW Coordinating Technology (FACT) 
program.500 By combining data from different Aegis radars, 
CEC can maintain a fire-control-quality radar track 
499Department of the Navy 1997 Posture statement 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997), 73. 
SOONorman Friedman, Naval Institute Guide To World 
Naval Weapons Systems 1994 Update (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1994), 38-39. 
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continuously, without the "fadeouts" conunon when a single 
radar attempts to hold a track. 
In order to share information in real-time while 
remaining highly jam-resistant, CEC-equipped Aegis ships and 
E-2C Hawkeye radar surveillance aircraft use very short 
transmit/receive windows and line-of-sight signals. The 
transmit/receive functions are automatic, controlled by the 
cooperative engagement processors. Although units can 
exchange data only in pairs, the speed achieved through 
computer control of the data exchange process makes the 
sharing of information effectively instantaneous.Sol 
The clearest advantage provided by CEC is the extension 
of a ship's anti-air engagement envelope to the maximum 
range of its weapons, rather than the ship's radar horizon. 
Because CEC provides remote fire control, a ship can fire on 
a target well before the ship's radar can detect the target, 
provided that another CEC radar has detected the target. 
The concept of remote fire control was tested successfully 
in 1996 in Hawaii, when a CEC radar and data transmitter 
located on a hilltop sent targeting information to~ 
E.ri..e., allowing engagement of a low-flying target drone. 50 2 
501cooperative Engagement Capability: A Revolution in 
Air Defense, U.S. Navy booklet (no publisher or date), 2. 
502rbid., 13; Glenn Goodman, "Extending the Horizon," 
Armed Forces Journal International (April 1996): 58; Captain 
Jim Patton, "Keeping Up With the Revolution," Proceedings 
(July 1996): 41. 
259 
In addition to the advantage of extended range, CEC 
also. should provide the capability to defeat self-screening 
jammers in anti-ship cruise missiles. Such jammers 
typically radiate electronic noise in a cone of around 
thirty degrees in their direction of flight, thereby jamming 
the target ship's radar. A ship located off of the 
missiles' flight path likely would be outside the jammers' 
field of interference, and should be able to provide the 
target ship's defensive missiles with fire control data. 5 03 
Perhaps the most significant advantage offered by CEC 
will be the ability to share the E-2C's airborne radar 
picture with ships operating in the littoral area. Land 
features can produce radar "shadows", preventing a ship's 
radar from detecting low-flying targets inland. The E-2C's 
radar should be able to "peer over" many terrain features 
that ships' radars cannot, as well as providing much greater 
detection range. Also, the radar "clutter" of the littoral 
region, which can include weather, sand storms, birds, 
buildings, and electronic interference or jamming, can 
prevent a single ship from maintaining or verifying radar 
contacts, making CEC's composite radar picture very 
helpful.504 Given the speed of jet aircraft and cruise 
503cooperative Engagement capability, 11. 
504commander Robert Engel, "Bringing Aegis to the 
Littorals," Proceedings (January 1998): 42. 
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missiles, and the current Navy emphasis on operating close 
to shore, spotting targets as early as possible obviously is 
of great importance. 
CEC has entered low-rate initial production as of 
January 1998, and has been installed in four ships: USS .John 
F. Kennedy (CV-67), USS N..a.sJ;l (LHD-1), USS Hue City (CG-66), 
and USS Vicksburq (CG-69). In addition, USS Anzio (CG-68) 
and several P-3 aircraft were fitted with CEC components in 
1997 for a concept evaluation test program.505 In July 
1998, the Hue City and Vicksburq were reported to have 
software compatibility problems between their Aegis systems 
and the CEC system, preventing both systems from operating 
at the same time.506 As described previously, the current 
Aegis computer system involves over fifteen million lines of 
computer code, indicating the magnitude of the challenge 
involved in integrating the two systems. These problems 
aside, the CEC program is moving ahead, with the final 
report of the Under Secretary of Defense for Development, 
Operational Test, and Evaluation due early in 1999. 507 
The Information Backplane, which will link the Sensor 
Grid and Shooter Grid, is moving forward under the title of 
505vision, Presence, Power, 72. 
506Bender, "USN digitisation effort is hit by 
integration flaw," 9. 
507vision, Presence. Power, 72. 
261 
the Copernicus program. The 1998 Navy Posture Statement 
describes Copernicus: 
This common vision [Copernicus] enables the Navy and 
Marine Corps to adapt, evolve, and fully integrate 
their command and control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) capabilities to conduct joint naval 
expeditionary force operations in the 21st century . 
. . . Copernicus enables Navy c4 ISR development and 
implementation, such as the Global Command and 
Control System (GCCS), Global Command Support System, 
Defense Information Systems Network, and the Marine 
Air-Ground Task Force c4r (MAGTF C4I) .sos 
IT-21 forms the major component of Copernicus, and is 
seen as the most critical component of NCW. Accordingly, 
the Navy already has allocated financial resources, as well 
as human effort, towards the IT-21 program. IT-21 will 
provide a fleet-wide intranet, allowing for the exchange of 
information via secure military communications networks and 
existing civilian communications networks. The Enterprise 
CVBG recently used IT-21 technology in planning and 
conducting air strikes against Iraq, and saw mission 
planning eased by the ready availability of information. 5 09 
The ability to send and receive information, at every level 
and in regard to any aspect of operations, is a fundamental 
requirement of NCW: 
508 Forward. , .From the Sea: Anytime. Anywhere. u.s. 
Navy 1998 Posture Statement (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
the Navy, 1998), Section VIII, pg 15. 
509Robert Holzer, "U.S. Navy: IT-21 Shines in Debut 
Desert Fox Action," Defense News, 25 January 1999, 6. 
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For Network-Centric Warfare to be viable, an 
Information Backplane must be developed to support 
information flow among the sensor, C2, and shooter 
grids .... IT-21 provides critical infrastructure 
necessary to establish the Information Backplane. The 
information systems backplane provides the critical 
warfighter end-to-end capability that extends from 
personal computers (PCs) on local area network 
segments connected to metropolitan area networks and 
critical ship-to-shore interface sites .... Without 
the IT-21 Information Backplane, Network-Centric 
Warfare cannot occur.510 
After NCW's architecture is in place, the concept is 
expected to provide tremendous advantages to U.S. naval 
forces by providing "information dominance." In conjunction 
with the Sensor Grid, new computer-assisted command and 
control processes are expected to enhance the ability of 
U.S. forces to make the best use of information 
dominance.Sll Commanders should be able to view the 
battlespace in real time, enjoying accurate knowledge about 
the location and activities of friendly and enemy forces.5 12 
Individual units will be able to access the intranet for 
information, allowing them to utilize the data provided by 
remote sensors in real time. Remote databases will be 
510vision. Presence. Power, 21-22. 
51 1cebrowski and Gartska, "Network-Centric Warfare," 
33-34. 
512commander Austin Boyd, "Space Provides Real-Time 
Combat Identification," Proceedings (January 1996): 75. 
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available for pulling up needed information, such as the 
latest weather or intelligence reports for the theater.513 
Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the "Godfather of NCW", 
has stated that, "Network-Centric Warfare enables a shift 
from attrition-style warfare to a much faster and more 
effective style characterized by the new concepts of speed 
of command and self-synchronization. 11 51 4 Speed of command 
will derive from superior information and communications, 
allowing the commander's intent to be enacted rapidly. 
Self-synchronization will result from the ability of any 
unit in the force to cooperate adaptively with other units 
as the situation demands, able to solve problems at the unit 
level rather than requiring orders from above.51 5 
In the littoral setting, the advantages gained through 
NCW will be of great importance, both for power projection 
and for defense against littoral threats. Given the 
position naval forces likely will be required to take close 
to an enemy's shore, threats may appear and have to be 
defended against within a very short time frame. Anti-ship 
cruise missiles, for example, could cover the distance from 
513Nutwell, "IT-21 Intranet Provides Big Reachbacks," 
37. 
514cebrowski and Gartska, "Network-Centric Warfare," 
32. 
515Roger Barnett, "Grasping 2010 with Naval Forces," 
occasional paper 2-97, U.S. Naval War College, 10. 
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shore to the twenty-five-mile position of an ARG in as 
little as one minute. By combining the radar and sensor 
data of all units in a networked force, the ability of each 
platform within the force to defend itself should be 
improved greatly. The ability to recognize, target, and 
attack enemy positions ashore likewise should be improved. 
Although still in the early concept development stage, the 
NCW qualities of speed of command and self-synchronization 
should indeed provide a sizable advantage to U.S. forces, 
providing military dominance by virtue of superior 
information. 
Summary 
As the sea services prepare to enter the twenty-first 
century, it is important that they evaluate the systems and 
capabilities that may be needed in the projected 
international setting. While it is not necessary, or even 
possible, to predict with certainty who the opponent of the 
future will be, it is possible to predict the nature of the 
Navy-Marine Corps team's twenty-first century military 
requirements. 
Since the sea services have adopted complementary 
strategic visions based on operations in the littoral area, 
those systems and capabilities that will be needed in the 
littoral can be identified. These capabilities include 
amphibious landing, naval surface fire support, sea-based 
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aviation (aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings), 
future surface combatants, mine countermeasures, anti-
submarine warfare, theater missile defense, and NBC 
detection, protection, and decontamination capability. 
The Marines' ability to get themselves and their 
equipment ashore will depend on several systems expected to 
enter service in the next decade. The LHD-1 class of big-
deck amphibious ships are nearly complete, with six of the 
seven ships already delivered. The LPD-17 class ships will 
begin to enter service early in the next century. When 
combined with existing LHA-1 class and LST-41/49 class 
ships, these vessels will comprise the amphibious ready 
groups of the future. To get the Marines from their ships 
to shore, the AAAV and MV-22 Osprey will be vast 
improvements over the AAV7Al and CH-46E that they will 
replace. Each of the new vehicles bring major improvements 
in speed, delivery range, and survivability to Marine 
amphibious and vertical operations. 
Once the Marines get ashore, they will be able to call 
for support from several Navy land-attack systems. The 5-
inch naval gun, one of the oldest individual weapons in the 
Navy, is being re-engineered to provide long-range, 
precision gunfire support to Marine forces ashore, a 
capability that had been greatly degraded with the 
retirement of the Iowa-class battleships. By utilizing a 
new rocket assisted round and GPS/INS guidance, the new 5-
266 
Three new ship types have been proposed for service in 
the next century, each optimized for projecting U.S. power 
ashore. The DD-21 land attack destroyer, which should enter 
service in the next decade, will possess several systems for 
providing fire support, including a larger and longer-ranged 
version of the 5-inch ERGM. The arsenal ship proposal, 
although presently shelved, could provide a large amount of 
on-call precision firepower to regional commanders. 
Finally, the Ohio-class SSBNs slated for decommissioning in 
2002 have been nominated for conversion to SSGN 
configuration, providing a smaller, more survivable version 
of the arsenal ship, while also providing special forces 
delivery and intelligence gathering capability. 
For any military operations in the littorals, whether 
small-scale operations or major regional conflicts, mine 
countermeasures will be crucial. There is perhaps no more 
cost effective means of employing sea denial than through 
defensive mining, and potential adversaries should be 
expected to utilize mines in the future. The ability to 
detect, locate, and neutralize mines is an absolute 
necessity for littoral warfare, a fact underscored by the 
Tripoli and Princeton experience in 1991. Although perhaps 
still under-emphasized, U.S. mine warfare capability should 
be much improved by the arrival of several new systems in 
the next decade, including airborne, surface, and 
submersible minehunting and neutralization systems. 
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Of equal importance to mine warfare will be anti-
submarine warfare. Similar to mines in its ability to 
influence U.S. operations even when not detected, the 
submarine has the added advantages of mobility, stand-off 
attack capability, and surveillance. Many modern diesel-
electric submarines are very quiet when operating submerged, 
making them especially difficult to detect in the littoral 
setting, which can feature high background noise, strong 
thermal layers, and distorted sonar performance. While the 
Navy still retains many of the platforms and systems that 
made it the best anti-submarine force in the world just a 
decade ago, the recent lack of training and funding for 
anti-submarine systems have caused a significant decrease in 
overall capability. Re-establishing the former level of 
anti-submarine proficiency is an imperative for the Navy's 
new littoral strategy. 
Theater missile defense is perhaps the single most 
important capability being developed for the twenty-first 
century. A small adversary, without the conventional might 
even in its own region to confront the United States, could 
gain sufficient leverage through the threat of NBC attacks, 
delivered by ballistic missiles, to keep regional facilities 
closed to U.S. forces. In the event of a regional conflict, 
using ballistic missiles to deliver chemical or biological 
weapons onto regional facilities could render those 
facilities useless to U.S. forces, thus leveling the field 
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by neutralizing U.S. air power and preventing the delivery 
of U.S. sea lift. In either case, the possession of 
effective, sea-based missile defenses would allow adversary 
ballistic missile threats or actual attacks to be defended 
against, protecting U.S. forces, regional facilities, and 
allied population centers. Just as carrier-based aircraft 
are able to operate without host nation support, so could a 
sea-based theater missile defense system. Thus U.S. missile 
defenses could be in place essentially all the time in areas 
of U.S. interest, rather than having to be flown to a crisis 
region from CONUS. By 2003 the Lower Tier system should be 
deployed, while Upper Tier should be in service by 2008. 
All branches of the U.S. armed forces currently are 
focusing on improving their level of NBC defenses. Since 
forward-deployed naval units likely will continue to be the 
first on the scene when a crisis arises, it is imperative 
that their NBC defenses be improved on. The Marines are the 
forces most likely to be at risk in a future conflict, as 
they may be tasked with conducting a forced entry to secure 
facilities for the follow-on forces. Accordingly, the 
Marines have conducted much successful work on chemical 
detection systems, although their personal protective 
capability requires further improvement. Biological agent 
detection, however, remains a very difficult problem, as 
most biological agents do not produce effects for hours or 
days, sometimes weeks, after exposure. Also, both the Navy 
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and Marines must address the problem of decontamination 
after a chemical attack, and of providing vaccines or 
treatments for biological attacks. 
In addition to the systems and capabilities being 
developed, the Navy is in the early stages of developing an 
information-based warfighting concept, known as Network-
Centric Warfare. Intended to take advantage of the rapid 
advances currently taking place in the areas of 
communications, computers, and sensors, it is forecast that 
Network-Centric Warfare will provide U.S. forces with 
information superiority sufficient to impart military 
superiority as well. 
The systems and capabilities described in this chapter, 
some of which have been around for many years and some of 
which still are being developed, are vital for the post-Cold 
War security environment. The United States cannot be sure 
where it may have to use military force to defend national 
interests in the future, but the likelihood that the United 
States will have to resort to force seems as high or higher 
than during the Cold War. Potential adversaries have 
adopted new weapons and strategies. If the Navy-Marine 
Corps team is to be prepared for the twenty-first century, 
and is to be employed primarily in the littorals, they too 
must avail themselves of new weapons, new defenses, and new 
concepts. 
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Chapter V will examine three suggested alternatives to 
forward presence as a strategy for protecting American 
interests. The alternatives are proposals for the posture 
and employment of the entire U.S. military, not just naval 
forward presence forces. While each alternative has 
champions to argue its merits, it is the position of this 
thesis that forward presence, consisting primarily of U.S. 
naval forces, is and will remain superior to alternative 
strategies for protecting American interests. 
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CHAPTER V 
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO FORWARD PRESENCE 
Although the United States currently relies on the 
presence of U.S. forces around the world to safeguard U.S. 
interests, the strategy employed by the United States is not 
fixed by any binding law, treaty, or convention. Unlike the 
existence of the Navy, which is specifically spelled out in 
the Constitution, the national security strategy employed by 
the United States is subject to change at the pleasure of 
the sitting administration. While power projection through 
forward presence is the basis of the present strategy, 
naturally there are other possible strategies. Three 
alternative proposals for U.S. national security strategy 
will be presented in this chapter. These alternatives are: 
a smaller, CONUS-based military that would deploy overseas 
only in crisis periods; a smaller, CONUS-based military that 
would rely heavily, almost exclusively, on air power to 
resolve crises; and a much smaller, CONUS-based military 
with few if any security obligations beyond the borders of 
the United States. 
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The "Pull-Back" Strategy: A Smaller, 
CONUS-based Military 
The first alternative proposal for U.S. national 
security strategy is to reduce the size of the armed forces 
beyond even their 1999 levels, pull most U.S. forces back to 
CONUS, keeping only a few forces forward-deployed to provide 
a token presence, and deploy the armed forces overseas only 
when a crisis must be resolved with military force. The 
proponents of this strategy cite a number of arguments to 
make the case that this strategy is both feasible and 
appropriate for the post-Cold War setting. 
The most common argument for this strategy is that, 
with the demise of the Soviet Union and with China and 
Russia not yet able to challenge the United States as peers, 
there is no plausible threat to U.S. national security. The 
United States reigns supreme over the world, and can safely 
withdraw from its present role as the world's policeman (an 
inappropriate role to begin with). If any regional state 
should have the bad judgment to challenge or assail a U.S. 
interest, U.S. forces can deploy to the offender's region, 
restore order and the status quo, and then return home. 
There is no realistic scenario in which American security 
and prosperity can be threatened by any other state, so why 
exert ourselves unnecessarily? Even George Kennan, a giant 
figure of the Cold War containment strategy, is quoted as 
advocating such a "pull-back" strategy: "What we should 
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want, in these circumstances, is the minimum, not the 
maximum, of external involvement. 11 516 
Part of the rationale of the desire for "the minimum, 
not the maximum," is the belief that domestic concerns 
should take priority over international concerns in the 
post-Cold War era. After all, we "fought" a forty-five year 
war against the Soviets in order to enjoy peace and 
prosperity at home. Why not do so now that the Soviets are 
no more? Regional instability largely is irrelevant to the 
security of the United States, and the rare regional crisis 
that does pose a threat can be dealt with summarily. Thus 
the United States should turn its focus inward to domestic 
political and economic concerns, and ignore most of the 
events in the international arena.517 
Perhaps the most often-used argument given in support 
of the pull-back strategy, one that has grown almost to have 
a life of its own, is that the so-called "Revolution in 
Military Affairs" (RMA) will allow high-technology U.S. 
systems to substitute for a numerically strong, forward-
deployed military. With an insurmountable technological 
edge over the rest of the world, there is no opponent who 
516christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore 
Balancing," in Brown et al., America's Strategic Choices, 
282. 
51 7 Johnson and Krulak, "Forward Presence In A Violent 
World," 4. 
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cannot be overcome: "It [RMA] appears to offer the United 
States the prospect of military power beyond that of any 
other country on the planet, now and well into the next 
century. 11518 Technology therefore substitutes for forces 
and strategy: we are the best, we will remain the best, and 
anyone who challenges us will be overwhelmed by U.S. 
technological mastery: 
In an era of satellite reconnaissance, 
supercomputers, instant telecommunications, and 
rapid-reacting U.S. forces based at home, the United 
States can respond quickly to emerging crises and 
therefore need not maintain a permanent physical 
presence abroad .... Changes in technolog1 render the old ways of projecting power obsolete. 9 
The favorite choice of RMA proponents as the "poster 
boy" for security through technology is the B-2 bomber 
(which will be the focus of the second alternative 
strategy), armed with a variety of smart and brilliant 
weapons: 
Stealth and precision-attack abilities, together with 
vastly improved situational awareness and 
surveillance capabilities, are among the most 
important tenets of the RMA, which in many 
518Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," Foreign 
Affairs (March/April 1996): 54. 
519Rodman, America Adrift, 66. See also O'Hanlon, "Can 
High Technology Bring U.S. Troops Home?" 73: "Many of its 
[RMA] proponents argue that with the United States able to 
strike at any potential enemy anywhere in the world, 
overseas military bases and deployments will become much 
less important." 
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circumstances can permit leveraged tradeoffs between 
technology and manpower.520 
Another argument of RMA proponents is that, by 
employing technology instead of manpower, the risks involved 
in military action to U.S. servicemen will be reduced 
greatly.52l Although this argument is fundamentally 
correct, it sometimes is distorted into a vision of 
bloodless U.S. victory regardless of the specific scenario. 
The more technology used, the lower the risk to U.S. 
servicemen. Therefore at some level of technology risk 
drops to zero, and any military action can be casualty-free. 
Also argued in favor of the pull-back strategy is the 
position that the United States no longer can afford the 
kinds and numbers of forces that are required for forward 
presence. With no plausible threat to demand a large, 
capable military at the pitch of readiness, vigilantly 
standing guard around the world, the United States cannot 
justify the continued expenditure of hundreds of billions of 
dollars on a forward presence military.522 
520charles Perry, Robert Pfaltzgraff, and Joseph 
Conway, Lonq-Ranqe Bombers & the Role of Airpower in the New 
Century (Cambridge, Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy 
Analysis, 1995), xi. 
52 1Dismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 51. 
S22Johnson and Krulak, "Forward Presence In A Violent 
World," 4. 
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To preempt the arguments that a pull-back strategy 
would involve greater incidence of regional crises, with a 
corresponding increase in U.S. deployments to fight regional 
wars, pull-back advocates cite the historical record of U.S. 
warfighting abroad. The United States has been involved in 
only three of the ten "great power wars'' since achieving 
independence from Britain, and could safely have stayed out 
of two of the three wars it did fight in. Only World War 
Two posed a sufficient threat to the United States to force 
intervention.523 Thus the increased incidence of regional 
crises, if any, need not lead to U.S. intervention unless 
desired. 
Finally, there is the argument that the United States 
should give up its position as the world's policeman, that 
the United States has, "undertaken an imperial role without 
discharging the classic duties of imperial rule," and that 
it must, "learn to exercise far greater caution and 
restraint than it has recently displayed in the use of 
military power."52 4 The pull-back strategy does just that, 
and envisions the deployment and use of force only in the 
523Brown et al., America's Strategic Choices, 278-279. 
524navid Hendrickson, "The End of American History; 
American Security, the National Purpose, and the New World 
Order," in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton, eds., 
Rethinking America's Security: Beyond the Cold War to New 
World Order (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992), 400-401. 
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most dire of crises. Even Iraq's invasion of Kuwait could 
have been ignored, according to this logic, as it did not 
sufficiently threaten U.S. interests to justify war. 525 
Despite recent statements about the new world order, the 
United States should no longer accept the burden of policing 
a chaotic world, instead focusing on its own internal 
security and prosperity. 
What would a pull-back military look like? Clearly it 
would be smaller than the current force size, but would it 
consist of the same capabilities, or would it have a 
different set of criteria for military missions and 
capabilities? Would the three services remain roughly 
balanced in emphasis, with Joint Vision 2010's follow-on 
document as the guiding principle for U.S. forces, or would 
one service move to the forefront in protecting American 
interests? 
While all attempts to describe a pull-back force 
structure must be considered hypothetical, it is reasonable 
to make several assumptions about what it would look like. 
The strategic nuclear forces would retain their crucial 
role, and indeed would be increasingly important in 
deterring others from direct attack on the United States. 
As smaller states around the world begin to acquire nuclear 
weapons, as it seems likely that they will, and in light of 
52 5rbid., 399. 
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the existing arsenals in China and Russia, the United States 
would have to retain the position of advantage in regard to 
nuclear weapons and nuclear escalation in a crisis. Smaller 
states that wish to avoid conventional defeat in a war 
against the United States might come to see nuclear weapons 
as providing the needed leverage to achieve their aims, thus 
requiring that the United States retain what has been called 
"escalation dominance." As stated by Colin Gray, "Although 
the United States likely will have little practical need of 
its nuclear arsenal, if that need should arise, nothing else 
would do."526 
The Navy likely would be elevated in emphasis over the 
Army and Air Force in terms of size, as the absolute 
requirement for the deployment of U.S. forces from CONUS 
would be naval supremacy. The Navy would not need to be as 
large as it is today, but would have to be large enough to 
be more than a match for any regional navy or alliance of 
regional navies. 527 The principal mission areas of the Navy 
would be those needed to keep the SLOCs open: ASW, AAW, and 
MCM. 528 In addition, heavy use would be made of 
prepositioning ships for Army heavy equipment and supplies, 
526Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast," 42. 
527Brown, et al., America's strategic Choices, 271. 
528Perla et al., Future sea-Based Aviation, 55. 
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as well as fast sea lift ships. 529 Getting the 
prepositioning ships, as well as the sea lift ships coming 
from CONUS, safely into port in the crisis area would be the 
principal duty of the Navy. 
The Air Force would be the preeminent fighting 
service, as air power and high-tech precision weapons would 
do most of the fighting, but the Air Force would not need to 
be as large as today's.530 Since future aircraft are 
expected to be capable of flying to targets in a theater 
from bases well outside the theater, or even directly from 
CONUS, today's large fleet of short-legged tactical aircraft 
would be reduced, replaced by medium- and long-range bombers 
able to carry large numbers of precision weapons on each 
trip.531 Only a modest number of F-15 or F-16 type tactical 
aircraft would remain active, to be deployed into a theater 
for air defense purposes. The impact of RMA technologies 
and stealth aircraft would make each aircraft more 
effective, allowing fewer aircraft to do the job of today's 
large tactical air forces. As in the Gulf War model, air 
power would set the stage for the final victory on the 
529nismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 51. 
530charles Perry, Laurence Rothenberg, and Jacquelyn 
Davis, Airpower synergies in the New strategic Era 
(Cambridge, Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 
1997), 41. 
531nismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 51. 
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ground by paralyzing the adversary's forces and conunand 
links. 
Of great importance for a pull-back strategy would be 
space power, since the ability to monitor events abroad 
could no longer be provided by on-scene forces. Also, the 
air power assets being deployed from CONUS or other out-of-
theater bases, such as Guam or Diego Garcia, would need 
targeting information that could be updated in real time, 
requiring space-based surveillance.532 
Finally, the Army likely would be smaller even than 
today's Army. The ground forces in Europe and Korea no 
longer would be needed, nor would forces have to be deployed 
to Kuwait, and certainly not to Bosnia or Kosovo. The Army 
would need to maintain three or four heavy divisions, whose 
personnel could be flown quickly to a theater to mate up 
with prepositioned equipment, and two light divisions. The 
highly mobile 82nd Airborne division would be the model for 
the light divisions, all of which would be structured for 
air deployment anywhere in the world on short notice. The 
ability to air lift Army ground forces anywhere in the world 
largely would obviate the need for Marine amphibious forces, 
which would have to deploy by sea from CONUS simply to get 
to the theater. 533 Maximum use of air lift would be made in 
532Perry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 10; 
53 3william Odom, "Transforming the Military," Foreig:n 
Affairs . (July/August 1997) : 58. 
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the deployment of Army forces, with sea lift serving to 
provide the heavy equipment and supplies needed to bolster 
the prepositioning ships. 
Although air power would be expected to produce the 
shock and degradation of the enemy's strength needed for the 
ultimate resolution of the conflict, the services still 
would observe much the same joint warfighting philosophy 
that exists today, although on a smaller scale. The Navy 
would be responsible for getting the Army and Air Force 
safely into the theater, after which time the Army and Air 
Force would set about defeating the enemy. Thus the pull-
back strategy is not a shift in military warfighting 
philosophy, but in the national security posture of the 
armed forces in peacetime. 
What weaknesses exist in the pull-back strategy? Given 
that many of the arguments presented in support of the pull-
back strategy seem reasonable in and of themselves, what 
faults can be found in the pull-back strategy? More 
importantly, is the pull-back strategy a viable alternative 
to forward presence? The answer must be a resounding "no." 
First, and most importantly, the pull-back strategy 
would place the United States in a reactive posture, able 
only to respond to events after the fact. 534 Adversaries 
who harbor aggressive intent thus might be tempted to pursue 
534Dismukes, "The U.S. Military Presence Abroad," 52. 
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a fait accompli strategy, striking quickly and then 
attempting to hold onto their gains. For example, China 
might throw its military across the Taiwan Strait, subdue 
and occupy Taiwan, and then warn off a U.S. response with 
the threat of a war that would have to be fought in China's 
front yard, hundreds of miles from U.S. logistical bases, 
against a state able to deploy thousands of mines, 
submarines, and cruise missiles to keep U.S. forces away.5 35 
Iran or Iraq likewise might decide to attack one of the 
small GCC nations, and then combine sea denial in the Strait 
of Hormuz with NBC blackmail to prevent U.S. intervention. 
Given the very narrow majority in the U.S. Senate vote in 
support of the 1990 Gulf War, it is not impossible to 
imagine the cost of deploying to the Gulf, without the 
benefit of Saudi Arabia's major facilities or the support of 
a multi-national coalition, being judged too high to 
tolerate. Given the fact that it took six months before the 
United States was ready to dislodge Iraq in 1991, when Saudi 
Arabia's facilities and multi-national support were 
available, the prospect of repeating the 1990-1991 effort 
535rt is just such a strategy that is posited in a 
recent U.S. Navy war game, conducted in cooperation with the 
Office of Net Assessment. Set in the year 2020, the game 
portrays a Chinese invasion of a re-unified Korea. China's 
strategy is to overwhelm Korea quickly, employ sea denial in 
the Sea of Japan and the China Sea, and force the United 
States into a political settlement. See "U.S. Navy RMA 2020 
War Game Draft Final Report." Conducted by the Office of Net 
Assessment, 21-23 April 1998, in Tyson's Corner, Virginia. 
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with a smaller military would be unattractive to say the 
least. 
By basing most U.S. forces in CONUS, the United 
States in effect would hand over the initiative to 
adversaries. Without forces on the scene at all times, the 
kinds of preventive steps afforded by forward presence would 
not be available, forcing the United States to re-establish 
acceptable conditions in a region rather than preventing 
unacceptable conditions from arising in the first place. 536 
Thus the United States would have two choices when a crisis 
arose: accepting the new status quo, or going to war. 537 
'Any change in conditions that did not justify going to war, 
or that did not present good chances of going to war 
successfully and at acceptable cost, could be forced on the 
United States for lack of other options. 
The only measures available to the United States for 
signaling interest in a region would be diplomatic, and the 
only means of backing up diplomatic efforts would be through 
deterrence.538 As described earlier, deterrence depends on 
capability and credibility to be effective. While a CONUS-
536cornrnander Christopher Wode, "Beyond Bombers vs. 
Carriers," Armed Forces Journal International (April 1995): 
29; Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence: status. 
Prospects, 5. 
537Krulak, "'An Enduring Instrument," 8. 
538Dismukes, National security strateqy and Forward 
Presence, 39. 
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based U.S. military would retain its capability, it is 
questionable whether much credibility would remain for 
deploying overseas if the issue was not clearly a vital U.S. 
interest. Adding to the problem is the fact that the 
adversary's leadership, not U.S. leadership, would have to 
perform the mental equation of how much U.S. interest was 
involved and how much misbehavior could be gotten away with. 
In the period when a crisis was becoming visible, 
there would be no opportunity for increasing the signals of 
U.S. interest through additional naval forces, increased 
tempo of operations in the region, conducting limited 
military operations, or any of the other means of conducting 
naval diplomacy. Also, if U.S. deterrent efforts failed, 
they would fail catastrophically. That is, the United 
States would not be able to fall back on defense in the 
failure of deterrence, because the forces needed to defend 
would be thousands of miles away in CONUS. U.S. forward 
presence forces, on the other hand, would be able to defend 
U.S. interests when deterrence failed, hopefully preventing 
the aggressor from achieving his aims. 
In addition to these faults of a CONUS-based posture, 
there is reason to question whether the deployment of U.S. 
forces in periods of crisis would be viable logistically.539 
539Rear Admiral Thomas Lynch, "A Critical Look at Who 
Does What," Proceedings (May 1995): 88. 
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Moving forces and equipment from CONUS, as well as 
delivering MPS equipment, still would require access to 
major port and airfield facilities. 540 With those 
facilities captured or under attack by ballistic or cruise 
missiles, most if not all equipment being delivered by air 
or sea would have to arrive far from the theater and then 
travel by land, requiring both a massive logistical effort 
and likely the permission to move through another state's 
territory. The tactical aircraft needed for air defense in 
the theater still would require major airfields from which 
to operate, posing the same problems as the maritime 
delivery of equipment.541 
Unless the United States had many months in which to 
build up its forces, ·it is doubtful that a trans-oceanic 
deployment could be conducted to reverse an act of 
aggression. If Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were occupied by 
Iran or Iraq, waiting six to twelve months while U.S. forces 
and supplies were built up would not be acceptable, since 
the loss of Saudi and Kuwaiti oil would cripple the 
economies of most U.S. allies in the meantime. Where U.S. 
forces might be built up would pose another major problem in 
this scenario. 
s400'Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops 
Home?" 83. 
541Krulak, "An Enduring Instrument," 11. 
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Provided that U.S. forces were able to reach the 
theater, they would lack familiarity with local conditions 
and operational patterns, things that forward presence 
forces monitor daily in regions around the world. The 
forces of any regional allies that could be convinced to 
join the United States would lack interoperability with U.S. 
forces, reducing their ability to render assistance. In 
addition, simply convincing regional allies to participate 
would be problematic. The most important factor in 
convincing allies to assist the United States is likely to 
be those allies' perception of U.S. willingness to act alone 
if necessary.542 With the bulk of the U.S. military 
stationed at home, U.S. willingness to act alone may not be 
credible to regional allies.543 Finally, U.S. forces should 
be expected to have less than outstanding combat proficiency 
if their use is perceived as very unlikely, since expensive 
live training and frequent exercises likely would occur less 
often.544 
542Dismukes, National Security Strategy and Forward 
Presence, 45. 
543Rodman, America Adrift, 67. 
544 John Pay, "Full Circle: The US Navy and Its 
Carriers, 1974-1993," in Geoffrey Till, ed., Seapower: 
Theory and Practice, special issue of The Journal of 
Strateqic Studies (March 1994): 136. 
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Lastly, despite the belief in RMA concepts by many in 
the defense establishment, technology cannot substitute for 
a coherent strategy in U.S. national security. The Gulf 
War's impact on the thinking of many defense planners and 
authors is probably the most important factor in the new 
wave of RMA enthusiasm. The orders-of-magnitude superiority 
of U.S. forces over Iraqi forces often is extrapolated into 
future scenarios without regard to differences of quality, 
geography, culture, or will. 545 While technological 
advantage is important in U.S. national security and 
military strategies, it is not sufficient by itself as a 
means of protecting vital interests or prevailing on the 
battlefield. 
A sound strategy supported by appropriate forces is the 
basic requirement for protecting U.S. interests. Attempting 
to protect interests from afar, through the deterrent threat 
of deploying halfway around the world to restore order and 
rescue U.S. interests, is neither sound nor feasible. Thus 
the pull-back strategy, which rests solely on deterrence to 
prevent assaults on U.S. interests, and can only respond to 
aggression after the fact, is no strategy at all. The pull-
back strategy equates to waiting for trouble to occur, while 
hoping that it will not, then expending enormous effort to 
545stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the 
Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," 
International Security (Fall 1996): 173-179. 
289 
set things right again when regional adversaries exceed the 
limits of U.S. tolerance. While perhaps attractive to some 
for financial, technological, or moral-philosophical 
reasons, the pull-back strategy is not a viable means of 
protecting U.S. interests and security. 
"Virtual Presence:" Global Air 
Power and Space Surveillance 
The second alternative to forward presence centers 
around recent technological advances in the areas of air 
power and surveillance. Through such programs and systems 
as GPS, space-based sensors, smart and brilliant weapons, 
and stealth aircraft, proponents of global air power have 
produced the concept of "virtual presence." Virtual 
presence rests on the assumptions that U.S. surveillance 
capability can find and track any object on earth, in any 
weather and despite any concealment efforts, in real time, 
and that stealth aircraft carrying highly lethal smart 
weapons can destroy any target on earth from bases far 
removed from the theater, even from CONUs. 546 
First articulated by then-Air Force Chief of Staff 
General Merill McPeak in 1994, virtual presence envisions 
U.S. air power providing the means to resolve any crisis, 
and obviating the need for more "traditional" military 
546sheila Widnall and Ronald Fogleman, "Global 
Presence," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1995): 96-99. 
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instruments, such as armored forces or amphibious forces. 547 
With U.S. aircraft able to move into any region quickly, and 
with U.S. space assets watching over every area of the 
earth, no impending crisis could develop to the point that 
U.S. interests were threatened without being reversed by air 
power. 548 The National Defense Panel, established in 1996 
as an independent cross-check on the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, accepted many of the claims of air power advocates, 
stating that greater use should be made of long-range 
bombers and precision weapons.549 
The centerpiece of the virtual presence concept is the 
B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. With inter-continental range and 
the ability to carry a large load of PGMs, the B-2 is the 
embodiment of the high-tech systems counted on by RMA 
advocates to allow a smaller force to meet U.S. national 
security requirements: 
The capacity of the quite revolutionary technologies 
embodied in the B-2 to influence the behavior of 
regional actors lies in the unprecedented combination 
of operational features they make possible in one 
system, encompassing long-range power projection 
capabilities able to reach virtually any region in 
547 James Canan, "McPeak Sums It Up," Air Force Magazine 
(August 1994): 31. 
548General Ronald Fogleman, USAF, "The Air Force and 
Joint Vision 2010," Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 1996-97): 
25. 
549John Tirpak, "The NDP and the Transformation 
Strategy," Air Force Maqazine (March 1998): 22. 
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the world from CONUS bases with only one 
refueling. 550 
Consistently touted as the means to apply U.S. military 
power to 100 percent of the earth's surface, without the 
need for any support facilities overseas and with impunity 
from air defenses, the B-2 combines with space surveillance 
to replace physical presence with virtual presence. 551 
A supporting agent in virtual presence is the Air 
Force's air expeditionary force (AEF) concept, typically a 
group of twenty-four to thirty aircraft capable of deploying 
rapidly to bases in a theater. In annual exercises such as 
BRIGHT STAR (U.S.-Egypt), the Air Force deploys "alpha 
packages" of tankers, F-15 and F-16 aircraft, and ground 
personnel to forward bases on short notice, to provide a 
rapid air power response to emerging events. 552 General 
John Jumper, commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, has 
stated that access to the needed bases likely will not be 
withheld by allies in a theater, and that ballistic missiles 
and CBW attacks will not be significant impediments to the 
AEF concept, allowing CONUS-based air power to maintain 
presence from afar.553 
SSOPerry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 31. 
551Goodman, "Virtual Overseas Presence," 12. 
552canan, "Airpower from Home Base," 23. 
55311 operating Abroad," Air Force Magazine (December 
1998): 28. 
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The result of air power's elevation to global status, 
at least for backers in the Air Force, has been to truncate 
the United States' warfighting strategy to a single phase: 
the halt phase. With rapid deployment of aircraft armed 
with PGMs, supported by space-based surveillance assets, 
adversaries can be stopped in their tracks, and their 
tactical and strategic options quickly whittled down to 
surrender or obliteration through the destruction of their 
forces. 554 For example, it is claimed that three B-2 
bombers could produce enough armor kills with anti-armor 
PGMs to halt an attack by three armored brigades in a matter 
of minutes.555 
The various PGMs, including emerging GPS-aided 
munitions (GAMs) as well as older laser or optical guided 
weapons, are claimed to allow a force of half as many U.S. 
aircraft to inflict Gulf War numbers of kills, while 
reducing risk to U.S. pilots.55 6 In the words of one air 
power advocate: 
I would maintain that from that point [the halt 
phase] on, the enemy's strategic options decline. He 
is either leaving for home or dying in place, and a 
554Elaine Grossman, "Duel of Doctrines," Air Force 
Magazine (December 1998): 30. 
555Perry et al., Long:-Ranqe Bombers, 41-42. 
556John Tirpak, "Brilliant Weapons," Air Force Maqazine 
(February 1998): 48; "The Long Reach of On-Call Airpower," 
Air Force Magazine (December 1998): 22. 
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follow-on counteroffensive may not be necessary. A 
ground war becomes an option rather than an 
inevitability. 557 
Air and space power thus maintain presence in distant 
regions of the world through the knowledge among other 
governments that U.S. airplanes could arrive within days or 
hours to punish aggressive acts. 558 With PGMs and global 
reach, U.S. air power by itself can deter aggression, and 
defend U.S. interests if deterrence fails: 
That ability [to regain the initiative in a crisis] 
may be derived from strikes at global range on short 
notice with devastating intensity and accuracy . 
. . . Global attack and precision strike are thus key 
to the U.S. national security posture.559 
General McPeak, addressing the fact that the 
adversary's perception is what matters in deterrence, has 
stated that regional actors will recognize the global reach 
of U.S. bombers and the continual presence of U.S. 
557Major General (Retired) Charles Link, USAF, quoted 
in James Kitfield, "To Halt An Enemy," Air Force Magazine 
(January 1998): 65. 
558Tirpak, "The Long Reach of On-Call Airpower," 22: 
"The USAF's B-1B, B-2A, and B-52H bombers, from a cold start 
at their home bases in the ·continental United States, could 
attack virtually anywhere on Earth in 18 hours ... could 
destroy hundreds of armored targets on a single pass, would 
be able to stop an enemy column on the march." See also 
Glenn Goodman, "The Power Of Information," Armed Forces 
Journal International (July 1995): 24: "In most instances, 
information, combined with forces that can rapidly respond 
with the right mix of capabilities, can achieve U.S. goals." 
559Jeffrey Jackson, "Global Attack and Precision 
Strike," in Goure and Szara, Air and Space Power in the New 
Millennium, 106. 
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satellites, and that, "air and space forces provide global 
presence, not a localized presence."5 60 
Additional advantages gained through long-range air 
power and PGMs include safety from attack on the bases 
supporting long-range bombers, which can be located far from 
a theater, and the reduction by several orders of magnitude 
of the number of U.S. servicemen put at risk. By providing 
the means to, "conduct relatively risk-free counterforce 
strikes" against enemy NBC facilities, and through exposing 
fewer servicemen to enemy fire, long-range air power is 
advanced as the safest and most economical means of applying 
U.S. combat power.561 
Under a virtual presence strategy, the Air Force would 
be the mainstay of U.S. military power. Long-range bombers 
would be required in much larger numbers than the 187 called 
for in the ouadrennial Defense Review, while tactical 
fighters would be needed in smaller numbers. The B-2 in 
particular would be needed in larger numbers, perhaps as 
many as 100. With higher production expected to bring down 
B-2 unit cost by as much as two-thirds, from around 2.2 
billion dollars to 865 million dollars per aircraft, a 
larger B-2 fleet would be affordable within the overall 
S60canan, "McPeak Sums It Up,'' 34; John Correll, "Let's 
You and Him Fight," Air Force Magazine (June 1994): 4. 
561Horner, "What We Should Have Learned," 54, 55. 
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defense budget as other systems were cut back. 562 Aerial 
re-fueling and air lift assets would be needed in large 
numbers, to allow aerial re-fueling of bombers and to get 
AEF supplies and personnel into a theater quickly. 
Space assets would be of equal importance to aircraft, 
and could justify the establishment of an Air Force space 
corps, or even an independent Space Force. The ability to 
defend U.S. satellites from attack, and to attack and 
neutralize other nations' space assets, likely would be 
prominent features of a virtual presence strategy.5 63 
Although U.S. space surveillance capability is very high 
today, it is posited that even greater improvements would 
need to be made in order to achieve the kind of global 
awareness described in the virtual presence strategy. 
The Navy likely would be sized and structured very much 
as under the pull-back strategy. Needing only to keep the 
military SLOCs open for transporting Army equipment and 
supplies to a distant theater, ASW, MCM, and AAW would be 
the primary features of the Navy. 
The Army would be reduced to perhaps as few as five 
divisions, with the armored divisions' heavy gear stored 
562At the original number of 132 B-2 bombers, the unit 
cost was expected to be 480 million dollars. Producing 100 
would have cost 865 million per plane, while the current 
force of twenty-one aircraft will cost over two billion 
dollars each. See Perry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 72. 
563Friedman, The Future of War, 363-366. 
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mainly aboard prepositioning ships. Two light divisions 
would be structured for rapid air deployment. The principal 
function of Army units would be to provide air defenses for 
Air Force bases, and to stand by for whatever ground combat 
remained to be conducted after U.S. air power had been 
applied to the enemy. 
What are the faults of the virtual presence strategy? 
As the pull-back strategy did, the virtual presence strategy 
employs many valid arguments in creating the larger argument 
for presence through long-range air power. The B-2, for 
example, no doubt is an aeronautical and military marvel of 
high-technology systems. PGMs have indeed performed much 
better than iron bombs, as much as twelve times better 
according to various studies.56 4 And air power does offer a 
means to minimize the number of U.S. servicemen placed at 
risk in applying military force. Do the individual 
arguments in favor of virtual presence support the larger 
claim, that virtual presence can and should replace physical 
preseqce? Again the answer must be "no." Just as the pull-
back strategy's arguments ultimately are unconvincing, so 
too does the virtual presence strategy fail to convince in 
the end. 
564Perry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 18, cites the Gulf 
War Air Power Survey in claiming that PGMs enjoyed twelve 
times better kill ratios than iron bombs. 
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The one overwhelming flaw in the virtual presence 
concept is the incorrect belief that the ability to kill any 
target on earth, at any time and from any distance--if 
possible at all, a dubious assumption to begin with--is the 
same as providing presence. 56 5 While such a capability may 
well be invaluable in a future war, the belief that global 
reach and global strike capability is synonymous with 
presence is a gross conceptual error.566 The kinds of 
strikes portrayed by virtual presence advocates--stopping 
three armored brigades on the march with PGMs--are wartime 
missions. Presence is the peacetime employment of military 
forces to influence others across a full range of actions 
and across the spectrum of violence. Thus claiming that 
global air power can provide presence is to argue apples and 
oranges. 
Bombers, especially the B-2 bomber, are unique in their 
ability to deliver a large amount of destructive force, over 
a great distance and in a short time. However, bombers also 
are largely one-dimensional. The only option afforded to a 
commander by available bombers is to put bombs on a 
565wode, "Beyond Bombers and Carriers," 29. 
56 6DeYoung, "Sea Power Is Grand Strategy," 77; Mauz, 
"The Value of Being There," 27: "To be sure, bombers have a 
role in conflict, and they also contribute to deterrence, 
but their contribution to overseas presence is limited and 
to suggest that they can compare to naval forces is 
nonsense." 
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target.5 67 Unless the situation calls for a destructive 
strike on some target, bombers provide little value. 
The analogy often used is that air power is either "on 
or off", with no ability to move up or down the spectrum of 
activity. For example, during the entire period during the 
1980s when U.S. forces were deployed to the Persian Gulf, 
attempting to safeguard Saudi and Kuwaiti oil shipments 
during the Iran-Iraq war, not a single strike mission was 
flown in the theater. 5 68 There were no instances in which 
the United States could justify turning bomber air power 
"on", so it was a non-factor. 
In crisis response the same limitation applies. How 
would B-2 bombers have resolved the crisis at the U.S. 
embassy in Somalia in 1991? How would bombers go about 
monitoring and intercepting Iraqi oil smuggling? Unless the 
crisis calls for the destruction of a certain target set, 
bombers are likely to be of little or no value to U.S. 
commanders.569 Since presence more often than not involves 
567Krulak, "An Enduring Instrument," 10. 
568navid Perin, comparing Long-Range Bombers and the 
Carrier Force (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 
1994), 9. 
569Appendix A, Table 11 and Table 12, compare the 
utility of bombers and carrier battle groups in peacetime 
crisis response. As shown in these illustrations, unless the 
crisis calls for strike missions, bombers will have very 
limited ability to contribute. 
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less-than-war activities, a platform whose only mission is 
destructive cannot be viewed as a suitable means of 
providing presence. 
While air power advocates may claim that bombers' 
military capabilities will produce a deterrent effect, and 
that this deterrent effect should operate on regional actors 
in the same manner as presence forces, history does not 
support this argument. The B-36 bomber offers a near-exact 
parallel to the current B-2 theory of global air power. The 
B-36 was claimed to be capable of attacking any location on 
earth quickly, from bases beyond the reach of enemy weapons, 
and so would be able to influence events and protect U.S. 
interests. Alas, the Korean War proved otherwise, just as 
Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait, and to stay 
there after receiving demands from the U.N. that he leave, 
came in the face of truly global U.S. air power.570 
Deterrence depends, as always, on the adversary's 
perception to be successful.571 For an adversary with 
first-rate intelligence gathering capability, able to 
identify and analyze the range of U.S. capabilities, and to 
extrapolate the damage likely to be done if those 
capabilities are unleashed, a non-visible bomber force may 
serve to deter. However, for less sophisticated actors, 
570Johnson, "Carries Are Forward Presence," 39. 
571siegel, To Deter. compel, and Reassure, 3. 
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such as most regional states, visibility remains at the 
heart of deterrence, and bombers are poorly-suited to 
providing and maintaining visibility.572 
A further serious flaw in the virtual presence paradigm 
is that the historical model that serves as the basis for 
many air power claims--the Gulf War--had conditions so 
unique as to be highly unlikely to repeat themselves in the 
future. Thus air power may not be applicable, or at least 
may not be decisive, in future conflicts. Even the 
perception of the Gulf War has changed over the last eight 
years in regard to air power, with many now believing that 
air power was not as effective as portrayed at the time. 573 
Unless a future conflict involves desert terrain, 
largely immobile armored forces without any significant air 
defenses, a six-month period in which to build up logistics 
and gather intelligence, an enemy command and control 
structure that has been decapitated at the outset and never 
re-established, the withholding of enemy CBW capability, and 
no possibility of U.S. space assets being interfered with, 
it is unlikely that air power would enjoy the complete 
572colin Gray, Explorations In Strategy (Westport, 
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996), 75: "Sustained local presence 
in the air typically is physically impracticable." Dietz, 
"Presence Is in the Beholder's Eye," 112. 
573Till, "Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First 
Century," 186. 
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freedom of operation experienced in 1991. Marine Corps 
General Paul Van Riper states the matter clearly: 
If we're looking to repeat Desert Storm, then I have 
little problem with the Air Force argument ... What 
we have are a lot of buzzwords floating around 
associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs 
... It's ludicrous to suggest that such concepts as 
'information dominance' will now somehow make all the 
military doctrine that came before it irrelevant.574 
In addition, it is likely that even the B-2 would need 
a fighter escort when operating in daylight. While enemies 
may not know when or from which direction a B-2 is 
approaching, they can defend likely targets and rely on 
visual detection in daytime. If the B-2 can be seen it 
becomes a slow, vulnerable target. Also, it is not 
inconceivable that an enemy undergoing an RMA of its own 
might field the means to triangulate the B-2's targeting 
radar signal in real time, allowing fighters to intercept 
incoming B-2s.57 5 Finally, given current U.S. research into 
radars capable of defeating stealth, it is reasonable to 
assume that others are working on the same problem. If 
another nation were able to solve this technical problem, it 
is possible that the B-2 could lose its greatest asset. 576 
574Kitfield, "To Halt an Enemy," 63. 
5750 1 Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops 
Home?" 80. 
576oavid Fulghum, "New Radars Peel Veil From Hidden 
Targets," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 January 1999, 
58. 
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Thus there is reason to doubt the B-2's continued ability to 
operate with impunity from air defenses. 
The AEF concept that supplements global bombers also is 
based on questionable assumptions. In particular, General 
Jumper's belief that ballistic missiles and chemical weapons 
pose no threat to AEF operations is difficult to reconcile 
with different war games and Red Team studies: 
With a few SCUDs, can you take out an airfield? No, 
you cannot. You can contaminate with chemical 
weapons, but that is what we practice for .... All 
services have practiced doing these sorts of 
things. 577 
Alternatives to highly corrosive decontaminants are 
needed. Current decontaminants leave a corrosive 
residue on equipment, buildings, vehicles, etc., 
which impedes combat and support operations and thus 
threatens mission accomplishment. The services have 
no effective means to decontaminate aircraft that 
have been contaminated by toxic agents or materials 
without taking the aircraft out of service for a long 
period or damaging key aircraft components.578 
While military casualties would likely be low, there 
are no good options for today's theater airbase 
commander if the enemy is able to continuously 
restrike/recontaminate his facility .... Over time 
casualties will increase and efficiency will drop, 
with the anticipated disastrous effects on sortie 
generation and airlift throughput.57 9 
577"0perating Abroad," 28-29. 
578The Impact of Nuclear. Biological, and Chemical 
Proliferation on u.s. Armed Forces, 14. 
579weaver and Glaes, InvitinQ Disaster, 45. 
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Access to bases may be no more secure in peacetime, 
when the United States may wish to engage in less-than-war 
operations. Again, it is peacetime operations, not wartime 
strikes, that comprise the great majority of presence 
missions, and even close allies may hesitate to provide 
unrestricted access to their facilities for U.S. planes. 5 80 
As capable as U.S. land-based tactical air power may be, the 
AEF concept is totally dependent on access to someone else's 
facilities to be viable.581 
From the weaknesses described here, it is clear that 
virtual presence is no more realistic an alternative for 
protecting U.S. interests than the pull-back strategy. In 
fact, the term "virtual presence" is a misnomer, as the 
concept does not qualify as a peacetime presence strategy at 
all, but rather as a high-tech RMA warfighting strategy. 
Since the only response available to U.S. leaders under a 
virtual presence strategy would be to order bombs dropped on 
various targets, in attempting to resolve a crisis the 
United States would be forced to choose between accepting an 
undesired action, or employing destructive force via air 
power to correct the situation, with no intermediate actions 
available to U.S. leaders. 
580Goodman, "Virtual Overseas Presence," 12. 
581Perry et al., Airpower synergies in the New 
strateqic Era, 56. 
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In many, indeed in most peacetime presence scenarios, 
putting bombs on a target simply does not suffice as an 
appropriate, effective solution. General Krulak makes the 
point clearly: "I don't care what anyone says, you're not 
going to manage instability in the Persian Gulf, the Indian 
Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean from 60,000 feet overhead." 5 82 
While global strike capability should be developed for use 
in wartime, when the advantages provided by long-range, 
stealthy aircraft delivering PGMs clearly would be of great 
value, the position that global air power and global strike 
capability can allow virtual presence to replace forward 
presence has little if any credibility. 
Return to an Isolationist Security Policy 
A third alternative strategy for U.S. national 
security, one that has enjoyed some support in recent years, 
is a return to the kind of isolationist policy followed by 
the United States between the World Wars. By focusing only 
on the defense of U.S. citizens and territory, an 
isolationist policy forgoes even the pretense of protecting 
U.S. interests abroad. By definition, in an isolationist 
context the United States has no interests abroad that 
require protection. Isolationism therefore is not in the 
same category as the pull-back strategy or the virtual 
582Hessman, "For the Corps and for the Nation," 13. 
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presence strategy, both of which are claimed to be methods 
of protecting U.S. interests abroad, but nonetheless is an 
alternative strategy for U.S. national security. 
The central tenet of an isolationist policy is the 
belief that events outside the United States need not 
concern us. For some isolationists this belief comes from 
the United States' position of unchallenged power in the 
post-Cold War world. In this regard, the isolationist 
strategy can be viewed as the ultimate extension of the 
pull-back strategy, with no crisis justifying the deployment 
of U.S. forces. For others, isolationism springs from the 
belief that the United States should mind its own business 
in the world, and demand the same treatment from other 
states. As long as other states do not threaten U.S. 
citizens or territory, they will not be bothered by the 
United States. For whatever reasons, isolationists share 
the same guiding principle: the United States should not 
extend its influence or power beyond its own borders. 
Struggles for power within different regions, possibly 
involving open war between rival states, are not expected to 
disappear in the future. For isolationists, however, these 
regional disputes do not threaten U.S. safety and security, 
and should be ignored. 583 As long as the effects of 
regional wars do not spill over onto U.S. territory, which 
583Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81. 
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seems unlikely as only Canada and Mexico border on the 
United States, regional wars are of no importance to the 
United States.584 
Similarly, the desire to spread democracy abroad is an 
inappropriate goal for the United States, and should not be 
attempted. Certainly we support democratic ideals and offer 
an example to others of democracy's benefits, but how other 
states choose to rule themselves should be none of our 
concern. If others are oppressed by brutal dictatorships, 
or if lawless anarchy reigns in a distant region, it is for 
the people living there to correct, not the United 
States. 585 
The vital interests of the United States would amount 
to only three requirements: the safety of U.S. citizens, the 
integrity of U.S. territory, and the independence of the 
U.S. political process. In regard to overseas interests, at 
most the United States should take some interest in and 
encourage a balance of power within different regions. 586 
Another argument often cited in making the isolationist 
case, and indeed one heard for many years before the end of 
S84Earl Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," Foreign 
Policy (Winter 1990-1991): 7-8. 
585Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," 
81. 
5S6Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 15. 
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the Cold War, is that other states, particularly the 
affluent states of Europe and Asia, should provide for their 
own defense, allowing U.S. troops and support to be 
withdrawn.587 For example, South Korea has twice the 
population of North Korea, and an economy nearly an order of 
magnitude larger than North Korea's. South Korea thus 
should not need American assistance in defending itself, 
certainly not assistance on the order of an entire U.S. Army 
division and supporting air assets. 588 An isolationist 
policy would force U.S. allies to ''carry the load" for their 
own defense by withdrawing U.S. protection.589 
An important point to be noted is that isolationists 
would not sever commercial interaction along with military 
support in withdrawing from the world.590 U.S. overseas 
trade would continue as ever, since it would be in the best 
interest of overseas nations, even those hostile or less 
than friendly to the United States, to continue to have 
economic interaction: 
The restraint we propose should not be misdescribed 
as a total withdrawal from the world. On the 
587Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence; Status. 
Prospects, 19. 
588Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," 
80. 
589Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 210. 
590Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81. 
308 
contrary, we believe in a vigorous trade with other 
nations and the thriving corrunerce of ideas. Military 
restraint need not, and will not, bring economic 
protectionism. 591 
Even that most strategic of resources, oil, should not 
require United States military forces to be deployed 
overseas. Instead, the United States could depend on market 
forces to maintain the price of oil, and to ensure the 
availability of the huge amounts of oil required for world 
economies. Some possible benefits of this course of action 
might be to prompt the U.S. population and government to 
lower their demand and dependence on oil, and to promote the 
development of useful alternatives to fossil fuels. 592 Even 
if Saudi and Kuwaiti oilfields came into the possession of 
Iraq or Iran, their oil still would be available on the 
world market, as the oil would have no value unless sold, 
and market forces again would serve to prevent artificial 
manipulation of the oil market.593 
The armed forces required by the United States would be 
highly capable, but very small and structured for defense, 
not power projection. Accordingly, ballistic missile 
defense and the strategic nuclear forces would be of 
paramount importance.594 Space systems and high technology 
591Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 200. 
5 92Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 9. 
593Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 220. 
S94Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," 
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surveillance and strike systems also would be important, 
possibly requiring the establishment of a separate Space 
Force.595 
The conventional forces would make maximum use of high 
technology as a force multiplier, an effort made easier by 
the United States' technological lead over other nations. 
With better technology and a defensive posture, the services 
could be reduced to as few as six ground divisions, ten or 
eleven Air Force wings, and as few as one hundred ships. 59 6 
By withdrawing to CONUS, the requirements placed on the 
military would be streamlined greatly. The services would 
need only to defend CONUS and the sea and air approaches, to 
retain strong retaliatory nuclear forces, and to employ 
those retaliatory forces along with missile defenses in 
order to deter NBC attack.5 97 The rest of the world could 
be left alone, with regional affairs and events taking care 
of themselves. 
The problem, and the reason that isolationism is not a 
viable strategy for the United States, is that the world 
80. 
595Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence,"81. 
596Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," 
80; Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 17. 
597Perla et al., Future Sea-Based Aviation, 55; 
Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 15. 
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does not take care of itself, at least not peacefully and in 
ways that will be favorable to the United States. If the 
five thousand-plus years of written history are any guide, 
there will always be states and entities with hostile 
ambitions, bent on taking by force what others possess: 
The world does not sort itself out on its own .. 
International stability is never a given. It is never 
the norm. When achieved, it is the product of self-
conscious action by the great powers, and most 
particularly of the greatest power, which now and for 
the foreseeable future is the United States. If 
America wants stability, it will have to create it . 
. . . There will constantly be new threats disturbing 
our peace. 598 
While isolationism might have been sufficient in the 
early nineteenth century, when all of America's resource 
requirements could be met domestically and the British Navy 
served to safeguard trade on the high seas, today and in the 
future isolationism cannot be seen as a credible choice for 
U.S. national security. As elaborated in Chapter II, the 
United States has interests in nearly every region of the 
world. Only the most narrowly defined interests of safety 
and security reside within the borders of the United States. 
Whether or not this should be the case is immaterial: it is 
the case, and U.S. strategy must deal with what is, not with 
what we might like to be. 
598charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," in 
Allison and Treverton, Rethinking America's Security, 301-
302. 
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If Texas and Alaska could provide our oil demands, and 
if Canada and Mexico could satisfy our import and export 
markets, an isolationist strategy would be viable, if not 
necessarily appropriate. However, the reality is that we do 
have interests overseas, there are threats to those 
interests, and we cannot protect our interests by 
withdrawing into isolation.599 
The results of adopting an isolationist strategy might 
be slow to manifest themselves, especially in the current 
international setting. The U.S. position of unrivaled power 
could allow the United States to muddle along in isolation 
for several years, even a decade or more, before being 
forced to address a situation that had become threatening to 
U.S. interests.600 
History, on the other hand, suggests that the United 
States would experience a rapid rise in misbehavior 
worldwide, which would impinge on U.S. interests sooner 
rather than later. Regional bullies should be expected to 
push hard against the envelope of U.S. tolerance, and to 
threaten, either directly or indirectly, the safety and 
security of the United States. Charles Krauthammer, in a 
remarkable critique of recent U.S. foreign policy, explains 
why this is so: 
599Johnsen, The Future Roles of u.s. Military Power, 3. 
600Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81. 
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The basic difference between the international system 
and domestic society is that in domestic society 
there exists a monopoly of the means of coercion, an 
enforcer, a sovereign. There is generally also a 
preexisting community of norms. 
Neither of these conditions obtains in the 
international arena .... And, in any social system, 
whether of individuals or nation-states, where there 
is no enforcer, there can be no real law. 60 1 
The years between World War One and World War Two 
provide the clearest example of the perils of isolationism 
for the United States. Convinced after World War One that 
the best way to avoid another destructive war was to 
withdraw from the world, the United States practiced a 
determined isolationism right up until the 7th of December, 
1941.602 Ignoring the threat to Europe posed by Hitlerian 
Germany, and the threat to Asia posed by a militant Japan, 
the United States surrendered the initiative in world 
events. 603 When the United States could no longer ignore 
the outside world, after isolationism had been forcibly 
refuted by the Japanese carrier task force at Pearl Harbor, 
four years of tremendous effort and cost were required to 
restore U.S. security. There is no reason to think that 
601charles Krauthammer, "A World Imagined," The New 
Republic, 15 March 1999, 23. 
602Allison and Treverton, Rethinking America's 
security, 301. 
603 Jordan et al., American National Security, 12-13. 
Ellsworth et al., eds., America's National Interests, 10. 
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today's world will order itself any more peaceably than the 
world of eighty years ago. 
Summary 
The current U.S. strategy of power projection through 
forward presence is grounded in the experience of the past 
and the logical security requirements of the future. As 
with any strategy, alternatives to forward presence exist, 
and have been argued forcefully by various authors. While 
championed by thoughtful and well-intentioned persons, the 
alternatives presented in this chapter cannot be judged 
acceptable in replacing forward presence in U.S. security 
strategy. 
The first alternative strategy, the pull-back strategy, 
can be seen as an attempt to enjoy great power status 
without exerting great power effort in the world. While 
maintaining a military similar in structure and capabilities 
to the current force, although significantly smaller, the 
pull-back strategy would not maintain that force near U.S. 
interests, counting instead on the deterrent threat of U.S. 
forces to protect interests. With RMA systems making up for 
the reduced size and physical absence of the U.S. military, 
U.S. forces could respond from CONUS to any act that 
threatened U.S. interests, and overwhelm any opponent 
through technological superiority. Arguments also are made 
that the United States can no longer justify the cost of a 
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large forward presence military, as no plausible threats 
exist to U.S. security. 
The pull-back strategy may also be viewed as a reversal 
of the "world policeman" role taken on by the United States 
since the end of the Cold War. Since there is no plausible 
threat to U.S. safety, domestic interests should take 
priority over international affairs, obviating the need for 
deploying military force all over the world. 
Despite the logic of many pull-back arguments when 
viewed in isolation, the whole turns out to be less than the 
sum of the parts. The most obvious flaw in the pull-back 
strategy is its total reliance on deterrence to defend U.S. 
interests, and the strictly reactive nature of a CONUS-based 
military. If deterrence fails, no defensive options are 
likely to exist, a condition virtually certain to encourage 
regional bullies and bad actors to contemplate fait accompli 
strategies. 
None of the intermediate steps afforded by naval 
forward presence and naval diplomacy would be available, 
forcing the United States to accept an aggressor's actions 
or deploy overseas to fight a regional war. The cost of 
deployment could exceed the loss involved in accepting the 
new conditions, making it more likely that aggressors would 
be able to keep their gains. If the decision was made to 
deploy, U.S. allies would lack interoperability with U.S. 
forces, making those allies' contribution less effective. 
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Finally, there is reason to be skeptical about the 
RMA's ability to solve any strategic problem through 
technology. The substitution of technology for strategy is 
one of the pitfalls of buying into the RMA school of 
thought, and should be avoided in all cases. Technology is 
important in U.S. security and military strategy, but 
technology cannot become strategy. 
The second alternative described in this chapter, the 
use of global air power to produce virtual presence, is 
miscast by its advocates as a means of defending U.S. 
interests abroad. While possibly a potent warfighting 
concept, virtual presence through global air power in no way 
can substitute for the physical presence of naval forces in 
protecting U.S. interests, a role that mostly involves 
peacetime activities. 
Supported by such Air Force luminaries as former Chief 
of Staff McPeak, virtual presence envisions the growth of 
space surveillance and long-range air power into an 
omnipresent force, able to see and stop any misbehavior, in 
any location, at any time and in time to be effective. The 
B-2 bomber, probably the most advanced system in the U.S. 
military, is held up as the means to stop or correct any 
threat to U.S. interests. By raining PGMs on adversary 
forces, if necessary from bases in CONUS, the B-2 and 
supporting air expeditionary forces can prevent enemy plans 
from succeeding, thereby protecting U.S. interests. 
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Presumably adversaries will recognize the iron logic of U.S. 
strategy and refrain from challenging U.S. air power. 
Virtual presence is better-suited as a wartime 
strategy, when the ability to destroy targets from great 
distance, with highly accurate and lethal PGMs, would be 
very valuable. Even in this context, however, there is 
reason to doubt that the virtual presence strategy is 
sufficient by itself, without the need for Army or Navy 
forces to take part. Ironically, the B-2 is stealthy in 
inverse proportion to the technological level of the sensor 
it is attempting to evade. Able largely to avoid detection 
by radar or infrared systems, it is as visible to the naked 
eye as any other aircraft, making it highly vulnerable in 
daytime. Thus the B-2 would need either to operate only at 
night, probably not an option in a fast-moving ground war, 
or to have an escort of short-range fighters. The 
limitation of vulnerability to attack on supporting air 
bases again intrudes into the problem, as ballistic missiles 
and NBC weapons should be capable of neutralizing airfields 
within a theater. 
The weakness of the virtual presence concept is that it 
attempts to apply a wartime activity--dropping bombs--to 
solve problems and protect U.S. interests in peacetime. 
Virtual presence offers no options for U.S. commanders, 
whether in day-to-day operations or crisis response, except 
to destroy something of the enemy's. Thus virtual presence 
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relies strictly on the deterrent threat of launching an air 
campaign against any nation that threatens U.S. interests, 
with no capacity for less-than-war activities. It is a 
strategy manifestly unfit for the conditions that the U.S. 
must work with the majority of the time, and to suggest that 
it provides any kind of presence, virtual or otherwise, is 
at best a statement of misguided enthusiasm from the De 
Seversky school of air power. 
Finally, the possibility of returning to an 
isolationist posture has gained some currency since the Cold 
War ended. Based on the belief that what goes on outside 
the United States does not and should not concern us, the 
isolationist strategy calls for the return of all U.S. 
forces to CONUS, where their only role would be preventing 
an attack on U.S. territory. The services would be reduced 
greatly, although still provided with the best and most 
advanced systems available. 
The vital interests of the United States would be the 
safety of U.S. citizens, the integrity of U.S. territory, 
and the freedom of the U.S. political process from outside 
influence. Nothing else on earth would require protection, 
or be worth fighting for. Our many allies would have to 
fend for themselves in terms of defense, although we would 
maintain healthy trade with all amenable nations. Even 
access to oil, on which our economy, and therefore our 
quality of life, depends, would not require active measures 
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of protection. Either through the invisible hand of the 
world oil market, or through the pragmatism of the state in 
possession of the world's oil, U.S. oil demands could be met 
at affordable cost. 
If history teaches us anything, it is that peaceful 
coexistence is not the natural order of things for sovereign 
states. This lesson is of large importance today, since the 
United States depends on resources from abroad, as well as 
the survival of world economic markets even more dependent 
on oil than our own. This reason alone is sufficient to 
disqualify isolationism as an acceptable strategy for the 
United States. In addition to the need for secure access to 
resources, the United States would surrender all but 
diplomatic means of influencing others. Even the pull-back 
strategy hedges by retaining the forces to set things right 
when others trespass on U.S. interests. An isolationist 
America would have no ability to maintain favorable 
conditions abroad. While viable and not entirely 
inappropriate two hundred years ago, this strategy cannot be 
considered a realistic possibility today. 
The three alternatives presented here are not intended 
to encompass every possible strategy for U.S. national 
security. The three alternatives were selected because each 
has significant backing within the U.S. defense 
establishment, and in the case of isolationism, within the 
U.S. population. However, after examining the shortcomings 
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of each, it is clear that forward presence, and especially 
naval forward presence, is the most appropriate and 
effective strategy for U.S. national security. With 
interests and threats residing far from U.S. territory, U.S. 
forces likewise must be positioned far from U.S. territory 
if interests are to be protected. No other option provides 
a realistic means of protecting U.S. interests, influencing 
events in the United States' favor, and defending U.S. 
interests when armed force is called for. Thus the Navy-
Marine Corps team's forward presence mission will retain its 
importance in the post-Cold War international environment, 
and will continue to influence events, protect American 
interests, and underwrite the security of the United States. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The United States Navy has been operating around the 
world for nearly two centuries, since Thomas Jefferson sent 
American warships to the Mediterranean in 1801. Although 
the shape of American sea power has changed in the 
intervening years, from sail power to nuclear power, from a 
surface Navy to a submarine, surface, air, and space Navy, 
the fundamental requirement of sea power has remained the 
same for the United States. Today's Navy is just as 
essential to the safety and prosperity of the United States 
as was the Navy of John Paul Jones, and will remain so in 
the next century. 
The United States is a maritime nation, dependent on 
the sea for the majority of trade with other nations. While 
aircraft allow goods to cross great distances in a matter of 
hours, air lift is extremely expensive and inefficient for 
the transportation of bulk cargo, and is incapable of 
transporting bulk resources such as oil. The sea remains 
the economic highway of U.S. trade, a fact that has not 
changed since the first British colony was established at 
Jamestown. The immutable laws of physics limit the returns 
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on air lift, making sea lift the most efficient means of 
transporting goods over long distances. 
The efficiency of sea lift is of great importance to 
the United States, as most U.S. trading partners and many 
necessary resources lie across the oceans. Unlike the 
continental states of Europe, the United States must look to 
the sea for trade with nations other than Canada and Mexico. 
In contrast to the maritime trading states of ancient Greece 
or Persia, the United States must cross the two greatest 
oceans in the world, the Atlantic and Pacific, in order to 
deliver goods to other nations. Merchant sea lift therefore 
is an enduring requirement for the United States, and, as 
observed by Mahan, the need for a Navy springs from the 
existence of peaceful shipping. The need for a Navy is an 
equally enduring feature of American existence, a need 
important enough to be called for by name in the 
Constitution. 
In addition to the protection of U.S. trade, the Navy 
provides the means to defend the United States from attack. 
By virtue of the freedom of movement enjoyed by ships at 
sea, U.S. naval forces help to ensure that the fight, if and 
when it comes, will be conducted as far from the U.S. 
homeland as possible. Due to the need to watch over U.S. 
maritime commerce, and to protect the United States itself, 
forward presence has long been judged the best employment 
for the Navy-Marine Corps team. 
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Three strategic "hubs" warrant special attention in the 
form of naval forward presence forces. These are the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia. 
Combining U.S. interests, crucial U.S. trading partners, and 
clear threats to those interests and trading partners, these 
three regions are the principal focus of U.S. naval 
deployments. Indicative of the importance of these regions 
is the assignment of a numbered fleet to each: the Sixth 
Fleet in the Mediterranean, the Fifth Fleet in the Gulf, and 
the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific. 
Threats to U.S. interests exist in two general forms. 
The first is a peer or near-peer rival, such as the former 
Soviet Union. While the United States presently enjoys the 
absence of any such peer threat, the status and health of 
China and Russia bear watching, as either could develop 
sufficient power and influence to challenge the United 
States on a global scale. The other type of threat, which 
receives greater emphasis in the post-Cold War setting, 
comes from the existence of "bad actors" in important 
regions. Saddam Hussein is merely the best-known of these 
regional bad actors, each of whom has sufficient leverage 
through proximity to U.S. interests to require U.S. 
attention. Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are the clearest 
regional threats, and are the basis for the two-MRC 
requirement in U.S. defense planning. 
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Each of the services has a role to play in protecting 
U.S. interests, and each service has forces located around 
the world to provide forward presence. The Army has been 
present in Korea since 1950, as have units of the Air Force. 
The Army recently has taken position in Kuwait on a 
permanent basis, with Air Force units deployed to several 
Gulf nations. And of course, both the Army and Air Force 
have been key members of NATO for nearly fifty years. 
While the deployment of Army and Air Force assets 
provides valuable presence in support of U.S. interests, the 
position on land of Army and Air Force personnel and 
equipment means that the permission of a foreign nation must 
be secured for their deployment. Naval forces are free from 
the political problems of deploying on another state's 
territory, and have the additional advantage of easy 
mobility. Anywhere that there is salt water, the sea 
services can operate in the protection of U.S. interests. 
It is through the combination of mobility and freedom from 
the permission of other states to come and go that naval 
forces are superior to land-based forces in providing 
presence. 
When naval forces are present in a region, the United 
States has available a wide range of options for influencing 
events, protecting interests, and responding to emerging 
crises. Under the broad concept of naval diplomacy are such 
activities as conventional deterrence, signaling U.S. 
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interest in a region or state, providing support to allies, 
employing limited military force, enforcing sanctions, and 
protecting and enforcing freedom of the seas. 
The wide range of actions that can be undertaken by 
naval forces highlight the difference between forces that 
are forward-based, such as Army units in Korea, and forces 
that are forward-deployed. Forward-based units usually are 
positioned in a specific location to counter a specific 
threat, and are not readily available to react to other 
events. Forward-deployed forces, on the other hand, can be 
re-positioned to respond to events, and can move quickly 
within a region, or even to another region, in support of 
U.S. interests. 
Forward presence forces also take part in two important 
activities intended to maintain wartime readiness. First, 
forward presence forces are able to conduct joint training 
and exercises with U.S. allies, which maintain combat skills 
and interoperability. Allied participation is a central 
feature of U.S. planning, and allies must be interoperable 
with U.S. forces to assist in wartime. Second, by operating 
in a region on a daily basis, forward presence forces 
develop a good knowledge and understanding of conditions in 
the region. Local and regional intelligence, conditions 
affecting sonar or radar, patterns of movement within the 
region, geographic features of significance, the operational 
patterns and tempo of potential adversaries--all can be 
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monitored and updated by forces operating in the region. 
Without current information on regional conditions, U.S. 
forces would be at a disadvantage in wartime, a disadvantage 
that could translate into increased casualties, a longer and 
more difficult campaign, and even the inability to resolve a 
crisis or conflict on favorable terms. While some 
conditions in a region can be monitored with space-based or 
other surveillance assets, many local conditions require 
forces on the scene for observation. 
When crises arise in distant regions, naval forces are 
capable of quick response, and of more flexible response 
than land-based forces. Naval forces require only the 
orders of the National Command Authority to move into a 
crisis area, making them largely immune to political, 
religious, or other obstacles that frequently plague land-
based forces. Naval forces also can vary their position and 
level of visibility, in contrast to land-based forces, and 
can maintain a degree of ambiguity that can heighten an 
adversary's apprehension. In addition, naval forces can be 
withdrawn or moved back from a crisis area with less 
political impact than the removal of land-based forces. 
One of the more frequent types of crisis in recent 
years has been situations of violence, or impending 
violence, that threaten the safety of U.S. citizens abroad. 
Whether involving civil war, general anarchy, or even 
natural disasters, these situations often require the 
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ability to remove a large number of civilians quickly, and 
may require military force to safeguard evacuees until they 
are safely out of harm's way. Known as non-combatant 
evacuation operations, this activity has become a Marine 
Corps specialty. 
With the ability to move quickly from ships at sea to 
locations on land, and able to bring along organic firepower 
and air support when needed, the amphibious ready group has 
proven itself invaluable in getting U.S. citizens out of 
trouble in distant locations. Capable of a wide variety of 
special missions, the amphibious ready group provides the 
means to place U.S. combat forces, with supporting 
firepower, into a crisis area to conduct evacuations, 
intelligence gathering, covert operations, or other short-
of-war activities. The ability to operate from 
international waters allows such missions to be conducted 
without restraint from other states' political leadership, 
often a critical concern when time is a limiting factor. 
If a crisis involves military aggression, it may be 
necessary to respond with the deployment of U.S. military 
power to fight a regional war, such as the 1990-91 Gulf War. 
If U.S. Army and Air Force units are to deploy to a theater, 
their arrival will depend on the ability of forward-deployed 
forces to keep open the facilities needed by U.S. air and 
sea lift. An increasingly important aspect of keeping ports 
and airfields open in the future will be ballistic missile 
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defense. Two Navy missile defense systems currently are in 
development, and should enter service in the next decade. 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Navy has 
shifted its emphasis from the open ocean to the littorals, 
focusing on projecting power ashore rather than blue water 
operations. Without a plausible threat to the movement of 
U.S. ships on the high seas, and with the current national 
security strategy's focus on regional threats, the shift to 
a littoral focus is appropriate. The only nations likely to 
possess the means of challenging the Navy on the open 
oceans, China and Russia, are many years, if not decades, 
from being able to do so. Thus the use of the Navy to 
influence events ashore directly is a logical move. 
With the shift from blue water to the littorals, the 
Navy will need to re-assess its systems and capabilities for 
the new environment. Gone is the space buffer afforded by 
the open ocean, where naval forces could maintain separation 
from opposing forces. The littoral typically is a very 
crowded place, with a large volume of air and sea traffic. 
Also, the need to provide greater support to Marine forces 
is producing several new systems and capabilities, and 
placing greater importance on some existing warfare areas. 
The amphibious forces of the Navy-Marine Corps team are 
undergoing significant change, as new systems begin to 
replace aging Vietnam-era equipment. The new LHD-1 Wasp-
class amphibious ships are great improvements over the LPH-1 
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Iwo Jima-class ships, providing a very large flight deck, 
large well deck, and carrying space for a large amount of 
Marine Corps manpower and equipment. It has even been 
suggested that the Navy shift funds allocated for refitting 
and overhauling the LHA-1 Tarawa-class ships to purchasing 
more LHD-ls, a move that would appear to provide the 
greatest return on the Navy's investment. 
The Marines are preparing to take delivery of two very 
important systems, each providing a tremendous improvement 
in amphibious capability over its predecessor. The AAAV 
amphibious vehicle and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft 
will provide great increases in the speed with which Marine 
forces can be put ashore, as well as the distance from which 
Marine landings can be launched. These increases in range 
and speed are highly important in the context of the 
Marines' Operational Maneuver From The Sea concept. 
In order to provide greater support for Marine forces 
ashore, the Navy is improving its shore bombardment 
capability, a mission that has suffered for many years from 
an inadequate weapon, the 5-inch gun. Possessing only 
thirteen-mile range, the 5-inch gun is no longer suitable 
for Marine Corps operations that will attempt to avoid 
defended landing areas, instead maneuvering directly against 
enemy centers of gravity that may be many miles inland. 
Through modifications to the gun and shell, and the 
incorporation of GPS guidance, the new ERGM shell will allow 
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supporting fires at ranges up to sixty-three miles. The 
VGAS system, intended for installation on the next-
generation surface combatant, may extend this range out to 
one hundred miles. 
Naval aviation, including both aircraft carriers and 
their embarked aircraft, is at a critical transition point 
between the present and the future. Existing aircraft 
carriers are seen by many as too large, too expensive, too 
vulnerable, and unnecessary in the post-Cold War setting. 
With advances in RPVs, the lack of a threat requiring air 
power on the open ocean, and the emergence of the AEF 
concept in the Air Force, carriers often are labeled as Cold 
War relics, the most expensive method possible for putting a 
bomb on a target. Although undoubtedly expensive to 
purchase and operate, carriers bring much more than bomb-
dropping capability to U.S. commanders. Carrier air wings 
are capable of a multitude of missions, all of which can be 
conducted independent of host nation permission, a feature 
commonly overlooked by carrier critics. Carriers have no 
peer when it comes to providing presence, and will remain a 
necessity as long as tactical air power remains a necessity. 
The centerpiece of the Navy's carrier air wings in the 
next decade will be the FA-18E/F Super Hornet, an enlarged 
version of the existing FA-18C/D. Intended to replace the 
A-6E in the strike role and the F-14 in the fighter-
interceptor role, the Super Hornet is a throwback to the 
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days of the F-4 Phantom, an outstanding multi-mission, 
multi-service aircraft in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the 
Super Hornet also entails some risk for the Navy, as it is 
intended to serve only until the Joint Strike Fighter enters 
service. If the Joint Strike Fighter program is delayed for 
any length of time, the age of the FA-18 program could 
become a liability, forcing carrier air wings to deploy with 
what is essentially an early 1970s design. Nonetheless, the 
first production Super Hornets have been delivered to the 
Navy, and should enter squadron service early in the next 
decade. 
Three specific mission areas will be of greatly 
increased importance for the Navy's littoral strategy. Mine 
countermeasures, neglected for many years as irrelevant to 
the Cold War scenario of a mid-ocean battle against the 
Soviets, have been given renewed emphasis in recent years. 
Mines are one of the most cost-effective of naval weapons, 
potentially allowing a state with no naval forces to defend 
against even a superpower navy. With the littoral strategy 
calling for operations near the shore, the ability to 
detect, locate, and neutralize mines is of tremendous 
importance, and must be improved over current levels. 
Anti-submarine warfare likewise must be improved if the 
Navy-Marine Corps team is to operate in the littoral areas 
of the world. While a mere ten years have passed since the 
Navy of Ronald Reagan raised ASW to an art form, the recent 
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lack of emphasis on ASW training and modernization has led 
to much atrophy in this critical mission area. Even old 
diesel submarines, operated by poorly-trained crews, cannot 
be ignored when U.S. naval forces operate in littoral areas, 
requiring that urgent attention be given to this area of 
naval warfighting. 
An emerging mission area will be of paramount 
importance in the new international environment. Ballistic 
missile defense was demonstrated as a necessary capability 
in 1991, when Iraq used "militarily insignificant" SCUD 
missiles as strategic political weapons, attempting to draw 
Israel into the Gulf War in order to splinter the coalition. 
If used to deliver NBC warheads, ballistic missiles could 
render facilities useless, lead to massive U.S. casualties, 
and coerce U.S. allies into remaining neutral in a crisis. 
Thus the two Navy missile defense programs, Navy Area and 
Navy Theater Wide, must continue to receive the full 
attention and support of naval leaders. 
A related capability of great importance is NBC 
defense, detection, and decontamination. Chemical and 
biological weapons in particular have emerged in recent 
years as a kind of "poor man's nuclear weapon," allowing 
small states to employ military and political leverage 
similar to that of nuclear weapons at a fraction of the 
cost. Inexpensive and relatively easy to produce, chemical 
weapons are known to exist in many regional arsenals, and 
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biological weapons are suspected to be nearly as widespread 
as chemical. Both chemical and biological weapons, 
delivered by ballistic missiles, could make it impossible 
for U.S. air power and sea lift to utilize regional 
facilities, possibly preventing the United States from being 
able to deploy into a theater. 
Two equally dubious mindsets concerning chemical and 
biological weapons seem to prevail among many service 
leaders and planners. The first is that U.S. nuclear 
weapons will deter the use of chemical or biological weapons 
in a regional conflict, an assumption based on the Cold War 
deterrence model of mutually assured destruction. The 
second assumption is that, if chemical or biological weapons 
are used, their impact will be marginal and U.S. forces will 
suffer little loss of combat capability. Both assumptions 
are contradicted by existing Red Team analyses, by the 
different nature of potential regional regimes to be 
deterred, and by the lack of adequate detection and 
decontamination equipment and procedures among the services. 
While all of the services are addressing NBC defense and 
protection, it may take a chemical or biological "Pearl 
Harbor" to drive home the effectiveness of these weapons. 
Finally, a new vision of warfighting for the twenty-
first century is being developed by the Navy. Known as 
Network-Centric Warfare, the concept will be an important 
improvement in situational awareness, speed of command, and 
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engagement capability. Through the sharing of information 
in real time, the networking of sensors and shooters, and 
several automated command and control processes, Network-
Centric Warfare should improve the combat capabilities of 
Navy-Marine task forces operating in the littorals, where 
events are likely to develop more quickly, and with less 
warning, than on the open ocean. 
Cooperative Engagement Capability, the first 
operational component of Network-Centric Warfare, has been 
tested successfully on several occasions, and is likely to 
be approved for installation in the fleet in 1999. Allowing 
any networked platform with appropriate weapons to engage an 
air or missile target, without having to track the target 
independently, CEC should improve greatly the ability of 
U.S. naval forces to defend themselves against aircraft, 
cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. 
While forward presence has been the chosen military 
posture of the United States since World War Two, the end of 
the bi-polar Cold War setting has led many defense planners 
and analysts to question whether forward presence is 
appropriate for the new international setting. The lack of 
a world peer, on the order of the old Soviet Union, combined 
with the United States' unchallenged position as the 
military and economic superpower of the world, has produced 
several calls for changing the national security strategy 
employed by the United States. 
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One proposed alternative is to maintain the structure 
and mission capabilities of the military, but reduce the 
overall size of the military and station most forces in 
CONUS. By retaining the ability to deploy overseas in a 
crisis, and threatening to punish any attacks on U.S. 
interests, the pull-back strategy is an attempt to maintain 
great power status without exerting great power effort. The 
flaws of such a strategy are obvious. 
First, U.S. strategy would rest largely on deterrence, 
as the forces needed to defend U.S. interests would be 
located far from those interests. Secondly, when deterrence 
fails (as it should be expected to do), the U.S. response 
would be reactive, only able to address conditions after the 
fact. Quick-grab strategies thus would be encouraged among 
regional powers, who might judge that U.S. deployment was 
not credible to protect a less-than-vital U.S. interest. 
Third, the deployment of U.S. forces to a distant region 
could become a logistical problem too great to overcome, 
forcing the U.S. leadership to re-assess the choice of 
deploying at all. Thus the pull-back strategy is not viable 
for U.S. national security in the post-Cold War setting. 
The second alternative is to return U.S. forces to 
CONUS, and rely on global air power and space surveillance 
to monitor and regulate events surrounding U.S. interests. 
Based on belief in RMA technologies and the long-standing 
doctrine of air power according to Billy Mitchell, air power 
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and space surveillance would replace physical presence with 
virtual presence, allowing a much smaller military to 
protect U.S. interests abroad. 
While the B-2 bomber and emerging smart and brilliant 
weapons should provide a large improvement in U.S. 
warfighting capability, there is no basis in fact or corrunon 
sense for believing that presence can exist through CONUS-
based air power alone. The most serious flaw in the virtual 
presence concept is that it is wrongly applied to peacetime 
presence operations, in which visibility and sustainability 
are key. Virtual presence is more suitable for wartime 
operations, where stealth aircraft have proven their worth. 
However, by limiting U.S. options to accepting an 
adversary's actions or conducing a bombing campaign, virtual 
presence is wholly unsatisfactory as a peacetime presence 
strategy. 
The third alternative is a return to the isolationism 
of the 1920s and 1930s. As there is no credible threat to 
the U.S. homeland, the forces of the United States should be 
brought home, and the United States should withdraw from 
world events. Based on the belief that what other states do 
and how they interact is their own business, and placing 
faith in fair market practices to ensure the availability of 
oil and resources, isolationism observes few if any U.S. 
interests besides the safety of U.S. citizens, territory, 
and democratic government. 
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Although isolationism perhaps resonates with the belief 
of many individuals in the philosophy of "live and let 
live," it is not appropriate for the interaction of nations, 
where no common understanding of acceptable norms or 
restraint on misbehavior exist. Events outside the United 
States do affect our safety and prosperity, a fact of life 
since the late 1940s, when the U.S. became a net energy 
importer. When combined with our economic dependence on the 
health of foreign economies, and the dependence of all 
modern industrial states on oil, the Persian Gulf by itself 
is sufficient to invalidate an isolationist posture. 
The need for forward presence forces will continue in 
the post-Cold War world, just as it existed during the Cold 
War. w.hile the threat has changed, and become perhaps more 
uncertain in its nature, the need to maintain U.S. military 
power in proximity to national interests is a lasting 
requirement in U.S. national security. Where the threat is 
well-defined and capable of striking out with little 
warning, as in Iraq or North Korea, land-based ground and 
air forces are appropriate for maintaining presence and 
defensive capability. 
For dealing with the current uncertainty in the origin 
and location of threats to U.S. interests, however, land-
based forces are at a distinct disadvantage. Forced to take 
position on the sovereign territory of another state, land-
based forces must overcome political obstacles to their 
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deployment, political restraint on their freedom of action, 
and the political impact that their withdrawal might cause 
in the eyes of U.S. allies. While very valuable, indeed 
invaluable, towards the wartime end of the spectrum of 
operations, land-based forces are much less valuable in the 
peacetime presence operations, intended to hedge against 
uncertain threats, that comprise the great majority of U.S. 
military action abroad. 
Naval forces, through their historical characteristics 
of global mobility and freedom of access in international 
waters, are the most useful in meeting uncertain threats, 
and of sustaining U.S. power near national interests. With 
over fifty years' experience in at-sea replenishment and 
logistical support, U.S. naval forces can take station in 
any of the world's seas, and maintain station for weeks or 
months, even years through the rotation of ships and battle 
groups. 
This is presence--the permanent occupation of 
strategically important positions near U.S. interests, free 
to take any necessary action, subject only to the orders of 
the National Corrunand Authority. With combat power, organic 
logistics, and command and control capability already 
present in underway battlegroups, deployed naval forces are 
essentially at full wartime readiness all the time, and can 
respond instantly to emerging crises. Naval forces offer 
the NCA a full range of options in crisis response, ranging 
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from non-combatant evacuations to limited military 
operations to wartime strikes. Operating in all mediums--on 
land, on and under the sea, in the air, and increasingly in 
space--naval forces are likely to possess the means of 
responding to any crisis that may occur in the littorals of 
the world. 
While the international environment has changed 
dramatically with the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
fundamental need for sea power in U.S. security has not 
changed. Barring a truly revolutionary change in the laws 
of physics and aerodynamics as we understand them today, sea 
power will remain a constant necessity for the United 
States, regardless of the presence or absence of a peer-
level threat. Through the continued deployment of U.S. 
naval forces to vital regions of the world, and through the 
ceaseless vigilance of U.S. naval forces in protecting U.S. 
national interests, the Navy-Marine Corps team will continue 
to be 
.a safeguard unto the United States 
of America, and a security for such as 
pass on the seas upon their lawful 
occasions. 
--Book of Common Prayer; 
Prayer for the Navy 
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follow-on counteroffensive may not be necessary. A 
ground war becomes an option rather than an 
inevitability. 557 
Air and space power thus maintain presence in distant 
regions of the world through the knowledge among other 
governments that U.S. airplanes could arrive within days or 
hours to punish aggressive acts. 558 With PGMs and global 
reach, U.S. air power by itself can deter aggression, and 
defend U.S. interests if deterrence fails: 
That ability [to regain the initiative in a crisis] 
may be derived from strikes at global range on short 
notice with devastating intensity and accuracy . 
. . . Global attack and precision strike are thus key 
to the U.S. national security posture.559 
General McPeak, addressing the fact that the 
adversary's perception is what matters in deterrence, has 
stated that regional actors will recognize the global reach 
of U.S. bombers and the continual presence of U.S. 
557Major General (Retired) Charles Link, USAF, quoted 
in James Kitfield, "To Halt An Enemy," Air Force Magazine 
(January 1998): 65. 
558Tirpak, "The Long Reach of On-Call Airpower," 22: 
"The USAF's B-1B, B-2A, and B-52H bombers, from a cold start 
at their home bases in the ·continental United States, could 
attack virtually anywhere on Earth in 18 hours ... could 
destroy hundreds of armored targets on a single pass, would 
be able to stop an enemy column on the march." See also 
Glenn Goodman, "The Power Of Information," Armed Forces 
Journal International (July 1995): 24: "In most instances, 
information, combined with forces that can rapidly respond 
with the right mix of capabilities, can achieve U.S. goals." 
559Jeffrey Jackson, "Global Attack and Precision 
Strike," in Goure and Szara, Air and Space Power in the New 
Millennium, 106. 
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satellites, and that, "air and space forces provide global 
presence, not a localized presence."5 60 
Additional advantages gained through long-range air 
power and PGMs include safety from attack on the bases 
supporting long-range bombers, which can be located far from 
a theater, and the reduction by several orders of magnitude 
of the number of U.S. servicemen put at risk. By providing 
the means to, "conduct relatively risk-free counterforce 
strikes" against enemy NBC facilities, and through exposing 
fewer servicemen to enemy fire, long-range air power is 
advanced as the safest and most economical means of applying 
U.S. combat power.561 
Under a virtual presence strategy, the Air Force would 
be the mainstay of U.S. military power. Long-range bombers 
would be required in much larger numbers than the 187 called 
for in the ouadrennial Defense Review, while tactical 
fighters would be needed in smaller numbers. The B-2 in 
particular would be needed in larger numbers, perhaps as 
many as 100. With higher production expected to bring down 
B-2 unit cost by as much as two-thirds, from around 2.2 
billion dollars to 865 million dollars per aircraft, a 
larger B-2 fleet would be affordable within the overall 
S60canan, "McPeak Sums It Up,'' 34; John Correll, "Let's 
You and Him Fight," Air Force Magazine (June 1994): 4. 
561Horner, "What We Should Have Learned," 54, 55. 
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defense budget as other systems were cut back. 562 Aerial 
re-fueling and air lift assets would be needed in large 
numbers, to allow aerial re-fueling of bombers and to get 
AEF supplies and personnel into a theater quickly. 
Space assets would be of equal importance to aircraft, 
and could justify the establishment of an Air Force space 
corps, or even an independent Space Force. The ability to 
defend U.S. satellites from attack, and to attack and 
neutralize other nations' space assets, likely would be 
prominent features of a virtual presence strategy.5 63 
Although U.S. space surveillance capability is very high 
today, it is posited that even greater improvements would 
need to be made in order to achieve the kind of global 
awareness described in the virtual presence strategy. 
The Navy likely would be sized and structured very much 
as under the pull-back strategy. Needing only to keep the 
military SLOCs open for transporting Army equipment and 
supplies to a distant theater, ASW, MCM, and AAW would be 
the primary features of the Navy. 
The Army would be reduced to perhaps as few as five 
divisions, with the armored divisions' heavy gear stored 
562At the original number of 132 B-2 bombers, the unit 
cost was expected to be 480 million dollars. Producing 100 
would have cost 865 million per plane, while the current 
force of twenty-one aircraft will cost over two billion 
dollars each. See Perry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 72. 
563Friedman, The Future of War, 363-366. 
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mainly aboard prepositioning ships. Two light divisions 
would be structured for rapid air deployment. The principal 
function of Army units would be to provide air defenses for 
Air Force bases, and to stand by for whatever ground combat 
remained to be conducted after U.S. air power had been 
applied to the enemy. 
What are the faults of the virtual presence strategy? 
As the pull-back strategy did, the virtual presence strategy 
employs many valid arguments in creating the larger argument 
for presence through long-range air power. The B-2, for 
example, no doubt is an aeronautical and military marvel of 
high-technology systems. PGMs have indeed performed much 
better than iron bombs, as much as twelve times better 
according to various studies.56 4 And air power does offer a 
means to minimize the number of U.S. servicemen placed at 
risk in applying military force. Do the individual 
arguments in favor of virtual presence support the larger 
claim, that virtual presence can and should replace physical 
preseqce? Again the answer must be "no." Just as the pull-
back strategy's arguments ultimately are unconvincing, so 
too does the virtual presence strategy fail to convince in 
the end. 
564Perry et al., Long-Range Bombers, 18, cites the Gulf 
War Air Power Survey in claiming that PGMs enjoyed twelve 
times better kill ratios than iron bombs. 
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The one overwhelming flaw in the virtual presence 
concept is the incorrect belief that the ability to kill any 
target on earth, at any time and from any distance--if 
possible at all, a dubious assumption to begin with--is the 
same as providing presence. 56 5 While such a capability may 
well be invaluable in a future war, the belief that global 
reach and global strike capability is synonymous with 
presence is a gross conceptual error.566 The kinds of 
strikes portrayed by virtual presence advocates--stopping 
three armored brigades on the march with PGMs--are wartime 
missions. Presence is the peacetime employment of military 
forces to influence others across a full range of actions 
and across the spectrum of violence. Thus claiming that 
global air power can provide presence is to argue apples and 
oranges. 
Bombers, especially the B-2 bomber, are unique in their 
ability to deliver a large amount of destructive force, over 
a great distance and in a short time. However, bombers also 
are largely one-dimensional. The only option afforded to a 
commander by available bombers is to put bombs on a 
565wode, "Beyond Bombers and Carriers," 29. 
56 6DeYoung, "Sea Power Is Grand Strategy," 77; Mauz, 
"The Value of Being There," 27: "To be sure, bombers have a 
role in conflict, and they also contribute to deterrence, 
but their contribution to overseas presence is limited and 
to suggest that they can compare to naval forces is 
nonsense." 
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target.5 67 Unless the situation calls for a destructive 
strike on some target, bombers provide little value. 
The analogy often used is that air power is either "on 
or off", with no ability to move up or down the spectrum of 
activity. For example, during the entire period during the 
1980s when U.S. forces were deployed to the Persian Gulf, 
attempting to safeguard Saudi and Kuwaiti oil shipments 
during the Iran-Iraq war, not a single strike mission was 
flown in the theater. 5 68 There were no instances in which 
the United States could justify turning bomber air power 
"on", so it was a non-factor. 
In crisis response the same limitation applies. How 
would B-2 bombers have resolved the crisis at the U.S. 
embassy in Somalia in 1991? How would bombers go about 
monitoring and intercepting Iraqi oil smuggling? Unless the 
crisis calls for the destruction of a certain target set, 
bombers are likely to be of little or no value to U.S. 
commanders.569 Since presence more often than not involves 
567Krulak, "An Enduring Instrument," 10. 
568navid Perin, comparing Long-Range Bombers and the 
Carrier Force (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 
1994), 9. 
569Appendix A, Table 11 and Table 12, compare the 
utility of bombers and carrier battle groups in peacetime 
crisis response. As shown in these illustrations, unless the 
crisis calls for strike missions, bombers will have very 
limited ability to contribute. 
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less-than-war activities, a platform whose only mission is 
destructive cannot be viewed as a suitable means of 
providing presence. 
While air power advocates may claim that bombers' 
military capabilities will produce a deterrent effect, and 
that this deterrent effect should operate on regional actors 
in the same manner as presence forces, history does not 
support this argument. The B-36 bomber offers a near-exact 
parallel to the current B-2 theory of global air power. The 
B-36 was claimed to be capable of attacking any location on 
earth quickly, from bases beyond the reach of enemy weapons, 
and so would be able to influence events and protect U.S. 
interests. Alas, the Korean War proved otherwise, just as 
Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait, and to stay 
there after receiving demands from the U.N. that he leave, 
came in the face of truly global U.S. air power.570 
Deterrence depends, as always, on the adversary's 
perception to be successful.571 For an adversary with 
first-rate intelligence gathering capability, able to 
identify and analyze the range of U.S. capabilities, and to 
extrapolate the damage likely to be done if those 
capabilities are unleashed, a non-visible bomber force may 
serve to deter. However, for less sophisticated actors, 
570Johnson, "Carries Are Forward Presence," 39. 
571siegel, To Deter. compel, and Reassure, 3. 
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such as most regional states, visibility remains at the 
heart of deterrence, and bombers are poorly-suited to 
providing and maintaining visibility.572 
A further serious flaw in the virtual presence paradigm 
is that the historical model that serves as the basis for 
many air power claims--the Gulf War--had conditions so 
unique as to be highly unlikely to repeat themselves in the 
future. Thus air power may not be applicable, or at least 
may not be decisive, in future conflicts. Even the 
perception of the Gulf War has changed over the last eight 
years in regard to air power, with many now believing that 
air power was not as effective as portrayed at the time. 573 
Unless a future conflict involves desert terrain, 
largely immobile armored forces without any significant air 
defenses, a six-month period in which to build up logistics 
and gather intelligence, an enemy command and control 
structure that has been decapitated at the outset and never 
re-established, the withholding of enemy CBW capability, and 
no possibility of U.S. space assets being interfered with, 
it is unlikely that air power would enjoy the complete 
572colin Gray, Explorations In Strategy (Westport, 
Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996), 75: "Sustained local presence 
in the air typically is physically impracticable." Dietz, 
"Presence Is in the Beholder's Eye," 112. 
573Till, "Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First 
Century," 186. 
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freedom of operation experienced in 1991. Marine Corps 
General Paul Van Riper states the matter clearly: 
If we're looking to repeat Desert Storm, then I have 
little problem with the Air Force argument ... What 
we have are a lot of buzzwords floating around 
associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs 
... It's ludicrous to suggest that such concepts as 
'information dominance' will now somehow make all the 
military doctrine that came before it irrelevant.574 
In addition, it is likely that even the B-2 would need 
a fighter escort when operating in daylight. While enemies 
may not know when or from which direction a B-2 is 
approaching, they can defend likely targets and rely on 
visual detection in daytime. If the B-2 can be seen it 
becomes a slow, vulnerable target. Also, it is not 
inconceivable that an enemy undergoing an RMA of its own 
might field the means to triangulate the B-2's targeting 
radar signal in real time, allowing fighters to intercept 
incoming B-2s.57 5 Finally, given current U.S. research into 
radars capable of defeating stealth, it is reasonable to 
assume that others are working on the same problem. If 
another nation were able to solve this technical problem, it 
is possible that the B-2 could lose its greatest asset. 576 
574Kitfield, "To Halt an Enemy," 63. 
5750 1 Hanlon, "Can High Technology Bring U.S. Troops 
Home?" 80. 
576oavid Fulghum, "New Radars Peel Veil From Hidden 
Targets," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 18 January 1999, 
58. 
302 
Thus there is reason to doubt the B-2's continued ability to 
operate with impunity from air defenses. 
The AEF concept that supplements global bombers also is 
based on questionable assumptions. In particular, General 
Jumper's belief that ballistic missiles and chemical weapons 
pose no threat to AEF operations is difficult to reconcile 
with different war games and Red Team studies: 
With a few SCUDs, can you take out an airfield? No, 
you cannot. You can contaminate with chemical 
weapons, but that is what we practice for .... All 
services have practiced doing these sorts of 
things. 577 
Alternatives to highly corrosive decontaminants are 
needed. Current decontaminants leave a corrosive 
residue on equipment, buildings, vehicles, etc., 
which impedes combat and support operations and thus 
threatens mission accomplishment. The services have 
no effective means to decontaminate aircraft that 
have been contaminated by toxic agents or materials 
without taking the aircraft out of service for a long 
period or damaging key aircraft components.578 
While military casualties would likely be low, there 
are no good options for today's theater airbase 
commander if the enemy is able to continuously 
restrike/recontaminate his facility .... Over time 
casualties will increase and efficiency will drop, 
with the anticipated disastrous effects on sortie 
generation and airlift throughput.57 9 
577"0perating Abroad," 28-29. 
578The Impact of Nuclear. Biological, and Chemical 
Proliferation on u.s. Armed Forces, 14. 
579weaver and Glaes, InvitinQ Disaster, 45. 
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Access to bases may be no more secure in peacetime, 
when the United States may wish to engage in less-than-war 
operations. Again, it is peacetime operations, not wartime 
strikes, that comprise the great majority of presence 
missions, and even close allies may hesitate to provide 
unrestricted access to their facilities for U.S. planes. 5 80 
As capable as U.S. land-based tactical air power may be, the 
AEF concept is totally dependent on access to someone else's 
facilities to be viable.581 
From the weaknesses described here, it is clear that 
virtual presence is no more realistic an alternative for 
protecting U.S. interests than the pull-back strategy. In 
fact, the term "virtual presence" is a misnomer, as the 
concept does not qualify as a peacetime presence strategy at 
all, but rather as a high-tech RMA warfighting strategy. 
Since the only response available to U.S. leaders under a 
virtual presence strategy would be to order bombs dropped on 
various targets, in attempting to resolve a crisis the 
United States would be forced to choose between accepting an 
undesired action, or employing destructive force via air 
power to correct the situation, with no intermediate actions 
available to U.S. leaders. 
580Goodman, "Virtual Overseas Presence," 12. 
581Perry et al., Airpower synergies in the New 
strateqic Era, 56. 
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In many, indeed in most peacetime presence scenarios, 
putting bombs on a target simply does not suffice as an 
appropriate, effective solution. General Krulak makes the 
point clearly: "I don't care what anyone says, you're not 
going to manage instability in the Persian Gulf, the Indian 
Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean from 60,000 feet overhead." 5 82 
While global strike capability should be developed for use 
in wartime, when the advantages provided by long-range, 
stealthy aircraft delivering PGMs clearly would be of great 
value, the position that global air power and global strike 
capability can allow virtual presence to replace forward 
presence has little if any credibility. 
Return to an Isolationist Security Policy 
A third alternative strategy for U.S. national 
security, one that has enjoyed some support in recent years, 
is a return to the kind of isolationist policy followed by 
the United States between the World Wars. By focusing only 
on the defense of U.S. citizens and territory, an 
isolationist policy forgoes even the pretense of protecting 
U.S. interests abroad. By definition, in an isolationist 
context the United States has no interests abroad that 
require protection. Isolationism therefore is not in the 
same category as the pull-back strategy or the virtual 
582Hessman, "For the Corps and for the Nation," 13. 
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presence strategy, both of which are claimed to be methods 
of protecting U.S. interests abroad, but nonetheless is an 
alternative strategy for U.S. national security. 
The central tenet of an isolationist policy is the 
belief that events outside the United States need not 
concern us. For some isolationists this belief comes from 
the United States' position of unchallenged power in the 
post-Cold War world. In this regard, the isolationist 
strategy can be viewed as the ultimate extension of the 
pull-back strategy, with no crisis justifying the deployment 
of U.S. forces. For others, isolationism springs from the 
belief that the United States should mind its own business 
in the world, and demand the same treatment from other 
states. As long as other states do not threaten U.S. 
citizens or territory, they will not be bothered by the 
United States. For whatever reasons, isolationists share 
the same guiding principle: the United States should not 
extend its influence or power beyond its own borders. 
Struggles for power within different regions, possibly 
involving open war between rival states, are not expected to 
disappear in the future. For isolationists, however, these 
regional disputes do not threaten U.S. safety and security, 
and should be ignored. 583 As long as the effects of 
regional wars do not spill over onto U.S. territory, which 
583Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81. 
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seems unlikely as only Canada and Mexico border on the 
United States, regional wars are of no importance to the 
United States.584 
Similarly, the desire to spread democracy abroad is an 
inappropriate goal for the United States, and should not be 
attempted. Certainly we support democratic ideals and offer 
an example to others of democracy's benefits, but how other 
states choose to rule themselves should be none of our 
concern. If others are oppressed by brutal dictatorships, 
or if lawless anarchy reigns in a distant region, it is for 
the people living there to correct, not the United 
States. 585 
The vital interests of the United States would amount 
to only three requirements: the safety of U.S. citizens, the 
integrity of U.S. territory, and the independence of the 
U.S. political process. In regard to overseas interests, at 
most the United States should take some interest in and 
encourage a balance of power within different regions. 586 
Another argument often cited in making the isolationist 
case, and indeed one heard for many years before the end of 
S84Earl Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," Foreign 
Policy (Winter 1990-1991): 7-8. 
585Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," 
81. 
5S6Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 15. 
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the Cold War, is that other states, particularly the 
affluent states of Europe and Asia, should provide for their 
own defense, allowing U.S. troops and support to be 
withdrawn.587 For example, South Korea has twice the 
population of North Korea, and an economy nearly an order of 
magnitude larger than North Korea's. South Korea thus 
should not need American assistance in defending itself, 
certainly not assistance on the order of an entire U.S. Army 
division and supporting air assets. 588 An isolationist 
policy would force U.S. allies to ''carry the load" for their 
own defense by withdrawing U.S. protection.589 
An important point to be noted is that isolationists 
would not sever commercial interaction along with military 
support in withdrawing from the world.590 U.S. overseas 
trade would continue as ever, since it would be in the best 
interest of overseas nations, even those hostile or less 
than friendly to the United States, to continue to have 
economic interaction: 
The restraint we propose should not be misdescribed 
as a total withdrawal from the world. On the 
587Goure and Mauldin, Naval Forward Presence; Status. 
Prospects, 19. 
588Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," 
80. 
589Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 210. 
590Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81. 
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contrary, we believe in a vigorous trade with other 
nations and the thriving corrunerce of ideas. Military 
restraint need not, and will not, bring economic 
protectionism. 591 
Even that most strategic of resources, oil, should not 
require United States military forces to be deployed 
overseas. Instead, the United States could depend on market 
forces to maintain the price of oil, and to ensure the 
availability of the huge amounts of oil required for world 
economies. Some possible benefits of this course of action 
might be to prompt the U.S. population and government to 
lower their demand and dependence on oil, and to promote the 
development of useful alternatives to fossil fuels. 592 Even 
if Saudi and Kuwaiti oilfields came into the possession of 
Iraq or Iran, their oil still would be available on the 
world market, as the oil would have no value unless sold, 
and market forces again would serve to prevent artificial 
manipulation of the oil market.593 
The armed forces required by the United States would be 
highly capable, but very small and structured for defense, 
not power projection. Accordingly, ballistic missile 
defense and the strategic nuclear forces would be of 
paramount importance.594 Space systems and high technology 
591Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 200. 
5 92Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 9. 
593Brown et al., America's strategic Choices, 220. 
S94Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," 
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surveillance and strike systems also would be important, 
possibly requiring the establishment of a separate Space 
Force.595 
The conventional forces would make maximum use of high 
technology as a force multiplier, an effort made easier by 
the United States' technological lead over other nations. 
With better technology and a defensive posture, the services 
could be reduced to as few as six ground divisions, ten or 
eleven Air Force wings, and as few as one hundred ships. 59 6 
By withdrawing to CONUS, the requirements placed on the 
military would be streamlined greatly. The services would 
need only to defend CONUS and the sea and air approaches, to 
retain strong retaliatory nuclear forces, and to employ 
those retaliatory forces along with missile defenses in 
order to deter NBC attack.5 97 The rest of the world could 
be left alone, with regional affairs and events taking care 
of themselves. 
The problem, and the reason that isolationism is not a 
viable strategy for the United States, is that the world 
80. 
595Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence,"81. 
596Buchanan, "America First--and Second, and Third," 
80; Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 17. 
597Perla et al., Future Sea-Based Aviation, 55; 
Ravenal, "The Case for Adjustment," 15. 
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does not take care of itself, at least not peacefully and in 
ways that will be favorable to the United States. If the 
five thousand-plus years of written history are any guide, 
there will always be states and entities with hostile 
ambitions, bent on taking by force what others possess: 
The world does not sort itself out on its own .. 
International stability is never a given. It is never 
the norm. When achieved, it is the product of self-
conscious action by the great powers, and most 
particularly of the greatest power, which now and for 
the foreseeable future is the United States. If 
America wants stability, it will have to create it . 
. . . There will constantly be new threats disturbing 
our peace. 598 
While isolationism might have been sufficient in the 
early nineteenth century, when all of America's resource 
requirements could be met domestically and the British Navy 
served to safeguard trade on the high seas, today and in the 
future isolationism cannot be seen as a credible choice for 
U.S. national security. As elaborated in Chapter II, the 
United States has interests in nearly every region of the 
world. Only the most narrowly defined interests of safety 
and security reside within the borders of the United States. 
Whether or not this should be the case is immaterial: it is 
the case, and U.S. strategy must deal with what is, not with 
what we might like to be. 
598charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," in 
Allison and Treverton, Rethinking America's Security, 301-
302. 
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If Texas and Alaska could provide our oil demands, and 
if Canada and Mexico could satisfy our import and export 
markets, an isolationist strategy would be viable, if not 
necessarily appropriate. However, the reality is that we do 
have interests overseas, there are threats to those 
interests, and we cannot protect our interests by 
withdrawing into isolation.599 
The results of adopting an isolationist strategy might 
be slow to manifest themselves, especially in the current 
international setting. The U.S. position of unrivaled power 
could allow the United States to muddle along in isolation 
for several years, even a decade or more, before being 
forced to address a situation that had become threatening to 
U.S. interests.600 
History, on the other hand, suggests that the United 
States would experience a rapid rise in misbehavior 
worldwide, which would impinge on U.S. interests sooner 
rather than later. Regional bullies should be expected to 
push hard against the envelope of U.S. tolerance, and to 
threaten, either directly or indirectly, the safety and 
security of the United States. Charles Krauthammer, in a 
remarkable critique of recent U.S. foreign policy, explains 
why this is so: 
599Johnsen, The Future Roles of u.s. Military Power, 3. 
600Yost, "The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence," 81. 
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The basic difference between the international system 
and domestic society is that in domestic society 
there exists a monopoly of the means of coercion, an 
enforcer, a sovereign. There is generally also a 
preexisting community of norms. 
Neither of these conditions obtains in the 
international arena .... And, in any social system, 
whether of individuals or nation-states, where there 
is no enforcer, there can be no real law. 60 1 
The years between World War One and World War Two 
provide the clearest example of the perils of isolationism 
for the United States. Convinced after World War One that 
the best way to avoid another destructive war was to 
withdraw from the world, the United States practiced a 
determined isolationism right up until the 7th of December, 
1941.602 Ignoring the threat to Europe posed by Hitlerian 
Germany, and the threat to Asia posed by a militant Japan, 
the United States surrendered the initiative in world 
events. 603 When the United States could no longer ignore 
the outside world, after isolationism had been forcibly 
refuted by the Japanese carrier task force at Pearl Harbor, 
four years of tremendous effort and cost were required to 
restore U.S. security. There is no reason to think that 
601charles Krauthammer, "A World Imagined," The New 
Republic, 15 March 1999, 23. 
602Allison and Treverton, Rethinking America's 
security, 301. 
603 Jordan et al., American National Security, 12-13. 
Ellsworth et al., eds., America's National Interests, 10. 
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today's world will order itself any more peaceably than the 
world of eighty years ago. 
Summary 
The current U.S. strategy of power projection through 
forward presence is grounded in the experience of the past 
and the logical security requirements of the future. As 
with any strategy, alternatives to forward presence exist, 
and have been argued forcefully by various authors. While 
championed by thoughtful and well-intentioned persons, the 
alternatives presented in this chapter cannot be judged 
acceptable in replacing forward presence in U.S. security 
strategy. 
The first alternative strategy, the pull-back strategy, 
can be seen as an attempt to enjoy great power status 
without exerting great power effort in the world. While 
maintaining a military similar in structure and capabilities 
to the current force, although significantly smaller, the 
pull-back strategy would not maintain that force near U.S. 
interests, counting instead on the deterrent threat of U.S. 
forces to protect interests. With RMA systems making up for 
the reduced size and physical absence of the U.S. military, 
U.S. forces could respond from CONUS to any act that 
threatened U.S. interests, and overwhelm any opponent 
through technological superiority. Arguments also are made 
that the United States can no longer justify the cost of a 
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large forward presence military, as no plausible threats 
exist to U.S. security. 
The pull-back strategy may also be viewed as a reversal 
of the "world policeman" role taken on by the United States 
since the end of the Cold War. Since there is no plausible 
threat to U.S. safety, domestic interests should take 
priority over international affairs, obviating the need for 
deploying military force all over the world. 
Despite the logic of many pull-back arguments when 
viewed in isolation, the whole turns out to be less than the 
sum of the parts. The most obvious flaw in the pull-back 
strategy is its total reliance on deterrence to defend U.S. 
interests, and the strictly reactive nature of a CONUS-based 
military. If deterrence fails, no defensive options are 
likely to exist, a condition virtually certain to encourage 
regional bullies and bad actors to contemplate fait accompli 
strategies. 
None of the intermediate steps afforded by naval 
forward presence and naval diplomacy would be available, 
forcing the United States to accept an aggressor's actions 
or deploy overseas to fight a regional war. The cost of 
deployment could exceed the loss involved in accepting the 
new conditions, making it more likely that aggressors would 
be able to keep their gains. If the decision was made to 
deploy, U.S. allies would lack interoperability with U.S. 
forces, making those allies' contribution less effective. 
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Finally, there is reason to be skeptical about the 
RMA's ability to solve any strategic problem through 
technology. The substitution of technology for strategy is 
one of the pitfalls of buying into the RMA school of 
thought, and should be avoided in all cases. Technology is 
important in U.S. security and military strategy, but 
technology cannot become strategy. 
The second alternative described in this chapter, the 
use of global air power to produce virtual presence, is 
miscast by its advocates as a means of defending U.S. 
interests abroad. While possibly a potent warfighting 
concept, virtual presence through global air power in no way 
can substitute for the physical presence of naval forces in 
protecting U.S. interests, a role that mostly involves 
peacetime activities. 
Supported by such Air Force luminaries as former Chief 
of Staff McPeak, virtual presence envisions the growth of 
space surveillance and long-range air power into an 
omnipresent force, able to see and stop any misbehavior, in 
any location, at any time and in time to be effective. The 
B-2 bomber, probably the most advanced system in the U.S. 
military, is held up as the means to stop or correct any 
threat to U.S. interests. By raining PGMs on adversary 
forces, if necessary from bases in CONUS, the B-2 and 
supporting air expeditionary forces can prevent enemy plans 
from succeeding, thereby protecting U.S. interests. 
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Presumably adversaries will recognize the iron logic of U.S. 
strategy and refrain from challenging U.S. air power. 
Virtual presence is better-suited as a wartime 
strategy, when the ability to destroy targets from great 
distance, with highly accurate and lethal PGMs, would be 
very valuable. Even in this context, however, there is 
reason to doubt that the virtual presence strategy is 
sufficient by itself, without the need for Army or Navy 
forces to take part. Ironically, the B-2 is stealthy in 
inverse proportion to the technological level of the sensor 
it is attempting to evade. Able largely to avoid detection 
by radar or infrared systems, it is as visible to the naked 
eye as any other aircraft, making it highly vulnerable in 
daytime. Thus the B-2 would need either to operate only at 
night, probably not an option in a fast-moving ground war, 
or to have an escort of short-range fighters. The 
limitation of vulnerability to attack on supporting air 
bases again intrudes into the problem, as ballistic missiles 
and NBC weapons should be capable of neutralizing airfields 
within a theater. 
The weakness of the virtual presence concept is that it 
attempts to apply a wartime activity--dropping bombs--to 
solve problems and protect U.S. interests in peacetime. 
Virtual presence offers no options for U.S. commanders, 
whether in day-to-day operations or crisis response, except 
to destroy something of the enemy's. Thus virtual presence 
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relies strictly on the deterrent threat of launching an air 
campaign against any nation that threatens U.S. interests, 
with no capacity for less-than-war activities. It is a 
strategy manifestly unfit for the conditions that the U.S. 
must work with the majority of the time, and to suggest that 
it provides any kind of presence, virtual or otherwise, is 
at best a statement of misguided enthusiasm from the De 
Seversky school of air power. 
Finally, the possibility of returning to an 
isolationist posture has gained some currency since the Cold 
War ended. Based on the belief that what goes on outside 
the United States does not and should not concern us, the 
isolationist strategy calls for the return of all U.S. 
forces to CONUS, where their only role would be preventing 
an attack on U.S. territory. The services would be reduced 
greatly, although still provided with the best and most 
advanced systems available. 
The vital interests of the United States would be the 
safety of U.S. citizens, the integrity of U.S. territory, 
and the freedom of the U.S. political process from outside 
influence. Nothing else on earth would require protection, 
or be worth fighting for. Our many allies would have to 
fend for themselves in terms of defense, although we would 
maintain healthy trade with all amenable nations. Even 
access to oil, on which our economy, and therefore our 
quality of life, depends, would not require active measures 
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of protection. Either through the invisible hand of the 
world oil market, or through the pragmatism of the state in 
possession of the world's oil, U.S. oil demands could be met 
at affordable cost. 
If history teaches us anything, it is that peaceful 
coexistence is not the natural order of things for sovereign 
states. This lesson is of large importance today, since the 
United States depends on resources from abroad, as well as 
the survival of world economic markets even more dependent 
on oil than our own. This reason alone is sufficient to 
disqualify isolationism as an acceptable strategy for the 
United States. In addition to the need for secure access to 
resources, the United States would surrender all but 
diplomatic means of influencing others. Even the pull-back 
strategy hedges by retaining the forces to set things right 
when others trespass on U.S. interests. An isolationist 
America would have no ability to maintain favorable 
conditions abroad. While viable and not entirely 
inappropriate two hundred years ago, this strategy cannot be 
considered a realistic possibility today. 
The three alternatives presented here are not intended 
to encompass every possible strategy for U.S. national 
security. The three alternatives were selected because each 
has significant backing within the U.S. defense 
establishment, and in the case of isolationism, within the 
U.S. population. However, after examining the shortcomings 
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of each, it is clear that forward presence, and especially 
naval forward presence, is the most appropriate and 
effective strategy for U.S. national security. With 
interests and threats residing far from U.S. territory, U.S. 
forces likewise must be positioned far from U.S. territory 
if interests are to be protected. No other option provides 
a realistic means of protecting U.S. interests, influencing 
events in the United States' favor, and defending U.S. 
interests when armed force is called for. Thus the Navy-
Marine Corps team's forward presence mission will retain its 
importance in the post-Cold War international environment, 
and will continue to influence events, protect American 
interests, and underwrite the security of the United States. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The United States Navy has been operating around the 
world for nearly two centuries, since Thomas Jefferson sent 
American warships to the Mediterranean in 1801. Although 
the shape of American sea power has changed in the 
intervening years, from sail power to nuclear power, from a 
surface Navy to a submarine, surface, air, and space Navy, 
the fundamental requirement of sea power has remained the 
same for the United States. Today's Navy is just as 
essential to the safety and prosperity of the United States 
as was the Navy of John Paul Jones, and will remain so in 
the next century. 
The United States is a maritime nation, dependent on 
the sea for the majority of trade with other nations. While 
aircraft allow goods to cross great distances in a matter of 
hours, air lift is extremely expensive and inefficient for 
the transportation of bulk cargo, and is incapable of 
transporting bulk resources such as oil. The sea remains 
the economic highway of U.S. trade, a fact that has not 
changed since the first British colony was established at 
Jamestown. The immutable laws of physics limit the returns 
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on air lift, making sea lift the most efficient means of 
transporting goods over long distances. 
The efficiency of sea lift is of great importance to 
the United States, as most U.S. trading partners and many 
necessary resources lie across the oceans. Unlike the 
continental states of Europe, the United States must look to 
the sea for trade with nations other than Canada and Mexico. 
In contrast to the maritime trading states of ancient Greece 
or Persia, the United States must cross the two greatest 
oceans in the world, the Atlantic and Pacific, in order to 
deliver goods to other nations. Merchant sea lift therefore 
is an enduring requirement for the United States, and, as 
observed by Mahan, the need for a Navy springs from the 
existence of peaceful shipping. The need for a Navy is an 
equally enduring feature of American existence, a need 
important enough to be called for by name in the 
Constitution. 
In addition to the protection of U.S. trade, the Navy 
provides the means to defend the United States from attack. 
By virtue of the freedom of movement enjoyed by ships at 
sea, U.S. naval forces help to ensure that the fight, if and 
when it comes, will be conducted as far from the U.S. 
homeland as possible. Due to the need to watch over U.S. 
maritime commerce, and to protect the United States itself, 
forward presence has long been judged the best employment 
for the Navy-Marine Corps team. 
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Three strategic "hubs" warrant special attention in the 
form of naval forward presence forces. These are the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia. 
Combining U.S. interests, crucial U.S. trading partners, and 
clear threats to those interests and trading partners, these 
three regions are the principal focus of U.S. naval 
deployments. Indicative of the importance of these regions 
is the assignment of a numbered fleet to each: the Sixth 
Fleet in the Mediterranean, the Fifth Fleet in the Gulf, and 
the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific. 
Threats to U.S. interests exist in two general forms. 
The first is a peer or near-peer rival, such as the former 
Soviet Union. While the United States presently enjoys the 
absence of any such peer threat, the status and health of 
China and Russia bear watching, as either could develop 
sufficient power and influence to challenge the United 
States on a global scale. The other type of threat, which 
receives greater emphasis in the post-Cold War setting, 
comes from the existence of "bad actors" in important 
regions. Saddam Hussein is merely the best-known of these 
regional bad actors, each of whom has sufficient leverage 
through proximity to U.S. interests to require U.S. 
attention. Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are the clearest 
regional threats, and are the basis for the two-MRC 
requirement in U.S. defense planning. 
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Each of the services has a role to play in protecting 
U.S. interests, and each service has forces located around 
the world to provide forward presence. The Army has been 
present in Korea since 1950, as have units of the Air Force. 
The Army recently has taken position in Kuwait on a 
permanent basis, with Air Force units deployed to several 
Gulf nations. And of course, both the Army and Air Force 
have been key members of NATO for nearly fifty years. 
While the deployment of Army and Air Force assets 
provides valuable presence in support of U.S. interests, the 
position on land of Army and Air Force personnel and 
equipment means that the permission of a foreign nation must 
be secured for their deployment. Naval forces are free from 
the political problems of deploying on another state's 
territory, and have the additional advantage of easy 
mobility. Anywhere that there is salt water, the sea 
services can operate in the protection of U.S. interests. 
It is through the combination of mobility and freedom from 
the permission of other states to come and go that naval 
forces are superior to land-based forces in providing 
presence. 
When naval forces are present in a region, the United 
States has available a wide range of options for influencing 
events, protecting interests, and responding to emerging 
crises. Under the broad concept of naval diplomacy are such 
activities as conventional deterrence, signaling U.S. 
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interest in a region or state, providing support to allies, 
employing limited military force, enforcing sanctions, and 
protecting and enforcing freedom of the seas. 
The wide range of actions that can be undertaken by 
naval forces highlight the difference between forces that 
are forward-based, such as Army units in Korea, and forces 
that are forward-deployed. Forward-based units usually are 
positioned in a specific location to counter a specific 
threat, and are not readily available to react to other 
events. Forward-deployed forces, on the other hand, can be 
re-positioned to respond to events, and can move quickly 
within a region, or even to another region, in support of 
U.S. interests. 
Forward presence forces also take part in two important 
activities intended to maintain wartime readiness. First, 
forward presence forces are able to conduct joint training 
and exercises with U.S. allies, which maintain combat skills 
and interoperability. Allied participation is a central 
feature of U.S. planning, and allies must be interoperable 
with U.S. forces to assist in wartime. Second, by operating 
in a region on a daily basis, forward presence forces 
develop a good knowledge and understanding of conditions in 
the region. Local and regional intelligence, conditions 
affecting sonar or radar, patterns of movement within the 
region, geographic features of significance, the operational 
patterns and tempo of potential adversaries--all can be 
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monitored and updated by forces operating in the region. 
Without current information on regional conditions, U.S. 
forces would be at a disadvantage in wartime, a disadvantage 
that could translate into increased casualties, a longer and 
more difficult campaign, and even the inability to resolve a 
crisis or conflict on favorable terms. While some 
conditions in a region can be monitored with space-based or 
other surveillance assets, many local conditions require 
forces on the scene for observation. 
When crises arise in distant regions, naval forces are 
capable of quick response, and of more flexible response 
than land-based forces. Naval forces require only the 
orders of the National Command Authority to move into a 
crisis area, making them largely immune to political, 
religious, or other obstacles that frequently plague land-
based forces. Naval forces also can vary their position and 
level of visibility, in contrast to land-based forces, and 
can maintain a degree of ambiguity that can heighten an 
adversary's apprehension. In addition, naval forces can be 
withdrawn or moved back from a crisis area with less 
political impact than the removal of land-based forces. 
One of the more frequent types of crisis in recent 
years has been situations of violence, or impending 
violence, that threaten the safety of U.S. citizens abroad. 
Whether involving civil war, general anarchy, or even 
natural disasters, these situations often require the 
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ability to remove a large number of civilians quickly, and 
may require military force to safeguard evacuees until they 
are safely out of harm's way. Known as non-combatant 
evacuation operations, this activity has become a Marine 
Corps specialty. 
With the ability to move quickly from ships at sea to 
locations on land, and able to bring along organic firepower 
and air support when needed, the amphibious ready group has 
proven itself invaluable in getting U.S. citizens out of 
trouble in distant locations. Capable of a wide variety of 
special missions, the amphibious ready group provides the 
means to place U.S. combat forces, with supporting 
firepower, into a crisis area to conduct evacuations, 
intelligence gathering, covert operations, or other short-
of-war activities. The ability to operate from 
international waters allows such missions to be conducted 
without restraint from other states' political leadership, 
often a critical concern when time is a limiting factor. 
If a crisis involves military aggression, it may be 
necessary to respond with the deployment of U.S. military 
power to fight a regional war, such as the 1990-91 Gulf War. 
If U.S. Army and Air Force units are to deploy to a theater, 
their arrival will depend on the ability of forward-deployed 
forces to keep open the facilities needed by U.S. air and 
sea lift. An increasingly important aspect of keeping ports 
and airfields open in the future will be ballistic missile 
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defense. Two Navy missile defense systems currently are in 
development, and should enter service in the next decade. 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Navy has 
shifted its emphasis from the open ocean to the littorals, 
focusing on projecting power ashore rather than blue water 
operations. Without a plausible threat to the movement of 
U.S. ships on the high seas, and with the current national 
security strategy's focus on regional threats, the shift to 
a littoral focus is appropriate. The only nations likely to 
possess the means of challenging the Navy on the open 
oceans, China and Russia, are many years, if not decades, 
from being able to do so. Thus the use of the Navy to 
influence events ashore directly is a logical move. 
With the shift from blue water to the littorals, the 
Navy will need to re-assess its systems and capabilities for 
the new environment. Gone is the space buffer afforded by 
the open ocean, where naval forces could maintain separation 
from opposing forces. The littoral typically is a very 
crowded place, with a large volume of air and sea traffic. 
Also, the need to provide greater support to Marine forces 
is producing several new systems and capabilities, and 
placing greater importance on some existing warfare areas. 
The amphibious forces of the Navy-Marine Corps team are 
undergoing significant change, as new systems begin to 
replace aging Vietnam-era equipment. The new LHD-1 Wasp-
class amphibious ships are great improvements over the LPH-1 
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Iwo Jima-class ships, providing a very large flight deck, 
large well deck, and carrying space for a large amount of 
Marine Corps manpower and equipment. It has even been 
suggested that the Navy shift funds allocated for refitting 
and overhauling the LHA-1 Tarawa-class ships to purchasing 
more LHD-ls, a move that would appear to provide the 
greatest return on the Navy's investment. 
The Marines are preparing to take delivery of two very 
important systems, each providing a tremendous improvement 
in amphibious capability over its predecessor. The AAAV 
amphibious vehicle and the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft 
will provide great increases in the speed with which Marine 
forces can be put ashore, as well as the distance from which 
Marine landings can be launched. These increases in range 
and speed are highly important in the context of the 
Marines' Operational Maneuver From The Sea concept. 
In order to provide greater support for Marine forces 
ashore, the Navy is improving its shore bombardment 
capability, a mission that has suffered for many years from 
an inadequate weapon, the 5-inch gun. Possessing only 
thirteen-mile range, the 5-inch gun is no longer suitable 
for Marine Corps operations that will attempt to avoid 
defended landing areas, instead maneuvering directly against 
enemy centers of gravity that may be many miles inland. 
Through modifications to the gun and shell, and the 
incorporation of GPS guidance, the new ERGM shell will allow 
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supporting fires at ranges up to sixty-three miles. The 
VGAS system, intended for installation on the next-
generation surface combatant, may extend this range out to 
one hundred miles. 
Naval aviation, including both aircraft carriers and 
their embarked aircraft, is at a critical transition point 
between the present and the future. Existing aircraft 
carriers are seen by many as too large, too expensive, too 
vulnerable, and unnecessary in the post-Cold War setting. 
With advances in RPVs, the lack of a threat requiring air 
power on the open ocean, and the emergence of the AEF 
concept in the Air Force, carriers often are labeled as Cold 
War relics, the most expensive method possible for putting a 
bomb on a target. Although undoubtedly expensive to 
purchase and operate, carriers bring much more than bomb-
dropping capability to U.S. commanders. Carrier air wings 
are capable of a multitude of missions, all of which can be 
conducted independent of host nation permission, a feature 
commonly overlooked by carrier critics. Carriers have no 
peer when it comes to providing presence, and will remain a 
necessity as long as tactical air power remains a necessity. 
The centerpiece of the Navy's carrier air wings in the 
next decade will be the FA-18E/F Super Hornet, an enlarged 
version of the existing FA-18C/D. Intended to replace the 
A-6E in the strike role and the F-14 in the fighter-
interceptor role, the Super Hornet is a throwback to the 
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days of the F-4 Phantom, an outstanding multi-mission, 
multi-service aircraft in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the 
Super Hornet also entails some risk for the Navy, as it is 
intended to serve only until the Joint Strike Fighter enters 
service. If the Joint Strike Fighter program is delayed for 
any length of time, the age of the FA-18 program could 
become a liability, forcing carrier air wings to deploy with 
what is essentially an early 1970s design. Nonetheless, the 
first production Super Hornets have been delivered to the 
Navy, and should enter squadron service early in the next 
decade. 
Three specific mission areas will be of greatly 
increased importance for the Navy's littoral strategy. Mine 
countermeasures, neglected for many years as irrelevant to 
the Cold War scenario of a mid-ocean battle against the 
Soviets, have been given renewed emphasis in recent years. 
Mines are one of the most cost-effective of naval weapons, 
potentially allowing a state with no naval forces to defend 
against even a superpower navy. With the littoral strategy 
calling for operations near the shore, the ability to 
detect, locate, and neutralize mines is of tremendous 
importance, and must be improved over current levels. 
Anti-submarine warfare likewise must be improved if the 
Navy-Marine Corps team is to operate in the littoral areas 
of the world. While a mere ten years have passed since the 
Navy of Ronald Reagan raised ASW to an art form, the recent 
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lack of emphasis on ASW training and modernization has led 
to much atrophy in this critical mission area. Even old 
diesel submarines, operated by poorly-trained crews, cannot 
be ignored when U.S. naval forces operate in littoral areas, 
requiring that urgent attention be given to this area of 
naval warfighting. 
An emerging mission area will be of paramount 
importance in the new international environment. Ballistic 
missile defense was demonstrated as a necessary capability 
in 1991, when Iraq used "militarily insignificant" SCUD 
missiles as strategic political weapons, attempting to draw 
Israel into the Gulf War in order to splinter the coalition. 
If used to deliver NBC warheads, ballistic missiles could 
render facilities useless, lead to massive U.S. casualties, 
and coerce U.S. allies into remaining neutral in a crisis. 
Thus the two Navy missile defense programs, Navy Area and 
Navy Theater Wide, must continue to receive the full 
attention and support of naval leaders. 
A related capability of great importance is NBC 
defense, detection, and decontamination. Chemical and 
biological weapons in particular have emerged in recent 
years as a kind of "poor man's nuclear weapon," allowing 
small states to employ military and political leverage 
similar to that of nuclear weapons at a fraction of the 
cost. Inexpensive and relatively easy to produce, chemical 
weapons are known to exist in many regional arsenals, and 
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biological weapons are suspected to be nearly as widespread 
as chemical. Both chemical and biological weapons, 
delivered by ballistic missiles, could make it impossible 
for U.S. air power and sea lift to utilize regional 
facilities, possibly preventing the United States from being 
able to deploy into a theater. 
Two equally dubious mindsets concerning chemical and 
biological weapons seem to prevail among many service 
leaders and planners. The first is that U.S. nuclear 
weapons will deter the use of chemical or biological weapons 
in a regional conflict, an assumption based on the Cold War 
deterrence model of mutually assured destruction. The 
second assumption is that, if chemical or biological weapons 
are used, their impact will be marginal and U.S. forces will 
suffer little loss of combat capability. Both assumptions 
are contradicted by existing Red Team analyses, by the 
different nature of potential regional regimes to be 
deterred, and by the lack of adequate detection and 
decontamination equipment and procedures among the services. 
While all of the services are addressing NBC defense and 
protection, it may take a chemical or biological "Pearl 
Harbor" to drive home the effectiveness of these weapons. 
Finally, a new vision of warfighting for the twenty-
first century is being developed by the Navy. Known as 
Network-Centric Warfare, the concept will be an important 
improvement in situational awareness, speed of command, and 
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engagement capability. Through the sharing of information 
in real time, the networking of sensors and shooters, and 
several automated command and control processes, Network-
Centric Warfare should improve the combat capabilities of 
Navy-Marine task forces operating in the littorals, where 
events are likely to develop more quickly, and with less 
warning, than on the open ocean. 
Cooperative Engagement Capability, the first 
operational component of Network-Centric Warfare, has been 
tested successfully on several occasions, and is likely to 
be approved for installation in the fleet in 1999. Allowing 
any networked platform with appropriate weapons to engage an 
air or missile target, without having to track the target 
independently, CEC should improve greatly the ability of 
U.S. naval forces to defend themselves against aircraft, 
cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. 
While forward presence has been the chosen military 
posture of the United States since World War Two, the end of 
the bi-polar Cold War setting has led many defense planners 
and analysts to question whether forward presence is 
appropriate for the new international setting. The lack of 
a world peer, on the order of the old Soviet Union, combined 
with the United States' unchallenged position as the 
military and economic superpower of the world, has produced 
several calls for changing the national security strategy 
employed by the United States. 
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One proposed alternative is to maintain the structure 
and mission capabilities of the military, but reduce the 
overall size of the military and station most forces in 
CONUS. By retaining the ability to deploy overseas in a 
crisis, and threatening to punish any attacks on U.S. 
interests, the pull-back strategy is an attempt to maintain 
great power status without exerting great power effort. The 
flaws of such a strategy are obvious. 
First, U.S. strategy would rest largely on deterrence, 
as the forces needed to defend U.S. interests would be 
located far from those interests. Secondly, when deterrence 
fails (as it should be expected to do), the U.S. response 
would be reactive, only able to address conditions after the 
fact. Quick-grab strategies thus would be encouraged among 
regional powers, who might judge that U.S. deployment was 
not credible to protect a less-than-vital U.S. interest. 
Third, the deployment of U.S. forces to a distant region 
could become a logistical problem too great to overcome, 
forcing the U.S. leadership to re-assess the choice of 
deploying at all. Thus the pull-back strategy is not viable 
for U.S. national security in the post-Cold War setting. 
The second alternative is to return U.S. forces to 
CONUS, and rely on global air power and space surveillance 
to monitor and regulate events surrounding U.S. interests. 
Based on belief in RMA technologies and the long-standing 
doctrine of air power according to Billy Mitchell, air power 
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and space surveillance would replace physical presence with 
virtual presence, allowing a much smaller military to 
protect U.S. interests abroad. 
While the B-2 bomber and emerging smart and brilliant 
weapons should provide a large improvement in U.S. 
warfighting capability, there is no basis in fact or corrunon 
sense for believing that presence can exist through CONUS-
based air power alone. The most serious flaw in the virtual 
presence concept is that it is wrongly applied to peacetime 
presence operations, in which visibility and sustainability 
are key. Virtual presence is more suitable for wartime 
operations, where stealth aircraft have proven their worth. 
However, by limiting U.S. options to accepting an 
adversary's actions or conducing a bombing campaign, virtual 
presence is wholly unsatisfactory as a peacetime presence 
strategy. 
The third alternative is a return to the isolationism 
of the 1920s and 1930s. As there is no credible threat to 
the U.S. homeland, the forces of the United States should be 
brought home, and the United States should withdraw from 
world events. Based on the belief that what other states do 
and how they interact is their own business, and placing 
faith in fair market practices to ensure the availability of 
oil and resources, isolationism observes few if any U.S. 
interests besides the safety of U.S. citizens, territory, 
and democratic government. 
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Although isolationism perhaps resonates with the belief 
of many individuals in the philosophy of "live and let 
live," it is not appropriate for the interaction of nations, 
where no common understanding of acceptable norms or 
restraint on misbehavior exist. Events outside the United 
States do affect our safety and prosperity, a fact of life 
since the late 1940s, when the U.S. became a net energy 
importer. When combined with our economic dependence on the 
health of foreign economies, and the dependence of all 
modern industrial states on oil, the Persian Gulf by itself 
is sufficient to invalidate an isolationist posture. 
The need for forward presence forces will continue in 
the post-Cold War world, just as it existed during the Cold 
War. w.hile the threat has changed, and become perhaps more 
uncertain in its nature, the need to maintain U.S. military 
power in proximity to national interests is a lasting 
requirement in U.S. national security. Where the threat is 
well-defined and capable of striking out with little 
warning, as in Iraq or North Korea, land-based ground and 
air forces are appropriate for maintaining presence and 
defensive capability. 
For dealing with the current uncertainty in the origin 
and location of threats to U.S. interests, however, land-
based forces are at a distinct disadvantage. Forced to take 
position on the sovereign territory of another state, land-
based forces must overcome political obstacles to their 
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deployment, political restraint on their freedom of action, 
and the political impact that their withdrawal might cause 
in the eyes of U.S. allies. While very valuable, indeed 
invaluable, towards the wartime end of the spectrum of 
operations, land-based forces are much less valuable in the 
peacetime presence operations, intended to hedge against 
uncertain threats, that comprise the great majority of U.S. 
military action abroad. 
Naval forces, through their historical characteristics 
of global mobility and freedom of access in international 
waters, are the most useful in meeting uncertain threats, 
and of sustaining U.S. power near national interests. With 
over fifty years' experience in at-sea replenishment and 
logistical support, U.S. naval forces can take station in 
any of the world's seas, and maintain station for weeks or 
months, even years through the rotation of ships and battle 
groups. 
This is presence--the permanent occupation of 
strategically important positions near U.S. interests, free 
to take any necessary action, subject only to the orders of 
the National Corrunand Authority. With combat power, organic 
logistics, and command and control capability already 
present in underway battlegroups, deployed naval forces are 
essentially at full wartime readiness all the time, and can 
respond instantly to emerging crises. Naval forces offer 
the NCA a full range of options in crisis response, ranging 
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from non-combatant evacuations to limited military 
operations to wartime strikes. Operating in all mediums--on 
land, on and under the sea, in the air, and increasingly in 
space--naval forces are likely to possess the means of 
responding to any crisis that may occur in the littorals of 
the world. 
While the international environment has changed 
dramatically with the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
fundamental need for sea power in U.S. security has not 
changed. Barring a truly revolutionary change in the laws 
of physics and aerodynamics as we understand them today, sea 
power will remain a constant necessity for the United 
States, regardless of the presence or absence of a peer-
level threat. Through the continued deployment of U.S. 
naval forces to vital regions of the world, and through the 
ceaseless vigilance of U.S. naval forces in protecting U.S. 
national interests, the Navy-Marine Corps team will continue 
to be 
.a safeguard unto the United States 
of America, and a security for such as 
pass on the seas upon their lawful 
occasions. 
--Book of Common Prayer; 
Prayer for the Navy 
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Table 1 
TOP 15 IMPORTERS TO THE UNITED STATES 
Percentage 
Millions of Dollars Totals of Total 
Total Imported Commodities 743,400 100 
Total of Top 15 Trade Partners 593,900 79.9 
1. Canada 145,100 19.5 
2. Japan 123,600 16.6 
3. Mexico 61,700 8.3 
4. China 45,600 6.1 
5. Germany 36,800 5.0 
6. Taiwan 29,000 3.9 
7. United Kingdom 26,900 3.6 
8. South Korea 24,200 3.3 
9. Singapore 18,600 2.5 
10. Malaysia 17,500 2.4 
11. France 17,200 2.3 
12. Italy 16,500 2.2 
13. Thailand 11,400 1.5 
14. Hong Kong 10,300 1.4 
15. Venezuela 9,700 1. 3 
Source: Kim Holmes and Thomas Moore. Restoring American 
Leadership: A u.s. Foreign and Defense Policy 
Blueprint. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage 
Foundation, 1996. 
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Table 2 
TOP 15 DESTINATIONS FOR U.S. EXPORTS 
Percentage 
Millions of Dollars Totals of Total 
Total Exported Commodities 583,900 100 
Total of Top 15 Trade Partners 439,200 75.2 
1. Canada 126,000 21.8 
2. Japan 64,300 11.0 
3. Mexico 46,300 7.9 
4. United Kingdom 28,800 4.9 
5. South Korea 25,400 4.4 
6. Germany 22,400 3.8 
7. Taiwan 19,300 3.3 
8. Netherlands 16,600 2.8 
9. Singapore 15,300 2.6 
10. France 14,200 2.4 
11. Hong Kong 14,200 2.4 
12. Belgium 12,500 2.1 
13. China 11,700 2.0 
14. Brazil 11,400 2.0 
15. Australia 10,800 1.8 
Source: Kim Holmes and Thomas Moore. Restoring American 
Leadership; A u.s. Foreign and Defense Policy 
Blueprint. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage 
Foundation, 1996. 
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Table 3 
PERSIAN GULF FORCE LEVELS 
country Manpower Tanks Artillery Aircraft 
Iran 518,000 1,390 2,000 300 
Iraq 387,000 2,700 3,800 280 
s. Arabia 105,000 1,000 300 336 
UAE 64,000 225 225 100 
Kuwait 15,300 225 60 76 
Bahrain 11,000 100 40 24 
Qatar 11,000 34 40 11 
Source: Terence Taylor. The Military Balance 1997/98. 
London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1997. 
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Table 4 
COMPARISON OF TRAVEL TIMES FROM THE PERSIAN GULF TO EUROPE 
Persian Gulf to Europe Journey: SUMED vs, cape Route 
Time (Days) 
To: 
VIA: 
Cape of Good Hope 
SUMED* 
Savings In Time (Days) 
Distance (Nautical Miles) 
To: 
VIA: 
Cape of Good Hope 
SUMED 
Savings In Distance 
(Nautical Miles) 
Rotterdam Fos 
42 
29 
13 
Rotterdam 
11,170 
6,213 
4,957 
(France) 
41 
22 
19 
Fos 
10,784 
4,499 
6,285 
Augusta 
(Sicily) 
42 
20 
22 
Augusta 
11,136 
3,870 
7,266 
* Includes five days to offload oil at SUMED terminal, pump 
through SUMED pipeline, and re-load oil into tanker. 
Source: The Suez canal I SUMED Complex: Global Shipping and 
Trade Implications in the Event of Closure. 
Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, 
1996. 
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Table 5 
US NAVY MISSIONS BY REGION 
D Caribbean 
m Mediterranean 
[Z3 Indian Ocean/ Persian Gulf 
• Western Pacific 
FON Escort Open/ Land Survelllance NEO Inter- Inter- Contingency 
close LOCs strike ventlon diction 
Mission Type 
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Table 6 
PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE MISSIONS BY REGION 
Caribbean Mediterranean lndlan Ocean/ Western Pacific 
Persian Gulf 
Ocean area 
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- Reactive 
CJ Proactive 
17 May 
25 May 
21-22 Jul. 
24 Jul. 
30 Jul. 
10 Aug. 
24 Aug. 
21 Sep. 
Table 7 
EVENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF 1987 
Iraqi missile attack on USS Stark (FFG-31). 
U.S. Navy warships escort a Kuwaiti-flagged 
freighter carrying U.S. arms to Bahrain. 
First U.S.-escorted convoy of reflagged Kuwaiti 
tankers, including ss Bridgeton, begins. 
Bridgeton hit and disabled by mine about 20 
miles west of Farsi Island. 
U.S. Navy SH-3 Sea King helicopter crashes into 
the Gulf while trying to land aboard USS L.a. 
Salle (AGF-3). Five are rescued: four die. 
F-14 Tomcat from USS Constellation (CV-64) fires 
two Sparrow missiles at radar blip thought to be 
Iranian F-4 showing hostile intent toward U.S. 
P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft. Neither 
missile hit any airborne object. The Texaco 
Caribbean, under charter to a U.S. firm, hits a 
mine outside of the Persian Gulf in the 
international anchorage off of Fujayrah. It was 
the first mine encountered outside the Gulf. 
Several more were detected over the next two 
days. 
The USS Kidd (DDG-993) fires warning shots 
across the bows of two dhows when they approach 
a U.S.-escorted convoy entering the Strait of 
Hormuz on its way into the Gulf. Later, an 
Iranian warship approaches the convoy. She is 
met by the USS Jarrett (FFG-33) and 
Guadalcanal(LPH-7). The Iranian ship turns away 
after the Jarrett moves between her and the 
convoy. 
U.S. frigate-based MH-6 Army special operations 
helicopters attack and capture the Iran Ajr, an 
Iranian landing craft being used for covert 
minelaying, about 50 miles northeast of Bahrain, 
in an anchorage used by ships before moving into 
oil-loading terminals. The next day, SEALs board 
the ship and take her in tow. Ten mines are 
found on board. Twenty-six Iranians are rescued: 
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3 Oct. 
4 Oct. 
8 Oct. 
9 Oct. 
14 Oct. 
15 Oct. 
16 Oct. 
19 Oct. 
1 Nov. 
Table 7 (continued) 
three are reported killed and two are missing. A 
U.S. Navy frigate fires warning shots across the 
bow of an Iranian hovercraft that approached the 
ships towing the Iran Ajr. 
Saudi fighter planes and naval forces reportedly 
turn back a force of about 60 Iranian speedboats 
heading toward the Saudi offshore oilfield at 
Khafji. Saudis reportedly alerted to speedboats 
by U.S. forces. 
U.S. Navy helicopter crashes near the La Salle 
off Bahrain, killing one and injuring three. 
U.S. frigate-based MH-6 helicopters attack four 
Iranian speedboats about 15 miles southwest of 
Farsi Island after one of the boats fired on a 
U.S. helicopter, sinking one and damaging and 
capturing two. U.S. forces pick up six Iranians, 
two of whom later die. 
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger reports that 
parts for U.S.-made Stinger antiaircraft 
missiles were found on the two speedboats 
captured in the 8 October attack. 
Administration reportedly rejects informal 
request from on-scene U.S. task force corrunander 
to come to aid of some non-u.s. flag ships under 
attack. 
U.S.-owned, Liberian-flagged tanker Sunqari, at 
anchor nine miles off Kuwait's Mina al-Ahmadi 
terminal, hit and damaged by Silkworm missile 
fired by Iran from Fao Peninsula. No casualties, 
but ship damaged. 
Ref~agged Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City, about 
ten miles off Mina al-Ahmadi, hit and damaged by 
Silkworm missile fired by Iran from Fao 
Peninsula. Eighteen injured, including U.S. 
master, and ship damaged. 
In response to 16 October missile attack, U.S. 
destroyer and SEALs shell and blow up Iranian 
oil platform east of Bahrain, and destroy 
electronic equipment on nearby platform. 
U.S. frigate fires machine guns at night on boat 
believed to be Iranian speedboat making hostile 
high-speed run at U.S. Military Sealift Corrunand 
cargo ship Patriot as she was being escorted out 
of the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz. Boat 
later discovered to be United Arab Emirates 
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12 Dec. 
23 Dec. 
24 Dec. 
25 Dec. 
Table 7 (continued) 
fishing vessel: one Indian fisherman killed: 
three others on board injured. U.S. Government 
expresses regret for incident. 
Helicopters from the USS Chandler (DDG-996) 
evacuate 11 people from the Cypriot-registered 
tanker Pivot after the tanker was attacked by 
Iranian speedboats. A helicopter chartered by 
CBS News evacuates another 29. 
Norwegian-flagged oil tanker attacked by Iranian 
forces reportedly turns down offer from U.S. 
Navy helicopter to help evacuate crew. 
Iranian speedboat fires shots at U.S. frigate-
based helicopter, perhaps only to warn it away, 
when helicopter flies to investigate Liberian-
flagged tanker attacked by Iranian speedboats. 
U.S. Navy helicopter evacuates 11 people from 
South Korean-flagged freighter Hyundai attacked 
by Iranian frigate about 20 miles northeast of 
Sharjar, near Abu Musa Island. A helicopter from 
a British frigate evacuates another nine. 
Source: Ronald O'Rourke. "The Tanker War." Proceedings Naval 
Review (May 1988): 33. 
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Table 8 
DATE, LOCATION, MISSION, AND INVOLVED NAVAL FORCES 
1991 - 1998 
Dates 
Jan. 1991 
Jan. 1992-
-1998 
Dec. 1992 
Jul. 1993-
-1997 
Jan. 1993-
-Mar. 1994 
Jan. 1993 
Jun. 1993 
Oct. 1993 
Nov. 1993-
-Aug. 1994 
Apr .-Aug. 
1994 
Location-operation 
Somalia-NEC 
s. Iraq-No Fly Zone 
Enforcement; 
Maritime Intercepts 
Somalia-humanitarian 
Adriatic/Balkans-
No Fly Zone 
enforcement; 
Maritime Intercepts 
Somalia-humanitarian 
Iraq-carrier strikes 
Iraq/Red Sea-Tomahawk 
missile strikes 
Somalia-response to 
increasing casualties 
Haiti-UN blockade 
Rwanda-relief/NEO 
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u.s. Naval Forces 
USS Guam ARG 
USS Trenton ARG 
USMC Force Recon, SEALS 
CVBGs 
SAGS 
USS Ranger CVBG 
USS Tripoli ARG 
15th MEU (SOC) 
CVBGs 
ARGs 
MEU(SOC) s 
CVBGs 
ARGs 
USS Kitty Hawk CVBG 
USS Peterson 
USS Chancellorsville 
USS Roosevelt CVBG 
USS America CVBG 
USS Guadalcanal ARG 
ARGs 
SEALS 
USS Peleliu ARG 
11th MEU(SOC) 
USS Tripoli ARG 
15th MEU(SOC) 
Dates 
Sep. 1994 
Oct. 1994 
Oct. 1994-
Mar. 1995 
Feb.-Mar. 
1995 
Jun. 1995 
Aug.-Sep. 
1995 
Aug. 1995 
Dec. 1995-
Dec. 1996 
Mar. 1996 
Sep. 1996 
Mar.-Jun. 
1997 
Apr.-May 
1997 
Table 8 (continued) 
Location-Operation 
Haiti-intervention 
Iraq/Red Sea-
deterrence; support 
for Kuwait 
u.s. Naval Forces 
USS Eisenhower CVBG 
USS Wasp ARG 
USS Washington CVBG 
USS Tripoli ARG 
15th MEU(SOC) 
Haiti-nation building Military Sealift 
Command 
Somalia-withdrawal 
of UN forces 
Adriatic Sea-rescue 
of Captain Scott 
O'Grady 
Adriatic Sea-Bosnia 
strikes 
Iraq/Red Sea-
deterrence; support 
for Kuwait 
Adriatic/Balkans-
Dayton Peace Accords 
enforcement 
China/Taiwan-freedom 
of navigation ops; 
deterrence 
Iraq-carrier strikes 
Adriatic-NEC; embassy 
security 
Eastern Atlantic-
standby off Zaire 
to conduct NEO 
387 
USS Belleau Wood ARG 
USS Essex ARG 
USS Roosevelt CVBG 
USS Kearsarge ARG 
24th MEU(SOC) 
USS Roosevelt CVBG 
USS America CVBG 
USS Kearsarge ARG 
USS Lincoln CVBG 
USS New Orleans SAG 
CVBGs 
ARGs 
USS Independence CVBG 
USS Nimitz CVBG 
USS Carl Vinson CVBG 
USS Nassau ARG 
26th MEU(SOC) 
USS Nassau ARG 
26th MEU(SOC) 
USS Kearsarge ARG 
22nd MEU(SOC) 
Dates 
Jun. 1997 
Oct. 1997-
1998 
Table 8 (continued) 
Location-operation 
West Africa-
humanitarian 
Iran/Iraq/Arabian 
Gulf-deterrence; 
support UNSCOM 
u,s, Naval Forces 
USS Kearsarge ARG 
22nd MEU(SOC) 
USS Nimitz CVBG 
USS Washington CVBG 
USS Independence CVBG 
USS Peleliu ARG 
13th MEU(SOC) 
USS Guam ARG 
24th MEU(SOC) 
Source: Vision, Presence, Power: A Program Guide to the u,s, 
Navy 1998 Edition. Washington, D.C.: Department of 
the Navy, 1998 
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Table 9 
MEU(SOC) SPECIAL MISSIONS 
1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 
2. Humanitarian Assistance 
3. Civic Actions 
4. Clandestine Reconnaissance/Surveillance 
5. In-Extremis Hostage Rescue 
6. Initial Terminal Guidance 
7. Mobile Training Teams 
8. Maritime Interdiction 
9. Seizure/Destruction of Offshore Oil Rigs 
10. Limited Objective Attacks 
11. Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel 
12. Deception Operations 
13. Security Operations 
14. Specialized Demolition 
15. Show of Force Operations 
16. Electronic Warfare 
17. Amphibious Raids 
18. Operations in Urban Terrain 
19. Counter-Intelligence Operations 
20. Reinforcement Operations 
21. Fire Support Control 
Source: Captain Neil Carns and Captain Stanton Coerr. "A 
True Force In Readiness." Proceedings (August 1994): 
35. 
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Table 10 
FACTORS AFFECTING CVN LIFETIME COSTS 
Preliminary data 
How 7 variables affect the percent change in 
average annual CVW APN(l-4) plus CVX SCN 
20.0 ..................................................................................................... . 
II 
DC 
15.0 ............................................. . 
10.0 · · .. · · · · · · · ··················· ............................................. . 
; s.o 10 less .. 20 less ·· More 
"5 A/C per A/C per 
'E 
" t 0.0 
Cl,. 
-s.o 
-10.0 
..... lless. 
-1S.O ............................ --........ -................. -................................................... . 
Preliminary data 
Source: John Hall. Lona-Term Affordability of Sea-Based 
TACAIR: Some Preliminary Examples. Alexandria, VA: 
Center for Naval Analyses, 1997. 
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Table 11 
COMPARISON OF CARRIER AND BOMBER RESPONSES TO CRISES 
CVBG Responses to Crises Since the Vietnam War 
Year Crisis CVs Year Crisis cv. 
1974 Cyprus 2 1983 Iran-Iraq 1 
1975 Cyprua Unrest 1 1983 Korea-Burma 1 
1975 Eagle Pull, Cambodia 1 1983 Grenada 1 
1975 Frequent Wind, Viet. 4 1983 Syria 1 
1975 Mayaguez 2 1984 Central America 1 
1975 Lebanon 1 1984 Persian Gulf 1 
1976 Keny•Uf,anda 1 1984 Saudi Hijacking 1 
1976 Korean ree Incident 1 1984 Cuba 1 
1977 Uganda 1 1985 U.S. Pers. in Lebanon 1 
1978 
~aden War 1 1985 TWA 847 Hijacking 1 
1978 A ghanistan 1 1985 Achille Lauro 1 
1978 Iranian Revolution 1 1985 Eiypt Air Hijacking 1 
1979 China-Vietnam 1 1986 0 L-FON Ops 3 
1979 Yemen 1 1986 La Belle Disco, Libya 2 
1979 Soviet Troops in Cuba 1 1986 Pakistan Hi;acking 1 
1979 Afghan/Iran Hostages 2 1987 Persian Gu f Ops 2 
1979 Park-Chung Hee 1 1987 Hostages in Lebanon 1 
1980 Korea 1 1988 Summer Olympics 2 
1980 Iran-Iraq War 2 1988 Maldive• Coup 1 
1981 Syria 2 1989 Lebanon Civil War 1 
1981 Lib a 2 1989 Panama Elections 1 
1981 Sadat-Sudan 1 1989 China Civil Unrest 1 
1981 Central America 2 1989 Hostages in Lebanon 2 
1982 Israeli Invasion 1 1989 Philippines 2 
1982 Peacekeeping Force 2 1990 Operation Desert Shield 3 
1982 Palestinian Massacre 2 1991 Operation Desert Storm 6 
1983 Libya-Sudan 1 1992 Op. Southern Watch 1 
1983 Honduras 1 1993 Somalia 1 
1983 Libya-Chad 1 1993 Op. Southam Watch 1 
1983 Marine Barracks Bomb 2 1993 Operation Deny Right 1 
(Source: CNA Research Memorandum 90-246) 
Source: David Perin. Comparing Lonq-Ranqe Bombers and the 
Carrier Force. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval 
Analyses, 1994. 
391 
Table 11 (continued) 
COMPARISON OF CARRIER AND BOMBER RESPONSES TO CRISES 
Bombers in Presence Missions, Combat, and 
Shows of Force Since the Vietnam War 
(Source:The USAF and National Security , SAF/OSX 1991) 
AUG 76 "Following the murder of two army officers, .•• B-52s flew 
training missions along the DMZ to underscore U.S. concern." 
JAN 80 "B-52s overflew Soviet naval vessels in the Arabian Sea to 
demonstrate U.S. power-projection capabilities." 
ocr 81 "During Bright Star 82, .•. two B-52Hs [flew] a nonstop mission 
from North Dakota to a simulated runway target in Egypt." 
DEC 81 "In show-of-force missions in response to mobilization of North 
Korean forces, B-52 sorties were flown along the border." 
AUG 90 16 B-52s deploy to Diego Garcia in response to Iraqi invasion. 
JAN 91 70 B-52s fly combat missions in Operation Desert Storm. 
Source: David Perin. Comparing Lonq-Ranqe Bombers and the 
Carrier Force. Alexandria, VA: center for Naval 
Analyses, 1994. 
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Table 12 
COMPARISON OF BOMBER AND CARRIER MISSION CAPABILITIES 
Tasks in Peacetime and Crises 
Mission/Task CVBGs Bombers 
• Promote regional stability Yes No 
(e.g., routine deployments) 
• Protect people and property (e.g., Iran hostage rescue) 
Yes No 
• Make a show of force Yes Some· 
(e.g., Gulf of Libya ops) 
• Protect, quarantine, interdict Yes No 
sea/air traffic (e.g., Earnest Will 
convoy operations and capture of the 
Achille Lauro hijackers) 
• Forestall/respond to hostile or Yes Yes 
terrorist acts (e.g., strike Libya) 
• Intervene in conflicts Yes Some 
e .. , Grenada 
Source: David Perin. Com.parinq Lonq-Ranqe Bombers and the 
Carrier Force. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval 
Analyses, 1994. 
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Strait of Hormuz 
Figure 1 
STRAIT OF HORMUZ 
Ir an 
Bandar-a 'Abbas 
•". ~ ~~ :': 
· · 'i1,/~, o:ian ' , 
fe. 
Nore: Shipping lane boundaries are marked. 
Source: Hans Binnendjik and Patrick Clawson. strategic 
Assessment 1997; Flashpoints and Force structure. 
Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1997. 
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Figure 2 
OIL SHIPMENTS THROUGH THE STRAIT OF MALACCA 
From 
Africa 
CD 
From Africa 
CD 
Note: Only lncludff llllpmenla ldentlllod H p1a1lno •la the 
Slralla of Malacca, Sunde, or Lomboll; or lht •• lanH 
pHslng lht Spratly ltlando 
Q) From 
Australia 
@) 
Pactnc 
Ocean 
Source: John Noer and David Gregory. Chokepoints; Maritime 
Economic concerns in southeast Asia. Washington, 
D.C.: NDU Press, 1996. 
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Figure 3 
ALTERNATIVE EAST-WEST ROUTES TO MALACCA 
I 
Phll/pplne Sea 
I 
Sunda Strait 
Lombok Strait 
Source: John Neer and David Gregory. Chokepoints: Maritime 
Economic Concerns in southeast Asia. Washington, 
D.C.: NDU Press, 1996. 
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APPENDIX B 
IRAN: A CASE STUDY OF THE KEEP-OUT STRATEGY 
The Persian Gulf is the region of greatest importance 
to the United States, by virtue of its oil supplies. 
Persian Gulf oil supplies the economies of Europe and Asia 
with the majority of their energy needs, and is projected to 
grow in importance in the future. While U.S. dependence on 
Persian Gulf oil is relatively low, the U.S. economy depends 
on the health of its trading partners, making the secure 
flow of oil from the Gulf a vital national interest. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran, once a solid U.S. ally in 
the Persian Gulf, has become one of the United States' most 
bitter opponents since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 
Although militarily exhausted at the end of the Iran-Iraq 
war in 1988, Iran's position astride the Strait of Hormuz 
provides Iran the means to block a critical SLOC with 
minimal force. By slowing or stopping the shipment of oil 
through Hormuz, Iran could threaten the economic health of 
Europe, Asia, and indirectly the United States. 
The ability to disrupt the flow of oil to the 
industrialized economies of the world provides Iran with 
leverage for meeting political goals within the Gulf region. 
Thus it is reasonable to expect that Iran has plans for 
397 
interdicting the Strait, either partially or totally. The 
systems and capabilities being acquired by Iran will be 
described in the following pages, along with the likely 
strategy Iran would use in a confrontation with the United 
States. 
Iran has been engaged in a military rebuilding program 
since 1988, when the Iran-Iraq War ended. Since that time 
Iran has acquired a wide variety of weapons systems, 
primarily from Russia and China. Although Iran's purchases 
have gone into every area of its armed forces, the main 
focus of Iran's efforts have been made in two areas: naval 
systems and ballistic missiles. 
The nature of the systems Iran has acquired provide a 
good indication of the strategy Iran appears to be pursuing. 
After faring poorly against U.S. naval forces in 1987-1988, 
Iran now appears to be developing the capability to close 
down the Strait of Hormuz, using naval weapons and forces 
tailored towards sea denial rather than conventional combat. 
Given Iran's position astride the full length of the Strait, 
such a strategy is entirely logical. 
By following a strategy of sea denial, Iran is 
relieved of the need to be able to meet the U.S. Navy--
clearly Iran's main adversary--on the open waters of the 
Persian Gulf or the North Arabian Sea, where the ships and 
aircraft of the U.S. Fifth and Seventh Fleets would enjoy 
tremendous advantages in surveillance, targeting, firepower, 
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air superiority, and tactical coordination. Sea denial 
requires only that Iran be able to prevent the adversary 
from transiting the Strait, a task Iran can meet largely 
from positions ashore. For a nation with no hope of 
matching even the 5th Fleet, let alone the entire U.S. Navy, 
in traditional naval combat power, sea denial provides the 
means to turn a geographical advantage into a military 
advantage. 
For much of its length the Strait is only thirty-three 
miles wide, with the main shipping channels occupying the 
center of the Strait. Given this limited width, Iran can 
easily observe and monitor all surface ships passing through 
the Strait, even if limited to using optical surveillance 
systems. Iran also holds four islands located in the middle 
of the Strait, providing ideal observation positions. In 
addition, possession of the north shore of the Strait allows 
Iran to construct, fortify, and camouflage positions for 
anti-ship missiles, observation posts, SAMs, and ordinary 
artillery pieces. In order to block the Strait, Iran has 
turned to the traditional weapons of sea denial, the mine 
and the submarine, and added to these the anti-ship missile. 
Iran has purchased several thousands of mines, some of 
them advanced influence and rising mines. The most conunon 
mine type in Iran's inventory is the contact mine, a weapon 
scarcely changed since World War One. These mines can be 
free-floating, allowing them to drift along on the current, 
399 
or can be moored to float on or just below the surface. In 
either case, the mine must be struck by a passing ship in 
order to detonate. Although technologically crude, such 
mines are effective and inexpensive.1 The production of 
contact mines is well within the capability of virtually any 
nation, and certainly within Iran's capability, allowing 
Iran to deploy very large numbers of contact mines. 
Influence mines are much more capable than contact 
mines, and are more suited to use in deep water.2 The 
Chinese EM-52 mine is one example of the influence mines in 
Iran's possession. Iran reportedly has received 1,800 
influence mines as part of its ongoing purchases from 
Russia. 3 Iran gained much operational experience in the use 
of mines during the Iran-Iraq War, in which Iranian mines 
were employed to attack the oil shipments of Iraq's 
financial supporters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
The other sea denial weapon, the submarine, had not 
been present in the naval forces of the Gulf states until 
Iran's purchase of three Russian Kilo-class diesel-electric 
1Lyons et. al., The Mine Threat; Show stoppers or Speed 
Bumps, 1. 
2uss Princeton (CG-59) was badly damaged by an Iraqi 
influence mine. Ibid. 
3James Bruce, "Choking the Strait: Iranian naval 
firepower and the threat to Gulf shipping," Jane's 
Intelligence Review (September 1996): 411. 
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boats.4 The Kilo is a very quiet submarine when submerged, 
a quality that is enhanced by the acoustic nature of the 
Gulf.5 The constant shipping traffic through the Gulf, and 
particularly the Strait, provides an ideal noise level for a 
quiet submarine to hide in. The Gulf also has a very strong 
thermal layer that would impede sonar searches by surface 
ships. 6 
The Kilo carries eighteen 533mm. torpedoes, which are 
thought to be wake-homing Russian models. 7 In addition, the 
Kilo can lay as many as thirty-six mines while submerged, 
providing the capability for covert deployment of 
minefields.a Although Iran is unlikely to get anything 
approaching full effectiveness from its Kilos, the ability 
to lay mines while submerged is a valuable attribute by 
itself. 9 
4The Kilos were purchased in 1992, 1993, and 1996. 
"Iran Bolsters Its Fleet With 3rd Russian Sub," New York 
Times, 20 January 1997, A5. 
5Robert Holzer, "Iran's Kilo Sub Buys Prompt Surge in 
ASW Demand," Defense News, 9-15 June 1997, 36. 
6James Kraska, "Gatekeepers of the Gulf," Proceedings 
(March 1994): 45. 
7Taylor, The Military Balance 1997 / 98, 126. 
8Ed Blanche, "Iran's naval forces: a shadow across the 
Gulf?" Jane's Navy International (March 1997): 14. 
9Any warship is a large concentration of complex 
systems, a submarine doubly so. Each system requires a well-
trained operator in order to function properly. Simply 
mastering the techniques of diving the boat will require 
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To complement its mines and submarines, Iran has 
invested heavily in anti-ship missiles (SSMs). Iran has 
acquired several different types of SSM, all of which are 
believed to be capable of shore or ship launch. Iran has 
also fired at least one type, the C-802, from an F-4 
aircraft.10 While all are capable of doing serious damage 
to a warship, the most capable of Iran's SSMs is the SS-N-22 
Sunburn, reportedly purchased from Ukraine in 1993.11 The 
Sunburn travels at nineteen hundred mph, can home on the 
electronic emissions of the target ship, and has its own 
radar seeker. It performs evasive S-turns during the final 
seconds before impact, and carries a three hundred kg 
warhead. In comparison, the Exocet missile that nearly sank 
USS Stark carries a 165kg warhead. The Sunburn's range is 
estimated at ninety kilometers.12 
lengthy training of Iranian crews. Additionally, maintenance 
takes on special importance when the equipment involved is 
expected to dive safely beneath the ocean, and Iran's 
history of maintaining its systems is poor. In the words of 
Seth Carus, "Few military instruments are as difficult to 
use well as submarines." Seth Carus, "Iran as a Military 
Threat," strategic Forum 113 (May 1997): 3. 
lOEd Blanche, "Air-to-surface missiles 'give Iran 360 
capability'," Jane's Defense Weekly, 25 June 1997, 3. 
llwhether or not the Ukrainian missiles were in fact 
SS-N-22s is disputed. See Steven Zaloga, "Russia's Moskit 
anti-ship missile," Jane's Intelligence Review (April 1996): 
155. 
l2Ibid. 
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Iran's oldest SSM is the Chinese HY-1 Silkworm. The 
Silkworm is a first-generation SSM, thought to be relatively 
inaccurate.13 However, Iran is believed to possess more 
than three hundred Silkworms, allowing high-volume attacks. 
Furthermore, all of Iran's Silkworms are deployed in shore 
batteries, rather than at sea.14 Whether in mobile 
launchers or permanent, hardened launchers, shore-based 
Silkworms likely would be more survivable than ship-mounted 
missiles. Iran has the luxury of deploying missiles ashore 
due to the need only to fire on ships in the Strait. 
Another Iranian SSM is the HY-2 Seersucker, also known 
as the CSSC-3 or C-801 Sardine. It is thought to be an 
improved version of the Silkworm. Iran possesses one 
hundred Seersuckers, which are deployed in shore batteries 
along the Strait and on Sirri Island.15 
The C-802 Saccade is Iran's most flexible missile. It 
can be launched from shore batteries, from fast attack craft 
(FAC), or from aircraft. The Saccade is carried on Iran's 
Kaman-class and Hudong-class FAC, and has been launched from 
F-4 aircraft on at least two occasions. It has a range of 
120 km and carries a seven hundred kg warhead, over four 
13Philip Finnegan, "U.S. Confronts Middle East 
Challenges," Defense News, 16-22 September 1997, 3. 
14Blanche, "Iran's naval forces," 21. 
15Ibid. 
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times larger than the Exocet warhead that sank HMS 
Sheffielct. 16 
SSMs are a particular hazard in a confined seaway like 
the Strait, due to the short reaction time afforded to 
target ships. Fired from shore at a target twenty miles out 
in the channel, a six hundred mph Silkworm would reach its 
target in two minutes. A nineteen hundred mph Sunburn would 
cover the same distance in forty seconds. The target ship 
thus could come under attack without warning, as Iranian 
shore batteries likely would not need to employ radar to 
search for targets. Unlike the Stark, which tracked an 
inbound Iraqi fighter for over an hour before being fired 
on, ships in the Strait could have their response time 
measured in seconds.17 
The large warheads on Iranian SSMs make them a 
significant danger to any ship. Modern warships have shown 
a remarkable susceptibility to critical damage from a single 
hit, especially in regard to their electrical systems. HMS 
Sheffield (Exocet missile) and USS Princeton (influence 
mine) were rendered dead in the water almost immediately 
16Bruce, "Choking the Strait," 414. 
17The Stark first received radar data from USS Coontz 
(DDG-40) via the Navy Tactical Data System at 2000 local 
time. The Stark acquired the Iraqi plane at 2058 and tracked 
it until 2107, when the second of two Exocet missiles was 
fired. See Vlahos, "The Stark Report," 64. 
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after being struck. The Princeton was without electrical 
power to her radar and fire control for over two hours 
before being towed to Bahrain, while the Sheffield was lost 
while under tow six days after being hit.18 
In order to take advantage of the confined nature of 
the Strait, Iran has built up a force of twenty FAC, each 
armed with four SSMs. These craft are small enough to 
conceal themselves along Iran's coastline, waiting for 
passing targets before dashing out at high speed to attack. 
In addition to their small size, their speed would make them 
difficult targets for U.S. weapons.19 Iran's ten Kaman-
class boats can carry four C-801 Seersucker or C-802 Saccade 
missiles, while the ten Hudong-class carry only the 
latter.20 
These craft would need to fire from short range due to 
their lack of long-range search radars, so they would not be 
survivable in the open for long periods. It is possible 
that target data could be supplied to the FAC by other 
units, or they could launch with bearing-only information. 
Given the narrow nature of the Strait, the need to launch 
18Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the 
Falklands (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1983), 153; 
Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, 345. 
l9Kraska, "Gatekeepers of the Gulf," 45. 
20Taylor, The Military Balance 1997 / 98, 126. 
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from close range is not as significant a disadvantage as it 
would be on the open sea. 
Ballistic missiles have shared top priority with naval 
systems in Iran's re-arming program. Both as a political 
weapon and as a military weapon, ballistic missiles serve 
Iran's purposes by providing the means to launch long-range 
attacks from Iranian soil. The Iranian Air Force is 
incapable of penetrating a modern air defense network, or 
even the fighter CAP of a carrier air wing, so Iran needs 
other means of conducting such attacks. Ballistic missiles 
provide the means. 
Ballistic missiles allow Iran to strike targets that 
would normally be assigned to deep-strike aircraft. These 
include logistical targets, such as Gulf airfields and 
ports, tactical targets, such as force concentrations or 
ship formations, and strategic targets, such as civilian 
population centers. The ability to deliver NBC warheads 
with ballistic missiles offers the additional option of 
blackmail, by threatening to attack the population centers 
of any state providing assistance or access to its 
facilities to U.S. forces. 
The primary missile in Iran's inventory is the SCUD, 
produced in China and North Korea. Iran possesses one 
hundred SCUD-Band one hundred SCUD-C missiles, and is 
406 
believed to be capable of producing SCUD-Bs indigenously.2 1 
Iran is known to have ten launchers for SCUD missiles, but 
may have produced more.22 
The SCUD-B has a range of three hundred km and a 
payload of one thousand kg. While it is not an accurate 
missile (CEP is estimated between one thousand and fifteen 
hundred meters), it can deliver NBC warheads sufficiently 
close to intended targ~ts to be effective. It obviously has 
the accuracy to strike cities, as demonstrated in 1991 by 
Iraqi SCUDs.23 The SCUD-C is an improved SCUD-B, possessing 
greater accuracy and range at the expense of a slightly 
smaller payload. The five hundred km range of the SCUD-C 
threatens most Saudi airfields and all Gulf ports. CEP is 
estimated between 750-1,000 meters, while payload is seven 
hundred kg.24 
Iran has an additional capability in its SA-2 and SA-6 
SAMs. Both of these missiles are capable of being fired in 
a ballistic mode, and include in their operating manuals the 
steps for doing so. The SA-2 has a range of 150 km and a 
payload of 190 kg, while the SA-6 has a range of 160 km and 
21 Proliferation: Threat and Response, 16. 
22Taylor, The Military Balance 1997 / 98, 126. 
23carus, "Iran as a Military Threat," 2. 
24 Ibid. 
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a payload of eighty kg. With such small warheads, both 
missiles clearly are more suited to delivering NBC warheads 
than conventional warheads.25 The fact that Iran has 
stockpiled chemical artillery shells on Abu Musa suggests 
that the SA-6 SAMs stationed there may be intended as NBC 
platforms. 26 
Iran was believed to be pursuing the North Korean 
Nodong missile, which has a one thousand km range. However, 
the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and 
North Korea specified that the Nodong not be sold to Iran. 
North Korea thus far has observed at least this portion of 
the agreement and has not sold the Nodong to Iran. 27 
Of greater significance are four new missiles Iran is 
believed to be developing indigenously. With Russian 
assistance, Iran reportedly has been developing missiles 
with ranges of thirteen hundred km, two thousand km, forty-
five hundred km, and ten thousand km. Israeli intelligence 
officials have stated that Russian SS-4 and SS-23 technology 
has reached Iran, a claim supported by The Proliferation 
25Hough, "Iranian Intentions: The Strait of Hormuz or 
Beyond?" 454; Carus, "Iran as a Military Threat," 2. 
26Barbara Starr, "CW stockpile 'a threat to Straits of 
Hormuz'," Jane's Defense Weekly, 1 April 1995, 3. 
27Alan George, "US outlines Iranian threat," The Middle 
E.as.t. (January 1997): 16. 
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Primer.28 Recent articles in the Jerusalem Post and Defense 
News describe the Shihab-3 missile as having a thirteen 
hundred km range and a seven hundred kg payload. The 
Shihab-3 is believed to be an attempted copy of the Nodong. 
The Shihab-4, based on the Russian SS-4, is believed to have 
a range of two thousand km and a payload of over one 
thousand kg. 29 
The other two developmental missiles are believed to 
have ranges of forty-five hundred km and ten thousand km. 
The first is believed to be in early prototype development, 
while the second is believed to be at least ten years from 
completion.30 If Iran continues to receive Russian 
assistance, it could field one or both of these missiles in 
the next decade. 
With a forty-five hundred km missile Iran would 
threaten most of Western Europe, including Paris, Berlin, 
Rome, Athens, and other NATO cities. With a ten thousand km 
missile Iran would threaten virtually the entire world, as 
only northeastern Russia, Canada, and Alaska would be out of 
28Barbara Opall, "Israelis Say Russia Aids Iran's Quest 
For Missiles," Defense News, 10-16 February 1997, 1. 
29Rodan, "Iran's missiles able to hit Israel in 18 
months," 1. 
30Yossef Bodansky, "Iran's New Ballistic Missiles," 
Defense & Foreign Affairs' strategic Policy (May I June 
1997): 6. 
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range. The ability to produce such missiles indigenously 
would be of great importance to Iran, even if the actual 
date of deployment is many years in the future. Dependence 
on outside sources places Iran's ability to acquire missiles 
at the mercy of the provider. As with North Korea, Iran 
could find a prospective source unwilling to sell missiles 
due to political pressure from the United States. Whether 
missile production is within Iran's technological capability 
remains to be seen, but Steve Rodan's articles and the 
statements by Israeli intelligence sources suggest that Iran 
has made significant progress in this endeavor. 
The leverage provided by ballistic missiles is 
maximized if those missiles can be used to deliver NBC 
warheads to various targets. Both in terms of political 
blackmail, in which the extreme vulnerability of large 
populations to chemical and biological agents is a lasting 
vulnerability, and in terms of military attacks on large 
logistical and support facilities, which are indispensable 
to U.S. warfighting capability, NBC weapons are a great 
equalizer for smaller states such as Iran. Not 
surprisingly, Iran has a robust chemical weapons capability, 
a strongly suspected biological weapons capability, and an 
all but publicly acknowledged nuclear weapons program: 
Iran has placed a high priority on possessing NBC 
weapons and missiles since Tehran's defeat in the 
Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Iran has an adequate 
technological base to support chemical agent and 
missile production activities and a biotechnical 
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structure capable of supporting the production of 
biological agents. Nevertheless, Iran is attempting 
to expand its current technological base to achieve 
self-sufficient production in all phases of NBC 
weapons and delivery systems. In the nuclear weapons 
arena, Iran is attempting to acquire an indigenous 
capabilit¥ to produce weapons-grade fissile 
material. 1 
As mentioned earlier, the use of ballistic missiles to 
deliver NBC weapons would allow Iran to conduct both 
military and political blackmail operations. While Iran's 
NBC programs pre-date the 1991 Gulf War, one of the lessons 
of that war is the overwhelming nature of American 
conventional capability. Iran therefore may have reached 
the conclusion that NBC weapons are required to offset U.S. 
conventional capability.32 NBC weapons also provide Iran 
the means to blackmail neighboring states, by holding the 
populations of those states hostage in order to gain 
leverage over U.S. access to regional facilities. 
Of Iran's NBC programs, its chemical weapons are 
considered the most threatening at present, and much has 
been written about the size and composition of Iran's 
chemical inventory. It is believed that Iran has produced 
at least several hundred tons of blister, blood, and choking 
agents, and has weaponized at least some of those agents. 33 
31Proliferation; Threat and Response, 13. 
32weaver and Glaes, Invitinq Disaster, 9. 
33Proliferation; Threat and Response, 15. 
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A Washington Times article, citing a classified U.S. 
intelligence report, gives a much larger estimate of Iran's 
chemical stockpile: 
U.S. intelligence officials say Iran has a stockpile 
estimated to include up to 2,000 tons of blister, 
choking, and nerve agents. The agents include sarin 
nerve gas and mustard gas, deployed in aerial bombs, 
artillery shells, mines, mortars3 and short-range missile warheads (italics mine). 4 
Iran also is believed to have received assistance from 
China in establishing the infrastructure needed for the 
production of chemical weapons, such as glass containers for 
storage and transportation.35 Many chemicals with 
pharmaceutical or agricultural application can be converted 
to useful chemical weapons. Iran's chemical program thus 
could be larger than the official estimates mentioned 
earlier. Iran's efforts to acquire additional chemical 
capability have extended to such unlikely sources as Israel 
and the United States, where individual citizens have been 
arrested and charged with selling chemical ingredients to 
Iran. 36 
34Bill Gertz, "China aided Iran chemical arms," 
Washington Times, 30 October 1997, 1. 
35Bill Gertz, "U.S. conceded China still aiding Iran," 
Washington Times, 31 October 1997, 13. 
3611 Israeli Held In Iran Traffic In Nerve Gas," New York 
Times, 7 May 1997, AlO; "2 Accused of Plotting Iran Chemical 
Deal," New York Times, 25 January 1997, 8. 
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In contrast to Iran's chemical programs, little 
concrete evidence exists concerning Iran's biological 
programs. Given the ease with which biological weapons can 
be produced and stored, lack of knowledge concerning Iran's 
biological weapons is not surprising. Any nation with 
biological expertise can easily produce biological weapons 
in secret, as their production does not require large 
facilities or staffs.37 While there is little evidence 
concerning Iran's biological weapons, there is a consensus 
among U.S. officials that such a program exists. 
The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 1996 
report, "Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control 
Agreements," made the following statements concerning 
biological weapons: 
China, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Libya and Russia 
either retain, or are trying to obtain, the 
capability to produce biological weapons ••. All 
have signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention .••• Biological weapons represent a 
threat that could rival nuclear warfare in number of 
casualties. An anthrax-loaded SCUD missile, for 
example, could kill 100,000 people in an urban area • 
. . • Iran probably has produced BW agents and 
apparently has weaponized a small quantity of those 
agents. 38 
37Dr. Kathleen Bailey, seminar comments, 23 October 
1997, Southwest Missouri State University. 
38Jeff Erlich, "U.S. Experts Cite Weakness of 
Biological War Treaty," Defense News, 25-31 August 1997, 6. 
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In addition to its CW and BW programs, Iran is believed 
to have an extensive program underway to develop nuclear 
weapons. In the event of Iran attaining nuclear capability, 
the leverage gained by Tehran over Gulf neighbors would be 
tremendous.39 Iranian nuclear capability also would make 
any U.S. decision to intervene in a Gulf conflict more 
difficult. 
Iran's nuclear program is generally estimated to be 
several years away from fruition, as little as one year or 
as many as ten years depending on the source.40 Iran is 
believed to be pursuing nuclear weapons both through its 
nuclear power industry, and through attempts to purchase 
components, fissile material, and finished weapons from 
outside sources. Since Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is able to utilize atomic 
energy in nuclear power plants under the guidance of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such plants 
produce plutonium in the form of spent fuel rods, which can 
then be processed into weapons-grade material. With the 
fragmentation of the Soviet Union, several newly-independent 
39Peters, The u.s. Military; Ready for the New World 
order?, 106-107. 
40Leonard Spector, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1995), 119; David Silverberg, "Shadow Over the Gulf," 
Armed Forces Journal International (August 1995): 24; 
George, "U.S. outlines Iranian threat," 16. 
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states to the North of Iran have found themselves in 
possession of fissile material. The possibility clearly 
exists for Iran to acquire such fissile material through 
purchase or theft. 
Whether or not Iran is able to acquire fissile material 
from former Soviet states, continued assistance from Russia 
and the IAEA likely will result in Iran's nuclear power 
plants becoming operational in the near future, perhaps two 
or three years. Even if Iran is forced to depend on its 
reactors for providing plutonium, the length of time before 
Iran has weapons-grade fuel is likely to be no more than 
five or six years. Thus it is prudent to assume that, in 
addition to its chemical and biological capability, Iran may 
have nuclear weapons early in the next decade. 
How might Iran attempt to utilize its capabilities in 
support of its policies? By utilizing the Strait of Hormuz 
and a keep-out strategy, along with the threat posed by 
ballistic missiles and NBC weapons, Iran could attempt to 
achieve a fait accompli in the Gulf region, then prevent the 
United States from responding. There are a number of 
different goals Iran could pursue in this way. 
One example of such an Iranian action in the Gulf could 
be an attack on the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Iran and 
the UAE have serious and long-standing disagreements over 
various islands in the Strait, as well as oil rights in the 
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Gulf and in the Strait.41 Either for reasons of domestic 
political difficulties, or simply out of aggressiveness, 
Iran could determine to resolve these disagreements through 
force. Iran's goal would be to quickly attack and overcome 
the UAE, and seize most or all UAE territory, especially the 
coastal areas of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and the offshore oil and 
gas fields. 
There are other scenarios in which Iran might attempt 
to seize the territory of neighboring states and then hold 
onto its gains. Alternatively, Iran could demand the 
removal of all U.S. forces from the Gulf, which Iran 
considers to be its rightful sphere of influence. 42 All 
such scenarios have one thing in common, however. For Iran 
to have any chance of succeeding, the forces of the United 
States would have to be kept from intervening. 
In order to keep U.S. forces from intervening, Iran's 
keep-out strategy would entail deploying mines to block the 
Strait and declaring a naval exclusion zone. Mines could be 
deployed in such a way that tanker traffic was still able to 
pass through safe corridors, or Iran could attempt to close 
the Strait completely. Next, Iran's Kilos would patrol 
behind the minefields, where a defensive posture and their 
41Binnendjik and Clawson, Strategic Assessment 1997, 
91-92. 
42see Hashim, crisis of the Iranian state, 43. 
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low noise levels would make them very hard to detect. 
Iran's SSM batteries ashore would strive to enforce the 
exclusion zone, firing on any naval forces that attempted to 
enter the Strait. Since ships passing through the Strait 
could be observed visually, monitoring the passage of non-
merchant ships would not be overly difficult. 
In conjunction with its operations in the Strait, Iran 
would attempt to blackmail neighboring countries by 
announcing that, in the event of U.S. attacks on Iranian 
forces or facilities, Iranian ballistic missiles would be 
used to retaliate against the country of origin. Iran might 
combine this threat with the threat of closing the Strait 
completely, rather than continuing to allow tanker traffic 
to pass through. Politically, Iran would strive to portray 
events as concerning only Iran and its victim, stating that 
only in the event of U.S. interference would Iran take 
actions that would impact on all Gulf nations. 
Even moderately skillful manipulation of the media 
could convey to U.S. viewers a lack of a vital U.S. interest 
worth fighting over.43 The very close vote in the U.S. 
Congress for supporting the Gulf War, and the advice of many 
senior military, ex-military, and civilian policy-makers to 
wait for sanctions to work on Iraq rather than using 
43The lengthy debates in Congress and "no blood for 
oil" slogans of 1990 are indicators of the viability of this 
strategy concerning U.S. public opinion. 
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military force, all suggest that Iran could plausibly 
construct a political atmosphere in which the United States 
would decide against opposing Iran. 44 As noted by Colin 
Gray, "Public mood, and not closely reasoned strategic 
argument, always sets the level of the U.S. defense effort," 
an observation that applies to the prosecution of specific 
crises as much as to support for defense spending and global 
military capabilities.45 
By holding out to the other Gulf nations, as well as to 
oil importers in Europe and Asia, the prospect of averting a 
very costly interruption of oil by accepting Iran's actions, 
it is possible that sufficient political pressure could be 
brought to bear on the United States to accept the 
situation. Germany and France, for example, have 
established semi-formal diplomatic ties with Iran in recent 
years, which could lead to their advocating acceptance of 
Iran's actions.46 Even without political pressure from 
44Admiral William Crowe, a former Chairman of the JCS, 
advocated waiting for up to a year for sanctions to work on 
Saddam. In the U.S. Senate vote for supporting the use of 
force, the resolution was passed by a mere 52 to 47 vote. 
See Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, 156, 205. 
45Gray, "Tomorrow's Forecast: Warmer/ Still Cloudy," 
43. 
46Roxanne Farmanfarmaian, "United, the West Can Handle 
Iran," New York Times, 19 April 1997, 12A; Jacob Heilbrunn, 
"Bon Mots: Iran and Germany Make Nice," The New Republic, 19 
May 1997, 17; "The French and Russians Certainly Don't Get 
It," Perspective, 2 October 1997, 1-4. 
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Europe or East Asia, if the Gulf states, and especially 
Saudi Arabia, refused to allow U.S. strikes to be launched 
from their facilities, or to allow U.S. reinforcements to 
stage through their airfields, the United States might 
determine that the "least bad option" would be to accept 
Iran's actions. 
If the United States faced the prospect of a military 
campaign in Southwest Asia, without the massive logistical 
support provided in 1990 by the Gulf states, and with the 
political pressure resulting from the threat of complete 
closure of the Strait, would the United States choose to 
resist Iran? The question would become even more difficult 
to assess if Iran was known to possess nuclear weapons. 
If the United States were to attempt to intervene, 
Iran's blockade of the Strait would delay greatly the 
reinforcement of U.S. forces in the region. Even more 
damaging would be Iran's ability to target regional port and 
airfield facilities with chemical weapons, delivered by 
ballistic missiles. Inviting Disaster describes the likely 
effect of persistent chemical contamination on ports and 
airfields, and judges that such attacks could close down air 
and maritime operations in and from those facilities.4 7 
47see Weaver and Glaes, Inviting Disaster, Section 2, 
pp. 18-33, and Section 3, pp. 34-51, for a depiction of 
hypothetical attacks on Saudi ports and airfields using VX 
nerve agent, delivered by SCUD missiles. 
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General Anthony Zinni, Commander in Chief of U.S. Central 
Command (CinCCENTCOM), recently testified before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee that, "theater missile defense and 
defense against chemical weapons and biological weapons is 
our top priority. 11 48 
Iran's strategy would hinge first on deterring the 
United States from attempting to intervene, by making the 
cost of intervention appear larger than the benefits of 
intervention. Iran's ability to influence the U.S. cost vs. 
benefit equation would differ according to the specific 
scenario, of course, but deterrence of U.S. intervention 
nonetheless would be Iran's first step. Possession of 
nuclear weapons would greatly enhance Iran's deterrent 
48Responding to Senator Tim Hutchinson's question about 
the possibility of chemical attacks on Gulf ports, General 
Zinni responded: 
"Senator, you've hit on our biggest concern in our 
region. There's obviously a proliferation of missile 
systems, the technology is advancing, the accuracy and range 
are increasing, the potential not only for Iraq, but for 
Iran and others in the region ... that have that. For 
CENTCOM, theater missile defense and defense against 
chemical and biological weapons is our top priority. In 
addition to that, we're not only concerned about our own 
ability, which we need to improve greatly, but the ability 
of our allies. The ports you mentioned, we rely on host 
nation support to get a lot of things done in those ports • 
• • • They of course have less capability than we have, but 
are critical to our power projection." Testimony before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 January 1999, C-SPAN 
broadcast. 
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effect on U.S. intervention, certainly as long as U.S. 
forces lack theater missiles defenses.49 
If Iran's efforts to deter the United States failed, 
Iran would attempt to execute its keep-out military 
strategy, using blackmail and, if necessary, its available 
NBC weapons to attack regional airfields. Since many 
important regional airfields, especially in Saudi Arabia, 
are located in remote areas away from civilian population 
centers, Iran could conduct these attacks in relative safety 
from causing civilian casualties. The apprehension in 
regional populations to NBC attack likely would serve Iran 
better than actual NBC attacks on population centers, which 
could generate strong demands to retaliate regardless of 
further Iranian attacks.SO Again, as long as U.S. missile 
defenses are limited to PAC-3 or Lower Tier, the blackmail 
threat of ballistic missiles and NBC weapons would serve 
Iran's strategy. 
49Gray, "The Second Nuclear Age: Insecurity, 
Proliferation, and the Control of Arms," 153. 
50Especially in the larger Middle East, many nations 
are "one-target" populations, with a majority of their 
citizens located in one or two major cities. A successful 
chemical or biological attack thus could destroy such 
nations as viable states. The apprehension to NBC weapons in 
these nations, which include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, 
Bahrain, the UAE, and Israel, might lead them to deny U.S. 
access in a conflict that they did not believe threatened 
their vital interests. See Rathmell, "Chemical Weapons in 
the Middle East: Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Libya," 60. 
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Iran's keep-out strategy thus would depend on two 
component parts. First, the use of mines to block the 
Strait would prevent the rapid transit of U.S. naval forces, 
slowing or preventing the reinforcement of the 5th Fleet. 
Iran's submarines and SSMs would serve to keep U.S. MCM 
forces from operating freely, maximizing the time needed to 
attempt to clear mine-free channels. With MCM efforts 
initially limited to submarine-deployed systems, it should 
be expected that Iran's minefields would be effective for a 
considerable length of time. 
The ability to construct, fortify, and hide SSM 
launching positions along the full length of the strait 
would make the hazard to surface ships severe. It is likely 
that SSMs in such shore batteries could be fired without 
radar information, since the Strait could be observed with 
ordinary optical systems. Thus Iranian SSM batteries would 
not be identifiable through electronic emissions, making 
their destruction more difficult for U.S. forces. The use 
of dummy positions also would complicate U.S. efforts, by 
multiplying the number of strikes that would need to be 
conducted. 
The risk of losing one or more U.S. warships in the 
Strait would be high if the United States attempted to 
reinforce the Fifth Fleet immediately. Certainly the risk 
would be too high to permit a CVN to attempt to transit the 
Strait. The need to proceed slowly, and wait until MCM 
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efforts had produced high-confidence safe channels through 
the Strait, would result in political pressure from U.S. 
allies that are dependent on Persian Gulf oil. 
The second component of Iran's military strategy would 
be to counter U.S. air power. By employing ballistic 
missiles and chemical weapons, Iran could strike regional 
airfields, very likely contaminating them at lethal levels. 
U.S. airbase commanders would have three unattractive 
options in this case. First, Air Force units could don 
protective suits and attempt to decontaminate their 
facilities and aircraft. Second, they could relocate to 
other facilities out of range of Iran's missiles. Finally, 
they could don protective suits and attempt to continue 
operating from a contaminated facility.51 
None of these options is likely to be satisfactory in 
maintaining U.S. air power at operable condition. 
Especially in temperatures above eighty-five degrees, 
working in existing protective gear is sufficiently 
exhausting to bring operations to a halt, while even at 
lower temperatures it is expected that up to 40 percent 
reduction in efficiency would be experienced. 52 The most 
likely option thus would be relocation to facilities out of 
51weaver and Glaes, Inviting Disaster, 40-42. 
52 Ibid., 42. 
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range of ballistic missiles, effectively neutralizing U.S. 
air power within the region. 
By combining these two keep-out operations, one against 
U.S. sea power and one against U.S. air power, with the 
political impact of the loss of oil to world economies, Iran 
could force the United States into choosing the lesser of 
two evils and accepting Iran's demands. While the United 
States clearly should be willing to go to war over such an 
assault on a vital national interest, it is not 
inconceivable that the chosen path to resolving the conflict 
would be accepting Iran's actions. 
Iran's recent "charm offensive" towards the United 
States and other nations, intended to lessen the degree of 
international disfavor directed at Iran, can be better 
understood in the context of this scenario.53 By 
attempting to portray military aggression as a matter to be 
settled between Gulf nations, and by emphasizing that Iran 
53For a depiction of Iran's diplomatic efforts and the 
changing view of many nations towards Iran, see: Heilbrunn, 
"Bon Mots: Iran and Germany make nice,"; Ed Blanche, 
Christopher Foss, and Barbara Starr, "Khatami emerges as 
Iran's acceptable face," Jane's Defense Weekly, 15 October 
1997, 19; Ed Blanche, "Signs of subtle US policy shift in 
Iran," Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's sentinel Pointer 
(October 1997): 7; Ed Blanche, "Iran under Khatami: pariah 
or potential peace partner?" Jane's Intelligence Review 
(November 1997): 505; Andrew Rathmell, "Iran's new charm 
offensive begins," Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's 
Sentinel Pointer (November 1997): 6; Dunn, "Mideast 
Turnaround,"; Caroline Faraj and Philip Finnegan, "Kuwait, 
Iran to Hold Joint Naval Exercise," Defense News, 9-15 
February 1998, 40. 
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did not intend to curtail oil shipment to world economies, 
Iran would hope for political support or pressure from 
France, Russia, China, and even other GCC states. 
Iran's overall strategy thus would combine a geographic 
chokepoint, the resulting ability to use that chokepoint to 
throttle a vital energy resource, and a regional keep-out 
military strategy. By attempting to raise the perceived 
cost to the United States of resorting to military force, 
Iran's leaders would hope to reach a political settlement 
that would leave Iran in possession of its gains. Iran's 
keep-out strategy thus would represent a sound alignment of 
military means to political ends, taking into account not 
just Iran's military capabilities, but the military 
capabilities and weaknesses, as well as the historical 
political behavior, of the United States. 
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